THE MONGOLS AND THE WEST 1221-1410
SECOND EDITION
Peter Jackson
The Mongols and the West provides a comprehensive survey of relations between the Catholic West and the Mongol Empire from the first appearance of Chinggis (Genghis) Khan’s armies on Europe’s horizons in 1221 to the battle of Tannenberg in 1410. This book has been designed to provide a synthesis of previous scholarship on relations between the Mongols and the Catholic world, as well as to offer new approaches and conclusions on the subject. It considers the tension between the Western hopes of the Mongols as allies against the growing Muslim powers and the Mongols’ position as conquerors with their own agenda, and evaluates the impact of Mongol-Western contacts on the West’s expanding knowledge of the world.

This second edition takes into account the wealth of scholarly literature that has emerged in the years since the previous edition and contains significantly extended chapters on trade and mission. It charts the course of military confrontation and diplomatic relations between the Mongols and the West, and re-examines the commercial opportunities offered to Western merchants by Mongol rule and the failure of Catholic missionaries to convert the Mongols to Christianity.

Fully revised and containing a range of maps, genealogical tables and both European and non-European sources throughout, The Mongols and the West is ideal for students of medieval European history and the Crusades.

Peter Jackson is Emeritus Professor of Medieval History at Keele University and a Fellow of the British Academy. His publications cover the Mongols, the Crusades and medieval Islam, and his most recent book is The Mongols and the Islamic World from Conquest to Conversion (2017).
THE MONGOLS AND THE WEST
1221–1410
Second Edition

Peter Jackson
For Rebecca
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In this timely book, Peter Jackson introduces us to the last great pulse of nomads from the inner Asian steppe to encounter the utterly different world of sedentary, urbanized European peoples. The military context of this story is a long front along the eastern fringe of late medieval Christendom, from Poland to the Crusader strongholds on the Syrian coast. Its cultural context is one of prejudice and curiosity stretching from Scotland to Japan, for this narrative of military encounters and diplomatic manoeuvring is set against a backdrop of fears of the unknown, rumours – frequently apocalyptic – and the details of everyday life which characterize one culture rather than another. In a fascinating exploration of the interactions between the Mongols and the Latin West, Professor Jackson invites the reader to follow Mongol armies west to Germany and to travel east to China with Christian missionaries, diplomats and traders, stopping at courts and camps at all points in between. This latest addition to the Longmans Medieval World series is thus a sustained reflection on what makes one culture, or civilization, different from another, and reminds us that the history of the European Middle Ages has a world historical context.

In the chapters which follow, we meet many famous men, real and imagined, who have excited the European imagination: Chinggis Khan, Temür (Tamerlane), Marco Polo and Christopher Columbus; Prester John, ‘Sir John Mandeville’, Gog and Magog. With skilful analysis, sensitive scholarship and wry humour, Jackson locates their actions – or stories about their actions – in a world characterized by the immense difficulty of long distance travel. It is a world of challenges: those facing nomads as they sought pasture for their horses in the Syrian desert, the linguistic difficulties to be surmounted by Italian friars trying to preach Christianity to speakers of
Turkish and Mongolian, the efforts of scholars in quiet European libraries trying to make sense of the limited information and mass of hearsay about the world beyond their direct experience. This is a story of the adjustments of reality to imagination – and of imagination to reality – on a vast geographical canvas, a story Peter Jackson tells with immense learning and deep humanity. I welcome it for that very reason.

Julia M. H. Smith
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The bibliography has been extensively updated, and I have made alterations to the text and notes throughout, to reflect both new editions/translations of primary sources and relevant secondary literature published since 2004 and, in addition, the helpful points made by scholars who reviewed the original edition. I have in some measure restructured the book, transposing Chapters 7 and 8 and Chapters 10 and 11 and inserting subheadings within the table of contents. Among the most significant changes to the text are those found in Chapters 8 (formerly 7) and 11 (formerly 10), where it has been necessary to take into account a considerable corpus of recent research; in Chapter 10 (formerly 11), where I have been concerned to emphasize more strongly the Mongols’ contribution to what might be termed an incipient ‘globalization’; and in Chapter 12, which now gives enhanced attention to the Asian cultural impact upon Latin Europe. I have also omitted the Appendix on the authenticity of Marco Polo’s travels, which has been placed beyond doubt, in my view, by the publication of Stephen G. Haw, *Marco Polo in China* (2006), and J. P. Vogel, *Marco Polo Was in China* (2013).

Peter Jackson
Madeley, Staffordshire
August 2017
Three fortunate circumstances are responsible for the fact that this book has not taken rather longer to appear in print. The first is the enthusiastic response in 1997 of Andrew MacLennan, at that time History editor for Longman, to the information that I was contemplating a book on the Mongols and the Latin West. Andrew’s support at an early stage was instrumental in persuading me to undertake to write the book. I am also grateful to his successor, Heather MacCallum, for her sustained interest in the manuscript and for seeing the finished product into the first stages of publication.

Secondly, the Institute for Advanced Study at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem offered me a Visiting Fellowship for six months in 2000, when I participated in a workshop on ‘Turco-Mongolian Nomads and Their Relations with China and Iran’, jointly chaired by Dr (now Professor) Reuven Amitai and Dr Professor Michal Biran. The opportunity to work alongside colleagues in my own and closely related fields was invaluable, and my wife and I both still recall with warm appreciation the hospitable welcome we received in a Jerusalem that was then a happier place than it has become in more recent years.

The third fortunate circumstance was the award of a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship for the period from October 2000 to September 2003, which provided my department with full-time replacement teaching and was accompanied by a substantial sum for research travel. Nobody who has worked within a UK university over the past twenty years can have any illusions about the difficulty of reading, thinking and writing without being exempt from teaching and administration over a sustained period. It is a pleasure to be able to express my gratitude to the Leverhulme Trust in this preface.
I have also accumulated many other debts. Thanks are due to the inter-library loans section of Keele University Library for obtaining for me numerous books and articles over the years. I am also grateful for the assistance of the staff of Cambridge University Library and of the Seeley Historical Library, Cambridge; The British Library, and the Libraries of the Institute of Historical Research and of the Warburg Institute, in London; the National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office), Kew; the Bodleian Library; the John Rylands University Library of Manchester; the Sydney Jones Library, University of Liverpool; the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Archives Nationales, Paris; the Bibliotheek te Rijksuniversiteit Leiden; Innsbruck Universitätsbibliothek; Universitätsbibliothek Graz; Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives) and Országos Széchényi Könyvtár (Széchényi National Library), Budapest; and Wrocław University Library. In addition, I greatly appreciated the promptness and courtesy of Dr Rudolf Lindpointner, of the Oberösterreichische Landesbibliothek (formerly Studentbibliothek), Linz, in sending me a digitized image of the ms. 446, fo. 267vb (the report of the Russian ‘archbishop’ Peter); of Herr Jens Altena, of the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen, in supplying me with a printout of ms. 4 Hist. 61, pp. 276–301 (Carpini’s Ystoria Mongalorum); and of Herr Hans Stein, of the Forschungs- und Landesbibliothek Gotha, for providing a printout of ms. Orient. A1559 (the first section of al-Jazarī’s Hawādith al-zamān). I should also like to acknowledge here the kind permission of the Master and Fellows of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, to reproduce an illustration from ms. 16 (Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora) in the Parker Library. For the production of the maps, I am indebted to my colleague, Andrew Lawrence, in the Keele University Digital Imaging/Illustration Services.

I have benefited greatly from the opportunity to try out parts of this book at seminars and conferences. Professor David Cannadine, then Director of the Institute for Historical Research, invited me to read what proved to be a remote forebear of Chapter 6 as a plenary lecture at the 68th Anglo-American Conference of Historians, where the theme was ‘Race and Ethnicity’, in June 1999. Subsequently I was given the chance to experiment with the material now in Chapter 10 both in Jerusalem in March 2000 and at the Conference on ‘Conversion: a Medieval and Early Modern Experience’, at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis, in May 2001. An early draft of Chapter 12 was read as an inaugural lecture at Keele University in January 2002, and I profited a great deal from the questions and comments of my colleagues. I am grateful, lastly, to Professor Jonathan Riley-Smith for inviting me to deliver a version of Chapter 8 to the Seminar on the History of the Crusades and the Latin East in Cambridge in November 2002.

A number of other historians have helped me in various ways. Professor Peter Hoppenbrouwers, of the Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, kindly sent me a number of references to the Mongols in medieval sources from the
Netherlands, which would otherwise certainly have escaped my notice. Professor Nicola Di Cosmo, of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, generously provided me with the texts of two as yet unpublished conference papers. In addition, Reuven Amitai, Michal Biran, Ann Fielding and Noreen Giffney each supplied me with valuable references. I received help from various experts on medieval Hungarian history, a field into which I was venturing for the first time: Dr Nora Berend, of St Catherine’s College, Cambridge; Dr Nagy Balázs, of the Central European University, Budapest; and Dr Zsoldos Attila, of the Historical Institute in Budapest.

Three scholars have been good enough to read some or all of the book. Professor Tina Endicott read early drafts of Chapters 1 and 2, and Dr Anthony Luttrell a draft of Chapter 9. Professor David Morgan read a penultimate draft of the whole book on behalf of the press. I am grateful to all three for offering suggestions and for saving me from a number of errors. Naturally, I alone merit the obloquy directed at any faults that have survived their criticism. The role of intelligent lay critic was filled admirably by my father-in-law, Tom Oswald, who read and commented on Chapters 1 and 2, and by my wife, who read the entire manuscript. Without her untiring support, indeed, this book would not have been written. I dedicate it to her with love and gratitude.

Peter Jackson
Keele
June 2004
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAS</td>
<td>Asian and African Studies (Haifa)</td>
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<td>AE</td>
<td>Odoricus Raynaldus et al., eds., Annales ecclesiastici, 34 vols (Lucca, 1738–59)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEMA</td>
<td>Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi</td>
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<td>AF</td>
<td>Asiatische Forschungen</td>
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<td>AFH</td>
<td>Archivum Franciscanum Historicum</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum</td>
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<td>AHR</td>
<td>American Historical Review</td>
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<td>AK</td>
<td>Archiv für Kulturgeschichte</td>
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<td>AKO</td>
<td>Imre Szentpétery and Iván Borsa, eds., Az Árpád-házi királyok okleveinek kritikai jegyzéke. Regesta regum stirpis Arpadianae critico-diplomatica, 2 vols in 5 parts (Budapest, 1923–87)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Archives Nationales, Paris</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>Imre Nagy and Gyula Tasnadi Nagy, eds., Anjoukori okmánytár. Codex diplomaticus Hungaricus Andegavensis, 6 vols (Budapest, 1878–1920)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOASH</td>
<td>Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOL</td>
<td>Archives de l’Orient Latin</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Αρχειον Ποντου</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>Ausgewählte Quellen zur deutschen Geschichte des Mittelalters</td>
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<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Asiatische Studien</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASI</td>
<td>Archivio Storico Italiano</td>
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<td>ASL</td>
<td>Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>ASV, Reg. Vat.</td>
<td>Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Registrum Vaticanum (microfilms in the Seeley Historical Library, Cambridge)</td>
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<td>AUO</td>
<td>Gusztáv Wenzel, ed., Árpádkori új okmánytár. Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus continuatus, 12 vols (Pest, 1860–74)</td>
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<td>BBTS</td>
<td>Girolamo Golubovich, ed., Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell’Oriente francescano, 5 vols (Quaracchi-Firenze, 1906–27)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEC</td>
<td>Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEO</td>
<td>Bulletin d’Études Orientales de l’Institut Français de Damas</td>
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<tr>
<td>BF</td>
<td>Byzantinische Forschungen</td>
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<tr>
<td>BGQM</td>
<td>Beiträge zur Geschichte und Quellenkunde des Mittelalters</td>
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<tr>
<td>BHR</td>
<td>Bulgarian Historical Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>BJRL</td>
<td>Bulletin of the John Rylands Library of the University of Manchester</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL</td>
<td>British Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>BN</td>
<td>Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAJ</td>
<td>Central Asiatic Journal</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Medievalis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDH</td>
<td>György Fejér, ed., Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis, 11 vols in 40 parts (Buda, 1829–44)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDRB</td>
<td>Gustav Friedrich et al., eds., Codex diplomaticus et epistolarius regni Bohemiae, 5 vols in 8 parts so far (Prague, 1907–93)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEHE, II</td>
<td>M. M. Postan and Edward Miller, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, II. Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 1987)</td>
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<td>CHC, VI</td>
<td>Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, eds., The Cambridge History of China, VI. Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368 (Cambridge, 1994)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHI</td>
<td>The Cambridge History of Iran</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>J. A. Boyle, ed., The Saljuq and Mongol Periods (Cambridge, 1968)</td>
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<td>VI</td>
<td>Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, eds., The Timurid and Safavid Periods (Cambridge, 1986)</td>
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<td>CHR</td>
<td>Catholic Historical Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICO</td>
<td>Pontificia Commissio ad Redigendum Codicem Iuris Canonici Orientalis, Fontes. 3rd series:</td>
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Abbreviations


V:1 Aloysius L. Tăutu, ed., *Acta Urbani IV, Clementis IV, Gregorii X (1261–1276)* (Vatican City, 1953)


CM Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*

CMRS *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*

CRAIBL *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. Comptesrendus des séances*

CS Camden Society

CSCO *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*

CSFS Collana Storica di Fonti e Studi

CSSH *Comparative Studies in Society and History*

CTT *Crusade Texts in Translation*

DA *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters*


DHGE *Dictionnaire d’Histoire et de Géographie Ecclésiastiques*
Abbreviations xix

 DIR  Eudoxiu de Hurchuzaki, Nic. Densusianu et al., eds., Documente privitóre la istoria Românilor, 19 vols in 36 (Bucarest and Cernăuți, 1887–1938)

DREP  Documents et recherches sur l’économie des pays byzantins, islamiques et slaves et leurs relations commerciales au Moyen-Âge

DRHC  Documents relatifs à l’histoire des croisades publiés par l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres


EAH  East Asian History

EB  Études Balkaniques

EHR  English Historical Review

EM[S]  Études Mongoles [et Sibériennes]


EO  Zsigmond Jakó et al., eds., Erdélyi okmánytár (Codex diplomaticus Transsylvaniae). Oklevelek, levelek, és más írásos emlékek Erdély történetéhez, 4 vols so far (Budapest, 1997–2014) [References are given only where the Latin text is supplied in whole or in part.]

FIS  Freiburger Islamstudien

FRAS1  Fontes rerum Austriacarum, erste Abtheilung. Scriptores

FRAS2  Fontes rerum Austriacarum, zweite Abtheilung. Diplomataria et Acta

FRB  Josef Emler, ed., Fontes rerum Bohemicarum. Prameny dějin českých, 7 vols published of 8 (Prague, 1873–1922)

GMS  Gibb Memorial Series


HJAS  Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies

HO  Imre Nagy, Arnold Ipolyi and Dezsö Vághely, eds., Hazai okmánytár. Codex diplomaticus patrius Hungaricus, 8 vols (Győr and Budapest, 1865–91)

HS1  Works issued by the Hakluyt Society, first series

HS2  Works issued by the Hakluyt Society, second series

HUS  Harvard Ukrainian Studies

HZ  Historische Zeitschrift

IHR  International History Review
Abbreviations

IJMES  International Journal of Middle East Studies
IKPI  M.Kh. Abuseitova et al., general eds., Istoriia Kazakhstana v persidskikh istochnikakh, 5 vols (Almaty, 2005–7)
IUB  Innsbruck Universitätsbibliothek
IUUAS  Indiana University Uralic and Altaic Series
JA  Journal Asiatique
JAH  Journal of Asian History
JAOS  Journal of the American Oriental Society
JEH  Journal of Ecclesiastical History
JEMH  Journal of Early Modern History
JESHO  Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient
JMH  Journal of Mediaeval History
JRAS  Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
JS  Journal des Savants
JSAI  Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam
JTS  Journal of Turkish Studies [Türklüik Bilgisi Araştırmaları]
JWH  Journal of World History
LTC  Alexandre Teulet et al., eds., Layettes du Trésor des Chartes, 5 vols (Paris, 1863–1909)
MA  Le Moyen Age
MAH  Mélanges d’Archéologie et d’Histoire de l’École Française de Rome
MAIBL  Mémoires de l’Académie [Royale] des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres
MES  Ferdinundus Knauz and Ludovicus Crescens Dedek, eds., Monumenta ecclesiae Strigoniensis, I–III (Esztergom, 1874–1924); Gabriel Dreska et al., eds., Monumenta ecclesiae Strigoniensis, IV (Esztergom and Budapest, 1999)
MGH  Monumenta Germaniae Historica
MGHLeg.  L. Weiland, ed., MGH Legum sectio IV. Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum, 11 vols to date (Hanover, 1893–1992)
MGHQu.  MGH Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters
MGHS  G. H. Pertz et al., eds., MGH Scriptores, 38 vols to date (Hanover etc., 1826–2000)
MHR  Mediterranean Historical Review
MHSM  Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium
MIOG  Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung
MMAH  Monumenta medii aevi historicar res gestas Poloniae illustrantia
MN  Il Mar Nero (Rome)
MOL  Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives, Budapest)
DF  Diplomáciai fényképgyűjtémeny
DL  Diplomáciai levéltár
*Mongolensturm*  H. Göckenjan and J. R. Sweeney, eds., *Der Mongolensturm. Berichte von Augenzeugen und Zeitgenossen 1235–1250*
*MPH*  August Bielowski et al., eds., *Monumenta Poloniae Historica (Pomniki dziejowe polski)*, 6 vols (Lwów, 1864–93)
*MPH²*  Tadeusz Kowalski et al., eds., *Monumenta Poloniae Historica (Pomniki dziejowe polski)*, new series (Cracow and Warsaw, 1946–present)
MPV  Jan Ptasnik, ed., *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*
MS  Mongolian Studies
NA  *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde*
*NCMH*  *The New Cambridge Medieval History* (Cambridge, 1997–2005)
NZM  *Neue Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft*
OE  *Oriens Extremus*
OKS  *Ostkirchliche Studien*
OM  Roger Bacon, *Opus maius*
OOLB  Oberösterreichische Landesbibliothek, Linz (formerly Linz Studienbibliothek)
OS  *L'Orient Syrien*
OSP  *Oxford Slavonic Papers*
PC  John of Plano Carpini, *Ystoria Mongalorum*
*PFEH*  *Papers on Far Eastern History*
*PNAS*  *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*
PPTS  Palestine Pilgrims’ Text Society
PRO  Public Record Office (since 2003: National Archives), Kew
PSRL  *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei*
PUB  R. Philippi et al., eds., *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, 6 vols so far (Königsberg and Marburg, 1882–1986)
QFIAB  *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*
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<tr>
<td>REA</td>
<td>Revue des Études Arméniennes</td>
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<td>REB</td>
<td>Revue des Études Byzantines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reg. Alex. IV</td>
<td>C. Bourel de la Roncière et al., Les registres d'Alexandre IV, 4 vols (Paris, 1902–53)</td>
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<td>REI</td>
<td>Revue des Études Islamiques</td>
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<td>RESEE</td>
<td>Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes</td>
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<tr>
<td>RH</td>
<td>Revue Historique</td>
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<td>RHC</td>
<td>Recueil des Historiens des Croisades</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Documents Arméniens, 2 vols (Paris, 1869–1906)</td>
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<td>RHSEE</td>
<td>Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen</td>
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<td>L. A. Muratori, ed., Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, new edn by C. A. Garufi et al. (Bologna, 1934–present)</td>
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<td>RO</td>
<td>Rocznik Orientalistyczny</td>
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<td>ROC</td>
<td>Revue de l'Orient Chrétien</td>
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<td>ROL</td>
<td>Revue de l'Orient Latin</td>
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<td>RRH</td>
<td>Revue Roumaine d'Histoire</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Rolls Series</td>
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<td>RV</td>
<td>Roger of Várad, ‘Epistola’</td>
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<td>Rymer</td>
<td>T. Rymer, ed., Foedera, conventiones, litterae et cuinuscumque generis acta publica (Amsterdam, 1739–45)</td>
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<td>SCH</td>
<td>Studies in Church History</td>
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<td>SEER</td>
<td>Slavonic and East European Review</td>
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<td>A. Van den Wyngaert, ed., Sinica Franciscana, I</td>
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<td>SH</td>
<td>‘Secret History of the Mongols’</td>
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<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Studia Islamica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMIZO</td>
<td>V. G. Frhr. von Tizengauen, ed., Sbornik materialov, otnosiashchikhia k istorii Zolotoi Ordy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SO  Károly Szabó, ed., Székely oklevéltár, 8 vols (Kolozsvár, 1872–98)
SOF  Südost-Forschungen
SRG  MGH Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum
SRG²  MGH Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum, new series
SRH  Imre Szentpétery, ed., Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum tempore ducum regumque stirpis Arpadianae gestarum, 2 vols (Budapest, 1937–8; repr. 1999)
SRP  Theodor Hirsch et al., eds., Scriptores rerum Prussiarum. Die Geschichtsquellen der preussischen Vorzeit bis zum Untergange der Ordensherrschaft, 5 vols (Leipzig, 1861–74)
SSQ  Simon of Saint-Quentin, Historia Tartarorum
SV  Studi Veneziani
TP  T’oung Pao
TR  ‘Tartar Relation’
TRHS  Transactions of the Royal Historical Society
TS  Thomas of Spalato, Historia Salonitanorum pontificum atque Spalatensium
TSCIA  Toronto Studies on Central and Inner Asia
UAJ  Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher
UBB  Hans Wagner and Irmtraut Lindeck-Pozza, eds., Urkundenbuch des Burgenlandes und der angrenzenden Gebiete der Komitate Wieselburg, Ödenburg und Eisenburg, 4 vols (Graz, Köln and Vienna, 1955–85)
UBGD  Franz Zimmermann and Karl Werner, eds., Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen, 4 vols (Hermannstadt/Sibiu, 1892–1937)
UBGS  G. D. Teutsch and Fr. Firnhaber, eds., Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens (vol. I only published), FRAS² 15 (Vienna, 1857)
VB  Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum historiale
VMP  Augustin Theiner, ed., Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque finitimarum historiam illustrantia, 4 vols (Rome, 1860–4)
VSWG  Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte
Wahlstatt  U. Schmielewski, ed., Wahlstatt 1241: Beiträge zur Mongolen schlacht bei Liegnitz und zu ihren Nachwirkungen
WR  William of Rubruck, Itinerarium
ZDMG  Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft
ZRGG  Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte
ZS  Zentralasiatische Studien
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

For the spelling of Mongol and Turkish proper names, I have followed the UNESCO system adopted in J. A. Boyle, *The Successors of Genghis Khan* (London and New York, 1971), and for Arabic and Persian proper names, the conventions used in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn (Leiden, 1954–2009), except that J replaces Dj and Q replaces Ḍ. For Chinese, I have used the Pinyin system, rather than Wade-Giles, as in the first edition.

The uncertain reconstruction of a proper name is preceded by an asterisk. Persian and Arabic manuscript readings are given in small capitals: the long vowels are represented by A, Y and W; Č stands for Ch, G for Gh, Š for Sh and X for Kh.
Consistency here would have had ludicrous results. To a large extent, personal names have been given the form appropriate to the country concerned: thus Hungarian ‘István’ rather than ‘Stephen’ and Spanish ‘Jaime’ for ‘James’. But some Western European names have been spelled as in English in the case of persons familiar to medievalists (e.g. Philip, for French monarchs) or in the case of commonly-cited sources (e.g. William of Rubruck, John of Montecorvino).

Where place-names (particularly in the one-time Habsburg Empire) have a chequered history, I have in each case given the form used in the relevant source, with contemporary alternatives and the modern name in brackets. Thus, at p. 75, for example, Hermannstadt, the German name referred to by Thomas of Spalato and Roger of Várad, followed in parentheses by the Hungarian form, Nagyszében, and the modern Rumanian name, Sibiu: Hermannstadt (later Nagyszében; now Sibiu in Rumania).
Primary sources are generally referred to by book (small roman numerals) and chapter or paragraph (Arabic numerals), as well as by the page number of the printed edition: thus William of Rubruck, xv, 3, p. 72. On rare occasions, where a text is subdivided into book, chapter and paragraph, it has been necessary to supply a threefold enumeration, beginning with a large roman numeral and a colon, e.g. Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum fidelium crucis, I:xiii, 3.
The phrase ‘the West’ in the title of this book denotes Latin (Catholic) Christendom, embracing not only Western Europe and Scandinavia but also the ‘crusader states’ in Syria, Palestine and Greece, together with Poland, Hungary and the present-day Czech Republic – all those territories, in other words, that owed obedience to the Roman Church and the pope. It therefore excludes the Eastern (i.e. Orthodox) Christian world, represented by the Russian principalities, Bulgaria and Byzantium, which enter into the picture only (a) insofar as the Papacy and other Western powers sought to create a bulwark against Mongol expansion or (b) insofar as Mongol military and diplomatic activity impinged on Western efforts to bring those regions under the ecclesiastical authority of Rome. Since, as we shall see, relatively little source material exists in Mongolian, this book is written largely from the European vantage-point. It is concerned with the West’s experience of the Mongols.

In the thirteenth century, the West – this dynamic and expansive political entity, which had been free of major attack from its steppe frontier for over two hundred years – was confronted by a new and alien power, more formidable than any it had previously encountered. The Mongols – or ‘Tartars’, as they were known in Western Europe – posed a grave threat, manifested most vividly in their devastation of Poland, Moravia and Hungary in 1241–2. That threat remained even after their empire splintered into a number of rival khanates in 1261–2 (notably the Golden Horde, based in the steppes to the north of the Black Sea and the Caspian, and the Ilkhanate in Persia and Iraq). Yet by this juncture their presence appeared to offer new and unprecedented opportunities. One was related to the West’s faltering crusading efforts, as the Mongol Ilkhans of Persia made repeated overtures to Western rulers for concerted operations against the Muslim Mamlûk empire.
in Egypt and Syria. Another centred on the dissemination of the Gospel, since it was now possible for Catholic missionaries to traverse great swaths of territory that had hitherto been under Muslim rule and therefore closed to Christian proselytism. And commercial opportunities, too, beckoned, as the subjection of a great many peoples first to a single government and then to just a handful of major polities created more stable conditions for trade and travel. As a consequence of the advent of the Mongols, therefore, it is commonly believed that the West’s field of vision expanded remarkably.

Although the past forty years or more have seen a rash of publications on the Mongol empire, no comprehensive, book-length study of relations between the Mongols and Western Christendom had appeared in English when this book was first published in 2005. Igor de Rachewiltz’s *Papal Envoys to the Great Khans* covers only diplomatic and missionary contacts. The thought-provoking book of Antti Ruotsala focuses on a relatively brief period framed by the early contacts with the Mongols (1245–55). Such reticence on the part of Anglophone writers hardly stems from any lack of interest in the subject. Possibly some blame attaches to the well known problem of linguistic expertise that confronts any serious scholarship on the Mongols: as David Morgan points out in what is still the standard work, the available sources are in Mongolian, Chinese, Persian, Arabic, Turkish, Japanese, Russian, Armenian, Georgian, Latin – and still the list is incomplete. Yet the number of languages required for the study of Mongol–Western relations is in fact naturally lower than it is for tackling the history of the empire at large.

Fortunately, there is an extensive literature in other Western European languages. The work of Giovanni Soranzo, though still useful, is already over eighty years old, predating the publication of several vital documents. More noteworthy are three fine books in German – the pioneering study by Gian Andri Bezzola, which appeared over forty years ago, and the two rather more recent works by Axel Klopprogge and Felicitas Schmieder. Bezzola and Klopprogge focus on the image of the Mongols in Latin Christendom and confine their attention to the thirteenth century. Schmieder’s work is far more ambitious in terms of both scope and chronological coverage, though Klopprogge’s book regrettably appeared at too late a stage for her to use, and she also gives relatively little space to the Mongol menace in Eastern Europe after 1242. All three authors, moreover, entered upon their task as historians of medieval Europe and utilized almost exclusively sources produced within the West.

A great many valuable studies of various aspects of the subject have, of course, appeared in article form, beginning with the work of Abel-Rémusat in the 1820s on the diplomatic contacts between the Ilkhans and Latin monarchs. In recent decades, this literature has been dominated by the researches of Robert Sabatino Lopez and Michel Balard on Western commercial activity in the Mongol dominions and of Denis Sinor and Jean Richard on
diplomacy; and Richard’s characteristically thorough examination of the Latin mission to Asia remains unsurpassed, though the relatively new (and monumental) work by Tanase is certainly a worthy successor. It will be obvious in the following pages how much I have benefited from the labours of these and other scholars.

This book is designed both to provide a synthesis of previous scholarship on relations between the Mongols and the Catholic world and to go beyond it by offering new approaches and conclusions, sometimes based on my own earlier work on the Mongols. Most of the sources produced by Western writers are, of course, in Latin, beginning with the majority of the annals that record Mongol attacks. So too are the detailed reports of the European envoys and missionaries who visited the Mongol world, notably the Franciscan Friars Carpini (1245–7) and Rubruck (1253–5), which furnish a particularly rich corpus of material. A significant minority of sources also exist in Old French and a few in Italian; the book associated with the most famous Latin visitor to the Mongols, Marco Polo, was originally written in an Italianate form of French.

I have also made wide use of sources composed by non-Europeans. Apropos of the linguistic difficulties previously referred, I have to confess at this juncture that the sources I cite which emanate from within the Mongol empire will be primarily in Persian; I have access only to the tiny fraction of the Chinese material that exists in translation. Strangely enough, a knowledge of Mongolian did not prove necessary for writing this book. Just one Mongolian narrative source has survived from the imperial era, namely the so-called ‘Secret History of the Mongols’, which in its original form dates from c.1228; a section added some years later furnishes a few lines on the campaign in Eastern Europe. Of the letters to Western rulers and other relevant documents issued by the chanceries of the Mongol Great Khan (qaghan) or of regional khans, the overwhelming majority have reached us only in Latin translation; a notable exception is the ultimatum brought back by Pope Innocent IV’s envoy Carpini (1247), which appears to have been drafted originally in Persian. I have also utilized Arabic authors writing in the Near East, much of which came under the rule of the Mamlūk Sultans of Egypt after 1260, having only briefly formed part of the Mongol dominions. They furnish us with a different perspective on the Mongol presence in this region.

One of my aims has been to examine the course of military confrontation and diplomatic relations between the Mongols and the West from the time when Latin Christians first heard of the campaigns of Chinggis Khan in far off Central Asia in 1221. The first two chapters set the scene by outlining, respectively, the situation of the Latin West on the eve of the Mongol attacks and the creation of the Mongol empire by Chinggis Khan and his immediate successor. Chapter 3 is devoted specifically to the Mongol invasion of Hungary and Poland in 1241–2 and the near-simultaneous incursion
Introduction

into northern Syria in 1244. Chapter 4 examines papal efforts, during the next ten years or so, to meet the ongoing threat, while Chapter 5 explains how the threat was diminished by developments within the Mongol world. Chapter 7 resumes the survey of mainly hostile contacts with the Golden Horde in Eastern Europe after 1242. Chapter 8 examines the more cordial, though abortive diplomatic relations between the Ilkhanids on the one hand and the papacy and Western monarchs on the other; this theme is taken up again in Chapter 9, with a study of the West’s dealings with the Turco-Mongol conqueror from Central Asia, Temür (Europeanized as ‘Tamerlane’). I have chosen to bring the coverage down to 1410 because the battle of Tannenberg in that year symbolized the decline of the Golden Horde to the status of just one among a number of rival powers in Eastern Europe. In the Near East, Temür’s death only a few years previously, in 1405, marked the passing of the last ‘Tartar’ sovereign who was widely regarded in the West as a potential or even real ally against the Muslim powers, the Mamluks and the Ottomans.

These chapters construct the chronological and geopolitical framework of Mongol–Western relations. Other chapters deal with specific themes that transcend such boundaries. Chapter 10 outlines the development and decline of Western trading links with the Mongol world. At its apogee, this commercial activity extended as far as the ports of southern China, but its nodal point was always the Black Sea region. Chapter 11 examines the efforts of Latin missionaries—overwhelmingly members of the newly-founded orders of friars, the Franciscans and the Dominicans—to convert the Mongols and their nomadic subjects to Christianity. And two chapters, lastly, are devoted to images: Chapter 6 to the Latin images of the Mongols themselves in the three decades or so following the attacks on Hungary and Poland in 1241–2, and Chapter 12 to the impact that contact with the Mongols had on the West’s notions about the world beyond Islam. Far greater attention is necessarily given here to Western perspectives; gaining an understanding of the Mongols’ view of Western Europe is virtually impossible, given the dearth of source material. For the Mongols, the subjugation and exploitation of China were of paramount interest, and campaigns in distant Europe barely figure in the sources composed in the Far East. Even those subjects of the Mongols in Persia who wrote the history of the empire say relatively little about the invasion of 1241–2, and nothing at all about the subsequent dealings of their Ilkhanid masters with the European infidel. Our picture of the Mongols’ ideas about Westerners is consequently refracted through the lens of Western visitors to the Mongol dominions.

Where the sources written by the Mongols’ subjects can be of assistance is in what they tell us about the Mongols themselves, their aims and their thought-world. This applies especially to the diplomatic negotiations between Mongol Persia and the West and to the efforts of the Catholic Church to convert the Mongols to Christianity. In trying to elicit why
Western–Ilkhanid contacts bore no fruit, I have sought to analyse the Ilkans’ purposes in wooing the West, insofar as we gain some insight into their policies from a reading of their court historians, and I have linked these purposes up with the Western reservations and suspicions that were the legacy of earlier Mongol expansionism. The failure of Western–Ilkhanid negotiations and the reasons for it are of particular importance in view of the widespread belief in the past that they might well have succeeded and that, had they done so, the history of the Near East would have followed a very different course.

Something similar could be said of the Catholic missions to the Mongol world. Here too there has been a tendency to magnify the chances of success and hence what was at stake. ‘It was a noble prospect’, wrote Sir Richard Southern of the hopes raised when an ambassador from the Ilkhan attended Mass in St Peter’s ‘and one which, if only a fraction of it had come true, would radically have altered the history of the world’.13 His judgement was widely shared, not least by historians of the crusades, and has retained much of its allure to this day. In this book, I endeavour to explain the meagre harvest of the mission by reference not just to the distances involved, or to the small number of missionaries, or to linguistic problems, but also to the universe the Mongols themselves inhabited and in particular to their preoccupations in matters of religion, Nature and magic.

It will be obvious that this book does not set out to purvey some grand model. I am instinctively wary of formulaic approaches that risk imposing patterns on – and hence, in my judgement, doing violence to – the sources. This is not to say that what I have written has been determined exclusively by the often fragmentary information which has survived from the thirteenth–fifteenth centuries. It has been necessary to look beyond the sources for explanations – even if only tentative ones that will no doubt have to be superseded by the work of other scholars in the future. Nor does it mean that I accept uncritically whatever our sources tell us. While no disciple of Postmodernism, I have tried to stand outside the source material and to remember that historians can never hope to retrieve ‘what actually happened’ – though that does not, in my view, absolve them of the responsibility of trying to get as close to it as possible.

Yet the reader will look in vain, for instance, for some great confrontation between ‘nomadic’ and ‘sedentary’ societies. In the following pages, the word ‘nomads’ is sometimes employed where the context permits it, but I have avoided casting the phenomena I am dealing with in terms of an age-old clash of the steppe and the sown. One good reason for this apparent dereliction of duty has already been mentioned. Our literary sources, even from the Mongol side, are overwhelmingly the work of sedentary observers; the thought processes of the nomadic pastoralist reach us, if at all, at second hand. Another and equally decisive reason is that by the time they came into contact with the Latin West, the Mongol regimes themselves were touched
by sedentary culture in several respects. They had recruited representa-
tives of the various settled societies that were in the process of yielding –
or had yielded – to their rule, as ministers, as generals, as chancery scribes
or as envoys. Visitors from the Latin world certainly met nomads in large
numbers on their journeys across Asia, and some of them have left us
extremely vivid impressions of these encounters; yet the Mongol khanate
with which Latin Europeans negotiated, or traded, or fought, was not some
‘pure’ nomadic polity but a hybrid. In any case, recent years have seen a
considerable scholarly reappraisal of the nomad–sedentary relationship. It
has been pointed out that pastoral nomads were no more ‘natural warriors’
than their sedentary neighbours, that the intrinsic poverty of their lifestyle
did not impel them to plunder those neighbours or to extort their wealth by
the threat of attack, that nomadic societies were by no means monolithic,
and that the relationship with agrarian communities was frequently one of
symbiosis.14

I have tried, lastly, to eschew two approaches which I
regard as hazard-
ous. The first (despite the prior reference to the Mongols’ universe) is an
unqualified focus on mentalités. In recent years, a number of historians,
writing in quite different contexts, have thrown into sharp relief the pitfalls
that attend this kind of conceptualization;15 and their caveats need to be
borne in mind when dealing with the reactions of medieval European Chris-
tians to a newly-revealed Asiatic world. I have tried, for example, in Chap-
ter 6 to show that the West’s preconceptions about the Mongols may have
been reinforced by ideas current among its Muslim neighbours and even
within Mongol circles; and both here and in Chapter 12 I have argued that
what European travellers saw and reported was not conditioned simply by
the mental baggage they had brought with them from home but was deter-
mined also by the tales they picked up in Asia.

The second danger I seek to sidestep is the temptation that arises from
overdosing on hindsight – the assumption, in other words, that we today
can automatically see more clearly than contemporaries did. That assump-
tion may be justified: historians’ access to sources can afford them an eyrie
more commanding than any vantage-point available to the people they
study. In the study of contacts between the two distinct cultures which are
covered in this book, there has sometimes been a tendency to explain things
by entering a verdict of mutual incomprehension. In some measure, this is
certainly appropriate here – in the case, for instance, of Western mission-
ary endeavours: my own view is that the friars failed to grasp a number of
important characteristics of steppe society, some of which they dismissed
as merely reprehensible pagan practice, while others were interpreted as
signs of particular sympathy for or commitment to the Christian faith. But
the field of diplomacy presents a rather different picture. Although several
scholars have criticized the Catholic world for its failure to perceive what
the Mongols of Persia offered, I shall argue that the majority of Western
observers were lukewarm about an alliance precisely because they recognized Ilkhanid ambitions for what they were. In this context, the Latin reaction demonstrates that incomprehension was neither total nor unavoidable.

Notes
2 Antti Ruotsala, *Europeans and Mongols in the Middle of the Thirteenth Century: Encountering the Other* (Helsinki, 2001).
9 See the papers collected in Robert Sabatino Lopez, *Su e giù per la storia di Genova* (Genova, 1975), and some of those in Michel Balard, *La mer Noire et la Romanie génoise (XIIe – XVe siècles)* (London, 1989).
THE BACKGROUND
The unity and growth of Latin Christendom

During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Latin Christendom – the area that employed the Latin rite and looked to Rome for ecclesiastical and spiritual leadership – had grown phenomenally. Around 900 it had comprised little more than the Carolingian empire (present-day France, Germany and northern Italy) and the British Isles and had been under frequent attack by non-Christian peoples from the surrounding territories, Vikings, Muslims and Hungarians. But by 1100, this defensive phase had given way to one of pronounced expansion. The slow reduction of Muslim territory in Spain was now under way. From the former Carolingian dominions, Norman knights had wrested Sicily from the Muslims, while monks and secular clerics carried the Christian faith into the territories of their Scandinavian, Slavic and Hungarian neighbours. Instrumental in the success of Latin Christians’ campaigns of conquest were the heavily-armed and mailed horseman – the knight (miles) – and the crossbow (arbalista); physically symbolic of their newly-implanted domination was the castle. The twelfth century was also an era of economic growth. Internal colonization of wasteland was matched by external, as knights and settlers, both burghers and agriculturists, pushed forward into new lands beyond the frontiers of Christian rule, transporting with them to regions as far afield as the Iberian peninsula and the Baltic the legal and tenurial institutions to which they were accustomed at home. Enterprising Western merchants, notably those of Venice, Genoa and Pisa, devised new techniques of credit and investment to support commercial ventures that took them to the furthest shores of the Mediterranean.

The most spectacular instance of Latin expansion was the movement now known as the First Crusade, by which a motley force of ‘Franks’ – knights
from France, the western borderlands of Germany and Norman-ruled southern Italy – wrested from Muslim hands in 1098–9 a narrow strip of the Syrian–Palestinian coastline, including the Holy City of Jerusalem, and established a small and vulnerable network of Latin states. These newly-founded polities – the kingdom of Jerusalem, the principality of Antioch and the counties of Edessa and Tripoli – became an integral part of the Latin world, and their fate a matter of vital concern to Christians throughout Western Europe. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the assertion of Western dominance over the Mediterranean sea-lanes by Venetians, Pisans and Genoese – and to a lesser extent by the men of other ports like Marseilles and Barcelona – served to underpin the survival of these distant Latin outposts in Syria and Palestine.²

What gave some structural unity to the extensive tract that comprised Latin Christendom was particularly the Latin Church, presided over by the pope. Between the Gregorian Reform of the late eleventh century and the pontificate of Innocent III (1198–1216), the prestige, influence and aspirations of the papacy grew enormously.³ Widespread and mounting support within the ranks of the laity combined with the allegiance of the clergy, the labours of three generations of canon lawyers and increasingly frequent recourse to letters, legates and councils to turn papal authority into a reality that impinged alike on the ambitions of kings and on the lives of ordinary Christians. Already in the first half of the twelfth century, the papal Curia was on the way to becoming the supreme juridical body in Latin Christendom. It was the nascent Reformed Papacy that had reaped the credit for the stupendous triumph of the First Crusade, launched by Pope Urban II in 1095; just over a hundred years later (1199), Innocent III registered his authority over the Church by introducing, in support of the crusade, universal taxation of ecclesiastical revenues.

An especial boost to the power of the papacy and the cohesion of Latin Christendom was the rise, around the beginning of the twelfth century, of international religious orders which looked to Rome for guidance and direction. The Cistercian monks, founded in 1098, and the Premonstratensian canons, who emerged in c.1115, were active in the settlement and exploitation of new lands in Eastern Europe; from their ranks, too, came many of the bishops who presided over the newly-founded dioceses. The Military Orders, of whom the earliest to emerge were the Knights Templar and the Hospitallers of St John, were warrior monks, whose primary duty was the protection and care of Christians and the defence of Christian territory. They were intimately associated with the crusading movement, and their headquarters were in the Holy Land, but gifts and bequests furnished them with property and income in virtually every part of the Latin world. The later twelfth century witnessed the appearance of other Military Orders, notably the Teutonic Knights (1198), who in 1226 were granted a foothold in Poland in return for defending the country against the heathen Prussians.
In the early thirteenth century the Mendicant Orders, or friars, were founded by St Francis (d. 1226) and St Dominic (d. 1221), with the support of Innocent III. The Franciscans and Dominicans, whose members were dedicated to poverty and preaching, were well placed to spread the Gospel not merely within Latin Christendom but beyond its frontiers; in 1219, during the Fifth Crusade, St Francis in person attempted to expound the Christian message to the Egyptian Sultan. Friars are also found at a relatively early date acting as agents of the papacy and from 1234 were employed as crusade preachers. It was no accident that in 1245 the first papal emissaries to the pagan Mongols would be chosen from their ranks.

**Enemies and coreligionists**

Confronting expansionist Latin Christendom were two types of opponent. In Northern Europe, the pagan territories into which Western knights and peasants advanced belonged to polytheists – Slavs (‘Wends’) or Baltic races like the Prussians, Livonians and Estonians. The rhetoric and (such as it was) the machinery of crusade were extended to these theatres during the twelfth century. The Baltic Crusade began in earnest in 1199, and from the late 1230s, the German *Drang nach Osten* in the Baltic was spearheaded by the Teutonic Knights. In these regions the enemy was characterized by looser forms of political organization and by a lower level of economic and technological development. By the early thirteenth century, the balance was shifting, as native princes copied the methods and borrowed the weaponry of their Latin opponents. Frequently they secured their future by accepting baptism for themselves and their subjects and ranging themselves alongside their erstwhile opponents in the work of crusade and evangelism. Their admission to the family of Latin Christian rulers was accompanied by the adoption of Latin as the language of faith and government. Their policies came to mirror those practised in Christian states of longer standing, like Hungary, whose kings were enhancing their military power and potential revenues by encouraging the immigration of substantial numbers of French knights and clerics and French and German artisans.

In the south, in the Mediterranean region, Latin Christians faced an adversary of an altogether different calibre. This was the world of Islam, a faith still more uncompromising in its monotheism than was Christianity. The days of government by a universal Caliphate were long past, and its former territories, stretching from Morocco to northern India, were divided among a plethora of rulers of different dynasties and races – Arabs, Berbers, Persians, Kurds and Turks. Some of these states attained a considerable size, like the empire of the Seljuk Turks, which embraced Persia, Iraq and Anatolia (Rûm) for a few decades prior to its disintegration in the early twelfth century; the branch of the dynasty that ruled Anatolia was still an important power in the early thirteenth. The fiction of a single Islamic polity was
The majority of Muslim princes acknowledged the ʿAbbasid Caliph at Baghdad as the source of their authority, seeking from him diplomats that granted them the status of his lieutenants and naming him, in return, on the coinage and in the public Friday prayers. The long-established exception to this, of course, was the Shīʿa. But in fact there had been no major Shīʿī polity since 1171. Even the leaders of the Ismāʿīlī Shīʿīs who held out in the mountainous regions of northern Persia and of Syria, the so-called Assassins, abandoned their religious claims early in the thirteenth century, adopted ‘Orthodox’ (Sunni) Islam and entered into friendly relations with the ʿAbbasids (although this was widely taken to be an example of the Ismāʿīlī practice of taqiyya, ‘dissimulation’). On the other hand, a significant cleavage loomed early in the thirteenth century, with the growth of tension between the caliph and the powerful rulers of Khwārazm (the Khwārazmshāhs), who had overthrown the last Seljuk Sultan of Persia in 1194; in c.1216, the quarrel peaked when the Khwārazmshāh ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad proclaimed the deposition of the ʿAbbasids, setting up a rival caliph and mounting an abortive expedition against Baghdad.

Yet for all this, the Islamic world (Dār al-Islām), unlike the Northern European pagans, was still characterized by a unity which more or less paralleled that of Latin Christendom. It possessed a cultural cohesion which was reinforced by the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, bringing together Muslims from territories as diverse as Morocco, Anatolia and present-day Afghanistan. It also boasted a higher standard of economic development. No city in Western Europe could as yet compete with Cairo, Damascus, Aleppo or Baghdad in wealth; even places like Acre and Tyre, in Latin-held Palestine, which were worth considerable sums to their rulers on account of the great volume of trade that passed through them, were not comparable. Access to such wealth enabled the Muslims to inflict major reverses on the Latin cause in the Near East, as demonstrated in the overthrow of the county of Edessa in 1144 or in the decisive defeat of the Frankish army at Hattin in 1187 by ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Yūsuf, which was followed by the loss of Jerusalem. Although by 1192 the Third Crusade had secured a new lease of life for the beleaguered Latin states of Jerusalem, Antioch and Tripoli, its achievements did not include the recovery of the Holy City, and relations with Saladin’s dynasty, the Ayyubids of Egypt and Syria, were henceforward marked by a series of truces. The most notorious of these truces was that made in 1229 – in the course of a crusade which apparently did not strike a single blow against the Muslims – between the Emperor Frederick II and the Egyptian Sultan al-Kāmil. By the terms of this agreement, the city of Jerusalem (for a mere fifteen years, as it transpired) largely passed back into Frankish hands.

There was one further point of contrast between the Muslims and the pagans of Northern Europe. The Muslims, who possessed their own revealed religion and sacred scriptures, proved far more impervious to Christian missionary endeavours than did the Latins’ weaker opponents in the Baltic.
Muslim slaves in Latin Syria and Palestine, prisoners of war with little hope of repatriation to their own communities, might seek baptism; not so Muslim princes. From time to time, rumours would spread of the imminent conversion of some Muslim ruler, perhaps one born of a Christian mother. The outcome was always disappointing, as in 1234, when the Seljuk Sultan of Rûm corresponded on the subject with the pope in the hope of Latin military assistance against his Ayyubid neighbours or, in 1239–40, when the alleged willingness of the Ayyubid prince of Hamâ to embrace the rival faith occasioned great excitement in the ranks of a crusading army but proved to be merely a ploy directed against his kinsmen.9 Yet the Catholic hierarchy did not abandon the hope that baptism might turn enemies into allies.

To the Muslims, successive attacks by European crusaders and the stubborn resistance of the Latin settlements on the Syro-Palestinian coast represented little more than a localized malaise alongside reverses on Islam’s eastern frontier from the third decade of the twelfth century to the middle of the thirteenth. During the 1120s, a semi-nomadic people of (probably) Mongolian stock, the Kitan, in flight from northern China, established an empire in Central Asia. The new power, known as the Qara-Khitai, asserted its paramountcy over several Muslim princes, and when in 1141 the Great Seljuk Sultan Sanjar moved to the aid of his coreligionists, he suffered a crushing defeat in Transoxiana. This was the first occasion on which a significant proportion of the Dâr al-Islâm (that is, discounting Sicily and parts of Spain) had passed back under the dominion of the infidel. In time, the Qara-Khitai would come to seem like the harbinger of much more formidable eastern conquerors, the Mongols, who subjugated Islamic Central Asia, Persia, Iraq and Anatolia in a series of invasions from the 1220s onward.

For Latin Christians, on the other hand, the Muslims, prior to the 1240s, were the most dangerous enemy that they had to face. Admittedly, the dealings of Frankish knights with Muslim lords in Syria were on occasion cordial. Muslim warriors like the Turks might command a grudging admiration; stories circulated that endowed Saladin with the characteristics of a Frankish knight.10 Following his crusade, the Emperor Frederick maintained friendly contacts with Cairo right down to his death, addressing to the scholars at the Sultan’s court questions on mathematics and scientific subjects. But generally speaking there was little understanding of the faith of Islam – indeed its image was a grotesque caricature – and no real awareness of sectarian differences among Muslims before the thirteenth century.11 What mattered above all was that pagans were wrong and Christians were right, as the ‘Song of Roland’ put it,12 and in the last analysis the most appropriate medium of dialogue was the sword. Islam’s territories might be wealthier than the lands of Christendom; its culture, steeped in the learning of Classical Antiquity, might seem superior. Yet there could be no doubt of the debased nature of the Muslims, who insulted Christ by polluting the Holy Places and persecuting His people.13 There was a growing conviction,
moreover, that the final demise of Islam – and with it the Last Things – were close at hand. This is often associated with the labyrinthine Biblical exegesis of the Calabrian hermit Joachim of Fiore (d. 1202), which may have had no impact on wider currents of thought until the second half of the thirteenth century. But even Pope Innocent III, who did not view Joachim’s speculations with favour, appears to have endorsed the belief that Islam would collapse within a matter of decades, a conviction shared also within Eastern Christian churches. And when Gregory IX issued the first bull authorizing the missionary friars to preach to pagan nations in 1235, he chose to begin with the evocative phrase Cum hora undecima (‘Since it is the eleventh hour’).

During the eleventh century, the very term Christianitas, which had originally denoted the Christian faith, was acquiring a new territorial significance, as ‘Christendom’ came to mean the lands occupied by Christians and the society they comprised. But its content increasingly hinged on the use of the Latin rite and the recognition of the primacy of Rome; there was less and less room for variant (or, as they would have been seen, deviant) practices, and in the peripheral regions of the Catholic world, immigrant clerics refashioned indigenous Christian usage to bring it into line with the metropolitan tradition. With Christians outside Latin territory who belonged to traditions altogether different from their own, the relations of Western Christians were somewhat diverse. Those with the Greek Orthodox hierarchy were the most problematic of all. Despite the so-called schism of 1054, the Greeks and the Latins, as distinct from the separated churches of the east, still constituted, juridically speaking, a single entity. It is therefore more accurate to speak of Latin and Greek ‘forms’ and ‘usages’ than of different churches; but, as within Western Europe, the Latin hierarchy was increasingly disposed to be impatient of such variation. Moreover, crusading activities in the Near East had served to embitter contacts between Greek and Latin. In Antioch, a formerly Byzantine city that should have been restored to the emperor in 1098, the Greek patriarch was replaced by a Westerner: thereafter a succession of Greek patriarchs promulgated their claims in exile at Constantinople. On the Latin side, resentment and jealousy of the magnificence of Constantinople and suspicion of a multifaceted imperial foreign policy combined with differences in language, creed, liturgy and practice to nurture the view of the Greeks as ‘false’ Christians – decadent, treacherous and less than wholehearted in their devotion to the war on Christ’s behalf.

As the power of the Byzantine empire atrophied from the late twelfth century onward, Western rulers began to encroach upon its territories. In 1191, during the Third Crusade, Richard I of England wrested Cyprus from a rebel Greek governor. The island became a Latin possession and remained so until its conquest by the Ottomans in 1571; from 1197, its Frankish ruler wore a crown which had been conferred on him by the Western emperor. In 1204, the Fourth Crusade, diverted from its official goal, went on to
sack Constantinople itself, and most of Byzantine Greece in turn passed into the hands of Latin lords and knights. Those territories not appropriated by Venice, which had played a prominent role in the crusade, recognized the nominal suzerainty of a Latin emperor at Constantinople; the region became known to the Latins as ‘Romania’. Only a rump of the once great Byzantine polity – the despotate of Epirus in the west and the empires of Nicaea and Trebizond in Anatolia – held out under Greek rulers. In time, it became apparent that Nicaea was more than a match for the feeble Latin empire, though the Nicaean emperor did not recover Constantinople until 1261. Well before that, the popes had begun to negotiate with the Nicaean government for the recognition of papal primacy.

In time, the Latins likewise encroached upon other lands that belonged to the Greek Orthodox world. In 1217, the ruler of Serbia accepted the Latin rite and Roman primacy in return for coronation by a papal legate. Just prior to the Fourth Crusade, the Vlach ruler of Bulgaria, a kingdom which had received its Christianity from Constantinople some centuries earlier, had made the same exchange. But he subsequently repudiated the union and allied with Nicaea, so that from 1238 the papacy tried to induce the Hungarian king Béla IV to lead a crusade against him. It is hard to gauge the impact of the fall of Byzantium upon the Orthodox Rus’; the account of the Fourth Crusade in The Chronicle of Novgorod is remarkably free of polemic. But during the early thirteenth century, Western expansionism was bringing the Rus’ into conflict with the Latins on their own account. To the south, the Hungarian kingdom intervened in the disputes among rival candidates for the principality of Galicia (Halych); in the Baltic, aggression by Swedes, Danes and Germans provoked the opposition of the rulers of Novgorod. Competition for fisheries, furs, the products of the forest and the tribute of Finnish tribes exacerbated a growing consciousness of the same differences in rite and practice that we noticed in Latin–Byzantine relations. Russian strongpoints were seized, like Iur’ev, which under German occupation became Dorpat (1224). Rus’ resistance to the Western advance in territories of mutual interest would in time provoke the wrath of Pope Gregory IX and the authorization of a crusade against them in 1237. Even prior to this, the papacy had manifested a concern to bring the Rus’ into the Catholic fold. When they were suddenly attacked and defeated by a new power in the southern steppes in 1223, Pope Honorius III appears to have hoped that the reverse would dispose them to welcome tighter links with Rome (see p. 68).

The Greek Orthodox, of course, were only one Christian group among many in the eastern Mediterranean. Latin-ruled Syria and Palestine contained not only an Orthodox population but also large numbers of Jacobite (Monophysite) Christians. Although the situation of these Eastern Christians was clearly preferable to that of the Muslim majority of the subject population, they were still in some sense second-class citizens. The Franks’
The background

occupation of Jerusalem had also brought them into closer contact than hitherto with Christians of other churches who made the pilgrimage to the Holy City, such as the Egyptian Copts and the Ethiopians. More importantly, it had introduced them to the far-flung world of Nestorian Christianity, which was centred on Iraq and had put down roots in Central Asia, present-day Mongolia and China in the eighth century, though the West did not really become aware of the Nestorian world and its geographical extent until the time of the Fifth Crusade (1218–21).22

Down to the early thirteenth century, however, the Latin hierarchy was generally content to leave to Eastern Christians the task of converting their pagan neighbours. And there were breakthroughs in relations with these separated churches. The Maronite Christians of Lebanon entered into union with Rome in 1182, and in 1198 the prince of Lesser Armenia (Cilicia), a region that had close connections with Frankish Antioch, accepted a crown from the pope and brought his people, theoretically at least, into the Roman obedience.23 Some Christian groups, like the Georgians and Armenians, had not been subject to Muslim government, and here a shared tradition of warfare undoubtedly helped to foster respect on the part of the Latins. Mutual esteem increased, perhaps, with distance. It was natural that the Syrian Franks should be on harmonious terms with the remote kingdom of Georgia, which during the twelfth century was engaged in its own conspicuously successful struggle with Muslim powers in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and that popes discussed with successive Georgian monarchs their participation in the war in Syria. In 1220, Jacques de Vitry, bishop of Acre, who was with the army of the Fifth Crusade in the Nile delta, pinned greater hope on Georgian intervention than on reinforcements from the West.24

To judge at least from their historical writing, the Monophysites of the Coptic Church in Egypt felt no marked affinity with the Franks who tried to conquer their county and liberate them from Muslim rule, either in the Fifth Crusade (1218–21) or in the Seventh (1249–50), headed by Louis IX of France (St Louis).25 But as regards other Eastern Christians, the prospects seemed more promising. In 1237 Philip, Dominican prior of the Holy Land, reported enthusiastically to Pope Gregory IX that the Jacobite patriarch and the head of the Nestorian communities, the catholicus, were ready to repudiate past errors and acknowledge papal primacy. Both prelates had in fact made only personal professions of faith; there was no question of entering corporately into union with Rome. For Philip, however, only the Greeks now remained obstinately outside the Catholic fold.26

The steppe frontier

To the south of the Russian forest zone lay the Pontic and Caspian steppes. Most of Latin Christendom had no direct contact with the nomadic herd- ers who occupied this region. This was the corridor through which, during
several centuries past, a succession of races had pushed westward into the heart of Europe. They included the Huns, who had briefly menaced the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century; the Avars, whose empire had been destroyed by Charlemagne in the 790s; and the Hungarians who, after terrorizing southern Germany and northern Italy in the tenth century, had at length settled down and become a part of Latin Christendom. Since the collapse of the Türk empire in Central Asia in the first half of the eighth century, the majority of the nomadic populations (and certainly the ruling elements) among the peoples of the western steppe appear to have been of Turkish stock. Some, like the remote Volga Bulgars (that is, of Bulghār, not far from the later city of Kazan), were largely sedentarized and had adopted Islam.

For all the terror and disruption they inspired, the peoples of the Pontic steppe were generally fugitives who had been driven westward by some stronger nomadic power, although the chain reactions which set on foot widespread migrations across the breadth of Eurasia over the centuries are processes almost entirely hidden from us. One such movement, which is believed to have involved a series of massive migrations, brought into the Pontic region in the 1050s the nomadic confederacy known to the Byzantines as the Cumans (Κομνανοί), to the Hungarians as the Kún, to the Muslims as the Qipchâq, to the Rus’ as the Polovtsy, and to the Germans as the Valwen or Falones. The newcomers clashed repeatedly with their Hungarian neighbours as well as with the Rus’; in 1213, the Hungarian king András II briefly entrusted a sizeable area of territory to the Teutonic Order so that they might defend his kingdom.

The Cumans were not a united force. Their political organization was a loose one, and different elements allied with one group of Rus’ princes against another; Qipchâq/Cuman chiefs and their followers served the twelfth-century Georgian kings as mercenaries, and in 1203 Philip of Swabia, one of the candidates in the struggle for the German crown, employed a body of Cumans. There were even signs that they might succumb to the efforts of Christian missionaries, as when Hungarian Dominican friars in 1228 succeeded in bringing to the font a number of Cuman leaders and Pope Gregory IX created the missionary diocese of ‘Cumania’. In the 1230s Dominican missionaries ventured still further afield, in an attempt to make contact with the inhabitants of Greater Hungary (Magna Hungaria). Nowadays tentatively identified with Bashkiria (in the Ural region), this – it was believed – was the home of the pagan descendants of that section of the Hungarian people which had remained behind in the east when their brethren crossed the Carpathians in the ninth century.

Although barbarous and unclean races were to be found even within Western Europe, where by the twelfth century the Frankish aristocracy and clergy were coming to regard even Christian Celtic and Slavic peoples as exponents of an inferior culture, the steppe and forest beyond Christendom’s eastern
frontiers – ‘Scythia’, to use its Classical designation – represented still more obviously alien terrain, the home of barbarism. Western observers were struck by the near-total absence of agriculture and various even less attractive characteristics. In the mid-twelfth century, Bishop Otto of Freising had commented on the fact that these regions were untouched by ploughshare or mattock.32 ‘They live like beasts’, the Dominicans reported in c.1235 of the people of Greater Hungary; ‘they do not cultivate the land, they eat the flesh of mares, wolves and the like, and they drink mare’s milk and blood’.33 Otto of Freising had claimed that the Cumans, like their predecessors the Pechenegs, ate raw flesh, including that of unclean animals.34 Such features, like the cannibalism imputed to other, fictitious peoples, constitute a literary topos with a pedigree stretching back to the Classical world.35 Other customs that also drew the attention of observers in the Christian West – the burial of live slaves with Cuman chiefs and oath-taking over a dog cut in two – represented practices that had been current among Inner Asian nomads for centuries.36 What was not known at this juncture was that the Cuman confederacy and Greater Hungary alike were about to be violently suppressed by a new and immeasurably stronger steppe power whose centre lay almost 3,000 miles to the east.

**Western Christendom and the wider world**

Of the tracts that lay beyond Cumania, the Rus’ and the Islamic Near East, Latin Christians entertained only the haziest and most inaccurate ideas.37 To the north-east, the horizon lay around the ‘marshes of Maeotis’ (the name given to the Sea of Azov) and the ‘Riphaean mountains’, which were mentioned by Pliny and by Isidore and were believed to divide Europe from Asia.38 ‘India’ was a blanket term for the entire land mass, including Ethiopia, that lay beyond Egypt and Mesopotamia. China, known indirectly to the Romans as the land of a silk-producing people, the ‘Seres’, had receded from view; it was now a dim memory perpetuated by Western encyclopedists. A work by Frederick II’s astrologer Michael Scot (d. c.1235) admittedly contains an isolated reference to ‘Sin’ (< Chin), probably gleaned from an Arabic source, but generally the emperor’s court was conservative in its geographical ideas.39

The West’s knowledge of distant parts was derived from two sources: the Bible and the lore of Classical Antiquity. From the canonical Scriptures, medieval Christians had acquired a composite picture that incorporated the postdiluvian division of the earth among the sons of Noah (Genesis, ix, 19, and x); the wanderings of Abraham’s son Ishmael, an archer whose hand would be against every man, and God’s promise to make his descendants into a great nation (ibid., xvi, 10–12, xvii, 20, and xxi, 18); the centrality of Jerusalem (Ezekiel, v, 5, cf. xxxviii, 12; Psalm lxiii, 12); the eastward deportation of certain tribes of Israel (the so-called Ten Lost Tribes) by the
Latin Christendom and its neighbours 21

Assyrians (II [IV] Kings, xvii, 6, and xviii, 11); and the story of the Three Magi of the Nativity (Matthew, ii, 1–12; subsequently metamorphosed into Kings). That the Apostles had fulfilled Christ’s commission to preach the Gospel throughout the world (Acts, i, 8; cf. also Matthew, xxvii, 19–20) was corroborated by the Apocryphal books of the New Testament, which claimed, in particular, that St Thomas had evangelized ‘India’. The Scriptures also offered glimpses of a future that involved the obscure but innumerable Gog and Magog, a nation of horsemen (Ezekiel, xxxviii, 1–3, 14–16, cf. xxxix, 1–13), whose advent would usher in the Last Things (Revelation, xx, 7–8).

Most of the geographical writing produced by the ancient world had been lost; nor did geography loom large among the Arabic texts translated into Latin during what is known as the Twelfth-Century Renaissance. Of Ptolemy’s works, the Geographia, already well known to Muslim scholars, was not rediscovered by the West until 1406 (a Latin translation was completed in 1410); only his astronomical–cosmological work, the Almagest, lay to hand by the thirteenth century. This may be symptomatic of a greater interest in astronomy than in geography: the heavenly bodies were seen as exerting a strong influence on the course of earthly events.

Especially striking is the failure to translate – or even, apparently, to notice – the one Arabic geographical work which emanated from within Latin-held territory and might therefore be expected to have bridged a cultural gap. The Kitāb Rūjār of al-Idrīsī (c.1150), produced at the court of the Norman King Roger II of Sicily, would – on any estimate – have amplified and extended the knowledge of the world’s geography available to Western Christians. Yet there is no evidence that anybody read it until the early fourteenth century, when al-Idrīsī’s influence can possibly be discerned in the map attached to Marino Sanudo’s Secreta fidelium crucis (1321). The reason for such neglect may well be that geography was regarded merely as the handmaiden of sacred truth, as illustrating the history found in the Bible; it is no accident that a good many medieval European maps were designed originally as altarpieces. Since the Qur’ān was believed to be devoid of truth, a familiarity with Arabic geography was hardly necessary or desirable.

To the knowledge that emanated from the pagan Classical world, then, the medieval Latin West had access only through mediocre compilations like Pliny’s Natural History, which was greatly in vogue throughout the Middle Ages, the third-century encyclopedia of Solinus, and – worse still – the burgeoning congeries of fiction now known as the Alexander Romance. What these works had in common was that the information they contained represented fantasy rather than the fruit of direct observation. In this fashion, Latin Christians learned of tracts inhabited by fabulous beasts and monstrous races: the Cynocephali (a dog-headed race) and Panotii (a race endowed with enormous ears) immortalized in the twelfth-century
tympanum at Vézelay; the Blemmyae (a people without heads, whose faces were located in their chests); the Monopods; and so on. Sometimes a substratum of genuine historical fact underlay the myth, as in the case of stories about Amazons, which probably derived from the presence of female warriors in ancient steppe societies. Within this category of alien peoples we must include also those races whose inhuman practices put them beyond the pale, like the Anthropophagi, or cannibals. The apocryphal account of the campaigns of Alexander the Great, dating probably from the third century C.E., not only included these and other fabulous nations but claimed also that the Macedonian conqueror had enclosed behind an impenetrable barrier certain barbarous and unclean races in order to prevent them overrunning and contaminating the civilized lands.

We might expect that the early Church would frown upon learning borrowed from the pagan world, but there were Christian ecclesiastics, beginning with patristic writers like Jerome, who took such knowledge on board and sought to harmonize it with the history and geography that were to be gleaned from the Bible. Although he appears to have been agnostic on the existence of monstrous races, Augustine of Hippo (d. 430), destined to become one of the most influential writers for the Middle Ages, thought that they demonstrated the power of God. The Etymologiae of Isidore, bishop of Seville (d. 636), which also came to wield considerable authority, incorporated details from Solinus about the fabulous races and marvels of the East. It should be stressed, therefore, that for some centuries to come in the Latin world, the monstrous peoples were a part of reality: eighth- and ninth-century churchmen seem to have anticipated meeting Cynocephali in the course of missions to the Baltic and beyond and were concerned to establish whether or not they were human and hence capable of being saved. Fabulous knowledge of this kind took on new life in the twelfth century, paradoxically, as a result of the marked growth of contact with the Asiatic world.

The monsters hallowed by a venerable tradition were not the East’s only inhabitants. The most recent addition to the storehouse of Western European knowledge was the legend associated with the figure of Prester John. In view of their geographical isolation and the inadequacy of Western efforts to aid them, it was natural that the Latin population of Palestine and Syria should be on the alert for the appearance of Christian allies in the East. At some point prior to the 1140s, rumours began to spread of the existence of a Christian king called John. The original basis of such reports defies speculation; but by 1146, when Otto of Freising received from a Latin Syrian bishop the fullest information to date concerning John, king and priest, a descendant of the Magi and located ‘in the extreme East, beyond Armenia and Persia’, distorted reports of the Qara-Khitai victory over the Seljuk Sultan Sanjar in 1141 had caused him to be located in Central Asia. The Qara-Khitai were Buddhists, but the Latin world, unaware of the existence
of Buddhism, assumed that the victors were in fact Christians under the rule of Prester John. This was, in any case, a time of optimism concerning the status of Christianity in the world. Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny, writing in 1143–4, thought that although a limited part of the oecumene was ruled by Muslims, there were already no regions without Christian inhabitants, and, for Jacques de Vitry, Christians who lived under Muslim regimes greatly outnumbered the Muslim populations.

King John’s failure to advance further west and reinforce his fellow Christians in Syria did not cause the Latin world to lose sight of him. The celebrated ‘Letter of Prester John’, a Latin forgery which circulated within Catholic Europe from the 1160s and that was in turn copied, embellished and translated into several vernacular languages over the next two or three centuries, drew on a great many legendary elements then current in the West. Among the numerous peoples supposedly subject to Prester John were not only the fabulous races derived from Pliny and Solinus but also Gog and Magog. The letter has been seen as having a primarily didactic and moralistic tone and purpose and as encapsulating Western visions of the ideal polity. However that may be, it did more than anything else to ensconce this mythical prince in the popular imagination. In 1217, Jacques de Vitry expressed the hope that ‘the numerous Christian monarchs who dwell in the East as far as the territory of Prester John’ would aid the crusaders by attacking the Muslims. Consequently, when in 1221 the crusading leaders heard fresh rumours of operations against the eastern Muslims by an allegedly Christian army, they too were easily persuaded to link them with Prester John.

To geographical vagueness was added certainty about the future course of events. In the seventh century an anonymous (probably Syrian) writer claiming to be St Methodius of Patara drew upon the prophetic material in the Bible to weave a circumstantial account of the final era of history. In his Sermo or Revelations, he foresaw the successive irruptions of the Ishmaelites, whose domination of the world would last for forty-nine years and who would threaten Rome, and of Alexander’s unclean peoples, whose defeat would immediately precede the coming of the Antichrist. For Pseudo-Methodius the Ishmaelites were represented both by the Midianites whom Gideon had overthrown (Judges, vi, 24) and by the Arab Muslim invaders of his own day. He called the wilderness from which they had emerged Ethrib, i.e. Yathrib, the former name of the Arabian city of Medina, the refuge of the Prophet Muüammad and the seat of the first Caliphs. The Arabs themselves came to trace their descent from Ishmael, and the Muslims would often figure as Ishmaelites in Western European sources. But the fact that the prophecy had thus largely been fulfilled was not always appreciated in a later age. Pseudo-Methodius, whose work was soon translated into Latin, was further popularized in the twelfth century by Peter Comestor, who included a summary of the Sermo in his own compendium
of sacred history, the *Historia scholastica*, and turned the unclean races into the Ten Lost Tribes.\(^{59}\) For others, however, they came to be equated with Gog and Magog.\(^{60}\) By the thirteenth century, the idea that world history had entered its final phase before the coming of the Antichrist was widely accepted, and Pseudo-Methodian prophecy – either directly or through the medium of Peter Comestor – wielded among Western Christians an authority second only to that of Scripture itself and of the Church Fathers: more than 200 Latin manuscripts of the work have come down to us from the Middle Ages.\(^{61}\)

**Discord within the West**

By 1240, then, Latin Christendom stretched from the Atlantic to the Bosphorus and the River Bug and from the Arctic Circle to southern Palestine. Within the past fifty years it had come to include parts of the eastern Baltic littoral, Lesser Armenia, Cyprus, Constantinople, much of mainland Greece and (if only temporarily) Bulgaria, and it was making inroads among the nomads of the Pontic steppe. Despite local setbacks in the Baltic and disappointments or even major crises in the Near East, the West was expansive and aggressive: more optimistic than before about the reunion of the churches, and confident in the knowledge that its military enterprises were ultimately sanctioned by God. Defeat could be written off time and again as the inevitable and even desirable consequence of sin (*peccatis exigentibus*) whereby God tested His faithful; remarkably few in the West questioned the tradition of sacred violence which had become firmly established by 1200.\(^{62}\) The defence of the Holy Land – viewed as Christ’s own patrimony – appeared the solemn duty of the kings, nobles and knights of the West.\(^{63}\) The eight decades following the Third Crusade (1191–2) witnessed more frequent major expeditions in aid of Syria and Palestine, as well as closer links between them and Western Europe, than had most of the twelfth century. Innocent III was the first pope to require a report on political conditions in the Near East from the Latin patriarch of Jerusalem.\(^{64}\)

Early in the thirteenth century, it became permissible to commute a vow made to fight in the Holy Land or other theatre for the purpose of participating in a crusade elsewhere, as the institutions of crusading were extended beyond the Muslims or Baltic pagans to enemies even within the Christian fold.\(^{65}\) Thus the violent suppression of the Cathar heretics in southern France was being advocated at the Third Lateran Council in 1179, though without any practical consequences until 1208, when Pope Innocent III proclaimed the Albigensian Crusade. If the Fourth Crusade was not actually launched against the Greeks, its outcome nevertheless meant that they rapidly became a logical and legitimate target of future crusading activity. Popes Honorius III and Gregory IX, faced with Nicaean irredentism, authorized expeditions
to prop up the ailing Latin regime at Constantinople, though this did not prevent the loss of the city in 1261.

Holy violence against Christian rulers within Western Europe who oppressed the Church or obstructed papal policy (the ‘political crusade’, to use the common but unsatisfactory term), is usually associated with the kingdom of Sicily, which had been held as a papal fief since its seizure from the Muslims, and the association grew stronger once the acquisition of the Sicilian crown in 1194 by the Hohenstaufen dynasty, which ruled the Holy Roman Empire, threatened the papacy with encirclement. There were also disputes over territory in central Italy, and papal–imperial rivalry was given additional edge by the emperor’s universalist claims. Emperor Frederick II, who had added to the German and Sicilian crowns that of Jerusalem (through marriage) in 1225, came to appear a formidable menace to the well-being of the papacy and of the Church at large. Having been excommunicated by Gregory IX in 1239, he marched on Rome in the following year, but was obliged to withdraw when the pope fortified the resistance of the populace by parading round the city the sacred relics of Saints Peter and Paul. This was the beginning of the crusade against Frederick, which lasted, with intervals, for the rest of his life. When Gregory convened a council to depose him, the emperor in May 1241 simply intercepted the ships that carried French and Italian prelates on their way to the council and threw them into prison, where many underwent great hardship.66 Frederick was again excommunicated and deposed by Pope Innocent IV at the First Council of Lyons in 1245, and his German opponents elected in succession two anti-kings, Henry Raspe (d. 1247), landgrave of Thuringia, and Count William of Holland. When Frederick died in 1250, Sicily was the only one of his territories over which he enjoyed undisputed control.

A consequence of the broadening of the crusading institution was the existence of simultaneous campaigns against quite different enemies on a number of fronts. At the end of 1240, for instance, four distinct crusades were in operation (not counting the Spanish theatre, which tended to attract international participation only rarely, or southern France, where a single Cathar stronghold still held out). In the Holy Land, the English prince Richard of Cornwall had just assumed the command of English and French crusaders; a major expedition had left France for Romania in 1239;67 on the Rus’ frontier, the Swedes, Danes and Teutonic Knights were each engaged in a local conflict with Novgorod (though it is debatable whether any of them were responding to the pope’s summons);68 and in central Europe the pope had recently launched the crusade against the emperor, for which in February 1241 he authorized the commutation of vows in Hungary.69

Whatever the ideological origins of and justification for crusades against Christian rulers within Latin Europe, they probably attracted a greater degree of criticism from contemporaries, although this is open to dispute. One of the grounds on which they were condemned was that they deflected
much-needed military assistance from the hard-pressed Latin states in Palestine and Syria. Victory over Louis IX’s crusade in 1250 precipitated a *coup d'état* in Egypt, displacing its Ayyubid rulers in favour of a series of sultans chosen from among the ranks of their Turkish military slave (*mamlūk*) élite. The new regime came to display a greater vigour and a stronger determination to expel the Franks from Syria and Palestine than had its predecessors.\(^70\)

From the early 1260s onward, the Franks were called upon to withstand, with minimal aid from overseas, a series of hammer blows by the Mamlūk Sultans, who destroyed the principalities of Antioch (1268) and the county of Tripoli (1289) and in 1291 took Acre and obliterated the last vestiges of the kingdom of Jerusalem. And indeed it is undeniable that these very same years witnessed substantial crusading efforts against Christian powers in the western Mediterranean. In 1266, the pope sanctioned an expedition headed by Louis IX’s brother, Charles of Anjou, which overthrew the Hohenstaufen king of Sicily, Frederick II’s illegitimate son Manfred, and installed an Angevin government; when Sicily rose against Charles (1282) and the king of Aragon championed the rebels’ cause, the papacy launched the War of the Vespers against the Aragonese from 1283 onward.\(^71\)

One further objection could have been levelled at holy wars against Christian lay powers – that they promised to heighten and perpetuate disunity within the West at precisely the moment when it confronted a greater menace than at any time since the Hunnish advance in the fifth century. Describing the events of 1241, an anonymous chronicler in Trier, on the western fringes of Frederick II’s dominions, commented on the emperor’s concern to prevent the papal bull of excommunication from being disseminated throughout Germany. Frederick had issued instructions to his officers there to make every effort to intercept papal messengers. Whether these efforts were successful we never learn because the chronicler’s attention is suddenly and dramatically distracted by events further east. ‘And behold’, he continues, ‘the Almighty sent messengers, but with a quite different message’.\(^72\)

**Notes**

3. For a good introduction, see, e.g., Tanase, “*Jusqu’aux limites du monde*”, introduction, pp. 50–6.


18 VMH, I, pp. 160–1 (nos. 283, 284). See Christoph T. Maier, Preaching the Crusades. Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge,


26 For this letter, which is preserved by two contemporaries, the Cistercian Aubry of Trois-Fontaines and the Benedictine Matthew Paris, see CICO, III, pp. 306–7 (no. 227a).


For a persuasive hypothesis as to its origins, see Bernard Hamilton, ‘Prester John and the Three Kings of Cologne’, in H. Mayr-Harting and R. I. Moore, eds., *Studies in Medieval History Presented to R.H.C. Davis* (London and Ronceverte,
Latin Christendom and its neighbours 31


57 Ibid., pp. 68, 80, 84.


64 Richard, *Crusades*, p. 296.


The background

Inner Asian nomadism

Before outlining the process whereby the Mongols, under Temüjin (Chinggis Khan; d. 1227), created the largest continuous land empire in world history, it will be well to consider some general features of Inner Asian nomadic societies. The Pontic steppes (together with their extension beyond the Carpathians into the Hungarian Alföld) formed the westernmost part of the great belt of prairie that stretches eastward as far as Manchuria. These were the lands of nomadic pastoralists – herders of oxen, goats, camels and especially sheep and horses. The nomads’ livestock furnished a good deal of what they needed to survive: meat and milk products (including both horse meat and qumis, the alcoholic beverage derived from fermented mare’s milk), wool (which was also used to make felt for covering tents) and hides. But the notion that these products conferred self-sufficiency (other than in emergency conditions) is a false one. Pastoral nomadism is now viewed as a continuum with, at one end, transhumant societies who are almost sedentarized and at the other a ‘pure’ form of nomadism in which the society’s needs are supplied exclusively by its livestock. This ‘pure’ form is a hypothetical construct and has never existed. In practice, Inner Asian nomadic societies required from their sedentary neighbours grain and other agricultural products, manufactures, notably weapons and other metal goods, and luxury items; they needed the products of the forest-dwelling peoples to the north, such as fish and furs; at the very least, the pastoralists might participate in regular, organized hunts to supplement their food stores. The economy of a tribal society might be mixed. Membership was based on shared political and economic interest rather than on strict ethnic affiliation or genealogical kinship. Thus the tribe might contain both pastoralists and forest peoples,
or some of the tribe, at the margins or in oasis regions, would engage in agricultural activity, and the tribal territory might contain colonies of metalworkers, who were often craftsmen taken prisoner in battle or raids.

Pastoral nomadism as a way of life has certain characteristics that lend themselves readily to the successful conduct of war. Life in the saddle and exposure to extremes of climate bred a proverbial hardiness and resilience. The complex logistical problems entailed in movement between seasonal pastures provided the entire male population with a valuable military training and discipline, to which the exigencies of the annual winter hunt further contributed. It was a training that began very early, since children were taught to ride and to use the bow from around the age of three. The nomads’ skill with the composite bow – a weapon that itself played an important role in their military achievements – was notorious, and access to considerable numbers of horses permitted the creation of a formidably mobile force of mounted archers. Unfortunately, one resource in short supply was the capacity to leave written records, with the result that our view of the nomads is in large measure refracted through the lens of their sedentary neighbours, for whom nomadic greed and brutishness were a byword. The impact of sedentary culture upon these tribal societies varied considerably: the Chinese distinguished the ‘cooked’ barbarians close to their frontiers, who were more susceptible to ‘civilizing’ Chinese influences, from the ‘uncooked’, whose territories lay further away.

Since the beginning of recorded history, China had enjoyed chequered relations with the pastoral nomadic peoples beyond its northern frontiers. On the nomads’ side, the aim was to secure those things which they could not obtain by means of trade; the purpose behind their attacks was not necessarily the conquest and occupation of part of the territory of their sedentary neighbours but to extort the commodities they required, either as tribute or through trade relations. From the vantage-point of successive Chinese governments, nomadic tribal leaders were merely an outlying part of the oecumene of which China was the centre, and their subordinate status could be expressed in the conferment of honorific titles. Trade with the herders, for instance in the products of animal husbandry, had to masquerade as the offer of tribute to the emperor, and, since the Chinese were less dependent upon the nomads’ goods economically than were the nomads upon theirs, the closure of frontier markets and the severance of trade relations could be deployed as a diplomatic weapon.

The steppe nomads possessed imperial traditions of their own. From time to time, various clans would coalesce to form a super tribal power under the rule of a charismatic royal clan which occupied a recognized sacral area and claimed a mandate from Heaven (Tenggeri) to rule the steppe world; the emperor (qaghan) possessed a special charisma and enjoyed the good fortune that was evidence of Heaven’s choice. In the Orqon inscriptions, the seventh- and eighth-century qaghans of the Türks articulated such
hegemonic claims, as did the rulers of the Turkish peoples who inherited their mantle, namely the qaghans of the Khazars, in the western half of the Türk empire (seventh–tenth centuries), and those of the Uighurs, in the eastern half (744–840). The Turks and the Uighurs in succession controlled a sacred centre, the Ötügen-yish in the Orqon valley, which seems to have enjoyed a special status in the eyes of the peoples of the eastern steppe. But no further translatio imperii followed the overthrow of the Uighur empire at the hands of the Turkish Qirghiz. The victorious ruler did not take the title of qaghan; fugitive Uighur dynasts founded principalities elsewhere, notably in the oasis towns of the Tarim basin, where they rapidly sedentarized and adopted an agrarian economy.

Imperial pretensions did not automatically involve designs upon Chinese territory. The eighth-century Turks had clearly deemed it inadvisable to occupy the lands of the Middle Kingdom. But on occasions, a nomadic power did conquer territory from the sedentary Chinese. In the tenth century, the Kitan created an empire that included parts of northern China, from which they expelled the native Song dynasty, and took the Chinese dynastic name of Liao (907–1125). Their tribal name, through its Arabic and Persian form, Khitā, became synonymous with northern China and, as Chata/Catai (‘Cathay’), would come eventually in Latin Europe to denote China as a whole. Steppe nomads themselves, the Kitan defeated the Qirghiz and brought under their sway several other pastoralist tribes, extending their network of garrisons deep into what is now Mongolia, in a marked departure from the policies of past Chinese regimes. The Kitan occupied the site of the old Uighur capital at Qara Balghasun but made no use of it, which suggests that their claims to hegemony rested on a different basis.

In the 1120s, the Kitan were overthrown by the Jurchen, a Tungusic people from the Manchurian plains. A body of Kitan refugees fled westward and, as we saw (p. 15), created a new empire in Central Asia, known to the Muslims as the Qara (‘Black’)-Khitai and to the Chinese as the ‘Western Liao’. Its sovereigns, who bore the style of Gür-khan (‘world-ruler’), ruled over both nomadic and sedentary elements; they may also have extended their authority over some of the tribes of what is now western Mongolia. The Jurchen, who as the Jin dynasty (1123–34) took over the Kitan territories in northern China, concentrated on the war with the Song and advanced even further to the south. They withdrew the steppe garrisons and reverted to the traditional Chinese imperial policy of divide-and-rule. The nomadic tribes who had been subject to the Kitan were left much more to their own devices until the rise of the Mongols under Chinggis Khan.

Various theories have been advanced to account for the periodic emergence of steppe confederacies. Professor Barfield has pointed to the close link between the political development of the nomadic pastoralists and the proximity of powerful sedentary neighbours. It was believed at one time that more aggressive polities arose in the steppe at a time of Chinese weakness.
But the preference for peaceful extortion over war – what Barfield calls the ‘outer frontier policy’ of the nomads – implies, rather, a correlation between Chinese strength and steppe pastoralist aggression. The nomads sought to prop up a weak Chinese regime and resorted to war with China only when a stable and resilient government there prevented them from securing what they needed by any other means.14

Owen Lattimore expressed doubts decades ago regarding explanations of nomadic migration on the grounds of climatic change.15 More recently, however, scientific evidence has emerged to link the profound political changes in Mongolia during Chinggis Khan’s era with climatic developments: several years of drought in the 1180s, engendering acute conflict among the nomadic tribes and the collapse of the existing order, followed by a prolonged period of warm and unusually wet weather from 1211 to 1225, which increased the productivity of the grasslands and made possible a greatly enhanced concentration of military resources.16

### Chinggis Khan and the Mongols

The Mongols are apparently first mentioned among the ‘barbarian’ peoples beyond the northern frontier of China in texts of the Tang era (618–907).17 They were subsequently subject to the Kitan-Liao empire, but with the advent of the Jin they ceased to lie within the Chinese imperial orbit. Apart from sporadic references in contemporary Chinese records, we possess a number of sources for the history of the Mongols down to the rise of Chinggis Khan in the late twelfth century. The earliest is the Mongghol’un niucha tobcha’an (known as the ‘Secret History of the Mongols’), an epic narrative commencing with a mythical account of the formation of the Mongol people; the nearest thing we have to an original text is written in the Mongolian language but in Chinese transcription. The original version ended with Chinggis Khan’s death and apparently dated from 1228, but an account of the reign of his son and successor Ögödei (1229–41) was subsequently added and interpolations were made still later, following the transfer of the imperial dignity to the youngest branch of the dynasty in the person of Ögödei’s nephew, Möngke (1251–59).18 It was probably early in the reign of Möngke’s brother, the Qaghan Qubilai (1260–94), that an unknown author compiled the Altan debter (‘Golden Book’) from records of councils and imperial decrees kept in the treasury. This second Mongolian source has not survived but was apparently rendered into Chinese as the Shengwu qinzheng lu (‘The Deeds of the Holy Warrior’, namely Chinggis Khan) shortly afterwards and was later used by a Jewish convert to Islam, Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh al-Hamadānī (d. 1318), the physician and polymath who rose to be vizier to the Ilkhan, the Mongol ruler of Persia, and whose encyclopedic Jāmiʿ al-tawārikh (‘Collection of Chronicles’), in Persian, was completed in 1303/4.19 In addition, the compilers of the Yuan shi, the official history of
MAP 2.1 Asia in the era of Chinggis Khan
the Mongol Yuan regime in China produced under the Ming dynasty soon after the Mongols’ expulsion in 1368, utilized the ‘veritable records’ of the Yuan era. The occasional detail, lastly, can be gleaned from the reports of visitors to the Mongol world from Latin Europe in the middle decades of the thirteenth century: the Franciscan John of Plano Carpini, who visited the court of the Qaghan Güyük (1246–8) as a papal emissary, the Dominican Simon of Saint-Quentin, who around the same time accompanied another papal embassy to the Caucasus region, and the Franciscan William of Rubruck, who travelled in the Mongol empire in a private capacity, as a missionary, in 1253–5.

It should be noted that none of these works dates from the era of Chinggis Khan himself. But the author of the ‘Secret History’ may have been one of his most prominent followers, his adopted son Shigi Qutuqu, and the work undoubtedly has the advantage that – for all the problems attached to it – it furnishes us directly with a Mongol standpoint. Rashīd al-Dīn, for his part, did not merely consult Mongol materials now lost but also derived a good deal of oral information from Bolod Chingsang (Chengxiang, ‘minister’; d. 1313), who in 1284/5 had accompanied an embassy from the Qaghan Qubilai in China and had remained in Persia. The Jāmiʿ al-tawārikh also drew on an earlier Persian work by a Muslim author, the Taʾrikh-i jahān-gushā (‘History of the World-Conqueror’), which ‘Alāʾ al-Dīn ‘Atā Malik Juwaynī completed around 1260 and which includes some brief remarks about the Mongols prior to the rise of Chinggis Khan. Juwaynī, a Persian bureaucrat in the Mongols’ service, based some of his material on the oral testimony of Mongol officials whom he met in the course of a visit to the qaghan’s headquarters in 1252–3. His work in turn was used by the Jacobite Christian prelate, Gregorius Abū l-Faraj, better known as Bar Hebraeus (d. 1286), who furnishes us with precious information of his own.

In the twelfth century, the Mongols, inhabiting the valleys of the Onon and Kerülen rivers, were by no means the most prominent among the tribes of the eastern Asian steppe. More powerful were the Naiman, whose pastures lay along the upper Irtysh and on the northern slopes of the Altai range and who may have been of Turkish stock (although their name is Mongolian); indeed, Western European visitors in the 1240s thought that the Mongols had formerly been tributary to the Naiman. The principal rivals of the Naiman were the Kereyit (Kerait), on the Orqon and Tuula rivers, who were probably Mongolian but whose ruling class may have been largely Turkish. At least as strong as the Mongols were the Merkit, a forest people in the regions south of Lake Baikal, along the lower Selenga, and the Tatars, who nomadized close to the Külün Nor and the Buyur Nor. The Tatars may have played a more prominent role in Inner Asian affairs earlier, in the eighth and ninth centuries, so that, both for the Chinese and for Islamic writers further west, their name had, it seems, become synonymous with non-Turkish peoples in general, and the Mongols, emerging from the eastern steppe, would naturally be known as Tatars.
The political sophistication of these tribes varied. The Naiman were in contact with the culture of the semi-sedentary Uighurs to the south, from whom they may have borrowed a written alphabet and rudimentary administrative techniques like a chancery, and with the Qara-Khitai empire, whose influence is harder to determine. Both the Naiman and the Kereyit represented more or less stable and cohesive entities under a ruling dynasty of khans, whereas the level of social integration of the Mongols was still that of the clan (obogh).27

It is a moot point how far we can trust the account given in the ‘Secret History’ of the immediate ancestors of Temüjin, the future Chinggis Khan. Internal evidence, backed by the report of an envoy from Song China in 1221, suggests that his father may have been of relatively humble stock.28

It has been further proposed that the title of qaghan, with its imperial overtones, applied in the ‘Secret History’ to twelfth-century Mongol leaders like the conqueror’s great-grandfather is anachronistic and is designed to promote the legitimacy of Chinggis Khan’s newly-founded imperial dynasty. The fragmentary data in Jurchen-Jin sources that speak of a ‘great Mongol state’ in the 1150s represent, in fact, a distortion by sedentary authors who were unable to conceive of a concentration of military power in terms other than the familiar metaphors of statehood. Such amalgamations of clans as occurred in this early period were temporary affairs, designed purely to maximize success in warfare and the booty that would accrue from it and did not outlast the campaign: they did not prefigure the Mongol empire of the thirteenth century.29 In fact, the manner in which many of our thirteenth-century sources allude to the weakness and poverty of the Mongols prior to the rise of Chinggis Khan suggests that their political fragmentation in the twelfth century was a prominent element in their folk memory.30

There can be no doubt that the ‘Secret History’ is much more reliable when it opens a window onto a world dominated by blood feuds31 and constantly shifting alliances, in which Jin diplomacy was ever ready to intervene. Temüjin’s father Yesügei stole his bride from the Merkit, who retaliated belatedly by abducting Temüjin’s wife Börte. Yesügei, whose forebears had been confronted by an alliance between the Tatars and the Jin government, was poisoned by the Tatars, and his son would later wreak a bloody revenge on them by slaughtering all the tribe’s adult males. At his father’s death, the young Temüjin and his mother and brothers, who represented the Borjigin clan, were deserted by the other Mongol clans, headed by the Tayichi’ut, and the family endured many years of hardship before Temüjin was able to reconstitute Yesügei’s following. This he did with the aid of Yesügei’s old ally and blood-brother (anda), Toghril, khan of the Kereyit, whose friendship and military cooperation were instrumental in his rise to power in the steppe. The two men profited from Jin disillusionment with the Tatar alliance and overthrew the Tatars in a joint campaign with Jin forces (1202). In recognition, the Jin gave Temüjin a lesser military rank and
Toghril the Chinese honorific title of wang (‘prince’), which was corrupted in the steppe world so that he became known as Ong Khan.

But the relationship between Temüjin and his benefactor grew strained, and in 1203 Temüjin overthrew the Kereyit ruler, who was killed while fleeing through Naiman territory. His forces augmented by those of the Kereyit, the victor next turned on the Naiman, gravely weakened by the feuds between the two sons of its late khan. The Naiman khanate too was destroyed (1204), and only a remnant, headed by Guchülug, the son of one of the brothers, escaped westward to take refuge, eventually, in Qara-Khitai territory. Temüjin had already crushed the Merkit. At an assembly (quriltai) of princes, princesses and military commanders in 1206, he was proclaimed ruler of the nomadic peoples, under the title Chinggis Khan. It was not until c.1218, however, at the time of his great westward expedition, that he selected as his base camp Qaraqorum, a locality close to the Orqon and hence in the region traditionally viewed as the sacred centre of their imperium by the Türks and Uighurs. The Franciscan missionary William of Rubruck, who travelled through the empire in 1253–5, when the place had grown into a town of sorts, says that the Mongols regarded it as ‘royal’, although the choice may also have responded to favourable climatic conditions.32

At this time, China was divided among three powers. While the native Song were still entrenched south of the Yellow River and the Jurchen-Jin dominated the north, the Tanggut, a people regarded by the Chinese as of Tibetan origin, had established in the Gansu corridor a kingdom known as Xi Xia. Chinggis Khan first gained allies in the strategic intermediate zone along the northern frontier of the Jin empire, notably the semi-sedentary Turkish Önggit people and those Kitan who lived under Jin rule,33 and reduced the Tanggut kingdom to tributary status. In 1211, he embarked on a protracted war with the Jin empire; its former capital, Zhongdu (close to modern Beijing), fell to the Mongols in 1215. Although far greater success ultimately attended the Mongols’ operations in China than those of their steppe predecessors such as the Kitan, the reduction of the entire county took a long time. The Jin state was not finally overthrown until 1234, during the reign of Chinggis Khan’s son and successor, Ögödei. More than another generation elapsed before the Mongols eliminated the Song empire in the south (1279). Not long prior to this, the Qaghan Qubilai had adopted for his regime the Chinese dynastic style of Yuan (1271) and thus reigned as both Mongol sovereign and Chinese emperor.

Mongol operations in the West

As early as c.1208, Chinggis Khan’s attention was being drawn towards Central Asia. By this time, the Qara-Khitai empire was moribund. In the west, its Muslim subordinates repudiated its authority. Chief among them was ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Tekish, the shāh of Khwārazm on the lower
Amū-daryā (River Oxus), who seized the opportunity to extend his rule over Transoxiana and Persia. The Mongol victories, moreover, had encouraged the Gūr-khan’s eastern clients to seek Chinggis Khan’s protection, notably the ruler (iduq-qut) of the Uighurs of Beshbaligh, who became the first monarch of a more or less sedentary state to submit to the Mongols of his own free will (1209). The stability of the Qara-Khitai empire was further undermined by the influx of Naiman and Merkit fugitives in sizeable numbers under the leadership of Chinggis Khan’s old enemy Gūchūlūg, who first married the Gūr-khan’s daughter and then supplanted him (1211); subsequently, he engaged in hostilities with the Khwārazmshāh. His accession to the throne of the still by no means negligible Qara-Khitai polity alerted the Mongols to a potential threat, and Chinggis Khan sent forces which hunted him down and killed him somewhere in the Pamirs (1218).  

Although a Mongol division had, as early as 1209–10, clashed with the forces of the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad, harmonious relations were briefly established. Chinggis Khan evinced a desire to be on friendly terms, pointing to the trade that was to their mutual benefit, and indeed Gūchūlūg’s activities were a matter of concern to both rulers. But the steady advance of the Mongols made the Khwārazmshāh apprehensive of his new eastern neighbour. He authorized the massacre of a group of merchants, who were acting as Mongol envoys but who were suspected of being spies, and brought down upon his head a seven-year campaign (1218–25), headed by Chinggis Khan in person. The Khwārazmian state was demolished; its principal cities were sacked and left in ruins, and Muḥammad himself died as an abject fugitive on an island in the Caspian Sea (1221). For a time, the conqueror lingered in present-day Afghanistan, supervising operations against the shah’s son, Jalāl al-Dīn, who fled to India.  

During Chinggis Khan’s final years, Mongol forces were engaged in the reduction of the steppe and forest peoples further to the west. The task was rendered especially necessary in the case of the Cumans/Qipchāq and the related groups belonging to the Qangli by their close links with the Khwarazmian state and the shelter afforded to Merkit fugitives. One important detachment was headed by the noyans (generals) Jebe (or Yeme) and Sübeʿetei, who, in pursuit of the Khwārazmshāh (of whose demise the Mongols were as yet unaware), pushed through northern Persia and northward through the Caucasus before rejoining Chinggis Khan by way of the Pontic steppe as he headed back towards Mongolia. In the course of this expedition, the Mongols ravaged Georgia, defeated the Alans in the Caucasus and overwhelmed a Cuman/Qipchāq army and its allies among the Rus’ princes on the River Kalka (1223); their forces sacked the Crimean port of Soldaia (Sūdāq) in January 1223. During their homeward journey, however, they themselves suffered a reverse at the hands of the Volga Bulgars. Another force in the region, active against the Qangli, was commanded by Chinggis Khan’s eldest son Jochi, who predeceased his father (1225).
Chinggis Khan’s last campaign was against the Tanggut kingdom, where he died in 1227, just before his generals dealt it the *coup de grâce*. The Mongol empire now stretched from Manchuria to the Caspian and from the Siberian forests to the Hindu Kush. At an early date, Chinggis Khan had apportioned the nomadic peoples among his kinsfolk, who also had their own specified pasturelands – the complex termed in Mongolian *ulus*. The larger of these units went to his four sons by Börte, his chief wife: Jochi, Chaghadai, Ögödei and Tolui. After the death of Jochi, who received the westernmost territory, his *ulus* was shared out among his numerous sons: of these, Batu effectively founded the Mongol power in the Pontic and Caspian steppes, later known to historians as the ‘Golden Horde’.

In keeping with the conqueror’s own desire, his third son, Ögödei (1229–41), was elected as his successor. While the new qaghan concentrated on the continued war in China, he did not neglect other fronts. Following his enthronement, fresh Mongol forces moved westward. The noyan Chormaghnun headed an expedition to annihilate the remnants of the Khwarazmians in western Persia; their shah, Jalāl al-Dīn, fled and was killed in the mountains of Kurdistan in 1231. Chormaghnun proceeded to subjugate Christian Georgia and Greater Armenia (1236–9). Likewise in 1229, a campaign had been launched through the steppe against not only the Cumans/Qipchāq and Qangli but the Bulgars, the Mordvins, the Bashkirs and other forest peoples in the Volga–Ural region. Resistance proved tenacious and little progress was made, but it is likely that the imperial government was concerned merely to maintain a military presence on this front for the time being. Lattimore’s thesis – that Chinggis Khan sought to eliminate all potential opposition in the steppe prior to embarking on the conquest of China – runs counter to the evidence. Envoys from Song China who visited Ögödei’s court in 1237 thought that Chinggis Khan had deliberately postponed further campaigns against the Qipchāq until after the overthrow of the Jurchen-Jin. It appears that his successor adhered to this policy.

Thus it was not until 1236 that Ögödei despatched a large army – headed in effect by the veteran noyan Sübe’etei but under the nominal command of Batu – to complete the subjugation of the western steppes. Other princely commanders included not only Batu’s brothers but the qaghan’s own sons Güyük and Qadan; Büri and Baidar, the sons of his second brother Chaghadai; and Möngke and Böchek, the sons of his youngest brother Tolui. Bulghār was sacked (1237) and the Bashkirs reduced to submission. By the end of 1239, Cuman/Qipchāq resistance was virtually over, and hordes of fugitives poured westward into Hungary or south into the Latin empire of Romania. The Mongols had also renewed the attack on the north Caucasus region and mounted a devastating assault on Rus’, defeating and killing the Grand Prince Iury II on the River Sit’ (1238) and sacking, among other cities, Riazan’ (1237), Vladimir-in-Suzdal’ (1238) and Chernigov (1239). The spring thaws spared Novgorod from attack, but there is some slight
evidence that the Mongols advanced into Karelia, on the fringes of the Baltic region. Kiev, the ecclesiastical centre and metropolitan city of Rus’, fell on 6 December 1240, and Batu’s forces wintered in the principality of Galicia-Volynia, while Mikhail of Chernigov and Daniil Romanovich of Galicia, who had contested both these principalities and Kiev for some years, fled to Poland. The Mongols were now poised to enter the territory of Latin Christendom.

The Mongol military and administrative machine

Already, when Chinggis Khan’s armies burst into the sedentary worlds of northern China and Transoxiana, the ‘great Mongol people’ (yeke Mongghol ulus) comprised not only Mongols but also other peoples of the eastern steppe, notably Tatars, Kereyit, Naiman and Önggüt. Its sway extended, too, over semi-sedentary societies like the Uighurs, and the western campaign would bring back significant numbers of slaves of both sexes, to serve as artisans and concubines. By 1241 peoples of Mongolian type were almost certainly outnumbered by the Turkish nomads who during Ögödei’s reign had been rolled up in the Mongol war machine. The Mongol forces also included peoples of Finnish stock like the Mordvins, dwelling west of the middle Volga, who are described as moving ahead of them during Batu’s campaign, and the closely related Moksha, Rubruck’s ‘Moxel’, of whom the friar would be told that the greater number had been killed in Germany. The Mongols became known in both the Islamic world and Europe as ‘Tatars’ – possibly, as we have seen (p. 38), a general designation further west for steppe peoples who were not Turks. In the political sense, the term embraced even client sedentary rulers and their subjects. ‘You are now a Tatar like us’, the Galician chronicle makes Batu tell Prince Daniil Romanovich when offering him qumis in 1246: ‘drink our drink’.

Although the Mongol empire had rapidly evolved into more than just a confederacy of steppe- and forest-dwelling peoples, it was governed very much as a large tribal federation. Thus all the peoples it comprised, whether pastoralist or sedentary, were subject in some degree to the customary law (Mongolian josun/yosun) of the steppe; all were expected in addition to obey each and every ruling (Mongolian jasagb/Turkish and Persian yasa) promulgated by Chinggis Khan. These originally ad hoc regulations, concerned broadly with affairs of state, military matters and the annual hunt, were reissued and supplemented by his successors. Some confusion attaches to the term yasa, which was at one time taken to be a code of law drawn up by the conqueror at his enthronement (the so-called Great Yasa). As his regulations came, in time, to be revered in the same way as his adages (biligs). ‘Chinggis Khan’s Yasa’ would become shorthand for the system or world-order over which the Mongols presided.
In accordance with steppe tradition, the empire was regarded as the joint possession of the imperial dynasty as a whole. With the reduction of sedentary territories, Mongol princes and princesses received groups of enslaved craftsmen, revenues from particular cities and sometimes even physical possession of such urban centres. By the end of Ögödei’s reign, what Professor Paul Buell has called ‘joint satellite administrations’, comprising representatives of the qaghan and the princes of the various branches of the imperial dynasty, had been set up for conquered sedentary regions like northern China, Transoxiana and Khurāsān, which lay outside the steppe territories assigned as princely ulus.

Chinggis Khan’s extraordinary career of conquest and the ability of his successors to extend his empire still further rested on a number of foundations. In some measure, Mongol strength sprang from precisely the circumstances that, as we have seen, underlay the vigour of earlier steppe powers. Every adult male was a warrior. Both Juwaynī and the Latin missionary William of Rubruck recognized this – the first when he exclaims that the Mongol forces are ‘a peasantry after the fashion of an army... and an army in the guise of a peasantry’, the latter when he contemplates what European peasants might accomplish were they to embrace the Mongols’ lifestyle. This might suggest that the Mongols achieved their conquests through sheer strength of numbers. But in fact the population of Mongolia in Chinggis Khan’s day has been estimated at around 700,000, on the basis of the total of 129,000 given by Rashīd al-Dīn for the Mongol troops at Chinggis Khan’s death. The figure does not include the auxiliaries required from princes who had submitted or (apart from some 20,000 Kitan and Jurchen troops) foreign contingents brought over by defectors. Yet it needs to be borne in mind that Chinggis Khan’s military resources were, even at this stage, stretched over a vast area from northern Persia to northern China and absorbed in simultaneous campaigns against major powers like the Jin and the Tanggut. We know, moreover, that the Mongols were adept at spreading an inflated idea of their own strength with a view to intimidating their antagonists. The question whether Mongol forces were numerically superior to those of their enemies must remain unresolved. In fact, what was decisive in the Mongols’ conquests, it seems, was not numbers but the composition of their armies and the impact they made on the enemy. We might note that their weaponry (see p. 78) and their capacity for siege warfare have certainly been underestimated. The evidence suggests that from as early as 1211, they were employing Chinese siege engineers and that they may have brought with them to Western Asia both incendiary devices and gunpowder borrowed from the Chinese. It has been proposed that this gave them a decisive edge over their opponents.

As regards military organization, although observers like Juwaynī would comment on the effectiveness of the decimal system of command, in which the pivotal unit was the thousand (mingghan), that system did not in fact
represent an innovation, having long been a feature of the armies of steppe
confederacies and latterly of both the Kitan and the Jurchen.\textsuperscript{57} So too Ching-
gis Khan imposed on his troops a series of \textit{jasaghs/lyasas} forbidding, for
instance, any man, on pain of death, to abandon the pursuit of the enemy in
search of plunder until victory was assured or to desert the unit to which he
had been allocated.\textsuperscript{58} Yet the rigorous discipline enforced within the Mon-
gol army, which made a profound impression on contemporary observers,
is unlikely to have surpassed the discipline prevalent in the ranks of the
Jurchen-Jin,\textsuperscript{59} though it does seem that the Mongols’ military operations
were accompanied by extremely careful strategic planning and involved
adhesion to the most rigid timetable.\textsuperscript{60}

More significant as mainstays in the development of the imperial struc-
ture were the emergence of the guard (\textit{keshig}) and the partial dismantling
of the tribal structure of the steppe. The \textit{keshig}, made up of the conqueror’s
sworn companions (Mongolian \textit{nököd}; sing. \textit{nökör}), not only protected
Chinggis Khan’s person and performed the numerous duties associated with
the imperial household; it also functioned as a training corps for those given
command in the military at large (and hence, in this early phase, employed
in governing the empire).\textsuperscript{61} Military commanders, personally selected by
the qaghan, owed their appointments to ability and not to their status in
the tribal hierarchy. The tribes which had mounted the most strenuous
opposition, like the Tatars, the Merkit, the Kereyit and the Naiman, were
systematically broken up and divided among new military units. Peoples
who had submitted more or less readily were left intact, but even they were
usually placed under officers from other tribes. By these means, the steppe
nomads were welded into a single ‘Mongol’ people; allegiance to the impe-
rial dynasty did not simply transcend but superseded the old tribal and clan
affiliations and in large measure neutralized the centrifugal tendencies that
had led to the disintegration of previous steppe powers.\textsuperscript{62}

The cohesiveness of the Mongol military stood in sharp contrast with
the disunity of their enemies, which Chinggis Khan and his successors took
care to exploit. The political fragmentation of early thirteenth-century Rus’
under the prolific Riurikid dynasty is notorious.\textsuperscript{63} But division also charac-
terized the two most formidable polities confronting the Mongols. Jurchen
rule was deeply resented by the Kitan still living in the northern borderlands
of China, large numbers of whom joined the Mongols or coordinated their
own operations against the Jin with those of Mongol commanders. Subse-
quently, even native Chinese and Jurchen officers and troops defected to
the invaders.\textsuperscript{64} In western Asia, the Khwārzmshāh’s bitter quarrel with the
ʿAbbasid Caliph (not to mention his lack of success against his infidel neigh-
bour Gūchūlūg) impaired his capacity to pose as an exponent of orthodoxy
and the \textit{jihād}, while the unreliability of significant elements in his recently
accumulated dominions undermined his preparations for resistance.\textsuperscript{65} By
contrast, Chinggis Khan’s evenhanded religious policy (see pp. 47–8) also
served the Mongols well, so that the Gür-khan’s Muslim subjects in eastern Turkestan, who had been persecuted by Güchüülüg, welcomed them as liberators.66

As an act of vengeance for the murder of Mongol envoys, Chinggis Khan’s campaign against the Khwārazmian empire was attended by considerable destruction. Rejection of the appeal to accept Mongol rule, moreover, could result in a wholesale massacre. This was especially true where fortified cities were concerned and where Mongol losses had been heavy or included persons of importance. Two examples will suffice. When Bāmiyān (in present-day Afghanistan) was taken (1221), every living thing was slaughtered because Chinggis Khan’s favourite grandson had been killed during the siege. At Kozel’sk, in the Chernigov region of Rus’, the fact that three sons of Mongol generals had fallen in the course of the investment prompted a general massacre (1238).67 The nomadic Mongols did not understand urban culture, and one purpose behind such tactics, of course, may have been to discourage resistance on the part of other towns.68 Even so, stories such as that retailed by the Muslim chronicler Jūzjānī, about great quantities of human bones and fat strewn on the ground not far from the Jin capital, Zhongdu, have perhaps led historians in the past to exaggerate the extent to which wholesale slaughter was deployed.69 We know that the Mongols deliberately fostered a terrifying image of themselves through their use of violence.70

The nascent Mongol administration bore the stamp of a number of influences. It has been proposed that Chinggis Khan borrowed a good deal from the Kereyit, of whose khan he had been a protégé during a formative period.71 But more important for the future development of the empire was the recruitment of officials belonging to semi-sedentary peoples like the Uighurs.72 It was an Uighur previously in the service of the khan of the Naiman who introduced Chinggis Khan to the Uighur script and, on his instructions, adapted it for the use of written Mongolian. By 1206, a rudimentary secretariat was emerging in the entourage of the Mongol ruler. The role of ‘cooked barbarians’ from the frontier zone between Mongolia and China, like the Kitan and the Önggüt, should also not be discounted. The influence of the officials of the defunct Qara-Khitai regime who entered the conquerors’ service can perhaps be discerned in the Mongol institution of the jamilyam (or postal relay system), in the use of the tablet of authority (paiza) and in the office of darūgha[chī] or basqaq (the commissioner in charge of a conquered city or the ‘resident’ appointed to the court of a subordinate ruler in order to oversee his activities and supervise the mustering of resources on the Mongols’ behalf).73 We know of two Muslim Turks who waited on Chinggis Khan and undertook, according to the ‘Secret History’, to initiate the Mongols into ‘the laws and customs of cities’, by which is possibly meant urban and commercial taxation,74 and merchants from Inner Asia, for whom the Mongols furnished capital and protection, and who
are known to have played a prominent role in the evolution of the Mongol polity. A system of registration of the nomadic population for taxation purposes, already in existence by 1206, was extended to cover the Mongols’ sedentary subjects during Ögödei’s reign, beginning with a census of north China in 1236.

The Mongols and religion

The indigenous cultic practices of the Mongols belonged in the category generally (but misleadingly) characterized as shamanism. The role of the shaman (Turkish qam; Mongol böge) was to mediate between the community and the forces to which life was subject, in order to ensure prosperity or secure guidance. This entailed communication with the world of spirits, invisible powers which dwelt in the forests and particularly in mountains. On this more will be said later in this volume (see Chapter 11). Although the ‘Secret History’ provides no evidence for a cult of the sky (Tenggeri, ‘Heaven’) or any of the gods whom the Mongols shared with other peoples of the steppe, there are nevertheless grounds for believing that during the early decades of the conquest era, Tenggeri was beginning to take on the characteristics of a supreme and omnipotent deity (allowing, of course, for distortion on the part of outside observers steeped in monotheistic culture).

The Mongols’ expansion brought them into contact with Muslims, Buddhists and – in smaller numbers – Manichaeans, but they would undoubtedly have encountered Christianity even prior to their emergence from their homeland. Since at least the eighth century, Nestorian Christianity had been present in the eastern steppe, and Christians are found among the Tatars in the eleventh. Juwaynī believed that the majority of the Naiman were Christians, and even though Bar Hebraeus was probably wrong to identify the khan of the Kereyit as a Turkish ruler converted as early as 1007, Toghril-Ong Khan’s immediate ancestors bore names that are unmistakably Christian; the faith had likewise made progress among the Önggüt.

The steppe tradition was one of syncretism and inclusiveness in matters of religion. The early Qara-Khitai sovereigns had treated Muslims with favour and shown reverence towards Muslim learned men (‘ulamā). It was Chinggis Khan’s decree that his representatives and troops permit the practice of all religious faiths (insofar as these did not clash with the customary law of the steppe). But the ‘religious class’ within each confessional group benefited still further, since the respect accorded to shamans extended to holy men within other religious cultures. The understanding was that they would pray for the imperial dynasty. Rubruck would observe that the Qaghan Möngke wanted everyone to pray on his behalf (p. 311). In 1222, Chinggis Khan granted immunity from taxation and from forced labour to Daoists of the Quanzhen sect, whose leader waited upon him at his invitation during the campaign in western Asia. The fact that the conqueror was
interested in the secret of prolonging life in the strictly biological sense should alert us to the possibilities for misunderstanding on the part of those for whom eternal life had a quite different meaning.

The ideology of world-rulership

Like earlier steppe powers, the Mongols embraced an ideology of universal dominion whereby their sovereigns ruled in the strength of their good fortune (suu) and by virtue of a mandate from Heaven (Tenggeri). Most probably Chinggis Khan derived his concept of empire from the Mongols’ nomadic precursors like the eighth-century Türks and via the Uighurs: the initial formulae of Mongol diplomatic documents were in Turkish. The difference, however, was that for the Mongols the mandate came to be valid for the whole world and not just the nomadic tribes of the steppe. All nations were de jure subject to them, and anyone who opposed them was thereby a rebel (bulgha). In fact, the Turkish word employed for ‘peace’ was that used also to express subjection (il/el): there could be no peace with the Mongols in the absence of submission. The part that Chinese imperial ideas played in this is uncertain, though it should be noted that the Türks and later powers like the Kitan had themselves borrowed ideas from China.

We should guard against the assumption that world-conquest was the Mongols’ goal at the very outset, which is implicit, for instance, in Lattimore’s thesis (see p. 42). The ‘Secret History’ mentions Heaven’s mandate to Temüjin only once and even then puts it into the mouth of the shaman Kököchü (Teb-Tenggeri), and the context is rule over the Mongol ulus, i.e. (at that time) the steppe nomads; nothing is said here of world-rulership. It has been proposed that the Mongols came to believe in a mandate of world-dominion only when they found that this was the task in which they were engaged, as no power appeared to be capable of withstanding them. The earliest direct evidence for the belief in such a programme dates, in fact, from the 1240s. By that juncture, it is clear that the Mongols not only believed in a divine mandate to conquer the world but associated this mission with an edict of Chinggis Khan himself; how accurate this tradition was, we cannot be sure. Although in his first diplomatic overtures to the Khwārazmshāh, he allegedly addressed him as ‘son’, this implies merely that he himself was the senior prince. It is conceivable, of course, that Chinggis Khan aimed initially at nothing more than the subjugation of the steppe nomadic tribes – ‘the people of the felt-walled tents’, as the ‘Secret History’ puts it when recounting his enthronement in 1206. This task was not completed by the time he died, but his aspirations may have changed following the Khwārazmian campaign, and his successor, equally, may have conceived of the task in broader terms. For what it is worth, an observer in Latin Europe writing as early as 1237–8 formed the impression that the
conqueror had begun to dream of world-conquest in the wake of the rapid collapse of the Khwārazmian empire. In this connection, it is important to notice that Juwaynī (writing c.1260) gives the gist of the Mongols’ ultimatum to the city of Nīshāpūr in eastern Persia in 1220, in which they already claimed to rule the whole world. Although Juwaynī was possibly reading back into Chinggis Khan’s own lifetime concepts that had taken hold only in the intervening period, he could well be offering authentic testimony as to the Mongols’ ideology at this stage. The transition, which probably took several years, must have been hastened by the flight of nomadic groups into the lands of sedentary or semi-sedentary peoples, as for instance of Gūchūlūg into the Qara-Khitai empire and (more particularly) of the Cuman/Qipchāq into Rus’ and later into Hungary.

Whatever the case, the ideology of world-dominion found unequivocal expression in the ultimatums that the Mongols were sending to the Latin West by the mid-1240s. In these documents, which in the Mongol view were quite simply ‘Orders of God’, the recipient was informed of his place in the Mongol world-empire, was ordered to recognize it by submitting in person and making his resources and troops available to the conquerors and was warned that persistence in ‘rebellion’ carried consequences which were no less menacing for being left unspecified. Take, for instance, the most celebrated of these ultimatums, the letter of the Qaghan Gūyuq to Innocent IV, brought back by the papal envoy Carpini in 1247:

In the power of God, all lands, from the rising of the sun to its setting, have been made subject to us. . . . You in person, at the head of the kings, should in a body, with one accord, come and do obeisance to us. This is what we make known to you. If you act contrary to it, what do we know? God knows.

Mongol diplomatic subterfuge

Nevertheless, this uncompromising stance could be modified in certain circumstances. In the first place, client princes or private individuals such as merchants sometimes misrepresented the character of Mongol overlordship to an independent ruler in order to persuade him to submit, inflate their own standing with the Mongols and gain rewards: in this way the merchant Shams al-Dīn ʿUmar Qazwīnī, bringing an ultimatum to the Seljūk Sultan of Rūm, had made light of Mongol requirements and had prevailed upon him to send back a subservient message in 1237. Secondly, and more importantly, the Mongols themselves, as Carpini would observe, adopted a less harsh tone towards states which lay on the far borders of countries that had not yet yielded, in order that these distant powers might not join the fight against them. More than this, the Mongols were capable of outright duplicity. Chinggis Khan’s own rise to power in the steppe had shown
the desirability, on occasions, of allying with one people against another, in order to turn against the erstwhile ally later. In completing the reduction of the Jin, Ögedei accepted the help of their Song enemies, only to clash with them in the following year (1235). During their westward expansion, the Mongols proved adept at splitting a heterogeneous opposition, as in 1222, when Jebe and Sibe’etani, after defeating the Alans in the Caucasus, moved against the Cumans/Qipchâq, whom they had induced to desert the Alans on the grounds of a common nomadic heritage. They essayed a similar tactic, though unsuccessfully, in order to detach the Rus’ from their Cuman allies prior to the engagement on the Kalka in 1223.104

In particular, it seems, the Mongols exploited the religious susceptibilities of the peoples who lay in the path of their advance, so as to take them at a disadvantage. When reports of the assault on the Khwârazmian empire reached the ears of the leaders of the Fifth Crusade in Egypt (1221), the Mongols were seen – like the Qara-Khitai eighty years previously – as a Christian army on its way to help its coreligionists. Their ruler was known as ‘King David’ (a designation which has yet to be explained), and the crusade leaders forwarded to Western Europe a lengthy if somewhat romantic account of his career and conquests, the Historia gestorum regis David Indo-rum (‘History of the Deeds of David, King of the Indies’), along with two shorter documents (chartae) supplying variant accounts of his campaigns.105 He planned to take Jerusalem, and his envoys secured the release of Christian prisoners held by the Caliph and sent them to Antioch. The Nestorian origin of this tale is clear from the fact that Catholicus Yahballaha II (‘Iaphhelech’) allegedly acted as the Caliph’s agent in inciting David to attack the Khwârazmshâh – an improbable role but one which echoes contemporary Muslim notions that the Caliph had instigated the Mongol invasion of western Asia.106 In fact, however, the reports that reached the crusaders did not merely represent a distorted perspective on Chinggis Khan’s own campaigns but embodied a pastiche of elements drawn from a number of distinct conflicts during the opening decades of the thirteenth century. They were based in part on the hostilities between the fugitive Naiman (and one-time Christian) prince, Güchülüg, and the Muslim Khwârazmshâh in the preceding few years and drew in addition upon a series of events in the eastern marches of the Islamic world reaching as far back as 1204.107 The bishop of Acre, Jacques de Vitry, readily identified David as the son or grandson of the long-awaited Prester John and was active in exploiting the good news in order to boost crusader morale.108 The impact was reinforced by prophecies current in the crusading army, regarding the simultaneous arrival of Christian monarchs from East and West and the downfall of Islam.109 The crusaders were sufficiently emboldened to reject the Egyptian Sultan’s peace terms and to press ahead with a hazardous offensive up the Nile. As a result, they were defeated and obliged to withdraw from the county.110 The Fifth Crusade had achieved nothing; nor had the expected Christian allies materialized.
It is hard to know what we should make of an apocalyptic tract, headed in some manuscripts *Nova pestis contra ecclesiam* (‘A Fresh Affliction Confronting the Church’) and, in one version, allegedly transmitted to the pope by the patriarch of Jerusalem. It announces the approach of a strange people (unnamed but, from the description of their clothing and weaponry, clearly the Mongols). Led by ‘pseudo-prophets’, they allegedly preach Christ and claim to carry him with them in a chariot, decked out in gold and precious stones; this figure bears a book written in Hebrew, Greek and Latin which claims to fulfil the New Testament and a copy of which is given to every visiting envoy. Evidently, this twofold misapprehension stems from the fact that the Mongols carried around in a wagon an image (Mong. *onggon*; pl. *ongghod*) of Chinggis Khan, before which foreign envoys were required to bow, and that his name, accompanied by the style ‘Son of God’, appeared at the head of Mongol ultimatums. Usually attributed to the same period as the *Historia gestorum regis David*, *Nova pestis* strikes a much less positive note overall, describing the slaughter of Christian clergy and monks. The fact that accounts of such massacres in Greater Armenia and Mesopotamia appear first to have surfaced in the 1230s suggests that it belongs to that decade; the allusion to the invaders as already at ‘our borders’ might even argue for a date not long prior to 1244.

Although the optimism of the *Historia gestorum regis David*, at least, reflected Nestorian – and then Latin – wishful thinking, *Nova pestis*, together with other evidence from widely distant parts of the Christian world, indicates that such illusions were fuelled by the Mongols’ own tactics in the course of the campaigns of Jebe and Sübe’etei in 1221–3. The Georgian Constable Ivané complained to Pope Honorius III that the Mongols had tricked his people by having a cross carried at the head of their army. According to the Armenian historian Kirakos Ganjakec’i, rumours had preceded them to the effect that they were ‘magi’ who possessed a portable tent-church and a miracle-working cross and had come to avenge the injuries suffered by Christians at the hands of the Muslims. Thus deceived, the population made no preparations for defence, while one priest and his flock even went to meet the invaders with crosses, only to be massacred. There is a striking echo of this in the description of the Mongols’ capture in 1223 of the small Rus’ town of Novgorod-Sviatopolch, on the western bank of the Dnieper, as transmitted by the Galician chronicle. Here we read that ‘the people were not aware of their treachery and came out to meet them with crosses in their hands, but the Tatars slaughtered all of them’. Nothing is said directly here of the Mongols’ carrying a cross or pretending to be Christians, but the episode implies that they had employed the same ruse as in Georgia. It must have been tactics of this kind which gave rise to the belief that each division of King David’s army was preceded by a cross.

The Mongols’ intelligence had not failed them. They had presumably learned from the local Muslims that the Georgian army, when on campaign,
was in the habit of carrying a cross aloft;\textsuperscript{120} they would also have been
informed of the reverence in which the cross was held among the Caucasian
Alans, to the extent that anyone bearing a cross tied to a spear could allegedly
travel in security even among pagans.\textsuperscript{121} The question whether the Mongols
were at this stage deliberately setting out to dupe the Christian powers among
those they regarded as their enemies must perhaps remain open. But the result
was, as the Georgian Queen Rusudan put it, that ‘we took no precautions
against them because we believed them to be Christians’.\textsuperscript{122} Similar accusa-
tions of duplicity would be levelled at the Mongols during the invasion of
Hungary and Poland in 1241.\textsuperscript{123} It is important that we do not lose sight of
these alternative, less direct modes of Mongol diplomacy and warfare.

Notes
1 John Masson Smith, Jr, ‘Mongol campaign rations: milk, marmots, and blood?’,
in Pierre Oberling, ed., Turks, Hungarians and Kipchaks. A Festschrift in Honor
2 Rudi Paul Lindner, ‘What was a nomadic tribe?’, CSSH 24 (1982), pp. 689–711
(here pp. 702–3).
in his Studies.
4 Idem, ‘The guilt of the northern barbarian’, in Larry V. Clark and Paul Alex-
ander Draghi, eds., Aspects of Altaic Civilization II. Proceedings of the XVIII
PIAC, Bloomington, June 29–July 5, 1975, IUUAS 134 (Bloomington, IN, 1978),
pp. 171–82, and repr. in Sinor, Studies. For a fuller study, see Johannes Gießauf,
Bärbaren – Monster – Gottesgeißeln. Steppennomaden im europäischen Spiegel
der Spätantike und des Mittelalters (Graz, 2006). As Naomi Standen, ‘Raiding and
frontier society in the Five Dynasties’, in Nicola Di Cosmo and Don F. Wyatt, eds.,
Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and Human Geographies in Chinese His-
tory (London and New York, 2003), pp. 160–91, demonstrates, the nomads had
no monopoly of raiding: sedentary powers raided the nomads and one another.
5 See Magnus Fiskesjö, ‘On the “raw” and the “cooked” barbarians of Imperial
China’, Inner Asia 1 (1999), pp. 139–68 (though none of his examples is taken
from Mongolia).
6 Sechin Jagchid, ‘Patterns of trade and conflict between China and the nomads
of Mongolia’, ZS 11 (1977), pp. 177–204, repr. in his Essays in Mongolian
Studies (Provo, UT, 1988), pp. 3–20; idem, ‘The historical interaction between
the nomadic people in Mongolia and the sedentary Chinese’, in Seaman and
Marks, Rulers from the Steppe, pp. 63–91. See further Sechin Jagchid and Van
Jay Symons, Peace, War and Trade along the Great Wall. Nomadic–Chinese
Interaction through Two Millennia (Bloomington, IN, 1989).
7 For what follows, see P. B. Golden, ‘Imperial ideology and the sources of political
unity amongst the pre-Činggisid nomads of western Eurasia’, AEMA 2 (1982),
pp. 37–76, repr. in his Nomads and Their Neighbours; Thomas T. Allsen, ‘Spirit-
ual geography and political legitimacy in the eastern steppe’, in Henri J. M.
Claessen and Jarich G. Oosten, eds., Ideology and the Formation of Early States
8 Larry W. Moses, ‘A theoretical approach to the process of Inner Asian confedera-
p. 124–5, 127.
9 Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier. Nomadic Empires and China (Oxford,
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23 See S. Murayama, ‘Sind die Naiman Türken oder Mongolen?’, CAJ 4 (1959), pp. 188–98.


34 For a revised chronology of these and the events to be described, see Paul D. Buell, ‘Early Mongol expansion in western Siberia and Turkestan (1207–1219): a reconstruction’, CAJ 36 (1992), pp. 1–32.


47 Letter of a Hungarian bishop, in CM, VI, p. 76. WR, xiv, 1, p. 68 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 111); Bacon, OM, I, p. 361, reproducing this passage, substituted Poland for Germany.


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66 David Morgan, ‘Prester John and the Mongols’, in Beckingham and Hamilton, Prester John, pp. 159–70 (here p. 161). The original source for this information is Juwaynî, I, p. 50 (tr. Boyle, I, pp. 66–7); but Biran, Empire of the Qara Khitai, p. 195, regards it as suspect.


71 Togan, Flexibility, esp. chaps. 3–4.


73 The duties of these two offices varied: see Elizabeth Endicott-West, Mongolian Rule in China. Local Administration in the Yuan Dynasty (Cambridge, MA, 1989), esp. pp. 25–9, 34–5. She regards the Qara-Khitai antecedents of the darughachi as unproven: ibid., pp. 35 and 151, n.55.

74 SH, §263, tr. De Rachewiltz, I, p. 194.


Biran, ‘“Like a mighty wall”’, pp. 77–9.


The view of Barfield, p. 198.

Julian, ‘Epistula de vita Tartarorum’, in Dörrie, p. 172 (tr. in Mongolensturm, pp. 103–4). Cf. also the vaguer statement (probably based on Julian) in TS, p. 280 (tr. in Mongolensturm, p. 251).

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103 PC, vii, 8, pp. 288–9 (tr. Dawson, p. 41).


105 The Historia is excerpted in Jacques de Vitry, Epistolae, pp. 141–8; Charta 2 ibid., pp. 148–9; and Charta 3 is ed. in Friedrich Zarncke, ‘Der Priester Johannes’ [part 2], Abhandlungen der phil.-hist. Klasse der königlich sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 8 (1883), pp. 1–186 (here pp. 58–9). See Brewer, Prester John, pp. 101–22, for all three documents; French translations are given in Richard, Au-delà de la Perse, pp. 41–56.


112 The edition, based on BN ms. lat. 4794, by Pierre-Vincent Claverie, ‘L’apparition des Mongols sur la scène politique occidentale (1220–1223)’, MA 105 (1999), pp. 601–13 (here pp. 612–13), supersedes that of Richard in *BEC* 119 (1961), pp. 243–5, but it is still necessary to compare the readings in the fuller version sent by Cardinal Hugo of S. Sabina to the bishop of Constance: see Robert Davidsohn, ‘Ein Briefkodex des dreizehnten und ein Urkundenbuch des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts’, *QFIAB* 19 (1927), pp. 373–88 (here pp. 383–4). Richard’s dating is to be preferred (Klopprogge, *Ursprung*, p. 154 and n.6); Claverie assumes that the text is a genuine letter from the Patriarch Raoul de Mérencourt, dated June 1221. The detail regarding the Christ-figure is possibly echoed in the statement by the Rus’ cleric Peter (p. 92) that the Mongols claimed to be led by St John the Baptist: Dörrie, p. 192.


118 PSRL, II, col. 745 (tr. Perfecky, p. 30).
122 MGHEp., I, p. 179 (no. 251): non cavebamus ab ipsis quia credebamus eos Christianos esse.
THE MONGOL THREAT
There can be little doubt that Europe ranked low in the order of Mongol priorities alongside China, though possibly this impression rests largely on the fact that our sole extant Mongol source, the ‘Secret History’, devotes merely a few vague lines to Batu’s great westward campaign of 1236–42 and confuses it with earlier operations by Sübe’etei. Unfortunately, no contemporary sources have come down to us from the Golden Horde – the power Batu founded in the Pontic and Caspian steppe – that might have recorded the expedition. But we are not entirely without a more detailed Mongol account of these events. Juwaynī, whose informants were presumably Mongols he met during his journey to Mongolia in 1252–3, provides a short section on the campaign against the ‘Keler and Bashgird’, i.e. the Hungarians, and Rashīd al-Dīn, who at one point reproduces Juwaynī’s data, also later inserts material gleaned from a different (but surely Mongol) source. Overall, however, we are dependent on authors from within the Latin world. The most important are the Croatian cleric Thomas, archdeacon of Spalato (Split), whose work was begun between 1245 and 1251 (though not completed until 1266), and Roger of Torre Maggiore, a canon of Várad (Grosswardein; Nagyvárad; now Oradea in Rumania), who wrote in 1243–4. But valuable information also emanates from annalists writing in Germany and Poland and from contemporary letters written in Eastern Europe during the crisis by the Mongols’ victims or in the West by those to whom they appealed for help. Many of these are known only from texts incorporated in the Chronica majora of the English Benedictine Matthew Paris, a problematic source in view of the author’s tendency to insert material of his own fashioning and of his desire to glorify Western Emperor Frederick II and denigrate the pope. A few additional details can be gleaned from the reports produced in 1247–8 as a result of the papal embassies to the Mongols (see Chapter 4), notably the ‘Tartar Relation’.
The first rumours

We saw how the first reports of Chinggis Khan’s campaigns of conquest had reached Latin Christendom via the Fifth Crusade in Egypt in 1221 and how the Mongols had been mistaken for the Christian army of ‘King David’, a notion given wide currency by the letters of the papal legate Pelagius and of Pope Honorius III. Even as early as 1223, however, the newcomers had been portrayed in rather different colours. In that year, the Georgian queen, Rusudan, and her Constable, Ivané, had written to Honorius apologizing for their failure to send reinforcements to the Fifth Crusade on the grounds that Georgia had been suddenly ravaged by a strange and barbarous people from the east, and the king of Hungary reported an attack by these barbarians on his Rus’ and Cuman neighbours. The Tours annalist saw fit to insert in his chronicle that King David was accompanied by savage races who were devouring the Muslims, a detail that seems to have been interpolated into the Prester John letter (see p. 23) around this date. Although King David’s attack upon the Georgians and Rus’ could be excused by dismissing the victims as ‘bad’ Christians or (in the Georgian case) by pointing to their recent alliance with Muslim powers, an alternative explanation did suggest itself. There were those – wrote the Cistercian annalist Aubry of Trois-Fontaines, a monastery in close contact with its brethren in Hungary – who alleged that the newcomers were neither Christians nor pagans (by which term he meant Muslims).

The Mongols were to threaten the Latin world on two fronts: in Eastern Europe and in Syria-Palestine. A full twenty years would elapse before they burst upon Poland and Hungary, and a further few years before they confronted the Franks in northern Syria. During this interval, rumours of their renewed advance had been filtering through to the West – according to Thomas of Spalato, for several years. Some of the material is clearly fabulous, like the apocryphal letter from the patriarch of Jerusalem to the pope referred to in the previous chapter. The manner in which Philip, the Dominican prior in the Holy Land, in a letter of 1237 to the pope (see p. 18), refers almost in passing to the Mongols’ devastation in Persia and the Caucasus suggests that the Curia was now familiar with their activity in Asia. The name ‘Tartar’ was already being applied to the Mongols in Western writings, even prior to their advance into Europe and the assimilation of their common designation ‘Tatar’ to Tartarus, the Hell of Classical Antiquity: the first Western author to use it was Quilichinus of Spoleto (1236).

The late 1230s, in particular, brought a flurry of fresh news about the Mongol advance. According to a Scottish chronicler, reports of the Mongol campaigns first reached his country in 1238. Similarly in 1238, if Matthew Paris can be trusted, an embassy from Muslim princes in the Near East (including those of the ‘Old Man of the Mountain’, the head of the Syrian Ismā’īlī Assassins) arrived in France and England to appeal for assistance
against the Mongols. Under the same year, Matthew records a glut in the supply of herrings at Yarmouth owing to the failure of traders from the eastern Baltic to leave their ports in view of the Mongol threat. And at some point in 1239, the pope received an appeal for help from the Georgian queen Rusudan, whose territories had again been invaded by the Mongols; he replied that the distance was too great and that the West had first to deal with the Muslim enemy in Spain and the Near East. By this juncture, Aubry of Trois-Fontaines was trying to account for the increasingly sinister news from Asia on the basis that the barbarous peoples originally incorporated in Prester John’s armies had risen in revolt and killed him.

Fuller and more ‘realistic’ information on the Mongols was also reaching Western Europe as a result of the evangelistic zeal of the Hungarian church. The majority of the Hungarian Dominicans who attempted to make contact with the inhabitants of Greater Hungary in the 1230s (see p. 19) perished, either from hardship or at the hands of the pagan Mordvins, but in 1237 the Dominican Julian penetrated as far as the fringes of the Ural region, only to discover that the people of Greater Hungary had just been subjugated by the oncoming Mongols. At Suzdal’, in the course of his return journey, he found two Mongol envoys who had been intercepted and detained by the Rus’ and who carried an ultimatum from Batu in the qaghan’s name demanding the submission of King Béla IV of Hungary. Béla was charged with disposing of previous Mongol embassies and with giving shelter to the fugitive Cumans:

I, the Qa’an [Chayn], the representative [nuntius] of the Heavenly King, [the one] to whom He has given power over the earth, to raise up those who submit to me and to cast down those who resist – I wonder why, O king of Hungary, when I have now sent envoys to you on thirty [sic] occasions, you have sent none of them back to me; nor do you send me in return your own envoys or letter. I am aware that you are a wealthy and powerful monarch, that you have under you many soldiers and that you have the sole rule over a great kingdom. Hence it is difficult for you to yield to me of your own volition; and yet it would be better for you, and healthier, were you to submit willingly. I have learned, moreover, that you keep the Cumans, my slaves, under your protection; and so I order that you do not keep them with you any longer and do not have me as an enemy on their account. For it is easier for them to escape than for you, since they are without houses and move about in their tents, and so may perhaps be able to escape. But as for you, who dwell in houses and have fortresses and cities – how will you evade my grasp?

From rumours gleaned during his travels, and more particularly from contact with Prince Iury of Suzdal’, who assured him of the Mongols’ determination
to conquer Hungary, Julian was left in no doubt of the menace confronting Eastern Europe. He duly laid considerable emphasis upon it in the report he drafted to the papal legate in Hungary on his return, the first Latin account to describe the Mongols with any accuracy. This report (including the text of the Mongol ultimatum) was passed on to the Hungarian king’s uncle, Berthold of Andechs, patriarch of Aquileia, who must have transmitted it to Pope Gregory IX. Even if a claim by Aubry of Trois-Fontaines that the Emperor Frederick II, too, received an ultimatum around this time is suspect, the West was evidently forewarned of the Mongol advance.

It seems equally certain, however, that the warnings were largely discounted. There was, of course, no real awareness of the extent of Mongol power, but an additional circumstance that may have fostered a mood of insouciance was the marked growth in numbers of those who acknowledged Roman primacy during the past two decades. The accommodating stance of the Jacobite Church in 1237 was symptomatic. In Eastern Europe, the conversion of some Cuman chiefs, as we saw (see p. 19), had made possible the creation in 1228 of the new episcopal see of Cumania. And when 40,000 Cuman warriors and their families, fleeing before the Mongols, were granted asylum in Hungary in 1239, one condition was the baptism of their khan, Köten; King Béla duly added ‘king of Cumania’ to his sonorous titles. It may well be that some thought the Mongol advance was already proving to the West’s advantage. Further north, the chronicler Henry of Livonia hints that the Mongol victory on the Kalka had encouraged various Rus’ princes to enter into negotiations with the papal legate in Livonia, and Pope Honorius III, writing to them about the conditions for ecclesiastical union, played upon their recent tribulations. In the Near East, Mongol attacks were weakening the Muslims. Describing the Assassin embassy of 1238, Matthew Paris makes the bishop of Winchester, Peter des Roches, express the hope that the Mongols and Muslims would destroy one another, so that the universal church might be founded on their ruins.

The emperor subsequently accused Béla IV of negligence in the face of the Mongol menace. This was not altogether justified. The king had apparently forged an alliance with the Bulgarians as well as the Cumans in order to resist the invaders, though he had failed to set in motion fortification works along the Polish and Russian frontiers until the very beginning of 1241. In all likelihood, the emperor’s criticism relates specifically to the murder of Mongol envoys. In any event, the same charge of carelessness could be levelled at Frederick. When a Mongol ultimatum supposedly offered him a ceremonial rank at the qaghan’s court, he is said to have joked that his interests qualified him for the post of falconer; at the height of the invasion, he was to confess that, despite frequent reports over a considerable period, he himself had imagined the threat to be far off. Even if Béla himself can in some degree be exonerated, however, his subjects may not. Our two principal sources for Hungarian affairs at this juncture, Roger of
Várad and Thomas of Spalato, furnish valuable images of the problems facing the government. Both tell us that the very frequency of unfulfilled rumours about the Mongols in the years leading up to 1241 had led to complacency and that the Hungarians were enervated by a long period of peace and reposed excessive confidence in their military strength, the latter charge to be echoed by the Emperor Frederick. More pernicious were the strained relations between Béla and the Hungarian nobility, owing to the king’s actions against certain nobles at the onset of his reign, his resumption to the Crown of baronial landholdings, his inaccessibility and his perceived dependence upon foreign elements in the administration and the military. In this context, the welcome that Béla extended to the Cumans provoked further disaffection which would more than neutralize the addition they made to his resources. As a result of these tensions, news of which reached the French court, a diet that Béla convened to discuss defence measures against the Mongols was unable to agree on any decisions. There were rumours in the Islamic world that the king had secured his barons’ cooperation against the Mongols only by dint of concessions relating to their lands.

Even prior to marching against the Mongols, the Hungarians destroyed their one chance of fighting alongside allies who were familiar with steppe cavalry warfare when suspicions that Köten was in league with the enemy came to a head and he was lynched by an angry mob. Such suspicions were possibly fuelled by the fact that the Cumans included what might be termed proto-Mongolian elements and that Batu’s armies were known to include Cumans who had been rolled up into the Mongol military at an earlier date and, according to Roger of Várad, were among the prisoners used as ‘cannon-fodder’ in siege warfare. There was consequently a widespread belief not only that the Cumans had allied with the Mongols in order to avenge previous injuries at the hands of the Hungarians but that the invaders themselves were Cumans, and some contemporary Western annalists, possibly relying on Hungarian informants, confuse the two peoples and blame the Cumans for the devastation perpetrated by the Mongols. This impression can only have been reinforced by the reaction of Köten’s followers, who took flight, avenging him as they went by ravaging that part of Hungary which lay west of the Danube.

The Mongol invasion of Latin Europe in 1241–2

In Volynia early in 1241, the Mongol armies divided. Hungary was the principal target. But Poland, albeit fragmented into several feuding duchies, constituted a danger, since King Béla might receive military aid from his relatives among the Polish dukes, notably his son-in-law Bolesław V (‘the Chaste’) of Cracow and Sandomir and his cousin Henry II (‘the Pious’) of Lower Silesia; so divisions under Batu’s brother Orda and Chaghadai’s son Baidar were deputed to conduct a campaign into Poland.
operations here began a few weeks earlier than the assault on Hungary, with an attack on the town of Sandomir on 13 February 1241; the invaders retired on meeting with resistance. On 18 March, however, Baidar’s forces defeated the army of Bolesław V, who took refuge in Hungary until dislodged from there also by the advancing Mongols. Baidar next moved west into the Oder valley, forcing the dukes of Upper Silesia to withdraw before him. On 9 April, the Mongols met an army under Henry of Lower Silesia in the vicinity of Liegnitz (Legnica). The duke, unable to wait for the assistance of his kinsman King Václav (Wenceslas) of Bohemia and assisted only by Duke Mieszko of Oppeln (Opole), the Bohemian margrave Boleslas and some Templars, was overwhelmed and killed, and his head carried around on a lance for several days to inspire terror in the population. Mongol detachments attacked parts of Meissen and Lausitz, but perhaps in view of the proximity of King Václav, who at the time of the battle of Liegnitz was only a day’s journey away, they then turned south and passed through Moravia to rejoin Batu in Hungary. En route they sacked several Moravian towns and raided those parts of Austria situated on the left bank of the Danube, including Korneuburg.
The arrival of Orda and Baidar added one more to the total of four Mongol armies that had converged on Hungary. Here the deliberations of King Béla and his barons at Ofen (Buda) had been interrupted on 10 March 1241 by the first news that the enemy had broken through the fortified passes in the Carpathians. Batu and Sübe etei advanced through the Verecke pass, the so-called Porta Rusciae, while Qadan and Büri came through the Borgó pass (28 March); two other divisions, led respectively by Böchek and a noyan whom Roger of Várad calls ‘Bogutai’ (Baghatur?) entered the country from the south-east. Hurriedly mustering an army, the king took up his position at Pest and awaited the contingents of his nobles while the Mongols harassed the mobilization process. At least one clash between the royal army and the invaders is known to have occurred in the plain of Rákos (near Pest). On 6 April 1241, Béla led his army as far as the plain of Móhi, adjoining the Sajó river, where the Mongol army (now united apart from the division that had ravaged Poland) was drawn up on the opposite bank, though in such a way as not to be entirely visible to the Hungarians. The Hungarians’ failure to mount adequate guard over the bridge, together with the arrival of a part of Batu’s army which had crossed the river upstream, meant that Béla’s troops were surrounded. In the battle that ensued (10 April), an earlier decision to fortify their encampment with a laager of wagons proved disastrous, since it impeded their movements when subjected to a hail of Mongol arrows. Allowing selected groups – including Béla and his brother Kálmán – to break through their ranks, the Mongols then mounted a ruthless pursuit; many of the fleeing Hungarians perished because heavy rainfall had turned the neighbouring terrain into a morass. Among the dead were the archbishops of Esztergom (Gran) and Kalocsa and the bishops of Raab (Győr), Nitra and Transylvania. Kálmán, halting briefly at Pest to order the citizens to look to themselves, died of his wounds soon after reaching Croatia. Béla made for the Austrian frontier, where he was for a short time the guest of Duke Frederick II before heading south into Slavonia.

The Mongols employed the spring and summer in plundering and enslaving Béla’s hapless subjects. They discovered the royal seal on the body of his chancellor and used it to issue bogus decrees ordering the population not to flee but to remain in their homes. The task of overrunning the kingdom was eased by the fact that Hungary, as a German chronicler observed, ‘had almost no city protected by walls or strong fortresses’. The Hungarians, as Béla would later admit, were unused to fortresses; in the overwhelming majority of cases, the walls were made of earth – ‘mud-pies’, as they have been labelled – and the few stone castles were concentrated in the west, on the Austrian border. In the early months, the Mongols’ unwelcome attentions were restricted to those regions of the Hungarian kingdom east of the Danube. But on Christmas Day 1241, the great river froze, and they were able to cross to the western bank. While Batu and Sübe etei moved on the royal residences of Esztergom (a particular target, according to Roger, on account of its wealth) and Stuhlweissenburg (Alba Regia), Qadan hurried
The Mongol threat in pursuit of the king. Béla, then in the Zagreb region, fled towards the Dalmatian coast, finally securing a refuge in the island town of Trogur (Trau). After an unsuccessful attempt on Spalato, Qadan appeared before Trogur and made vain efforts to obtain the king’s surrender by the inhabitants. Towards the end of March 1242, he retired through Bosnia and Serbia. The Mongols burned Cattaro (Kotor) and plundered the towns of Drivasto and Svać (Suagium), where they left behind, in Thomas of Spalato’s elegant phrase, ‘nobody to piss against a wall’; then they rejoined Batu’s main army in Bulgaria as it moved back east into the Pontic steppe. A indigenous source confirms that the Mongols invaded the Bulgarian kingdom, and a confused passage in Rashid al-Dīn might indicate that they sacked its capital, Trnovo; but a reported check at the hands of the Bulgarian king is probably unfounded, though the rumour even reached Bar Hebraeus in Iraq. If we can trust the single allusion in an Austrian chronicle, the Mongols also attacked the Latin Emperor Baldwin II of Romania (Constantinople), in all probability because like Béla he had given asylum in 1239 to a group of Cumans.

The response further west

Had the Mongols pressed on westward beyond Hungary and Poland, it is unlikely that they would have encountered coordinated opposition. Contemporary annalists report panic as far afield as the Netherlands and Spain. No help reached King Béla from his neighbours. When he sought refuge on the Austrian border, Duke Frederick II at first welcomed him but then lured him to a nearby castle and obliged him to relinquish a large sum of money which Béla had previously borrowed. To meet this demand, the unhappy monarch was obliged to pawn to the duke three Hungarian counties. Not content with occupying the territory in question, Austrian troops began to plunder the adjacent regions of Hungary, though they were soon expelled by Béla’s subjects. Nor was assistance forthcoming from Hungary’s other neighbour and rival, Venice: the chronicler Andrea Dandalo observes smugly that the Venetians refrained from harming the king in his hour of tribulation.

Immediately following his return from Austria, Béla despatched the bishop of Vác to the papal and imperial courts with an urgent request for assistance. Already informed of the crisis by other princes, Pope Gregory IX on 16 June 1241 took Béla and his brother Kálmán under the protection of the Holy See and promised them and all those who took the cross for the defence of Hungary the same indulgence as that enjoyed by crusaders to the Holy Land. He not only authorized the bishop of Vác to promote the crusade in Hungary and neighbouring kingdoms but also wrote to a number of German and Austrian prelates ordering them to preach the crusade for the defence of Bohemia and Germany. In allowing the Norwegian king early
in July to commute a vow to crusade in the Holy Land for an expedition against neighbouring pagans, he may have had the Mongols in mind. He ordered clergy to give shelter to the Hungarian king and his subjects should they seek refuge from the Mongols. But as early as 1 July, he warned Béla that help was unlikely until the Emperor Frederick made peace with the Church in a spirit of penitence. This is hardly surprising. To blame Gregory for his reluctance to settle his differences with Frederick is to ignore the emperor’s action in intercepting and imprisoning the prelates on their way to the council in May 1241 (see p. 25) and its effect upon the old pope.

When no military assistance was forthcoming, Béla sent another embassy to Rome, but the party was drowned in the Adriatic. In any case, Gregory had died in August, and his successor Celestine IV, elected in October, survived a mere three weeks; thereafter, the papal chair was vacant until June 1243. Béla issued a third plea on 19 January 1242, but the only response was a consolatory letter from the Cardinals, of which the king would complain to Pope Alexander IV in 1259, when Hungary was again menaced by a Mongol invasion. He was not alone in his resentment. In February 1242, leaders of the secular clergy and religious orders in Hungary, together with representatives of the lay nobility and the towns, had written yet a fourth urgent appeal to Rome, in which they decried the lack of support from their mother Church.

In fact, a crusade against the Mongols was under way well before Pope Gregory’s summons. In April 1241, the German prelates had promulgated crusading decrees in a series of councils; fasting and penitential processions had been instituted; and the German king, Frederick’s son Conrad IV, had proclaimed a Landfrieden throughout Germany. Friars, including many who had fled westward from Hungary and Poland, were active in preaching and in encouraging those who could not bear arms to redeem their vows for a money payment. Conrad had appointed a date of 1 July for the crusading army to assemble at Nuremberg, and in the middle of that month was at Weiden, some fifty or more miles to the east, so that it is clear the crusade actually set out. Why it proceeded no further is uncertain, but the most likely reason is the news that the Mongols had retreated from the Bohemian and German borders and were now concentrated in Hungary, east of the Danube; this enabled one annalist to conclude that they had been intimidated into withdrawal by the German crusade. Shortly afterwards, in September 1241, leading German magnates who had been instrumental in promoting the crusade rebelled against Conrad and his father, and Germany drifted into civil war which lasted for over a decade. The large sums collected for the crusade were largely used to finance the opposition to the Hohenstaufen cause. At any rate, the evidence suggests that the aims of the crusade did not extend to the liberation of Hungary.

It is unlikely, in fact, that any German prince encountered the Mongols. In his concern to magnify the emperor’s role as defender of Christendom
The Mongol threat against the pagan, Matthew Paris claims that he liberated Hungary and recounts various other improbable triumphs for which Frederick might ultimately take the credit. One was a victory by Conrad and his half-brother Enzio near an otherwise unknown river named the ‘Delpheos’ (the Dnieper?). Another is mentioned in a letter (the text of which is found only in the *Chronica majora*) from a certain Ivo of Narbonne, who speaks of the relief of Wiener-Neustadt by a force under the king of Bohemia, the patriarch of Aquileia, the dukes of Austria and Carinthia and the margrave of Baden. If any of the victories over the Mongols which are reported by the annalists are authentic, they would have been minor affairs, won over only small raiding parties. Such, we must assume, was the victory of Duke Otto of Bavaria, which is mentioned in more than one source. Significantly, Duke Frederick, when writing of the Mongol force which attacked Austria in the spring of 1241, gives figures of only 300 and 700 for their casualties and sets his own dead at a mere 100. But the idea that the Mongols had suffered a major check was remarkably widespread. Rumours of a setback in Germany reached both the Near East and Armenia, and around the turn of the century two crusading treatises would refer to their defeat on the Danube at the hands of the duke of Austria.

Nor did Béla IV receive any assistance from the Emperor Frederick. En route to the papal court, the bishop of Vác had conveyed to the emperor the Hungarian king’s offer to become Frederick’s vassal in return for military aid. Béla’s uncle, Patriarch Berthold of Aquileia, by now something of an expert on Mongol affairs, is also known to have visited the emperor in February–May 1242 in connection with the Mongol threat. But although Frederick issued urgent appeals to the German princes and to his fellow monarchs to take up arms against the Mongols, he also seems to have been intent on deriving the maximum advantage from the situation in his conflict with the pope. He stressed his inability to move until peace was made between them, warned of the encouragement the Mongols would derive from the strife within Christendom, complained that a crusade had been unleashed against him that should have been sent against the Muslims and the Mongols, spoke of his readiness to move north of the Alps to take over the leadership of the crusade and expressed his hopes, after Gregory’s death, that he would be able to work with a new pope in order to repel the invaders. Otherwise, Béla had to rest content with a letter advising him to cooperate with Conrad’s army until the emperor appeared.

The accusation that Frederick forbade the crusade to move because the Hungarian king neglected to wait upon him in person is surely nothing more than anti-Hohenstaufen propaganda. In a similar vein, the emperor himself was accused of having summoned the Mongols, and imperial envoys were said to have been sighted in their ranks – charges that are less outlandish than they at first appear, given that in previous decades Christian princes in Central and Eastern Europe, including Frederick’s uncle Philip
of Swabia, had made use of the Cumans in their conflicts (p. 19). But there was no denying Frederick’s failure to assist King Béla. Thomas of Spalato — contemptuous, no doubt, of the emperor’s inadequate response — believed that Frederick was intent on flight rather than resistance. In 1245, Pope Innocent IV would release Béla from his oath of fealty on the grounds that neither Frederick nor Conrad had given him any help.

**The material impact of the invasion**

Undoubtedly Poland and Moravia suffered less at the Mongols’ hands in 1241 than did Hungary. It has been claimed, reasonably, that the devastation in Silesia was confined to the narrow strip of territory through which the Mongol army passed on its way to meet Duke Henry and subsequently during its withdrawal into Moravia. The suburbs of Breslau (Wrocław) were destroyed, but the Mongols abandoned the siege of the citadel, a deliverance later ascribed to a miracle on the part of St Czesław. We know that the abbeys of Mogila and Heinrichau, in the Breslau diocese, were burned; the town of Troppau (Opava) was for the most part wasted. In Moravia, despite a sanguine report that the fortified places escaped the devastation, the towns of Littau, Freudenthal and Gewiczko were destroyed, while Brünn (Brno), Olmütz (Olomouc) and Uničov suffered damaging sieges. Many refugees are said to have arrived in Thuringia and Meissen.

Under the year 1241, a German chronicler remarked that the kingdom of Hungary had been destroyed after lasting for 350 years. The verdict was premature. In Hungary, admittedly, the visitation had been more protracted; this was the only Latin kingdom to undergo a Mongol occupation. Yet here too the scale of the devastation was proportionate to the length of the Mongols’ stay, so that the country east of the Danube, where the invaders pitched their tents for some months, came off worse. Transylvania is said to have been completely laid waste. The bishopric of Cumania simply ceased to exist; according to a Dominican author writing soon after 1259, around ninety friars of his Order had perished in the invasion.

But in the regions to the west, the Mongols again ravaged only the territory lying in the path of their troops; Qadan was reluctant to be detained by siege operations in view of the need to overtake King Béla. It should also be borne in mind that not all the destruction here was the work of the Mongols: following Köten’s murder, the fleeing Cumans had devastated these western provinces and sacked the larger towns such as Frankavilla (Nagyolaszi; now Mandjelos in Croatia) and St Martin (Szentmárton, now Martinci in Srem, Croatia). A reading of the accounts of both Thomas and Roger shows that the towns destroyed by the Mongols for the most part lay east of the Danube: Pest, Vác (Waitzen), Eger, Várad, Csanád, Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia), Hermannstadt (later Nagyszében; now Sibiu in Rumania), Rodana (Ó-Radna) and Bistritz (Nösen; now Beszterce). To the west, where
they were unable to take Stuhlweissenburg, however, only Esztergom was
sacked, and here they failed to capture the citadel, where many of the popu-
laction had taken shelter.100

In each of the towns that did fall, the slaughter was considerable, even
allowing for the hyperbole in our sources. Entering Gyulafehérvár not long
after the Mongols had left, Roger may, as he claims, have found nothing
but bones and severed heads.101 But his statement that only fifteen souls
survived in Esztergom carries less conviction.102 Nor can we believe Thomas
of Spalato and the anonymous author of a note on the invasion of Hungary
 appended to the Freisach annals, when they assert that the dead in Pest and
Hermannstadt respectively exceeded 100,000. The relatively sober figures
of 4,000 or more at Rodana and 6,040 at Bistritz provided by the latter
writer are more persuasive.103

Yet the lesson was a stark one; all these places had fallen for lack of ade-
quate defences. Following his return from the Dalmatian coast, King Béla
would make strenuous efforts to revive the economy of his kingdom and to
improve its defences by the construction and licensing of stone castles.104 In
the late 1240s, he again recruited into his service Cuman bands who had
returned to Hungary from Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and other neighbouring
regions, thereby creating what would prove to be an intractable problem
for his successors.105 He is also found granting the Knights Hospitallers the
territory of Severin (Zeurin) and ‘the whole of Cumania’, so that they might
assume defensive responsibilities against the Mongols and other enemies;
though in the event he had to station some of the Hospitallers in newly-built
fortresses along the Danube.106 Over the next fifteen years, the king would
try, in addition, to build a defensive wall around Hungary by forging mar-
rriage links with neighbouring dynasties.107

Those inhabitants of the captured towns who were of value to the
Mongols – craftsmen, some priests, comely women and girls – were usu-
ally spared, to be carried off as slaves.108 Although documentary evidence
shows that some Hungarian captives at least returned to their homeland,
if only many years later,109 they were doubtless a minority. In 1253–4 the
Franciscan William of Rubruck encountered not only Hungarian clerics in
Batu’s encampment and many Hungarian slaves elsewhere but also foreign-
ers domiciled in Hungary who had been captured and transported as far as
Mongolia: a woman from Metz, a Parisian goldsmith, the son of an Eng-
lishman and a nephew of a bishop in Normandy. The chief purpose of his
mission had been to seek out German slaves who had been removed from
Transylvania by prince Büri and who were known to be employed in mining
silver and manufacturing weapons in Central Asia.110

In Hungary there appears to have been large-scale displacement of
population. The account of Roger of Várad, who was himself for a time a
prisoner of the Mongols but escaped during Batu’s eastward withdrawal,
reveals numerous refugees in the countryside.111 The Mongols’ departure
was followed by a widespread famine and heavy mortality among the peasants, who had been unable to sow crops or reap a harvest during the visitation; two observers viewed this as at least as grim an affliction as the invasion itself. Reports of depopulation and lack of cultivation over the next few decades are naturally met with in Transylvania, as at Gyulafehérvár, where a new bishop in 1246 found ‘few or no inhabitants’. But the same phenomenon recurs further west also and even west of the Danube. Two districts dependent on the fortress of Nógrád were said to be empty and uncultivated in 1249; the lands of the bishop of Veszprém around the town of Beren had been devoid of people and cultivation for fifteen years in 1256, and the district of Inse, in Wieselburg, was still deserted in 1268. Abandoned villages, ruined churches and devastated monasteries were a mute reminder of the long-term effects of the Mongol campaign; much agricultural land may have reverted to pasturage. Yet it is far from clear to what extent changes in settlement patterns, for instance, can be ascribed to the Mongol invasion. And in any case the immediate economic dislocation should not be overstated. Béla mustered the resources not only to mount a punitive campaign against Duke Frederick of Austria immediately upon his return from Dalmatia but also to engage in wars with other neighbours during the next few years.

Mongol military superiority

The flower of Hungarian knighthood and perhaps of Polish knighthood too had suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of an army of nomad cavalry from the steppe. How this should have transpired was a matter of perplexity to contemporaries in the West. The abundant rumours concerning the identity of the attackers and their role in history will be analysed later (Chapter 6); here we are concerned only with contemporary attempts to explain Mongol victories. For all the chroniclers’ references to countless invaders and comparisons with locusts, it was not necessarily a matter of numbers. Thomas of Spalato heard subsequently that Béla’s was the larger of the two armies at the Sajó river; according to Juwaynī, the Mongols were outnumbered two to one. The Mongols gave the impression of being more numerous than they actually were, both by their tactic of dispersal while ravaging the countryside and by their dense arrow fire during battle, which the sources liken to hail or snow. Their mobility was well known: King Václav heard that they covered forty miles a day in their withdrawal from the Bohemian frontier, and rapid troop movements helped to foster the impression that their army was vast, extending, in one estimate, over an area twenty days’ journey by fifteen. Our Western sources stress that extensive herds of horses were at the Mongols’ disposal, although the precise number of spare mounts available to each warrior varies. Both men and horses were distinguished for their frugal diet and hardiness. Mongol
discipline and the concomitant ability of commanders to manoeuvre large units even during an engagement contrasted sharply with the highly individualistic mode of warfare practised by Western knights.

As regards weaponry, the Mongols might appear to have had the edge in archery. Their arrows penetrated every type of armour, claimed Thomas,\(^{122}\) whereas their own armour, made from strips of hard-boiled leather, could withstand the arrows of their enemies.\(^{123}\) But one weapon they did not possess was the crossbow, of which, the papal envoy Carpini would later claim, they stood in great fear.\(^{124}\) We are told that they were unable to take the citadel at Esztergom in face of the deployment of numerous crossbowmen (balistarii).\(^{125}\) It is noteworthy that Béla wanted the pope to secure him the assistance of Venetian crossbowmen, that Duke Frederick of Austria urged Conrad to bring them and that these artificers loom large in a brief list of instructions which the emperor sent to Germany with a view to countering the Mongol menace.\(^{126}\) Within a few years, the author of the ‘Tartar Relation’ would offer his own distinctive proposals for the deployment of crossbows – the West’s weapon *par excellence* – in battle against the Mongols.\(^{127}\)

**The reasons for the Mongol withdrawal**

The notion that there was nothing to stop the Mongols from reaching the Atlantic and that their withdrawal in the spring of 1242 spared Western Europe the rather unpleasant experience of Hungary is not confined to modern writers. At least one of the letters reproduced by Matthew Paris warned that none of the Western powers was capable of withstanding them,\(^{128}\) especially in view of the divisions that racked the Latin world.\(^{129}\) The Mongols’ sudden retreat from Hungary, which certainly baffled contemporaries, has consequently been more difficult to explain than their first appearance.\(^{130}\) Carpini heard that the withdrawal had been prompted by news of the death (11 December 1241) of the Qaghan Ögödei, poisoned by his sister, the aunt of the future Qaghan Güyük.\(^{131}\) There does appear to be some historical basis to this, since Rashīd al-Dīn tells us that Chinggis Khan’s daughter Altalun was later executed by Güyük’s supporters on some charge (of which she was in fact innocent),\(^{132}\) though Carpini may have confused Altalun and the Kereyit princess Ibaqa, who had been accused of poisoning Ögödei.\(^{133}\) As Professor Sinor has pointed out, however, the qaghan’s death would suffice to explain only the Mongol withdrawal had Batu proceeded to travel all the way to the Mongolian homeland to participate in the election of a successor.\(^{134}\) There were undoubtedly also other circumstances at work, including logistical problems. The Dalmatian coastlands were ill-adapted to Mongol cavalry operations, and Thomas of Spalato expressly mentions that Qadan took with him only a fraction of his contingent in view of the fact that the region afforded so little grass early in March.\(^{135}\) The primary reason for the retreat, in Sinor’s view (which has been adopted by other authors),
was that the Mongol cavalry had exhausted the available pasturage and that
the Hungarian plain was inadequate to support them further; they accord-
ingly made for the more spacious grasslands of the Pontic steppe, where
Batu pitched his tents along the Volga and shortly founded the town of
Sarai, destined to be the principal residence of the Golden Horde khans. On
this argument, the Mongols would have encountered the same difficulties in
Central Europe as had earlier steppe invaders like the fifth-century Huns.136

Yet it is important also to note that by the time of the advance into
Poland and Hungary the Mongol high command was deeply divided and
that not all the original contingents were present. Batu had quarrelled with
his cousins Güyük and Büri, and of these the former, at least, had retired
with his forces to Mongolia, where Ögödei had furiously sent him back to
be disciplined by Batu. He had not yet arrived when the news of his father’s
death reached him, and he took no part in the operations in Latin Europe.137
Batu’s withdrawal eastward was designed to enable him to keep a watch-
ful eye on developments in Mongolia should his enemy Güyük be elected
qaghan.138 For what it is worth, Güyük’s absence surfaces in the Rus’ chroni-
cle tradition, and the discord within the Mongol high command in Europe
at this juncture is mentioned as the reason for the withdrawal in a Western
source, albeit one dating from the early fourteenth century.139

Historians have also pointed to the losses the Mongols had sustained
in the course of the campaigns in Eastern Europe. The problem with this
line of argument is that it can all too easily become the vehicle of modern
nationalistic fervour: thus we read of the Mongols being so badly mauled by
the Rus’ that they were unable to sustain a longer campaign further west140
or of their harbouring a healthy respect for German military strength and
hence deciding to postpone their encounter with it.141 The evidence does
suggest, nevertheless, that the invaders’ losses had been serious: one com-
mander had been killed in the attack on Sandomir, and a prince of the blood
had allegedly fallen in Hungary.142 The Mongols were also confronted in
their rear with continued unrest among the Cumans, which had to be sup-
pressed by Batu’s brother Shingqur.143 Our Latin sources must admittedly be
deployed with caution. The claims of Carpini that the Mongols would have
beaten a retreat had the Hungarians resisted manfully and of the author of
the ‘Tartar Relation’ that they were on the point of flight when the Poles
turned tail at Liegnitz144 belong, as we shall see (p. 97), to a deliberate
effort to inspire Western resistance in the event of a future invasion. Yet
they are echoed in sources emanating from within the Mongol empire.
Juwaynī and Sübe’eti’s biography in the Ŷuan shi show that the Hungar-
ians and their neighbours were viewed as redoubtable opponents.145 Such
perceptions may well be linked with the reluctance of the shamans, as we
learn from Rubruck, to allow the Mongols to attack Hungary again for
several years to come.146 The advance into Europe was a serious undertak-
ing on the Mongol side.
There is, of course, one final possibility: that Batu’s objectives were more limited than we have supposed. The rumours retailed in Latin sources and current since c.1236, that the Mongols’ goal at this stage was Rome or Germany (i.e. the Roman empire) very probably spring from Western assumptions that the invaders were the peoples referred to in apocalyptic literature (pp. 146–7). Béla certainly assured King Conrad that the Mongols planned to invade Germany at the onset of winter 1241–2, but this could have been merely a desperate ploy to secure the German king’s assistance. The coins which the Mongols supposedly minted in Hungary can no longer be adduced as evidence for their long-term aims, since they are now known to bear pseudo-Arabic and Hebrew legends and to date mainly from the twelfth century. The Mongols did appoint from among the subject population representatives (canesii), whose task was to extort what the conquerors needed, but this does not necessarily prove that they planned a permanent occupation. We should remember that the programme of world-conquest could not be realized in a single expedition. Doubtless the purpose of this particular campaign of 1241–2 was simply to chastise Béla by devastating his kingdom (and, if possible, by capturing and killing the king), and the Mongols left because they had completed the task to the best of their ability. The merit of this – the most persuasive – hypothesis is that the retreat then requires no further explanation.

The Mongols in the Near East 1242–4

One consequence of the Mongol advance into the western steppe was the flight of numerous Cumans into the Crimea and across the Black Sea, where they were enslaved: many were bought as mamluks by the Egyptian Sultan al-Sâlih Ayyûb (1240–9). But Mongol forces were also operating in the Near East. Around the time that Batu’s forces began to move back eastward into the Pontic steppe, the Mongol noyan Baichu, who had succeeded to Chormaghun’s command in north-western Persia in 1241, embarked upon fresh operations against the Seljük Sultanate of Rûm. Erzurum fell in 1242, and on 26 June 1243 Baichu inflicted a crushing defeat at Kösedagh on the Sultan Kaykhusraw II, who forthwith became tributary to the Mongols. While Baichu’s main force occupied Sivas and sacked Kayseri, a Mongol squadron under Yasaʾur advanced in 1244 into Syria, demanding the submission of the Ayyubid rulers of Aleppo, Damascus, Hîms and Hamâ, who bought the invaders off with the payment of tribute. Matthew Paris reports the receipt of an ultimatum by the Frankish prince of Antioch, Bohemond V, who was ordered to dismantle his fortifications, hand over his gold and silver and surrender to the Mongols 3,000 young women; he defiantly refused. It was fortunate that Yasaʾur withdrew shortly afterwards. As in the European campaign, the explanation might be ecological, since
three Near Eastern authors allude to the damage done to the hooves of the Mongols’ horses in the summer heat.154

Two years later, King Hetʿum of Lesser Armenia, whose realm, as we saw, was technically part of Latin Christendom and who had reflected profoundly upon the deliverance afforded by the Mongols from his neighbours and enemies in Rûm, sent his brother, the Constable Smbat (Sempad) to Gûyûg’s court to offer his submission. But otherwise Baichu’s operations were more noteworthy, perhaps, for their indirect impact on the Latin world. By weakening the Seljûk Sultanate of Rûm, they dealt a further blow to the Latin empire of Constantinople, which was allied with the Seljûks, had already itself been attacked by Batu’s forces and had suffered the loss of another ally in the Bulgarian kingdom. The overall effect was temporarily to free the hands of Nicaean Emperor John Vatatzes for campaigns against the Latins.155 In Syria, the results were more momentous. Since c.1230, a large body of Khwarazmian horsemen had been active in the Jazîra, serving whichever of the Muslim princes offered the highest pay, including at one time the Ayyûbid al-Ṣâliḥ Ayyûb, prince of Ḥiṣn Kayfā. The advent of the Mongols, with whom they doubtless had no desire to cross swords ever again, impelled them to accept an invitation from Ayyûb, now sultan of Egypt, to assist him against his Frankish enemies in Palestine and their allies among his Ayyûbid relatives. In the summer of 1244, the Khwarazmians swept down through Syria, sacking Jerusalem and slaughtering its Christian population (11 August). Then they effected a junction with the Egyptian army, and on 17 October the combined forces inflicted a crushing defeat on Ayyûb’s enemies at La Forbie (al-Harbiyya), near Gaza. Within two years, the Khwarazmians had changed masters and had been annihilated by Ayyûb’s forces.156 But La Forbie was a body blow from which Latin Syria would never recover.

The Mongol invasions of Eastern Europe and Syria had both an immediate impact on the West and longer-term consequences. In the short term, they caused havoc in Hungary and Poland and induced terror and bewilderment further afield. They pushed large numbers of refugees into Latin Christian territory, whether Cumans into Hungary and Greece or Khwarazmians into Palestine. They incidentally brought the kingdom of Lesser Armenia within their orbit. They also incidentally and unintentionally contributed to a growth in the military resources of the Egyptian Sultan. Whereas the Khwarazmian menace was eliminated relatively quickly, the Cuman presence in Hungary would take several decades to assimilate; the rise of the Mamluk institution in Egypt would have profound implications for the future of the crusader states. These problems confronted a Catholic world that was already in conflict with various schismatic or pagan neighbours and that was further racked by the dispute between empire and papacy. It fell to the newly-elected Pope Innocent IV (1243–54) to deal with them.
Notes


5 For a general survey of Western sources on the Mongols, see Peter Jackson, ‘Western European sources’, in Michal Biran and Hodong Kim, eds., The Cambridge History of the Mongol Empire, II (forthcoming).


12 Jacques de Vitry, Epistolae, p. 147. Charta 3, in Zarncke, ‘Der Priester Johannes’ [Part 2], p. 59 (Brewer, Prester John, text pp. 105, 120, tr. pp. 112, 122; also tr. in
13 Aubry of Trois-Fontaines, ‘Cronica’, p. 911.
14 TS, p. 252.
15 CICO, III, p. 306 (no. 227a): *quas terras Tartari pro magna parte vastaverunt*.
20 Aubry of Trois-Fontaines, ‘Cronica’, p. 942.
22 Dörrie, p. 179 (tr. in *Mongolensturm*, pp. 107–8).
23 Ibid., pp. 177–8 (tr. in *Mongolensturm*, p. 107).
28 CM, III, p. 489.
29 Ibid., IV, p. 113 = HDFS, V, pp. 1149–50.
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38 Dominican ‘R.’ and Franciscan ‘J.’, in CM, VI, p. 82. TS, pp. 254, 284 (tr. in Mongolensturm, pp. 236, 256). RV, p. 212 (tr. in Mongolensturm, pp. 176, 178, 179).


41 RV, pp. 174, 176 (tr. in Mongolensturm, pp. 158–9). Rudolf, ‘Die Tartaren’, pp. 100–5, proposes that the Mongol thrust towards Wiener-Neustadt reported by Ivo of Narbonne (see p. 74) was the work of Cuman bands.

42 The idea that the Mongols entered Poland from Prussia is based on a scribal error in the sole source to mention it, namely a letter of the Emperor Frederick (CM, IV, p. 115 = HDFS, V, pp. 1150–1); Joseph Becker, ‘Zum Mongoleneinfall von 1241’, Zeitschrift des Vereins für Geschichte Schlesiens 66 (1932), pp. 34–57 (here p. 42 and n.5). For the campaign in Poland, see Hansgerd Göckenjan, ‘Der Westfeldzug (1236–1242) aus mongolischer Sicht’, in Wahlstatt, pp. 35–75 (here pp. 44–5).

43 Apart from the few Teutonic Knights based in Silesia, the Order took no part in the battle, in which the Master, Poppo von Osternau, was once wrongly believed to have been killed: Tomasz Jasiński, ‘Zur Frage der Teilnahme des Deutschen Orders an der Schlacht von Wahlstatt’, in Wahlstatt, pp. 117–27.


46 For the campaign culminating in the battle on the Sajó river, see Göckenjan, ‘Der Westfeldzug’, pp. 46–59, and Strakosch-Grassmann, pp. 68–101; for Mongol

48 *TS*, p. 260 (tr. in *Mongolensturm*, p. 240).
53 *RV*, p. 214 (tr. in *Mongolensturm*, p. 180).
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58 Strakosch-Grassmann, pp. 102–4.
59 Andrea Dandolo, ‘Chronica per extensum descripta’, RIS ii, XII:1, p. 299.
60 RV, p. 194 (tr. in Mongolensturm, p. 169). Béla’s letter is in VMH, I, p. 182 (no. 335).
64 VMH, I, p. 184 (no. 339).
65 Ibid., p. 185 (no. 342).
68 HDFS, V, p. 1216. IUB ms. 187, fo. 7r.
72 CM, IV, p. 298.
74 CM, IV, pp. 272–3. Strakosch-Grassmann, p. 146, saw this as more probable than other details in the letter.
76 HDFS, V, p. 1216. IUB ms. 187, fo. 7r.
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80 Richard of San Germano, ‘Chronica’, p. 213: *pro facto Tartarorum*; also p. 214, and see p. 68 and n.24.


83 Ibid., V, pp. 1141–2, 1144–5, 1152 (= CM, IV, p. 116), 1166, and VI, p. 5.

84 Ibid., V, pp. 1145–6. For Frederick’s attitude, see Bezzola, pp. 78–81.


86 Höfler, p. 28. CM, IV, p. 298 (for a rumour in 1247 that Frederick might be driven to call upon Mongol assistance, see IV, p. 635). Philippe Mouskès, *Chronique rimée*, II, p. 681 (vv. 30967–70). ‘Richeri Gesta’, p. 310. ‘Continuatio Sancrucensis secunda’, p. 640, blamed the Mongol attack on Hungarian nobles who had murdered King Béla’s mother (in 1213) and had been exiled.

87 *TS*, p. 286 (tr. in *Mongolensturm*, p. 253).


94 ‘Sifridi de Balnhusin Compendium historiarum’ (down to 1304), *MGHS*, XVII, p. 704.


96 ‘De invasione Tartarorum’, p. 599.
98 TS, p. 290 (tr. in Mongolensturm, p. 255). RV, p. 218 (tr. in Mongolensturm, p. 183).
99 Ibid., p. 176 (tr. in Mongolensturm, p. 159).
101 RV, p. 224 (tr. in Mongolensturm, p. 185).
102 Ibid., pp. 216, 218 (tr. in Mongolensturm, p. 182; see ibid., p. 222, n.222). For the slaughter in Esztergom, see MOL, DL 383 (late copy of document dated 28 June 1254 = CDH, IV:2, p. 215). But clearly a significant number of citizens survived: DF 248311 and DF 248313 (CDH, IV:2, pp. 37–8, 375 respectively).
104 Fügedi, Castle and Society, chap. 3. See also Spinei, ‘Les répercussions’, pp. 35–6.
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113 MOL, DF 277178 (6 May 1246, confirmation dated 1263 = CDH, IV:1, pp. 414–15; UBGS, p. 66, no. 63; UBGD, I, p. 72, no. 81; DIR, I:1, p. 230, no. 178). The district of Iheye, in the county of Szábolcs, was still allegedly deserted in 1291: DL 95050 (= CDH, VI:1, pp. 126, 128).


116 Senga, ‘Ungarisch-bulgarische Beziehungen’, p. 79. Berend, At the Gate, p. 37. The campaign against Austria is referred to in MOL, DL 260 (= CDH, IV:1, p. 289); DL 434 (= CDH, IV:2, p. 389; AUO, II, p. 270, no. 179); DL 92 (= CDH, IV:2, p. 391), and DL 86766 (= CDH, VII:5, p. 274); see also CDH, IV:1, p. 295 = AUO, VII, p. 135, no. 89.

117 For a full survey of Mongol methods of waging war, see Timothy May, The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System (Barnsley, 2007).


119 Igang, Schlesiisches Urkundenbuch, II, p. 131 (no. 212).

120 Henry Raspe, landgrave of Thuringia, to Henry II, duke of Brabant, in CM, VI, p. 77. See also Ponce of Albon, Templar preceptor in Francia, to Louis IX, in ‘Ex Historiae regum Franciae continuacione Parisiens’, MGHS, XXVI, p. 605.


122 TS, p. 274 (tr. in Mongolensturm, p. 248). See also ‘Carmina de regno Ungariae destructo per Tartaros’, MGHS, XXIX, p. 602.


124 PC, viii, 7, p. 296 (tr. Dawson, p. 46).

125 RV, p. 218 (tr. in Mongolensturm, pp. 182–3): the editors (n.2) suggest that the Latin term might equally denote siege engines.
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126 HDFS, V, pp. 1215–16, 1217, and VI, p. 904. Becker, pp. 53–4. See also Béla’s later request for 1,000 balistarii from Pope Alexander IV, 1259: CICO, IV.2, p. 87 (no. 42) = VMH, I, p. 241 (no. 454).


128 Dominic ‘R.’ and Franciscan ‘J.’, in CM, VI, p. 82.

129 Jordan, Franciscan vice-minister in Poland and Bohemia, ibid., VI, p. 81. For subsequent anxiety that the Mongols might profit from the divisions within Christendom, see pp. 167, 174–5.


131 PC, ix, 36, p. 322 (tr. Dawson, p. 65, with ‘mistress’, based on the faulty reading amica for amita). Cf. also viii, 5, p. 295 (tr. Dawson, p. 45); TR, §30, p. 21; and the unique fragment ed. Sinor as ‘John of Plano Carpini’s return’, p. 203, where PC’s testimony is corroborated by agents of King Béla.

132 Rashīd al-Dīn, I, p. 735 (tr. Boyle, Successors, p. 121; tr. Thackston, p. 255). Not named here, she is described as his favourite daughter and the wife of Cha’ur Sechen (see also Thackston trans., p. 105).


135 TS, p. 298 (tr. in Mongolensturm, p. 258).


141 Strakosch-Grassmann, pp. 147–8; see also ibid. p. 52. But cf. his more plausible hypothesis, cited in n.150.

142 TR, §§28, 29, p. 20. The only princely casualty mentioned in sources from the Mongol empire is Kölsen, a son of Chinggis Khan who had been killed outside the Rus’ city of Kolomna in 1237: Rashīd al-Dīn, I, p. 668 (tr. Boyle, Successors, p. 59; tr. Thackston, p. 232).
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147 Böhmer, ‘Briefe’, pp. 113–14 (no. 4). Cf. also Dominican ‘R.’ and Franciscan ‘J.’, in CM, VI, p. 82, for similar rumours.


149 RV, p. 208 (tr. in *Mongolensturm*, pp. 176–7).


155 I formerly shared the view of Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, p. 78, that the advent of the Mongols put a brake on Nicaean Greek aggression against the Latin empire, but see now Giebfried, ‘Mongol invasions’, pp. 130–5.

The papal embassies

By the election of Pope Innocent IV in June 1243, the Curia had at its disposal some limited information about the invaders, beginning, no doubt, with the report which the Dominican Julian had addressed to the papal legate in Hungary and which had been registered in the *Liber censuum*; in addition, copies of two of Béla IV’s letters from 1241–2 were among the documents transported from Italy to Lyons when Innocent took refuge there from the emperor in December 1244. And Roger of Várad, who had been in Rome in 1243, attended the First Council of Lyons in 1245. A possibly decisive role, however, was played by a refugee ecclesiastic from Rus’ named Peter, who arrived at Lyons at the end of 1244 or early in 1245. Peter was to be interrogated about the Mongols at the Council in June but must surely have had a previous audience with pope and cardinals. The information he supplied fell largely into two categories: (1) details that conveyed an uncompromising (and inflated) impression of the Mongols’ overwhelming military power and (2) material of a reassuring nature that might have been calculated to induce the Curia to enter into diplomatic relations with them. We have seen how the Mongols employed non-Mongols to lull the fears and suspicions of those who lay in the path of their advance, and it is not inconceivable, in fact, that Peter was acting as an agent and intelligence gatherer on their behalf. He is not heard of again after his appearance at Lyons.

In particular, Peter assured his interlocutors that the Mongols received embassies favourably (*benigne*) and did not mistreat them. The pope was encouraged by this news, which had not been available at the time of the invasion, to send ambassadors to the grim new power that had arisen on Latin Christendom’s eastern frontiers. The agenda for the First Council of
Lyons included not just ‘a remedy against the Tartars’ but also a remedy for perennial problems such as Church reform; the deposition of the Emperor Frederick; negotiations with the Greek emperor of Nicaea, John III Ducas Vatatzes, for ecclesiastical union; and the parlous situation of the Holy Land. It is a measure of the importance Innocent attached to the Mongol threat, however, that he did not wait for the opening of the Council but in March or April 1245 despatched no fewer than three embassies to the Mongols, consisting of members of the Mendicant Orders.

The most celebrated of these embassies was headed by John of Plano Carpini (Pian di Carpine), a former Franciscan provincial minister in Saxony (1232–9) and currently a papal penitentiary.6 Joined at Breslau by the Polish Franciscan Benedict, Carpini’s party took the route through Eastern Europe to Batu’s headquarters on the Volga. While some of their colleagues remained with Batu, Carpini and Benedict were sent on to Mongolia, arriving just in time to witness Güyük’s enthronement in August 1246. The other two missions headed for the Mongol armies in the Near East. For this task, the pope seems initially to have designated another Franciscan, the Portuguese Laurence, accompanied by two English Franciscans, but he then changed his mind and despatched Laurence as legate to the Latin territories in Syria and Cyprus.7 Contact with the Mongols in the Near East was entrusted instead to two groups of Dominicans, led respectively by the Lombard Ascelin, who waited upon the noyan Baichu at Sisian in Greater Armenia in the summer of 1247 and by Andrew of Longjumeau, who probably visited Tabrīz. The pope appears to have entrusted each embassy not merely with the bull Cum hora undecima originally issued by Gregory IX but with two further letters, addressed to the Mongol ‘king’ and his people as a whole. In Cum non solum (13 March 1245), Innocent remonstrated with the Mongols, appealed to them to desist from attacking Christians and other nations, and enquired as to their future intentions; Dei patris immensa (5 March 1245) contained an exposition of the Christian faith and urged the Mongols to accept baptism.8 From the summary given by Carpini, we can be sure that he carried both letters; doubtless Ascelin did also.9

In view of the distance they had travelled and the fact that they had visited the Mongol sovereign’s own court, the Franciscans’ return seems to have caused the greatest stir.10 Even as they made their way back through Eastern Europe, Germany and Champagne in the early autumn of 1247, Carpini tells us, he and his colleagues were obliged to hand over the unfinished draft of their Ystoria Mongalorum to eager inquirers, so that interim versions were being disseminated.11 One example, possibly, is a Historia Tartarorum, known as the ‘Tartar Relation’, which a Franciscan calling himself C. de Bridia, who may have been one of the unnamed colleagues left behind in Batu’s territory,12 completed on 30 July 1247 on the basis of information supplied by Carpini’s party (primarily Benedict).13 This was for long known only through a single manuscript, dated c.1440 and bound up
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with the Vinland Map, but any doubts as to its authenticity through association with the map have now been allayed by the discovery of a second text of the ‘Tartar Relation’ in a Lucerne manuscript, dated a full century earlier. A ninth and final chapter, comprising a narrative of the journey, was added to Carpini’s Ystoria after his return to Western Europe, and revisions were made elsewhere in the text. Donald Ostrowski has proposed that these changes were not made by Carpini himself. Benedict dictated his own brief account of the party’s experiences to a cleric at Cologne in October 1247. The data concerning the Carpini embassy that have come down to us are markedly fuller than the material on the Dominican missions. The account of Ascelin’s embassy, written up by one of its members, Simon of Saint-Quentin, is no longer extant in its original form, but lengthy excerpts are preserved in the Speculum historiale of the Dominican Vincent of Beauvais (c.1253), who also had access to the second redaction of Carpini’s Ystoria. Only a brief abstract of Andrew’s report has survived in Matthew Paris’s Chronica majora, and we would know hardly anything about his mission were it not for the survival of letters relating to his diplomatic activities in the Near East (below, pp. 98–9).

As a démarche aimed at placing relations with the Mongols on a fresh footing, it cannot be claimed that the embassies were a success. Ascelin greatly offended his hosts at the outset by stating that the pope, whom Christians regarded as superior to any other man, had never heard of the qaghan, Batu or Baichu. Consequently, the party did not receive unduly indulgent treatment. Because of their intransigence in the face of the requirements of Mongol protocol, they were denied an audience with Baichu and were kept waiting for a reply for some weeks, while the Mongol general allegedly issued orders for their execution on no less than three occasions before being dissuaded by his entourage. Even when they had been given permission to leave, their departure was further held up in view of the impending arrival of Arghun Aqa, the qaghan’s plenipotentiary and civil governor of Persia. When they finally left Baichu’s encampment late in July 1247, the friars were accompanied by two Mongol envoys, Aybeg and Sargis (the latter – to judge from his name, ‘Sergius’ – an Eastern Christian), and carried an ultimatum from the Mongol general ordering Innocent to appear before the qaghan in person, together with a copy of a letter from Güyüg delivered to Baichu by Arghun Aqa, which insisted on the publication of Heaven’s edict requiring the submission of all peoples. Innocent’s reply to Baichu, dated 22 November 1248, merely warned him of the consequences of persisting in error.

Carpini brought back for the pope an ultimatum from Güyüg, which has already been quoted (p. 49). The Qaghan claimed not to understand the plea that he be baptized as a Christian or the rebuke for having attacked the Hungarians and other peoples. How did the pope, calling himself a Christian, know whom God forgave and on whom He bestowed mercy? As
for the Hungarians, they had disobeyed the Order of God, killing Mongol messengers and envoys. Without God’s power, the Mongols could not have achieved all their victories and conquests. The entire world, from where the sun rose to where it set, had been conferred on them; the pope was therefore instructed to come in person, with the ‘kings’, to make his submission.22

The phrasing of the letter demonstrates that Güyüg had not just been perplexed by the request concerning baptism and the reproaches for Mongol massacres in Eastern Europe but had misconstrued the whole character and purpose of the embassy. At the first Mongol camp the party reached, Carpini had stated that the pope wished ‘all Christians to be friends of the Tartars and to have peace with them’ and desired, moreover, that ‘the Tartars be great before God in Heaven’.21 And in Cum non solum Innocent himself spoke of his desire for ‘all to live in the unity of peace’ and asked the Mongols to engage in ‘fruitful discourse . . . especially on those matters that pertain to peace’.24 Now in the Mongols’ vocabulary, as we have seen (p. 48), the terms for ‘peace’ and for ‘subjection’ were identical: the Turkish word il/[i] did duty for both. The mere despatch of an embassy seemed tantamount to surrender. ‘Why have you come’, Rubruck was asked in amazement some years later, ‘since you did not come to make peace?’25 It is no surprise to find the Mongols now treating Carpini’s arrival as a token of papal submission, so that Batu felt obliged to forward the envoys to the new qaghan. ‘Having taken counsel about making peace with us’, began Güyüg’s reply to the pope, ‘you have sent us a plea of submission’,26 and Innocent’s personal appearance was required if he was ‘sincere’. It seems the Qaghan was affronted that the embassy had brought no gifts; immediately following his enthronement, the friars’ rations were reduced.27 Nevertheless, in Mongol eyes Innocent had, through the Carpini mission, taken the first step towards recognizing his place in the Mongol world-empire.

This impression would have been reinforced by Carpini’s own conduct. He showed himself ready to adapt to practices such as passing between two fires, genuflecting three times before entering a commander’s tent and addressing Mongol leaders on bended knee;28 the friars apparently even bowed their heads before an effigy of Chinggis Khan.29 Ascelin, who was concerned to make no gesture that might dishearten other nations or cheer Christendom’s enemies, flatly refused to perform these acts of obeisance; he also made it clear to the Mongols that the pope was not subject to them.30 Carpini’s stay at the various Mongol encampments was therefore free of the altercations that characterized Ascelin’s mission. His compliance extended further. It is usually assumed that he was the only ambassador who was under orders to proceed to the Mongols’ headquarters,31 but we have no direct evidence for this. In any case, when required by Baichu to deliver his message to the qaghan in person, Ascelin refused on the grounds that his instructions were to hand the papal letters to the first Mongol army he met;
eventually Baichu acquiesced. By contrast, when Carpini was sent on from Batu’s encampment, he raised no objection.

In addition to the purely diplomatic function, Carpini at least was instructed to observe and examine everything prior to reporting back to the pope. His task was clearly to gather intelligence – to spy. The first eight chapters of his report constitute a systematic dossier of information on the Mongol enemy, arranged in answer to specific questions that are virtually identical with those put to the Rus’ cleric Peter. Significantly, his eighth chapter deals with the question of how to wage war against the Mongols. It is, of course, impossible to tell whether Simon of Saint-Quentin’s report was equally methodical, since the material may well have been reordered by Vincent of Beauvais, but here too we find chapters devoted to the Mongols’ diet, dress, weaponry, techniques of siege warfare and so on.

Carpini’s long journey afforded him a much clearer view of the vast extent of the Mongol empire. He mentions the presence at Güyüg’s enthronement of the Rus’ Grand Prince, Iaroslav Vsevolodovich, ‘chiefs’ from China and Korea, two sons of the king of Georgia, more than ten Muslim sultans and over 4,000 envoys, including those of the ’Abbasid Caliph; Benedict says that an embassy from the Egyptian Sultan accompanied the party for the first fortnight of the return journey. Carpini’s report also furnishes a long list of those nations who had acknowledged Mongol sovereignty, including the Khitai (Chinese), Georgians, Armenians, Persians, Cumans, the people of Great Bulgaria (Bulgăr) and the Ruthenians (Rus’). Apart from yielding at least one poignant reminder of the recent assault on Europe, in the form of Batu’s very fine linen tents that had at one time belonged to the Hungarian king, the mission also acquired the intelligence that Güyüg planned a fresh invasion, which would involve two separate armies attacking Poland and Hungary, and that these forces had already set out. The qaghan himself allegedly stated that he wanted to send an army into Livonia and Prussia. Carpini subsequently told the Franciscan Salimbene de Adam that the Mongols planned to conquer Italy.

Regarding the nature of Mongol overlordship, the papal envoys were in no doubt. Carpini remarked on the intolerable and unheard-of servitude that they imposed upon the subject peoples. He described at length the miserable conditions of the skilled craftsmen whom the Mongols enslaved, while Simon of Saint-Quentin stressed the burdensome nature of Mongol exactions. The conquerors’ intention was to bring the whole world into subjection, and they would accordingly make peace with no people that had not yielded to them. In particular, they sought to wipe off the face of the earth all princes, nobles and knights and those of gentle birth. They could not be trusted, and any initial appearance of mildness or mercy was merely pretence; at first, Carpini twice assured his readers, the Mongols spoke smooth words, but later they would sting like a scorpion. In meeting the threat, a coordinated effort was essential, for the Mongols were practised
at picking off one kingdom at a time and using its people to subjugate their neighbours.\textsuperscript{48} From concern, in part, that the Mongols might learn of the discord that reigned within the West – a concern manifested earlier in the letters of 1241–2 (p. 78) – he took care that no Mongol envoys accompanied him back to Lyons and offered instead to act as Güyüg’s ambassador.\textsuperscript{49}

Yet for all their emphasis on the menace posed by the Mongols, Carpini and Simon do draw attention to vulnerabilities. The enemy were weaker both numerically and physically than the Latins.\textsuperscript{50} In their forces were to be found other nations in significant numbers, who would willingly mutiny at the approach of a Western army.\textsuperscript{51} Carpini lists the many peoples, moreover, who had repulsed the Mongols and were still holding out.\textsuperscript{52} The Mongols showed greater courage in fighting those who were in flight,\textsuperscript{53} and their victories owed less to strength than to guile.\textsuperscript{54} In fact, they feared the Franks more than any other race in the world.\textsuperscript{55} A prophecy was allegedly current among them that they were due to rule for a further eighteen years before they were defeated.\textsuperscript{56} All this is pressed into service as evidence that it is not only desirable but possible for the West to withstand the next invasion. In much the same way Rubruck, a few years later, would claim that the Mongols were less formidable than the Huns because the latter had advanced much further, into France, and had received tribute even from Egypt\textsuperscript{57} – regardless of the fact that the centre of gravity of the Mongol empire lay hundreds of miles east of that of the Huns. There can be little doubt that the friars – much of whose information came from those the Mongols had enslaved – were seeking to stiffen the resistance of their fellow Latins.\textsuperscript{58}

**A buffer against the Mongol menace**

Why did the pope send three missions and in particular two to the Near East? He was certainly exercised by the plight of the Holy Land, which had been attacked by the Khwarazmians and briefly menaced by Yasa’ur’s campaign in the summer of 1244 (see p. 80). This finds an echo in the belief of the English Franciscan, Adam Marsh, that Innocent was sending envoys ‘to the nations who . . . have laid waste the Holy Land, namely the Khwarazmians, and to the Tartars and the Saracens’.\textsuperscript{59} And certainly the patriarch of Antioch was in Europe by March 1245 to seek aid for the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{60} But again it was probably above all the Rus’ cleric Peter who had been instrumental in the pope’s decision, for he had spoken of three Mongol armies, operating respectively against the Egyptians (Babilonii), the Turks (i.e. the Seljûks of Rûm) and the Christians of Eastern Europe (though the three armies are said, inaccurately, to be converging on Syria).\textsuperscript{61} In fact, these three directions coincide with the routes taken by the papal embassies, since Andrew’s itinerary is known to have included Syria and Palestine,\textsuperscript{62} while Ascelin’s mission took two years to reach the Mongols and Simon of Saint-Quentin’s report includes a wealth of detail about the Rûm
Sultanate which can only have become accessible as a result of a prolonged stay among the Seljuks.63

This in itself indicates that the embassies had other aims besides making diplomatic contact with the Mongols, and it may be that Innocent IV did not attach any greater importance to contact with the Mongols than to dealings with other peoples. Carpini tells us how he had decided to visit the Mongols first;64 in other words, the choice was left to the ambassador. He describes himself as envoy of the Apostolic See to ‘the other nations of the East’ as well as to the Mongols;65 and indeed other sources convey the same impression. Firstly, the reissued version of Cum hora undecima is addressed to friars operating among a host of peoples, Muslims, pagans and Christian alike.66 And secondly, the pope’s chaplain and biographer, Niccolò di Calvi, not only mentions that envoys were sent to the sultans of Egypt and Rûm but treats Carpini’s mission as just one among a whole series of legations to ‘barbarous nations of divers territories’, designed to bring about their adhesion to the Catholic faith.67 This is a reference to the simultaneous despatch of parties of friars with the letter Cum simus super (late March 1245), which affirmed the primacy of the Roman Church, marshalled scriptural quotation in its support and urged the recipients to return to ecclesiastical unity; it was addressed to the prelates of, among others, the Bulgarians, Vlachs, Serbs, Alans, Georgians, Nubians, Nestorians ‘and other Christians of the East’.68

In pursuit of his vision of a Christian world reunited under papal leadership, Innocent also engaged in renewed efforts to secure recognition of Roman primacy by the Greeks.69

Now the diplomatic missions to the Mongols were also part of this wider papal initiative. It will be as well to begin with Andrew. Western European annalists give some prominence, relatively speaking, to the despatch of a mission in 1245 to the Egyptian Sultan al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb, by which the pope (thought one writer) aimed to detach the Sultan from the Emperor Frederick.70 Ayyūb’s reply, expressing his determination to make no peace with the West without consulting the emperor, bears a date corresponding to June 1245; hence Andrew cannot have been the intermediary here.71 But he is known to have made contact with other Ayyubid princes,72 and a visit to the camp of the Egyptian general Fakhr al-Dīn Ibn al-Shaykh, near Karak in southern Palestine, elicited a letter to Innocent in which Ayyūb was absolved of responsibility for the Khwarazmian sack of Jerusalem.73 Andrew also met with the Jacobite ecclesiastical hierarchy in Iraq, and with the Nestorian ‘visitor’ to the Near East, Simeon Rabban-ata; he too must therefore have carried Cum simus super. The purpose of his mission was apparently to explore the possibility that the Mongol threat might throw Muslim rulers into the arms of the Roman Church and that by a parallel process the separated churches might be induced to seek Western protection by acknowledging papal primacy. In the latter sphere, he enjoyed some limited success. In 1247 the Jacobite patriarch, Ignatius II, brought his church officially into
union with Rome, though a significant section refused to follow his lead. On behalf of the Nestorian hierarchy, Simeon Rabban-ata forwarded a profession of faith from the catholicus and entrusted Andrew with a cordial letter to the pope in which Roman primacy was freely recognized. In other respects, however, Andrew’s achievement was disappointing. The Ayyubid princes failed to swallow the bait. Al-Manṣūr ʿIbrāhīm of Ḥimṣ, clearly aware of the thinking behind the papal overtures, assured Innocent that the Mongols posed no threat to the Islamic world and would soon be defeated by his overlord, the Egyptian Sultan. So too Innocent probably found Simeon’s profession of obedience more gratifying than his plea for the pope to be reconciled with the Emperor Frederick (although a separate letter to the emperor urged him in turn to seek the forgiveness of the Holy See). What also became manifest from the correspondence with the Eastern churches was that their leaders sought more favourable treatment for non-Latin Christians living under Frankish rule in Syria and Palestine. Both Ignatius and Simeon asked the pope to intervene in these territories and to prevent their confrères being treated as second-class citizens, and Simeon made the same request of the Emperor Frederick. Such a change of policy on the part of the Latins would have brought them into line with the Mongols’ stance towards their own subject populations. In the winter of 1248–9, a letter from the Mongol general Eljigidei (see p. 103) to the French king, who had by then reached Cyprus, asked him to see to it that Greek, Armenian and Nestorian Christians enjoyed equal status with Latins. This, together with the responses of Ignatius and Simeon which Andrew brought back in 1247, indicates that ‘separated’ Christians now under Mongol protection in the Near East were beginning to exploit a stronger position in their dealings with the West.

Carpini’s party likewise had more than one commission. En route to Batu, they met at Cracow Vasil’ko, the brother of Daniil Romanovich, prince of Galicia and Volynia (the regions commonly, if not altogether illuminatingly, termed ‘Ruthenia’), who was seeking the assistance of neighbouring Polish princes against the Mongols, and accompanied him back to Daniil’s court. Daniil himself was away at Batu’s encampment, but Vasil’ko convened an assembly of bishops to whom the friars read out a papal letter urging them to ‘return to the unity of Mother Church’, i.e. evidently Cum simus super. In view of Daniil’s absence, no response was forthcoming, but during the return journey in 1247, the friars halted at his court a second time. After further discussions with their bishops, the two princes assured Carpini of their desire ‘to have the Lord Pope as their special lord and father and the Holy Roman Church as their lady and mistress’. They had previously despatched an abbot to Innocent, and now sent with the Franciscans another envoy and a letter for the pope. Innocent had responded to the earlier legation, on 3 May 1246, by taking Daniil and his dominions under the protection of St Peter. At Güyük’s headquarters the Franciscans, as we saw, met the Rus’
Grand Prince, Iaroslav, whom Batu had invested with Vladimir-in-Suzdal in 1243 and had sent on to the qaghan. Iaroslav too was negotiating with the Curia. In a letter of 3 May 1246, carried by Archbishop Albert of Prussia and Livonia as papal legate, Innocent expressed his joy that the Grand Prince was ready to acknowledge the primacy of Rome. Another papal letter, to his son Alexander (Nevskii), prince of Novgorod and dated January 1248, asserts that Iaroslav had made an express profession of obedience to the Roman Church and cites Carpini as the source of the information.

Carpini says nothing of discussions with the Grand Prince in his *Ystoria*, mentioning only his sudden death in Güyük’s encampment: from the fact that the body rapidly turned a striking shade of blue, it was suspected that he had been poisoned by the qaghan’s mother, the regent Töregene. Possibly Iaroslav’s profession amounted merely to a deathbed conversion or his statement was misrepresented by the interpreter. It has been suggested that Iaroslav was poisoned precisely because of his flirtation with the pope and the West. Alexander certainly displayed a marked hesitation to obey Güyük’s command to travel to Mongolia to receive the qaghan’s patent for his inheritance. He had, moreover, accepted union with Rome by September 1248, since Innocent then wrote to him to express his pleasure at the news, which had been transmitted by Archbishop Albert. The prince had also undertaken to raise the Latin church in his city of Pskov to cathedral status.

In seeking to capitalize on the readiness of Rus’ princes to recognize the primacy of Rome in return for military assistance against the Mongols, Innocent may have aimed at erecting a bloc of buffer-states between the Latin heartlands and the Mongol world. Late in January 1248, he asked both Daniil and Alexander, should they hear news of an impending Mongol attack, to send word to the Teutonic Knights in Prussia and Livonia respectively, so that they in turn might inform the pope and the West may thus be spared a repetition of the unexpected onslaught of 1241. Daniil had already made good a promise to provide Béla IV’s envoys with intelligence following his return from the Mongols in c.1243. The pope perhaps also intended to incorporate within this anti-Mongol power-bloc the pagan peoples of Eastern Europe. The Peace of Christburg (1249), which regulated relations between the Teutonic Knights and their pagan subjects in Prussia, may well have been designed to free the Order’s hands for conflict with the Mongols. And by 1251 Innocent was in touch with the pagan Lithuanian prince Mindaugas, who in that year was baptized, in exchange for the crown conveyed to him by a Catholic bishop in 1253 and who subsequently built a cathedral in Vilnius. The Lithuanians promised to be useful allies in the face of Mongol expansion; Carpini attests to their raids deep into the old principality of Kiev. Mindaugas, who in embracing Christianity had been concerned primarily to fortify his position against a neophyte rival and to detach the Teutonic Knights from the ranks of his enemies, also hoped
to secure papal sanction for any conquests he might make at the expense of pagan or schismatic (i.e. Orthodox) rulers.92

Ultimately these negotiations bore no fruit. Within a short time of the arrival of Innocent’s letter of 1248, Alexander rejected the union; his brother Andrei of Suzdal’, who adhered to a pro-Latin policy, fled into exile in Sweden.93 By 1257, Daniil too was no longer mindful of his rapprochement with Rome.94 When the Mongols attacked Poland in 1259, they would be accompanied by contingents from Galicia and Volynia under Lev and Roman, Daniil’s sons, and Vasil’ko, his brother.95 One circumstance that may have weighed with these Rus’ princes, beyond the pope’s inability to render them practical military assistance, was the additional political clout conferred on them by becoming Mongol clients. The Galician chronicler believed that Béla IV grew afraid of Daniil following the latter’s return from a visit to the Mongols in 1246;96 whether this was true or not, Daniil himself may have believed it. Zatko proposed that Alexander defected because, fresh from a visit to Güyüg’s headquarters sometime early in 1248, he had perceived at first hand the extent of Mongol power and inevitably made the comparison with Western military strength, but it is as likely that what swayed him was his promotion by the Qaghan to be grand prince of Kiev.97 For his part, Mindaugas apostatized two years prior to his murder in 1263, and the Christianization of Lithuania – a hazardous and ambivalent process in Innocent IV’s time – remained a dead letter until the definitive conversion of its Grand Duke in the last decades of the fourteenth century. One result of the contacts with Daniil, at least, was that his descendants – in contrast with other Rus’ princes – maintained close links with their Latin neighbours.98

Innocent IV’s plan to erect a barrier between Western Europe and the Mongols had failed. The idea had developed naturally out of papal perceptions of the situation preceding the Mongol invasion of 1241–2 (above, p. 68); it may even have assumed priority for Innocent over the avowed purposes of his letters Cum non solum and Dei patris immensa. If he had little hope in 1245 of bringing the Mongols to accept Christianity, he could and did expect the Catholic Church to reap some benefit from the predicament in which Eastern Christians – and perhaps, too, the Muslims and Eastern European pagans – found themselves. This is not to say that the pope aimed to enter into an understanding with the Mongols against the West’s other enemies. The erroneous notion that he sought an alliance against the Islamic world is found in the secondary literature, and Matthew Paris, it is true, heard a scurrilous rumour that during the visit of Baichu’s envoys to Lyons in 1248, Innocent tried to incite the Mongols against Frederick II’s son-in-law, the Nicaean Emperor John III Vatatzes.99 Tales of this kind, in all probability, parallel the equally baseless charges that the Mongols had been summoned by Frederick (pp. 74–5). There is no evidence that the pope saw them in a providential light, as allies. Ironically, however, by the time his plans to resist them lay in shreds, more encouraging reports were
emerging from the Mongol empire regarding the possibility of the Mongols’ own conversion.

Christianity in the Mongol empire and the perspective of Non-Latin Christians

By the mid-thirteenth century, the Latin West had been alerted to the presence of Christians not only among the peoples subject to Mongol rule but even within the ranks of the Mongol imperial dynasty. Some of these reports were simply based on false identification. At Güyük’s encampment, Carpini had heard confused accounts concerning the Chinese Buddhists to the east. Pagans who were said to possess an Old and a New Testament, buildings like churches, and even their own saints, they allegedly worshipped one god, honoured Jesus Christ, loved Christians and believed in eternal life; they lacked only baptism. But the populations of central and eastern Asia did include Christians – Jacobites, Nestorians, Greek Orthodox and Armenians. Of these, the Nestorians were the most widespread and had a longer acquaintance with the new masters of Asia than had any of the other churches. In addition, they often had especial reason to value the termination of Muslim rule. In much the same way, the severe reverses inflicted on the Muslims in Central Asia by earlier pagan powers from the steppe had given rise to considerable elation among the Nestorian communities and (in however distorted a form) had nurtured the myth of Prester John.

The Christians of Güyük’s entourage told Carpini that the qaghan was about to become a Christian, on the grounds that he maintained Christian clerics and kept a portable chapel in front of his pavilion, in contrast with other Mongol princes. The tone in which the Franciscan records this is studiedly neutral, and he says no more about the Nestorians’ position within Güyük’s empire, perhaps because he looked askance at them as schismatics. He alluded to the Mongols’ toleration of the various religious communities within their empire, though in his later recension he adds the rider that it would be jettisoned once the conquerors’ dominion was secure. Andrew of Longjumeau and Simon of Saint-Quentin, on the other hand, observed merely that such latitude was conditional upon obedience to the qaghan. Andrew was the first to draw the West’s attention to the activities of the Nestorian Simeon Rabban-ata, who appears to have been responsible for Christian affairs in south-west Asia and obtained the Mongols’ permission to oversee the reconstruction of Christian churches; though Simon of Saint-Quentin formed a decidedly less favourable impression of the man. Andrew also brought back the earliest report that Güyük’s mother was a Christian – a daughter, allegedly, of Prester John.

More sanguine expectations were aroused by the Armenian constable, Smbat, in the course of his embassy to Güyük’s court on behalf of his brother King Het’um. Smbat, who as a member of the royal dynasty of
Lesser Armenia was closely connected with the Latin East, wrote from Samarkand in 1248 to his two sisters and their husbands, the king of Cyprus and the lord of Jaffa, a letter which they presented to Louis IX on his arrival in Cyprus with the Seventh Crusade and which was considered sufficiently important to be forwarded to Innocent IV by his legate on the crusade, Eudes de Châteauroux, cardinal bishop of Tusculum. Laying considerable emphasis on the presence of large numbers of Christians in the empire and on the way in which the Three Magi were honoured, Smbat, like Carpini, mentioned the chapels situated in front of the qaghan’s court, but he went further, alleging that the qaghan himself ‘and all his people’ had become Christians. Güyük’s grandfather (Chinggis Khan), moreover, had enfranchised the Christians and forbidden anyone to do them any injury. A Christian king in ‘India’ had become the Mongols’ client and with their help had inflicted a crushing defeat on his Muslim enemies. Smbat had learned of Carpini’s mission to Güyük and transmitted a somewhat anodyne version of the ultimatum given to the Franciscan, in which Innocent IV was told that God knew whether the qaghan was a Christian or not and that, if the pope wished to know, he should come and find out for himself. Smbat was apparently concerned to present the Franks with a more favourable image of the Mongols.

At around the same time as he was shown Smbat’s letter, King Louis was visited by envoys from the Mongol noyan Eljigidei, whom Güyük had sent to Persia in 1247. This general, whose ostensible purpose was to seek more equitable treatment for Eastern Christians living under Latin rule, expressed cordial wishes for the success of the crusade and assured Louis that he had been sent to oversee the protection of Christians, who under Mongol rule were exempt from taxation and forced labour. How accurate this was and what Eljigidei’s aims were will be considered later (pp. 212, 219). For the moment we should notice that when interrogated by Louis and the papal legate, his envoys – both Christians from the Mosul region – claimed not only that Eljigidei was a Christian but also that Güyük, at the instance of his Christian mother (again called a daughter of Prester John), had been baptized at Epiphany by a Christian bishop. The news, taken all the more seriously since it appeared to be confirmed by the tenor of Smbat’s letter, caused a considerable stir in Western Europe. Matthew Paris duly registered it in his Chronica majora; he included also a copy of the French translation of Eljigidei’s letter which Louis had sent to his mother, Queen Blanche, in France and which she had forwarded to the English king, Henry III. Adam Marsh wrote that news of the Mongols’ conversion was spreading across the world.

The French King was sufficiently encouraged by the replies of Eljigidei’s envoys to send them back in January 1249 with an embassy of his own, headed by Andrew of Longjumeau. Regarding this embassy, we have only meagre information, most of it in the form of a somewhat muddled account.
by Louis’s biographer Joinville, writing some decades later. The party must have met Eljigidei somewhere in Persia: since Gûyüg was now dead, the general forwarded them to his widow, the regent Oghul Qaimish, who received them near Emil. They rejoined the French king at Caesarea in 1251, bringing with them the regent’s letter, in which Louis’s gifts were acknowledged and he was ordered to send similar ‘tribute’ every year in future. Joinville assures us that Louis greatly regretted having entered into contact with the Mongols. As a result, when in 1253 the Franciscan William of Rubruck left the crusading army for the Mongol world in a missionary capacity but bearing a letter from Louis, the king insisted that he should not allow himself to be taken for another French ambassador.

One reason for Rubruck’s journey was that further rumours had reached the Holy Land, this time regarding the Christian convictions of Batu’s son Sartaq, whose pasturelands lay west of the Volga. Yet the letter Rubruck carried from the French king served to obscure his purpose. Louis asked permission for him to stay in the empire but also felicitated Sartaq on his conversion and urged him to be a friend to all Christians. Even before they reached Constantinople, the party were rumoured to be official envoys. The mere existence of the letter gave the Mongols the impression that Louis was taking steps to submit to them, and Rubruck subsequently suspected Armenian translators at Sartaq’s encampment of giving a tendentious rendering of the king’s amicable message and turning it into a proposal for an alliance. For this reason, Sartaq forwarded the two Franciscans to his father Batu, and Batu in turn sent them across almost the entire breadth of Asia to the court of the new qaghan, Möngke. There they were told that Louis’s letter had been mislaid. Möngke seems to have accepted that the friars were not ambassadors but after a few months sent Rubruck back as his own representative, with a letter requiring the French king’s submission and expressly disowning the words of Eljigidei’s envoys.

Rubruck was disappointed in Sartaq. On leaving his encampment, the friars were told by Sartaq’s chief secretary, *Quyaq* (‘Coiac’): ‘Do not say that our master is a Christian. He is not a Christian; he is a Mongol’. Rubruck was consequently in some doubt that the prince was a Christian, and suspected him of holding Christians in derision. His territory merely happened to lie athwart the route between Batu’s headquarters and a number of Christian peoples; and Muslim envoys, if they brought more valuable gifts, were sent on more expeditiously. Yet Kirakos Ganjakeci says that the Christians deeply mourned Sartaq’s death. And Sartaq’s Christian faith is attested not merely by Christian Syriac and Armenian writers but even by Muslim contemporaries who can have had no interest in distorting the truth.

*Quyaq’s warning furnishes the key to the Mongols’ attitudes. Rubruck deduced that they regarded ‘Christian’ as the name of a people (i.e. as a synonym for ‘Franks’) and wished only to be called Mongols.
have been some truth in this, though categorical evidence is lacking. The essential point to be grasped, however, is that Mongol princes and commanders were Mongols first and foremost; religious allegiances took second place to the task of conquering and governing the empire. Generally, in accordance with a *yasa* of Chinggis Khan, Mongol rulers were concerned to preside evenhandedly over the various religious communities within the empire. ‘Holy men’ representing every confessional group – rather than all Christians, as Eljigidei claimed – enjoyed freedom from personal taxation (though they were subject to imposts on any economic activity in which they engaged) and from military service and other kinds of compulsory labour. Kirakos admits that even Sartaq granted these privileges to mosques and their personnel. Juwaynī depicts Güyük as a dyed-in-the-wool Christian who hated Muslims because he had been reared in the faith by the Christian minister, Qadaq; he is followed by Bar Hebraeus, who says that the qaghan was ‘a true Christian’ and that in his reign ‘the status of many followers of Christ was exalted’. Yet other testimony suggests that Güyük was, rather, anti-Muslim and that he was attached to Buddhist lamas; Armenian sources, so impressed by Sartaq’s Christian sympathies, are silent about Güyük’s. A similar ambivalence surrounds Qaghan Möngke and his mother Sorqaqtani (d. 1252). Sorqaqtani’s Nestorian Christian faith was well known, and she was buried in a Christian church in Gansu. Yet Juwaynī, while admitting this, makes great play of her benefactions to Islamic colleges (*madrasas*) and her gifts to needy Muslims. Of Möngke he says that he reserved his greatest acts of generosity for Muslims; Jūzjānī even believed that, on his enthronement, the qaghan recited the Islamic profession of faith (*shahāda*) at the request of his cousin Berke. And still more conflicting evidence is furnished by a Buddhist source, which puts into Möngke’s mouth the pronouncement that the other religions of the world stood in the same relation to Buddhism as did the fingers to the palm of the hand; while the *Yuan shi* indicates that he persevered in the shamanistic path of his forebears.

The result, if not necessarily the intention, of the imperial religious policy was to ‘divide and rule’, as the different confessional elements jostled for favour and influence at the sovereign’s court. Rubruck, describing their participation in the ceremonies at Möngke’s headquarters, commented scornfully on their delusions about the qaghan’s spiritual allegiance: ‘He believes in none of them. . . ; and yet they all follow his court as flies do honey, and he makes them all gifts and all of them believe that they are on intimate terms with him and forecast his good fortune’. He was sceptical regarding the Christian faith of Güyük, Möngke and Sartaq alike and blamed these rumours, like the legend of Prester John, on the Nestorians’ addiction to hyperbole.

The replies made by Eljigidei’s envoys during their interrogation by Louis IX and the papal legate demonstrate how Eastern Christians had embraced
The Mongol threat

The legend of Prester John, had identified him with Toghril-Ong Khan of the Kereyit and drew encouragement from the marriages of various Kereyit princesses to princes of Chinggis Khan’s dynasty. In the eyes of such Christians, even the founder of the Mongol empire acquired a providential role. The Dominicans whom Louis IX despatched to the Mongols in 1249 heard a tale concerning Chinggis Khan, which through them came to the notice of Thomas of Cantimpré and subsequently of Joinville. The kernel of the story was apparently that a Mongol prince, lost in the wilderness, had encountered a magnificent king on a golden throne who announced himself to be the Lord of Heaven and Earth and who had a ‘knight’ escort the prince safely back to his people. The two versions differ. That of Thomas has a more Christian slant than Joinville’s account; Joinville’s magnificent king orders the prince to tell Chinggis Khan that he is giving him power to conquer the world, of which Thomas makes no mention; in Thomas’s version, the knight rides a white horse.

These are obviously distortions of a story current within Mongol society, about the transmission of Heaven’s mandate to Chinggis Khan through Teb-Tenggeri. The shaman had subsequently grown arrogant and had threatened to cause a rift between Chinggis Khan and his brothers, with the result that it had been necessary to eliminate him. His pivotal role is merely hinted at in the ‘Secret History’, but it is mentioned c.1260 by Juwaynī (from whom it was later borrowed by Bar Hebraeus), and in 1262 the Mongol prince Hülegü would refer to it in a letter to Louis IX (see p. 220). According to Rashīd al-Dīn (c.1303–4), the common folk had believed that Teb-Tenggeri in his trances used to ascend to Heaven on a white horse, and only a few years later the expatriate Armenian prince Hayton writes of a ‘knight’ on a white horse conferring Heaven’s mandate on Chinggis Khan. Clearly the French envoys in 1249 had met Nestorians who were endeavouring to reclothe Mongol legend in Christian garb. The fact that the theme of the lost prince surfaces in Bar Hebraeus’s account of the much earlier Christianization of the Kereyit shows how older elements were already attaching themselves to the chimera of Mongol conversion. According to Bar Hebraeus, again, Hülegü told the Jacobite Patriarch that Chinggis Khan had been visited by Christians, who had taught him their religion and just laws.

It was natural that non-Latin Christians should be over-optimistic regarding the susceptibility of their Mongol rulers to conversion. The majority of them had lived under Islamic rule for centuries, and the advent of the Mongols brought an amelioration of their condition, in the form of equality with Muslims and other religious communities, the promotion of Christians to administrative office and the opportunity to preach their faith in public. So too Het’um I and his Armenian subjects, while not subject to Muslim rule, had been hard-pressed by their powerful neighbour, the Seljuk Sultan, and saw Mongol overlordship as their salvation, a view expressed in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Armenian sources. As we shall see (pp. 124–5,
215), the treatise by Het’um’s nephew, Hayton of Gorigos, which gives a highly inflated account of the privileges conferred on the Armenian king by Möngke in 1254, offers a particularly extreme example.

The perspective of the Latins, for whom acceptance of Mongol sovereignty represented precisely the enslavement from which Eastern Christians had been delivered, was inevitably very different. The gulf between the Eastern and Western churches is nicely encapsulated in Rubruck’s conversation with the Armenian monk Sargis (Sergius) at Möngke’s headquarters. Sargis had assured Möngke that if he became a Christian, the whole world would enter into subjection to him and that the Franks and the pope would do his bidding, and he advised Rubruck to say the same thing. The Franciscan was horrified and refused to say anything more than that the West would regard a Christian Mongol qaghan as a friend and brother.140

In the summer of 1254, Sartaq’s chaplain, an Armenian named John, brought news of his master’s baptism to Innocent IV, although in Sicily Conrad IV’s officials had allegedly confiscated the prince’s letter asking for the means of instruction in Christian ritual and practice, along with John’s other effects, and he had been able to proceed only after Conrad’s death in May. The pope responded late in August, urging Sartaq to make a public proclamation of his new-found faith.141 Sartaq, who succeeded his father Batu as ruler of the Golden Horde in 1255/6, soon died in suspicious circumstances, however, and after the brief reign of his young son Ulaghchi, the succession passed to Batu’s brother Berke, a convert to Islam.142 Even before the news of Sartaq’s baptism, King Louis (inspired by the recent findings of his envoy Andrew of Longjumeau and not, perhaps, as disheartened by the outcome of the embassy as Joinville suggests) had proposed that members of the Mendicant Orders be promoted to vacant sees in the Caliph’s territory in order to cater for the needs of new converts, since it was reported that several Mongols were themselves baptized and would embrace the Christian faith fully if only preaching were set on foot. Innocent entrusted the matter to Eudes de Châteauroux.143 But nothing came of this. Despite a sense that Mongol leaders were being won for Christianity, the creation of a network of Catholic sees in Mongol Asia was still a long way off (see Chapter 11.)

The crusade

By 1253, when Rubruck began his journey through the Mongol empire, its limits extended well into Europe and the Near East.144 The Bulgarian kingdom, he tells us, paid the Mongols tribute; in all probability it had done so since the invasion of 1242.145 He believed, mistakenly, that the Georgians were still independent, although we know that they too had been tributary to the conquerors for several years and that Güyüg had divided the kingdom between two rival claimants who had appealed to him.146 Lesser Armenia
had been tributary since 1246. So too the once mighty Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm and the Greek Empire of Trebizond were subject to the Mongols. But the other Greek state in Anatolia, the Empire of Nicaea, had still not yielded: the Emperor John Vatatzes had sent envoys to the qaghan but was playing for time. From Constantinople his rival, the Latin Emperor Baldwin II, is known to have opened diplomatic contact with the Mongols by c.1251. Although Baichu himself was engaged in half-hearted attempts to browbeat the `Abbasid Caliph into submission and the early 1250s did not witness any major campaigns in the Near East, Syria lay within the penumbra of the Mongol empire. In 1246, the Ayyubid Sultan of Aleppo despatched his cousin to Mongolia to attend Gûyük’s enthronement, and Carpini believed that the Mongols were currently taking possession of his territory. His Dominican colleagues visiting the Near East in 1247 claimed that the limits of Mongol domination now lay two days’ journey south of Antioch, and Matthew Paris includes Bohemond V of Antioch among those who, around 1246, became tributary to the Mongols. Further south, the Franks of the kingdom of Jerusalem appear to have been anticipating an attack since 1244, for a charter issued there in 1248 is the first to make provision for the conquest of the kingdom by ‘other infidels’ apart from the Muslims.

Innocent IV’s readiness to make diplomatic overtures to the Mongols had not led him to abandon the crusade against them. From the very beginning of his pontificate, he had continued to foster armed resistance. When the Hungarians heard fresh rumours of Mongol activity in the neighbouring territories and turned to him for help, he ordered Berthold, patriarch of Aquileia, to preach the cross in Germany and to promise all those who took the vow to fight in Hungary the same rewards as for the Holy Land. As a result of the deliberations at the Council of Lyons, he wrote to all Christians urging them to inspect ways of access into their territories and to fortify them with ditches, walls and other structures; the pope undertook to make a financial contribution towards the work both from his own coffers and from the rest of Christendom. But other concerns had not been eclipsed. Even as he authorized crusade preaching in August 1243, Innocent was prepared to commute the vow of Norwegian Duke Knut (for an expedition to the Holy Land) to participation in the crusade against the Mongols in Hungary only if they returned within twelve months; otherwise, Knut was to redeem his vow with the sum of money he would have spent on a campaign in Palestine. By 1245–6 the wars against the Emperor Frederick II and the Greeks appear to have outweighed all other priorities. Innocent’s agents were then active even in Poland, which still smarted from the Mongol incursion of five years before, and were endeavouring to recruit crusaders both against Frederick and in defence of Constantinople. When, responding in 1247 to rumours of an impending Mongol attack on Hungary, the pope asked Béla IV to forward any fresh reports without delay; he promised for his own part to waste no time in sending to Hungary’s assistance those
who had taken the cross for Syria or Romania ‘or anywhere else’. His failure to mention explicitly crusaders in the war against the Hohenstaufen seems significant. Béla was evidently dissatisfied with the papal response: in a letter that should probably be dated to this same year, he expressed his amazement that Innocent was allowing Louis IX’s crusade to leave for the Near East at a time when the Mongols menaced the very heart of Europe.

The alarm continued to sound at intervals in the 1250s. Innocent was arranging for the crusade to be preached against the Mongols in the spring of 1253 in Bohemia, Moravia, Serbia (Sorbia?) and Pomerania and, in May 1254, in Estonia, Livonia and Prussia. In June 1258, Pope Alexander IV authorized further crusade preaching by the Mendicant Orders against the Mongols throughout Germany, Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. And from the Near East reports were increasingly ominous. As Rubruck learned, the qaghan’s brother Hülegü was moving west at the head of a great army, with the aim, firstly, of annihilating the Assassins and then of attacking Baghdad and John Vataztes. Following the prince’s arrival in Iran, Baichu headed a fresh campaign against the Anatolian Seljüks (1256). The backwash of this fresh surge of military activity reached as far south as the kingdom of Jerusalem where, according to Matthew Paris, the government at Acre received a Mongol ultimatum in 1257. In that year the patriarch of Jerusalem, Jacques Pantaléon, expressed his fears of an imminent Mongol invasion to Alexander IV; while the preceptor of the Temple in the kingdom warned of an assault on Palestine in the following spring. As it grew clear that there was no ‘remedy against the Tartars’, all the indications were that they were planning, at long last, to follow up the campaigns of 1241–4 in strength.

Notes

2 RV, ed. and tr. Bak and Sweeney, introduction, pp. xliii–xliv.
3 A variant version of his report, in OOLB ms. 446, calls him archbishop of ‘Belgrab’: see Ruotsala, Europeans and Mongols, pp. 153–5 (Appendix 1), who takes this as Belgorod, near Kiev. The identification with the known cleric Peter Akherovich, first made in 1927 by Tomasheskii and cited in Richard, La papauté, p. 67, n.10, is unlikely.
5 Dörrie, p. 194.
6 See the introduction to the Menestò edn, pp. 50–2.
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8 Texts in Lupprian, pp. 141–9 (nos. 20, 21); tr. in Dawson, Mongol Mission, pp. 73–6.
9 PC, ix, 8, pp. 306–7 (tr. Dawson, pp. 53–4). SSQ, p. 21 (= VB, xxxii, 2). Richard (n.1 ibid.) was uncertain whether Ascelin’s party carried Dei patris immensa, but in his reply to Baichu, 22 Nov. 1248, the pope mentions having sent envoys to him in order that they might expound the faith: Lupprian, p. 198 (no. 35).
18 SSQ, pp. 95–6 (= VB, xxxii, 40); see also p. 105 (= VB, xxxii, 46).
19 And not the general Eljigidei (see p. 103), as often supposed. Simon calls him ‘Anguca’, which is far more likely to be a corruption of Arghun Aqa’s name. According to the Yuan shi, Eljigidei did not leave the qaghan’s headquarters until autumn 1247: see P. Jackson, ‘Argūn Aqa’, Enc.Ir.
20 SSQ, pp. 113–17 (= VB, xxxii, 51–2).
21 Reg. Inno. IV, no. 4682 = Lupprian, pp. 197–8 (no. 35).
23 Lupprian, pp. 147, 148.
27 Ibid., ix, 11 and 14, pp. 308, 310 (tr. Dawson, pp. 54–5, 56).
28 Benedict, §5, p. 137 (tr. Dawson, p. 80). Carpini is silent on this, though he mentions the practice as one to which envoys are subject: PC, iii, 3–4, pp. 236–7 (tr. Dawson, pp. 9–10).
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31 See, e.g., De Rachewiltz, *Papal Envoys*, p. 88.

32 SSQ, pp. 104–7 (= VB, xxxii, 46–47); cf. also p. 96 (= VB, xxxii, 40).

33 PC, ix, 18, p. 312 (tr. Dawson, p. 57).

34 Ibid., prologue, 2–3, p. 228 (tr. Dawson, pp. 3–4).


37 Benedict, §12, pp. 140–1 (tr. Dawson, pp. 82–3).


39 Ibid., ix, 17, p. 311 (tr. Dawson, p. 57).

40 Ibid., vii, 2, p. 294 (tr. Dawson, p. 44); cf. also ix, 38, p. 323 (tr. Dawson, p. 65).

41 Ibid., viii, 5, p. 295 (tr. Dawson, p. 45).


43 PC, viii, 3, p. 294 (tr. Dawson, p. 44).


45 PC, v, 18, vii, 2, and viii, 2, pp. 264, 284–5, 293 (tr. Dawson, pp. 25, 38, 43–4).

46 Ibid., viii, 3, p. 294 (tr. Dawson, p. 44).


48 PC, viii, 6, p. 296 (tr. Dawson, p. 45).

49 Ibid., ix, 44, pp. 327–8 (tr. Dawson, pp. 68–9).

50 Ibid., viii, 3, p. 295 (tr. Dawson, p. 44). SSQ, pp. 31, 32 (= VB, xxx, 71), on their size and strength.


52 PC, v, 12, 13, vii, 10, and viii, 12, pp. 258–9, 260, 290–1, 300 (tr. Dawson, pp. 22–3, 41–2, 48–9).

53 SSQ, p. 52 (= VB, xxx, 87).


56 PC, v, 19, p. 264 (tr. Dawson, pp. 25–6). The figure seems to be linked with the same number given later on, when Carpini is speaking of the next campaign against Hungary and Poland; the troops’ orders are to fight without a break for eighteen years: ibid., viii, 4, p. 295 (tr. Dawson, p. 44); TR, §33, p. 22. See Ostrowski, ‘Second-redaction additions’, p. 542.


58 Ostrowski, ‘Second-redaction additions’, pp. 549–50; for specific examples, see pp. 543 (re PC, v, 34, on the Mongol threat in Syria), 546 (re vi, 11, regarding their highly effective plundering tactics), 548 (re v, 27, on the fate of the population of Kiev). I differ from Ostrowski in my reluctance to accept that all the second-redaction additions which materially affect the sense are the work of a later writer rather than Carpini himself. See also Klopprogge, *Ursprung*, pp. 216–19. For the friars’ informants, see Guzman, ‘European captives’, pp. 132–49; Jackson, ‘Franciscans as papal and royal envoys’, pp. 234–6.


60 *HDFS*, VI, pp. 263, 265–7. See also MGHEp., II, pp. 78–9 (no. 110, 30 April 1245), from which it is clear that he had already been in Europe for some months.
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61 Dörrie, p. 190.
64 PC, prologue, 2, p. 227 (tr. Dawson, p. 3); cf. also ix, 2, p. 302 (tr. Dawson, p. 50).
65 Ibid., prologue, 1, p. 227 (tr. Dawson, p. 3). See also TR, p. 3, *legat[us] ad omnes externas naciones, precipue tamen ad Tartaros*.
68 CICO, IV:1, pp. 48–9 (no. 21); for the full text, see pp. 43–8 (no. 20). Richard, *La papauté*, pp. 45, 59.
70 ‘Annales Stadenses’, MGHS, XVI, p. 370. Cf. also ‘Annales S. Pantaleonis’, p. 540; and CM, IV, p. 566, where the aim is supposedly a truce to last until the arrival of the Seventh Crusade.
73 Lupprian, p. 174 (no. 27).
75 Lupprian, p. 163 (no. 24).
76 CICO, IV:1, p. 96 (no. 52); see also CM, VI, p. 115.
80 PC, ix, 48, p. 330 (tr. Dawson, p. 70).
81 CICO, IV:1, pp. 69–70 (no. 28). For these negotiations, see Bolesław Szczepaniak, ‘The mission of Giovanni de Plano Carpini and Benedict the Pole of Vratislavia to Halicz’, *JEH* 7 (1956), pp. 12–20.
82 CICO, IV:1, pp. 66–7 (no. 26a); for the full text, cf. p. 65 (no. 26). The editors assume that the addressee was Daniil, but cf. Zatko, pp. 41–2. On Iaroslav’s background, see Fennell, *Crisis*, pp. 98–9.
83 CICO, IV:1, pp. 110–11 (no. 59).
84 PC, ix, 31, 37, 49, pp. 319, 323, 331 (tr. Dawson, pp. 62, 65, 70). The rumour about poison is reported also in the Galician chronicle: *PSRL*, II, col. 808 (tr. Perfecky, p. 58).
86 PC, ix, 37, p. 323 (tr. Dawson, p. 65).
87 CICO, IV:1, p. 117 (no. 65).
88 Ibid., pp. 108, 112 (nos. 57, 59); and cf. p. 109 (no. 58) to the Teutonic Knights on this subject.
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91 PC, ix, 4 and 10, pp. 304, 308 (tr. Dawson, pp. 52, 54, adopts the incorrect reading ‘Ruthenians’).


94 CICO, IV:2, pp. 67–8 (no. 32).

95 ‘Kronika Wielkopolska’ (down to 1273; written 1295), MPH2, VIII, p. 113. The date 1269/74 given for Ruthenia’s subjection to the Mongols by Michael B. Zdan, ‘The dependence of Halych-Volyn’ Rus’ on the Golden Horde’, SEER 35 (1956–7), pp. 505–22 (here p. 517), is therefore too late. The Galician chronicle does not mention their participation.


97 Zatko, pp. 50–1.


99 CM, V, pp. 37–8, where the proposal comes from the Mongol envoys; cf. Matthew Paris, Historia Anglorum, ed. Sir Frederic Madden, RS, 3 vols (London, 1866–9), III, pp. 38–9, where it allegedly emanates from the pope. The idea of an alliance against the Muslims at this early stage is advanced, e.g., in Davide Bigalli, I Tartari e l’Apocalisse. Ricerche sull’escatologia in Adamo Marsh e Ruggero Bacone (Firenze, 1971), p. 59 (Ascelin’s mission), and in Reichert, Begegnungen, pp. 71–2. On this, see the apt comments of Richard, ‘La correspondance’, p. 328.


103 PC, ix, 43, p. 327 (tr. Dawson, p. 68).

104 Ibid., iii, 5, p. 238 (tr. Dawson, p. 10).

105 CM, VI, p. 114. SSQ, p. 47 (= VB, xxx, 84).
106 CM, VI, p. 115. Andrew also transmitted this rumour to Thomas of Cantimpré, but probably following his second mission to the Mongols (see pp. 103–4): *Thomae Cantipratani... miraculorum et exemplorum memorabilium sui temporis libri duo*, II:liv, 14, ed. G. Colvenarius (Douai, 1605), pp. 526–8. For impressions of Simeon, see CM, VI, pp. 113, 116; SSQ, p. 30 (= VB, xxx, 70).


110 VB, xxxii, 91: ‘cui consonabant et alie quedam littere que paulo ante dicto regi a rege Cypri... fuerant presentatae’.

111 CM, V, pp. 80, 87; see VI, pp. 163–5, for the letter. A copy of Louis’s letter to Blanche is found in BN ms. latin 8865, fos 188–90.


114 WR, i, 6, p. 12 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 67).

115 Ibid., xxvii, 11, pp. 142, 144 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 171).


117 WR, xvi, 5, p. 80 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 120).

118 Ibid., xviii, 1, p. 86 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 126); cf. also i, 9, p. 14 (tr. p. 68).


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130 WR, xxix, 15, p. 172 ( *tr*. Jackson and Morgan, p. 187).
140 WR, xxviii, 8, p. 150 ( *tr*. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 174–5).
The Mongol threat

"limites du monde", p. 238, suggests that this overture on Sartaq’s behalf, so soon after Innocent’s summons of a crusade (below), may hardly have been coincidental; cf. also ibid., p. 240.

For the uncertain chronology of these events, see Pelliot, Notes sur l’histoire de la Horde d’Or, pp. 29, 34–44.

CICO, IV:1, p. 148 (no. 86).

WR, i, 5, pp. 10, 12 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 65–6), lists the states that had submitted to the Mongols.


For the uncertain chronology of these events, see Pelliot, Notes sur l’histoire de la Horde d’Or, pp. 29, 34–44.

CICO, IV:1, p. 148 (no. 86).

WR, i, 5, pp. 10, 12 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 65–6), lists the states that had submitted to the Mongols.


SSQ, p. 86 (= VB, xxxii, 29); and see n.3 ibid.


Richard, ‘À propos de la mission de Baudouin de Hainaut’.


Andrew of Longjumeau, in CM, VI, p. 114. SSQ, p. 93 (= VB, xxxii, 34).

CM, IV, p. 547.

CGOH, II, p. 673 (no. 2482).


CICO, IV:1, pp. 55–6 (no. 23).

ASV, Reg. Vat. 21, fo. 8r (= Lange and Unger, Diplomatarium Norvegicum, I, pp. 21–2, no. 27; CDH, IV:1, p. 303).


VMH, I, pp. 203–4 (no. 379, 4 Feb. 1247). For the alarms at this point, see also CM, IV, p. 546; Boniface, archbishop of Canterbury, to Peter of Savoy, ibid., VI, p. 133.

VMH, I, pp. 231–2 (no. 440) = DIR, I:1, p. 261–2 (no. 199); and for the date, see n.145.


PUB, I:2, pp. 51–3 (no. 59).

WR, xxxii, 4, p. 232 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 222–3), mentioning two brothers, possibly because Hülegü was initially accompanied by his brother Sübe’etei, who died en route: see Juwaynî, III, pp. 90, 98 (tr. Boyle, II, pp. 607, 612).

CM, V, p. 655.

5

THE HALTING OF THE MONGOL ADVANCE

Tensions within the Mongol imperial system

If princely strife played an uncertain role in the Mongols’ retreat from Eastern Europe in 1242 (pp. 78–9), it is undoubtedly one reason behind their failure to return in force for some time. For all the efficiency and discipline of the Mongol military machine and the striking loyalty of the nomads to Chinggis Khan’s dynasty, the empire he had founded was characterized by certain tensions. First, the boundary between the qaghan’s sphere of authority and that of his kinsmen was increasingly blurred. In conformity with steppe tradition, the Mongol conquests were regarded as the property of the imperial family as a whole. One expression of this idea was the tama (or tamma) system, whereby troops were selected, on a basis of perhaps two or three in every hundred, and despatched to the frontiers to make fresh conquests and to act as garrison troops: these comprised units supplied by the various branches of the imperial family and represented their interests.1 Another was the allocation of specific grazing-grounds and groups of nomadic subjects – the complex termed ulus in our sources – to each member of the dynasty. Although the sedentary territories, like northern China, were not apportioned in this manner but were under the qaghan’s direct rule, they were run by ‘joint satellite administrations’ comprising both his representatives and those of his relatives (p. 44); individual princes and princesses were granted particular towns as appanages, the revenues of which were forwarded to them by the qaghan’s officials. Naturally the qaghan’s kinsfolk were ever on the alert for opportunities to extend their possessions and influence at his expense.2 The second source of tension was the absence of fixed rules for the succession to the qaghanate. It is important to distinguish between the principles determining the inheritance of
pasturelands among the Eurasian nomads and those governing the succession to the headship of the empire as a whole. A prince’s original territory — the ‘hearthland’, as it was known — passed to his youngest son by his chief wife. If Juwaynī is to be believed, the older sons inherited grazing-grounds at a greater distance from the hearthland according to seniority. Thus Tolui, as the youngest son, received his father’s original encampment (yurt) on the Onon and Kerülen rivers; the second son, Chaghadai, and the third, Ögödei, were granted lands in Central Asia; while Jochi, as the eldest, was given ‘the land from Qayaligh and Khwārazm as far as Saqsīn and Bulghār and from that side as far as the hooves of Mongol horses had trodden’. We shall return to these territorial dispositions later.

The transmission of the imperial dignity proceeded along quite different lines. We are told that the great conqueror had designated his third son Ögödei as his successor, although this has recently been questioned. Ögödei was eventually elected by the princes in 1229, despite some opposition from Tolui, who had acted as regent of the empire since their father’s death. But this was the last occasion on which designation by the deceased sovereign proved effective, and henceforth the princes reverted to the time-honoured practice of choosing one of their number who was more senior or who appeared more competent — a system for which the late Professor Joseph Fletcher borrowed from the Celtic world the label ‘tanistry’. Ögödei’s desire to be succeeded by a younger son or by his grandson Shiremün was disregarded, and the throne passed to Güyüg. We do not know whom (if anyone) Güyüg designated, but his eventual successor was not a descendant of Ögödei but Möngke, Tolui’s eldest son, who headed the youngest branch of Chinggis Khan’s progeny. Whether this represented a breach of some earlier agreement, whereby the qaghanate was to remain in Ögödei’s or in Güyüg’s line, we cannot be sure; both claims appear in the sources. There is evidence that following the transfer of the qaghanate to Tolui’s line in 1251 the ‘Secret History’ was doctored in order to suggest that Chinggis Khan and Ögödei had foreseen the unsuitability of the latter’s progeny.

The five-year interregnum between Ögödei’s death and Güyüg’s election in 1246 did not necessarily entail the suspension of hostilities on the empire’s frontiers: there were operations in China in 1244, and we have seen how Baichu began a new offensive in the Near East two years previously. But the long interval bears eloquent witness to the discord within the imperial dynasty. From what the Carpini mission was told, Güyüg planned to unleash a fresh expedition against the West (p. 96). Yet already in 1247, during his return journey, Carpini had heard of the antagonism between Batu and the new qaghan, and the author of the ‘Tartar Relation’ suggested that this might afford the Latin world a respite for many years to come. Güyüg’s brief reign (1246–8) witnessed no campaigns of importance against external enemies. Instead, he sought to reduce the power of Batu, who had asserted his control over Baichu and his army. The noyan Eljigidei, sent to
The halting of the Mongol advance

Persia with fresh troops and an ostensible commission to guard the Caucasus and Armenia against outside interference, was secretly instructed to remove Batu’s representatives there; Baichu was superseded by Eljigidei himself. Güyüg was slowly moving westward in person against his old rival at the time of his death in Central Asia in April 1248. Güyüg’s premature death, which Rubruck later heard had come about either through poison or during a violent brawl with Batu’s brother Shiban, was followed by another interregnum, lasting three years. The regime of Güyüg’s widow Oghul Qaimish, who had received Andrew of Longjumeau (see p. 104), was swept away when Batu secured the election of Möngke (1251–9). The new reign began with a purge of those who had opposed Möngke’s accession. The majority of the descendants of Ögödei and Chaghadai were killed or exiled to the front in China, and their subjects and pasturelands were redistributed, mainly to Batu and his brothers or to the qaghan’s own family; many of their prominent supporters, including Eljigidei, were executed. Vague rumours of these upheavals reached France and even St Albans (through the intermediary of Armenian visitors). It was important for the new regime, established at the cost of such violence within the ranks of the Chinggisid dynasty, to consolidate its authority by renewing the programme of imperial expansion.

The Mongol invasion of Syria

To rally support behind his regime, Möngke in 1252–3 launched campaigns both in the Far East and in south-west Asia. While he, together with his brother Qubilai (the future qaghan), carried the war deeper into Song China, he despatched to Persia his third brother Hülegü, at the head of a considerable force, with authority over all Mongol troops already operating in the region. As in previous expeditions, Hülegü’s army was raised by a levy from the central forces (in this case, two men in every ten), and included contingents supplied by other branches of the dynasty, those led by Jochid princes from the Golden Horde territories being especially prominent. There was possibly some dissatisfaction at Mongol headquarters with the lack of progress made by Baichu, since Rashid al-Dīn depicts a stormy interview following Hülegü’s arrival, in which the general was upbraided for his inactivity. Baichu and his forces were ordered to move west into the Seljūk Sultanate of Rūm, at the time disputed between two of the sons of Kaykhusraw II; the Mongols defeated Sultan ‘Izz al-Dīn Kaykāʿūs, at Akseray (1256) and recognized as ruler his younger brother, Rukn al-Dīn Qilich Arslan. Meanwhile Hülegü took and destroyed the majority of the strongholds of the Ismūʿīʿīʿ Assassins in northern Persia, and their last Master was put to death (1256). Next it was the turn of the ‘Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad. After a siege of several weeks, the city was stormed and sacked on 6 February 1258, and the Caliph al-Mustaʿṣim, his sons and most of his suite were executed.
Hülegü’s forces then pushed forward into northern Syria, where Aleppo was taken by assault (24 January 1260). Its Ayyubid ruler, al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, who resided at Damascus, panicked and fled southward, with the result that the city surrendered to the Mongol general Kitbuqa in March. During the next few months Mongol troops raided Hebron, Ascalon and Jerusalem, sacked Nablus and received the surrender of Ba’labakk and ‘Ajlūn; the Ayyubid princes of Ḥimṣ, al-Ṣubayba and Karak all submitted. A contemporary Muslim author reports that the Franks were now virtually hemmed in on the coast, with a Mongol squadron based at Gaza to prevent them receiving any assistance from Egypt.

By this time Hülegü had withdrawn with most of his army and was on his way to Azerbaijan, leaving Kitbuqa with only a rump force of perhaps 10,000–20,000 men to complete the subjugation of Syria and to garrison the new conquests. The retreat has traditionally been ascribed to the news...
of the death of the Qaghan Möngke while besieging a fortress in China on 11 August 1259. There is a striking parallel with Batu’s retreat from Eastern Europe following Ögödei’s death. In this case too, there are grounds for believing that the withdrawal was dictated, at least in part, by ecological considerations. In a letter to the French King Louis IX in 1262, Hulegu himself would claim that he had left Syria because the grasslands there and his provisions were alike exhausted and because, moreover, it was the Mongols’ practice to move to cooler uplands for the summer. The departure of the majority of Mongol troops from Syria thus takes on the semblance almost of a matter of routine. But it is necessary, perhaps, to approach this evidence with circumspection, since Hulegu, in the act of seeking Frankish military cooperation against the Mamluks, would have had an interest in keeping silent about other, more pressing reasons for his retreat. A Western source hints that he halted in the hope of establishing his own power, and, as we shall see (pp. 129–30), he would shortly be engaged in full-scale conflict in the Caucasus with his cousins of the Golden Horde.

At the time of the attack on Aleppo, Mongol raiders had entered the principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli. The city of Antioch, whose dilapidated condition Rubruck had noticed five years previously, surrendered and accepted a Mongol resident. Prince Bohemond VI, perhaps under the influence of his father-in-law King Het’tum of Lesser Armenia, waited upon Hulegu in person and was allowed to reach a settlement that covered his county of Tripoli as well. He participated in the Mongol campaign against Ba’labakk, which he hoped to obtain from Hulegu, and may have ridden into Damascus with the Mongol army; though the story that he converted the Great Mosque into a church is demonstrably apocryphal. Mongol overlordship brought certain benefits in its wake. In return for Bohemond’s submission and military support, districts in the Orontes valley – Kafr Bilmīs, Dayr kūsh and Kafr Dubbīn – which the Muslims had taken at an earlier date were now restored to the principality of Antioch, a favour which would earn the prince the undying resentment of the Mamlūk Sultan Baybars.

The Franks further south, in the kingdom of Jerusalem, however, were not ready to yield to the conquerors. In the absence of a strong central authority, power was fragmented. Since 1257, the barons and the Military Orders had been split, having taken sides in the War of Saint-Sabas between the Venetians and the Genoese. In 1258, Bohemond had foisted on them a new regent, in the person of his sister, the widowed Queen Plaisance of Cyprus and a pro-Venetian policy: the Genoese had been driven from Acre, and it was important to remain on the winning side. But more recently nobles hostile to Bohemond from the county of Tripoli had taken refuge at Acre and were now to be found among the principal officers of the kingdom. Moreover, his conciliatory attitude towards the Mongols had incurred a ban of excommunication by the papal legate Thomas Agni di Lentino, bishop of
The Mongol threat

Bethlehem, which was still under consideration by Pope Urban IV in 1263. In the wake of the fall of Aleppo, the regime at Acre had sent Agni’s chaplain, David of Ashby, to Hulegu’s camp to ascertain his intentions. Now, as the Mongols ravaged the Palestinian hinterland, the Frankish government issued frantic appeals to the West: letters requesting urgent assistance reached Henry III of England, Louis IX of France, his brother Charles of Anjou and other Latin rulers in the Mediterranean region. Meanwhile they temporized, despatching envoys and gifts to Kitbuqa on at least two occasions, though they did not comply with his order to dismantle the walls of their fortresses.

In August 1260, Kitbuqa lost patience, and his forces sacked the city of Sidon. The outrage provoked such indignation in Acre that when the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, Sayf al-Din Quṭuz, advanced northward to attack the Mongols and requested safe-conduct through Latin territory, many of the Franks were ready to fight alongside the Egyptians. The gist of the ensuing debate has apparently been preserved for us by the so-called Rothelein continuation of William of Tyre’s history. The advice of the Master of the Teutonic Knights, Anno von Sangerhausen, carried the day. The Franks could ill afford to lose warriors by participating in the conflict, and there was no guarantee, in the event of a Mamluk victory, that Quṭuz would not subsequently turn against them; they should instead conserve their resources. In the event, the Franks confined themselves to furnishing supplies for the sultan’s troops.

On 3 September 1260, the Egyptian army did battle with Kitbuqa at ‘Ayn Jälût in Galilee. The Mamluk army equalled, or perhaps surpassed, the Mongols in number, and their victory was assured by the defection of the Ayyubid prince of Himṣ. Kitbuqa himself was killed, probably in the fighting; there is a less reliable tradition retailed by Rashid al-Din, according to which he was captured and executed after taunting Quṭuz by contrasting his own loyal service to his master with the Mamluks’ faithlessness and regicide. A smaller Mongol force that entered northern Syria in December to avenge Kitbuqa was easily crushed near Himṣ, and Hulegu himself was unable to return to the offensive in view of the outbreak of conflict within the Mongol dominions.

The effect of the brief Mongol occupation, followed by the defeat at ‘Ayn Jälût, had been simply to create a power-vacuum west of the Euphrates which was filled by the victorious Mamluks, as one Western observer, at least, realized. The former ruler, al-Nāṣir Yusuf, who had been captured by the Mongols, was executed on Hulegu’s orders as soon as news arrived of the disaster that had overtaken Kitbuqa. His territories, Aleppo and Damascus, now came under direct Mamluk rule; other principalities in Syria, notably Himṣ and Hamā, were in the hands of Ayyubid rulers who were the Egyptian Sultan’s allies and protégés. Ironically, Quṭuz did not live to enjoy the fruits of his victory. The triumphal reception in Cairo that would have been his
was reserved instead for his lieutenant Rukn al-Dīn Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, who murdered him en route for Egypt in October and usurped the throne.

Like the invasion of Europe in 1241–2, the advance of Hūlegū’s forces towards the eastern Mediterranean coast had provoked the greatest alarm in the West, and again the practical response proved inadequate. Some crusaders, among them the bishop of Marseilles, reached the Holy Land in the autumn of 1260; it is possible that King Jaime I of Aragon planned to bring military aid but was prevented from sailing by adverse weather. Pope Alexander IV ordered the summoning of provincial synods in the spring of 1261, from which delegates should be deputed to attend a general council in July. But the agenda did not just include the Mongol threat and the action to be taken against those who had submitted to the invaders, like Bohemond VI, Het’um and the Rus’ Grand Prince Alexander Nevsκii, who had submitted to the invaders; it also embraced the security of the Latin empire of Constantinople and the problem posed by Frederick II’s son Manfred in the kingdom of Sicily. The provincial councils met, and we know that Louis IX presided over one in Paris at Easter 1261, which decreed prayers, processions and penalties for blasphemy and prohibited tournaments for two years. But the pope died in May 1261, before the general council could meet and prior to the arrival of a high-ranking delegation from the Holy Land, headed by the archbishop of Tyre. In July, moreover, the Greek recovery of Constantinople threw all other crises into the shadows. When Pope Alexander’s successor, Urban IV, came to renew the crusade for the defence of the Holy Land against the Mongols in the spring of 1262, it would be just one of a number of crusading projects that competed for his attention.

A lost opportunity? The choice facing the Latin East in 1260

The failure of the Frankish regime at Acre to ally with the Mongols against the Mamlūks in 1260 has been seen as an act of extreme shortsightedness in view of the subsequent ability of Baybars and his successors to reduce Latin strongholds piecemeal and to destroy in turn the principality of Antioch (1268), the county of Tripoli (1289) and lastly the kingdom of Jerusalem (1291). Support for Kitbuqa, it is argued, would have brought about the destruction of the Mamlūk Sultanate and thereby secured a reprieve for the Latin settlements on the eastern Mediterranean coast. More will be said on this subject in the context of later negotiations between Western European powers and Mongol Persia (Chapter 8); for the moment, we shall focus on the choice confronting the Syrian Franks in 1260.

The idea of the lost opportunity rests upon two premises: that Hūlegū’s Mongols were anti-Muslim and pro-Christian and that we can read back into the circumstances of 1260 the readiness to court Latin friendship that he and his successors were to display from 1262 onward. In large measure,
these misapprehensions are sustained by the fact that in the Near East the chief political powers with which the Mongols were in conflict were Muslim. Contemporary Muslims and Eastern Christians alike sometimes equated the Mongol conquest with the triumph of the non-Muslim subject population, the *dhimmīs* or ‘protected peoples’, some of whom were promoted to office under the new regime. Thus a Muslim author lamenting the Mongol sack of Baghdad speaks (figuratively, perhaps) of the cross raised over the *minbars* and of authority in the hands of those who used to wear the *zunnār* (girdle), i.e. the *dhimmīs*. Hülegū’s mother Sorqaqtani, his chief wife Doquz Khatun and his general Kitbuqa were all Nestorians, and Doquz Khatun is credited by Eastern Christian sources with great services to her coreligionists. Yet to be beguiled by the view of oriental Christians that Hülegū and Doquz Khatun were a second Constantine and Helena is to forget that the Muslim subjects of the Qara-Khitai in Central Asia in 1218 had greeted the Mongols as liberators from the oppression of Güchülūg’s troops (p. 46). In any case, the personal inclinations of individual Mongols did not necessarily determine policy. Juwaynī comments that, although certain princes and generals had adopted a particular religion, they were careful to observe Chinggis Khan’s *yasa* decreeing equal treatment for all faiths, and a Muslim author whose family were living in Damascus in 1260 tells us that Kitbuqa had not displayed his sympathy for Christianity, out of deference to Chinggis Khan’s law. When an edict arrived from Hülegū late in August 1260 granting them freedom of worship, the Christians of Damascus responded with a triumphalism that placed their Muslim fellow citizens under a severe strain. But Hülegū’s edict extended the same concession to Jews, ‘Magians’ (Zoroastrians) and idolators (presumably Buddhists).

The primary concern of Mongol princes and generals was not the emancipation of any particular religious community, but the extension of their sovereignty over all other peoples in accordance with Heaven’s mandate to Chinggis Khan. The programme of world-conquest would be put on hold, in some degree, by Hülegū and his successors once it became clear that they could make headway against the Mamlūks only with Western assistance, and we must bear this in mind when using sources that date from this later era, beginning with Hülegū’s letter to Louis IX in 1262. Particular caution is required in approaching the crusade treatise, *La flor des estoires de la terre d’orient*, which the expatriate Armenian prince Hayton (Hetʿum) of Gorigos (Corycus), a nephew of King Hetʿum I, wrote in 1307 at the behest of Pope Clement V. Both these sources would find the attack on Sidon especially embarrassing. Hülegū told King Louis that his troops had exceeded their orders; Hayton blamed the Franks of Sidon for provoking Kitbuqa (whom he describes as a descendant of the Magi) with an audacious raid on the Mongol-occupied hinterland in which the general’s nephew was killed. Yet Hülegū’s letter was designed to elicit the French king’s assistance. And although Julian, the lord of Sidon, was an irresponsible hothead, and
although evidence exists for Frankish military activity at this time (p. 126), Hayton was quite simply a propagandist who sought to foster Latin–Mongol cooperation in the interests of his native Lesser Armenia by rewriting the events of 1260 and presenting Hülegü’s conduct in a more favourable light. Significantly, the only Western account of those events which depicts the Syrian Franks as hoping for Mongol assistance against the Muslims is a late one that is otherwise heavily dependent on Hayton.49

The decision taken by the Frankish lords at Acre in 1260 to adopt a position of benevolent neutrality towards the Mamlûks was the only rational choice in the circumstances. Firstly, the Mongols, by any standard, represented a formidable threat. They had no allies, only subjects or enemies. What they offered the Latin states in Syria and Palestine was no form of coalition on equal terms but simply a choice between annihilation and the acceptance of their overlordship. We have seen that the papal embassies of 1245–7 had left the West in no doubt regarding the character of that overlordship. In Latin Syria, it would have entailed a general levelling-out of the various groups that made up the population: the Franks would have forfeited their status as the ruling élite and would have been forced to share power with those whom they viewed as schismatics. This is clear from what transpired in 1260 in Antioch, the one Frankish state to accept a Mongol ‘resident’. Here the Greek Orthodox patriarch, who had been excommunicated by his Latin counterpart and repeatedly exiled from the city by the secular authorities, was reinstated on Hülegü’s express orders.51 Judging from developments in neighbouring Muslim territories during the Mongol occupation, moreover, the Franks would further have been obliged to share power with representatives of non-Christian groups – Jews and Muslims. To condemn them for recoiling before such a prospect is to demand a capacity for ecumenicism and interfaith dialogue that would not merely have been anachronistic in 1260 but has surfaced only as recently as the twentieth century.

In the second place, the Franks were clearly aware of their own limitations. Since the disaster at La Forbie in 1244, they had been too weak to participate in the struggles between Muslim powers in Syria, except when reinforced by a crusading army. As the Templar Master, Thomas Bérard, wrote to the West in 1260, only three strongholds in the kingdom, other than Acre and Tyre, could hold out against a Mongol attack.52 For this reason it made sense to allow Qutuz to relieve them of the Mongol menace at no cost to themselves, and the appreciative reception given in Western Europe to the news of the Mamlûk victory reflects the sense that the Sultan was fighting not just his own but the Franks’ battle also.53 Nor was it by any means self-evident that in assisting the Mamlûks, the Franks were nurturing the power that would destroy them. Anybody observing the course of Egyptian history in the previous decade could have been forgiven for concluding that the nascent Mamlûk state was
highly unstable. Qūṭūz, who had ascended the throne as recently as 1259, was the fourth sovereign since the Mamlūk usurpation in 1250. No one could have foreseen that he would be supplanted, within a month of his victory at ʿAyn Jālūt, by a sultan who would be able to embark upon the systematic reduction of Latin Syria. Still less could it have been predicted at this point that Baybars’s task would be greatly facilitated by Mongol inactivity – that Hülegü would not again move into Syria in force and that consequently the Franks would be unable to play off two powerful neighbours against each other.

Since they were unconscious of any advantage to be gained by submitting to Kitbuqa, it is worth pausing to observe how the Franks of the kingdom of Jerusalem did perceive their own interests. The rapid collapse of al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, whose army reputedly stood at 150,000 men, evidently made a profound impact on them, but it engendered hope as well as apprehension. As they assured Charles of Anjou, the current situation in Syria could be seen to offer an unprecedented chance to recover all the territory of the kingdom of Jerusalem that had been lost to Saladin, if only help arrived soon from Western Europe. Three years later, Thomas Agni, the Masters of the Military Orders and Geoffrey de Sargines, regent of the kingdom, reminded Henry III of England that they had continually brought the power-vacuum in Syria to the attention of Western rulers. Their perspective had been shared by no less a figure than Pope Urban IV, who (as Jacques Pantaléon, patriarch of Jerusalem) had left the Holy Land as recently as 1259: in a letter to the French king’s brother Alphonse of Toulouse in 1263, he admits that he too had been dazzled by the opportunities which seemed to be on offer.

Some among the Syrian Franks in 1260 were even ready to act without waiting for Western reinforcements. Kitbuqa’s sack of Sidon was doubtless a reprisal for the audacity of its lord, after al-Nāṣir’s flight, in occupying the whole of the region, the revenues of which had been divided since 1254 between the Franks and the Muslims. After the Mongols’ expulsion from Syria, a significant force from Acre, assisted by Templar contingents drawn from the Order’s principal strongholds, would launch an ambitious but disastrously unsuccessful raid on the Jawlān (Golan) region in February 1261. Expansion – rather than incorporation in the world-empire of the pagan Mongols – was the opportunity that seemed to beckon in 1260 to the Latin establishment in the east. Nor was this kind of opportunism confined to those in the anti-Mongol camp. In the wake of ʿAyn Jālūt, according to a well placed Egyptian author, Bohemond of Antioch occupied Laodicea (Lattakiya), thereby linking up the principality and his county of Tripoli. Frankish aspirations thus belonged squarely in the same tradition as the policies of popes, like Honorius III and Innocent IV, who had sought to capitalize on the Mongol threat since the 1220s.
The Mongol invasion of Eastern Europe in 1259

While the Franks of Syria and Palestine were facing a new antagonist and receiving deliverance at the hands of an old one, their confrères in Eastern Europe were once again experiencing the terrors of a Mongol invasion. Independently of Hülegü’s operations, Batu’s brother Berke, who had succeeded as ruler of the Mongols of the Golden Horde in 1256/7, launched a savage attack on Poland in 1259. The Mongol general Boroldai devastated Cracow and Sandomir, the territories of Boleslaw the Chaste, and sacked the town of Sandomir before withdrawing into the steppes. The Polish annals lay considerable stress on the removal of large numbers of enslaved captives. The campaign attracts less notice from chroniclers writing in neighbouring Germany than either Batu’s invasion of 1241–2 or the near-contemporary events in Syria, but conversely the impression given is that on this occasion the Mongols were concerned to deliver a heavier blow against Poland than they had previously. In the verdict of one Polish annalist, the attack exceeded in its ferocity even the visitation of 1241. These forces or possibly others acting in conjunction with them were also responsible for the devastation of Lithuania and for an assault on Prussia in 1259/60, which inflicted heavy losses on the Teutonic Knights. A significant number of crusaders may have assembled in Prussia by March 1260, when Pope Alexander placed them under the authority of the Teutonic Order’s Landmeister there. In August, the pope urged the Order to prepare to move to the Poles’ assistance in the event of another Mongol attack. But in the following spring he had to authorize the crusade instead to suppress a major revolt by the Order’s Prussian subjects, a directive repeated in 1262 by his successor Urban IV.

In 1260 or early in 1261, Berke followed up the attack on Poland by sending an embassy to Paris to demand the submission of Louis IX. Our sole source for this mission dates it in 1262, and modern scholars have accordingly identified it with the Mongol embassy which brought the French king Hülegü’s proposal for concerted action against the Mamluks, dated April of that year (p. 204). But we are told explicitly that Louis forwarded the envoys to Pope Alexander IV, who died in May 1261, and the few details we are given leave no doubt that the missive they carried was not couched in more or less amicable tones, as was Hülegü’s letter, but was an ultimatum threatening an invasion of France if Louis did not acknowledge Mongol overlordship. It surely came from Berke and heralded the next Mongol advance into the heart of Europe. Since 1259, Berke had been exerting pressure on Béla IV of Hungary to enter into a marriage alliance with the Mongols and to join them in a campaign against his Latin neighbours, or suffer another attack upon his kingdom. That the khan was unable to put either threat into execution was due to the outbreak of civil war within the Mongol world.
The end of the unitary Mongol empire

It was only natural that Muslims should hail the Mamlūk victory at 'Ayn Jālūt as a watershed. Following a period in which a pagan power had ravaged many of the core regions of the Dār al-Islām and destroyed the 'Abbasid Caliphate, the effects of Kitbuqa’s defeat on the Islamic world were all the more heartening. For Abū Shāma, writing in Damascus a few years later, it demonstrated how for every pestilence there was an antidote of its own kind: the Mongols had met defeat at the hands of another people of the steppe, since the roots of the Mamlūks lay among the nomadic Qipchāq.69 Yet for all the psychological impact of the engagement, it was not local reverses like 'Ayn Jālūt that halted the Mongol advance in the Near East but events in distant Mongolia.

Following the death of Möngke in August 1259, two of his younger brothers had emerged as candidates for election to the qaghanate:70 Qubilai, on campaign in China, and Arigh Böke, whom Möngke had left in charge at Qaraqorum and who, his supporters alleged, was the designated successor.71 For a time the two men engaged in a wary exchange of messages, but finally Qubilai took the decisive step of allowing himself to be elected at a rump assembly of princes and generals in Kaiping in May 1260. Arigh Böke’s supporters reacted by proclaiming him as qaghan in September–October. 72 Qubilai had already negotiated a suspension of hostilities with the Song empire in southern China in order to free his hand to deal with his brother,73 and a four-year struggle now erupted in the Far East, which ended only with Arigh Boke’s submission and death in 1264. The details of this war do not concern us; what does is the fact that other important members of the imperial dynasty were drawn in. Not merely did each claimant try to intrude one of his own princely supporters into the Chaghadayid ulus in Central Asia, but the conflict also spread further west, since Berke supported Arigh Böke and Hülegü, perhaps after an initial hesitation, declared for Qubilai.

The interests of Hülegü and of the Golden Horde were already at variance even prior to the outbreak of civil war in the Far East. Although we have no contemporary narrative sources from the Golden Horde lands themselves, authors writing in the Mamlūk empire – a polity which was in diplomatic contact with Berke and his successors from 1262 onward – clearly believed that Hülegü and the Muslim Berke had fallen out, firstly over the attack on Baghdad and the murder of the Caliph (1258) and secondly over the division of spoils from Persia. Hülegü is alleged to have executed the envoys sent by Berke to claim his share. The time-lapse of three years renders it improbable that the assault on the Caliphate played a major part in the estrangement, but the division of spoils was undoubtedly important.74 According to the Mamlūk encyclopedist Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-ʿUmarī (d. 1349), whose informants were traders from the Iranian world, Chinggis Khan had allocated to his eldest son Jochi not only the Pontic steppe but also Arrān, Tabrīz, Hamadān
The halting of the Mongol advance

and Marāgha. This is rather what we might expect, given Juwaynī’s statement that Jochi’s ulus extended in the west ‘as far as the hooves of Mongol horses had trodden’ (p. 118 above) because these regions had been traversed in the course of Jebe and Sübe’etei’s expedition in 1222–3. There is also a good deal of testimony in sources from Khurāsān and from Anatolia that, before Hülegū’s arrival and even thereafter, Batu and his representatives had wielded considerable authority in northern Persia.

It is, of course, possible that any arrangements favourable to the Golden Horde were abrogated when Möngke despatched Hülegū to south-western Asia and that the qaghan intended this to mark a fresh dispensation, with the creation of a new ulus. What we are told of the terms of Hülegū’s commission, however, is itself equivocal. Rashīd al-Dīn, writing under Hülegū’s great-grandson Ghazan, alleges that Möngke had intended his brother and the latter’s descendants to rule over Iran in perpetuity, just as they were doing, but that he had publicly concealed his purpose and ordered Hülegū to return to Mongolia when his task was accomplished. But far from representing an act of subterfuge, the qaghan’s instructions might suggest, rather, that he regarded his brother merely as his commander-in-chief in Persia and that the establishment of the Ilkhanate was no part of his plan. This seems to be the testimony, again, of al-ʿUmarī’s informants, who claim that at some point after the fall of Baghdad, Hülegū settled where he was, rebelled and proclaimed his independence. The ‘rebellion’ included the arrest and execution of the Jochid princes who had taken part in the campaigns of 1256–60 under his command – the men described as envoys in the earlier Mamlūk accounts – and the massacre of their troops. We shall probably never attain a full understanding of the events of these few years, but the balance of the evidence is that conflict broke out in the westernmost regions of the Mongol empire because Hülegū had misappropriated territories in north-western Persia which were traditionally held to belong to Jochi’s ulus.

There now ensued a duel for these regions which outlasted the Ilkhans themselves and was still intermittently in progress in the 1390s, during the era of Temür (Tamerlane). Berke’s response to the execution of his kinsmen was, firstly, to launch an attack upon Hülegū’s troops south of the Caucasus and secondly to enter into diplomatic relations with his fellow Muslims in Mamlūk Egypt. Some of his troops who had escaped slaughter at the hands of Hülegū’s forces had fled into Syria, where they were given asylum by the Mamlūk authorities and were subsequently enrolled in the sultan’s army. Berke himself wrote to Baybars in 1262, complaining of Hülegū’s conduct and appealing to the Mamlūk Sultan, on the basis of their common faith, to prosecute the holy war against his infidel cousin in Iran. This was the first occasion, it should be noticed, when a Mongol prince showed himself ready to enter into friendly relations with an external (and still unsubdued) power on the grounds of their shared hostility towards fellow Mongols. Baybars responded with alacrity and right down into the fourteenth century,
embassies were exchanged between Cairo and the khan’s headquarters on the Volga. Egypt benefited in addition from the recent fall of Constantinople to Michael Palaeologus in 1261 and the end of the Frankish and Venetian regime that had dominated the Bosphorus. The newly-restored Byzantine government was ready to cooperate with Baybars by permitting the shipment through the straits of Qipchāq Turkish slaves from the Pontic steppe, a task willingly assumed by its Genoese allies, with the result that the Mamlūk Sultanate was guaranteed a steady supply of fresh military recruits. The understanding between the Mongols of the Golden Horde to the north and his Mamlūk enemies beyond the Euphrates acted as a vital brake upon Hülegū’s ambition to expand his dominions into Syria. He too was compelled to look around for potential allies, and he naturally turned to the Mamlūks’ principal enemies, the rulers of the Latin West, beginning with Louis IX of France in 1262.

Hülegū’s campaigns of 1259–60 in Syria and perhaps too the almost simultaneous invasion of Poland by Berke’s forces were therefore the last military operations to be mounted by armies gathered on the qaghan’s orders and representing the united empire. By the time Arigh Böke submitted to Qubilai in 1264, that empire had dissolved into at least four distinct khanates: the Golden Horde; the Ilkhanate; the Chaghadayid khanate; and the dominions of the qaghan in China and what is now Mongolia. To maintain the struggle against Arigh Böke, Qubilai had been obliged to fall back upon the resources of northern China; Qaraqorum had been in the hands of his rival. But even after Arigh Böke’s overthrow, Qubilai resided at Shangdu (formerly Kaiping) and at the newly-built capital Dadu (formerly Zhongdu, close to the site of modern Beijing), which the Mongols called Khanbaligh (‘the Khan’s town’). The choice threw into sharper relief the vast distances separating the qaghan’s power-base from the westernmost marches of the Mongol world.

Qubilai’s victory over his brother enabled him to resume the conquest of Song China, which was completed in 1279 and by which the Mongols became the first steppe power to rule over the entire country. But it did not win him the recognition throughout the empire which he desired. Marco Polo’s bland assurance to his readers that the Mongol empire was Qubilai’s by right as well as by force of arms reflects little more than the official stance of the Yuan court he served. Apart from a rapprochement in 1283–4 (p. 167), which may have been short-lived, the khans of the Golden Horde remained aloof, refusing to accept Qubilai. His Chaghadayid nominees turned against him, recreating Chaghadai’s ulus within its pre-1251 boundaries and further securing the revenues of the neighbouring sedentary region of Transoxiana that should have gone to the qaghan. From 1269, Qubilai was also confronted in Central Asia by another rival in the person of Ögödei’s grandson Qaidu. Appealing, perhaps, to the tradition that the qaghanate should remain in Ögödei’s line, Qaidu was able to rally the princes of the lines of Ögödei and Chaghadai and from 1271 onward acted
as an over-khan in the region, nominating the Chaghadayid khans himself. He was never able to achieve more than local triumphs over Qubilai’s armies, notably the conquest of the client Uighur principality in the 1280s and the brief occupation of Qaraqorum in 1289, but he successfully resisted Qubilai’s attempts to reduce Central Asia to obedience, and he remained a thorn in the side of the qaghans in the Far East right down to his death in 1303. It was not until 1304, when his son and successor Chapar was induced by his Chaghadayid confederates to submit to Qubilai’s grandson, the Qaghan Temür Öljeitü, that the Mongol world again acknowledged a single paramount sovereign for the first time since 1259 – and even then imperial authority rested on nothing like the same foundations as that of Chinggis Khan and his first three successors.

Qubilai’s authority was acknowledged only by fellow Toluids, his brother Hûlegû and his descendants in Iran. The title ‘Ilkhan’ borne by these princes, which does not materialize in the sources until after 1259, appears to mean ‘ruling khan’. Qubilai issued a patent conferring on Hûlegû rulership of all the territories west of the Oxus, and similar patents were bestowed upon Hûlegû’s successors, following the enthronement of each new Ilkhan, down to the reign of Ghazan (1295–1304); on occasions, senior figures in the Ilkhanid administration received Chinese titles. The qaghan and his Ilkhanid allies were, of course, too far distant to give each other substantial military assistance in their conflicts with the other Mongol states. But Toluid solidarity meant that they exchanged frequent embassies; it was also responsible for the exchange of skilled personnel, men versed in astronomy, the natural sciences and technology of various kinds, including military technology. One high-ranking Mongol commander who travelled from China to Persia at the qaghan’s behest, and who stayed in western Asia for the remainder of his life, was Rashîd al-Dîn’s informant, Bolod Chingsang.

Our survey of events has brought us to 1262, a year in which the Mongols confronted the Latin world on the borders of Poland and Hungary, continued to require the unqualified submission of Western monarchs, and – despite their recent defeat in the Near East – loomed as a more distant menace beyond the Euphrates. At this point, they were still enunciating their design of incorporating into their world-empire peoples who had not yet yielded. To nobody in the West did they appear as the Heaven-sent allies that they were supposedly to become later. How they were in fact viewed in Western eyes and what caused opinion to begin to change after 1260 are the subject of the next two chapters.

Notes
3 As WR, vii, 4, p. 42 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 92), noticed.
132 The Mongol threat


8 Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, pp. 39–42. For other ex post facto attempts at such legitimation, see Herbert Franke, From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God: The Legitimation of the Yüan Dynasty, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Kl. (Munich, 1978), pp. 22–4, repr. in Franke, China under Mongol Rule (Aldershot, 1994).

9 TR, §30, p. 21.


13 John of Garlande, De triumphis, p. 140: Tartarei perimunt se, rege iubente. For the Armenians, see CM, V, p. 340; they are mentioned earlier (V, p. 116) as having arrived in England in 1250.


16 Cahen, Formation of Turkey, pp. 184–6.


19 The parallel is discussed by Haw, ‘Deaths of two Khaghans’.

The halting of the Mongol advance


1 ‘Menkonis chronicon’, MGHS, XXIII, p. 549: sperans se dominium suscepturum, uterius non processit . . . In the first edition, I erroneously interpreted this to mean that he saw himself as a candidate for the imperial dignity: Hayton, iii, 21–22, Fr. text p. 172, Latin text p. 303, does in fact allege that Hülegü was invited to take the throne.

22 Haw, ‘Deaths of two Khagans’, p. 367, sees concern about the ambitions of the Golden Horde as a possible reason for Hülegü’s departure from Syria for Azerbaijan.


35 ‘Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1228 à 1261, dite du manuscrit de Rothe-
36 For the location, see Reuven Amitai-Preiss, ‘ʿAyn Jalūt revisited’, Tārīḥ 2 (1991),
pp. 119–50, repr. in Amitai, Mongols in the Islamic Lands.
37 Rashīd al-Dīn, II, pp. 1032–3 (tr. Thackston, p. 359). On the size of the respec-
tive armies, see John Masson Smith, Jr, ‘ʿAyn Jalūt: Mamlūk success or Mongol
of Deeds of James I of Aragon (Aldershot, 2003), p. 340 and n.56. For the
bishop, see Richard, ‘Mongols and the Franks’, p. 51 and n.26; for attempts to
organize the crusade, Maier, Preaching the Crusades, p. 85.
40 Gui de Basainville, Templar visitor in partibus cismarinis, to Franco de Borno,
402. Pierre Toubert, ‘Les déviations de la Croisade au milieu du XIIIe siècle: Alexan-
(here pp. 512–13), repr. in his Croisades et états latins.
42 Urban IV to Alphonse of Poitou, 11 June 1263, AN, J448/79; also to the arch-
bishop of Reims, same date, in LTC, IV, p. 64 (no. 4849).
43 LTC, IV, pp. 36–7 (no. 4753, 18 April 1262). Ildefonso Rodríguez R. de Lama,
84–6 (no. 42, 15 May 1262). At this point, recruitment for the anti-Mongol
 crusade was first extended to Spain: José Manuel Rodríguez García, ‘Henry III
(1216–1272), Alfonso X of Castile (1252–1284) and the crusading plans of the
thirteenth century (1245–1272)’, in Björn K. U. Weiler, ed. (with Ifor W. Row-
lands), England and Europe in the Reign of Henry III (1216–1272) (Aldershot,
2002), pp. 99–120 (here n.74 at p. 117). For subsequent papal references to the
Mongol threat in Syria, see AN, J451/3 (4 July 1262, to the Portuguese hier-
archy), J451/4 (7 July 1262, to the Norwegian hierarchy), J451/6 (19 Febru-
ary 1263), J448/80 (25 April 1263, to the archbishop of Tyre).
44 Joseph de Somogyi, ‘A Qaṣīda on the destruction of Bagdhād by the Mongols’,
BSOS 7 (1933–5), pp. 41–8 (text at p. 44, tr. p. 45). The verses are preserved in
al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīḥ al-Islām, XLVIII, p. 38.
45 Stepʿannos Orbelean (d. 1304), Patmut iun nahanin Sisakan, tr. M. F. Brosset,
Histoire de la Sioumie, 2 vols (St Petersburg, 1864–6), I, pp. 234, 235. J. M. Fiey,
‘Iconographie syriaque: Hulagu, Doquz Khatun . . . et six ambons?’, Le Muséon
88 (1975), pp. 59–64.
46 al-Yūnīnī, II, p. 35. For Mongol evenhandedness, see Juwaynī, I, pp. 18–19 (tr.
Boyle, I, p. 26).
47 Ghāzī b. al-Wāsīṭī (d. 1312), Kitāb al-radd ʿalā ahl al-dhimma, ed. and tr.
48 Meyvaert, pp. 258–9 and n.83 (tr. in Barber and Bate, Letters from the East,
p. 159). Hayton, iii, 24, Fr. text p. 174, Latin text pp. 304–5. See also Osipian,
49 Bertold Spuler, Die Mongolen in Iran. Politik, Verwaltung und Kultur der
des Estoires de Terres d'Orient” Gaitona kak istoriko-geograficheskii istochnik
The halting of the Mongol advance


50 ‘Iohannis Longi Chronica S. Bertini’, *MGHS*, XXV, p. 850 (the author d. in 1383).


52 Bérard’s letter, as reproduced by Gui de Basainville, in *Monumenta Boica*, XXIX:2, p. 200; see also Jackson, ‘Crisis’, p. 492.


56 LTC, IV, pp. 71–4 (no. 4866, 6 Sept. 1263). The papal letter clearly echoes that of 4 April 1263 (see n.55).


63 ‘Rocznik kapituły krakowskiej’, p. 88 = ‘Annales capituli Cracoviensis’, p. 601. Cf. also the letter of 1259 referred to in n.61 and that of the abbot of Wonchok, in
Oswald Redlich, ed., *Eine Wiener Briefsammlung zur Geschichte des deutschen Reiches* (Vienna, 1894), pp. 7–8 (no. 8).


72 Shawwāl 658 H., according to Jamāl al-Qarshī, in *IKPI*, I, p. clxix also in Bartold’s, *Turkestan v epokhu mongol skogo nashestviia*, I (texts), pp. 137–8; in Jackson, ‘Dissolution’, p. 229, n.187, I erroneously gave the equivalence as June–July 1260, which is in fact the date furnished in the *Yuan shi*.


78 al-ʿUmarī, *Masālik*, ed. and tr. Lech, text p. 2 (German tr. p. 91). Cf. also note 21 above.


88 Rashīd al-Dīn, II, pp. 880, 1047 (tr. Thackston, pp. 304, 364); the date is unclear.


90 Allsen, *Culture and Conquest*, passim.
The Mongols’ image of the Franks

For those who seek an insight into the Mongol view of the Western world, there are only two avenues – both somewhat indirect, given the absence of any Mongolian narrative source that details the invasion of Europe. One way entails gleaning what we can from sources composed by the Mongols’ subjects, notably Chinese material and the universal history of the Ilkhanid statesman Rashīd al-Dīn, which includes a section on the Franks (1305/6). The other route is through the accounts of the Latin visitors to the Mongol empire. Some of the material they supply is problematic. To take one example, the way in which the Mongols are said to anticipate a final defeat at Frankish hands within a certain period owes far more, as we shall see, to Western exegesis of apocalyptic texts than it does to conversations in the steppe.

There are indications, nevertheless, that in the 1240s the Mongols conceived of Latin Christendom as a single power, of considerable size. According to the ‘Tartar Relation’, they thought of it as comprising the western half of the inhabited world. The Qaghan Güyüg’s letter to Innocent IV (1247) suggests that the Mongols initially saw the pope as the emperor or overlord of a number of lesser rulers, though subsequently Hülegü assured one of these kinglets, Louis IX of France (1262), that they had learned the pope’s true priestly status and his role as supreme head of all Christians. In 1255, Rubruck observed that if the Mongols heard the pope was preparing to unleash a crusade against them, they would all take to their heels and retire into the wilderness from which they had come. It is tempting to discount this statement – like the claims of Carpini and Simon of Saint-Quentin that the Mongols stood in some awe of Frankish might – as tendentious and
indeed chauvinistic, designed partly to inspire determined resistance in the event of a future attack (p. 97). But, as we saw, such views are echoed by authors within the Mongol empire (p. 79), while a Chinese source dating from 1263 and apparently based on a report sent by Hülegü to Möngke in 1258 describes the Franks as very fine warriors. Contemporary Muslim geographers, moreover, transmit the image of a powerful European king periodically launching formidable expeditions against Syria and Palestine, and it may be that this had been communicated to the Mongols during their advance through south-west Asia.

On the other hand, the Mongols’ sense of their own superiority was in no way modified, since they regarded all Westerners as future subjects. And early Latin visitors leave us in no doubt that their Mongol hosts held them in the greatest contempt. This was seemingly not so much because they represented sedentary culture as because of the incongruity between their role as ambassadors and their status as members of Mendicant Orders, who were devoted to poverty and abstinence, who brought only meagre gifts for the qaghan and who exorted their hosts to accept Christianity. ‘You urge us to become Christians and to be dogs like you’, Ascelin’s party were told at Baichu’s encampment; ‘is not your Pope a dog, and are not all you Christians dogs?’ And Rubruck’s guide on the route from Batu’s headquarters to the qaghan, before he recognized that the friars could be useful through their prayers, was disgusted at having to escort such wretched people. Both at Batu’s encampment and at Möngke’s headquarters, where the party arrived in December, the friars’ appearance with bare feet, says Rubruck, presented quite a spectacle for the crowd that had gathered; on the latter occasion, they were asked whether they had no use for their feet. Clearly the Western religious provoked a very different response from the Western warrior. As we shall see (pp. 311–12), the Mongols’ political ideology did not envisage that the meek should inherit the earth, even if by their sanctity they secured Heaven’s favour for those who would.

**Contemporary writers and public opinion in the West**

For the impact of the Mongol attack of 1241 on what might be called public opinion in the Latin West, the sources are rather more plentiful. They comprise the few authors, like Thomas of Spalato and Roger of Várad, whose narratives describe the onslaught at first hand; the notables who issued the appeals for help that have come down to us; major figures like the pope and the Emperor Frederick II who responded to such appeals; monastic and clerical annalists who commented on the invasion in greater or lesser depth; and model sermons which refer to the Mongols (as yet a relatively under-exploited source). As a means of eliciting public opinion, these sources are not entirely satisfactory. In the first place, to attempt a systematic exposition of Western views about the Mongols risks lending a spurious coherence to
ideas that may in fact have been half formed, transient and mutually contradic-
tory. And, secondly, we cannot be sure how much impact any particular letter or chronicle had. It might be expected, for example, that the emperor’s encycloval of 3 July 1241, which according to Richard of San Germano was sent to several of his fellow monarchs,\textsuperscript{14} did much to shape opinion, indirectly or otherwise. But even Matthew Paris, who in the early 1240s certainly felt a good deal of sympathy for Frederick, admits that the emperor’s proposals were greeted with suspicion and that his enemies charged him with inciting the Mongol attack in order to extend his suzerainty over Béla IV.\textsuperscript{15} So too the influence of a narrative source might bear no relation whatever to its value for scholars in the twenty-first century (and in what follows, I have tried to distinguish annalists who are not manifestly interdependent from those who clearly did no more than copy their material). Matthew Paris, as we saw, assembled a dossier of information on the Mongols, but only a few manuscripts of the \textit{Chronica majora} have survived, suggesting that it did not circulate widely. On the other hand, a set of annals – say, in Germany – might enjoy a wide currency, evident from the fact that it was borrowed, within a mere decade or two, by a number of other monastic chronicles, yet it might contain only the most cursory reference to the Mongol invasion of 1241–2. Not only do many annalists dismiss that invasion in a single laconic entry, but several neglect to mention it at all.\textsuperscript{16}

Within fifteen years of the attack, a number of Western Europeans had visited the Mongol world. Although the earliest reports outlining the Mongol threat, produced by the friars Richardus in \textit{c}.1235 and Julian in 1237–8, seem to have been known to Matthew Paris within a few years,\textsuperscript{17} it was the Franciscan and Dominican envoys of Pope Innocent IV, returning in 1247–8, who made available a significant corpus of more or less accurate information on Mongol society and its customs, in the reports of Carpini and of Simon of Saint-Quentin. For the next sixty years – until the appearance of the frequently-cited and much-copied \textit{La flor des estoires} of Hayton of Gorigos (1307) and, to a lesser degree, of Marco Polo’s book – they would have no equal. Initially, at least, Carpini’s experiences reached a wide public. As we have seen (p. 93), incomplete versions of his report were circulating even before the party rejoined Pope Innocent at Lyons in October 1247. Salimbene, who subsequently met Carpini at Sens in 1248, gives the impression that he was then virtually engaged on a lecture tour.\textsuperscript{18} Thereafter, it is possible that his report would have slid into obscurity had not Vincent of Beauvais incorporated sizeable extracts in his \textit{Speculum historiale} (\textit{c}.1253), one of the most popular works of the Middle Ages. Vincent did the same with Simon of Saint-Quentin’s \textit{Historia} (which has not survived in its original form), thus ensuring that the material the two reports contained was transmitted over time to an extensive readership.

Their contemporaries were less fortunate. Only a brief summary of the first mission of Andrew of Longjumeau has come down to us, and what
little we know of the course of his second, on behalf of Louis IX, is derived from Joinville and from Rubruck. Rubruck’s own report to King Louis was a commendably full document, but it would languish in relative obscurity for over three centuries. Indeed, only the English Franciscan Roger Bacon is known to have read it. He met Rubruck, probably during a visit to Paris in 1256–7, and had the opportunity to collate his own text of the *Itinerarium* with the friar’s oral statements. Whether Bacon’s copy was the book *de vita et moribus Tartarorum*, approximately the length of a psalter, which the chronicler John of Wallingford (d. 1258) says was presented to Simon de Montfort in 1257, we cannot tell; both Bigalli and Paviot identify this in turn with a work mentioned by Matthew Paris. In any event, Bacon duly inserted citations from Rubruck’s book, sometimes with specific attribution, in his own *Opus maius* (c.1267), though this too barely circulated. Two other reports dating from this early period are lost. The single known manuscript of David of Ashby’s *Les fais des Tartares*, written probably in advance of the Second Council of Lyons (1274), was destroyed in a fire in Turin in 1904, and its contents are known only to a limited degree through the notes published by a Belgian scholar in 1867. Of the *De ortu Tartarorum*, dated 1255, which has been persuasively attributed to the Dominican Jacek Odrowąż (St Hyacinth; d. 1257), only the preface has survived (and makes minimal reference to the Mongols); the main text was possibly never written.

### An alien people

The devastation of Poland, Moravia and Hungary in 1241–2 largely dispelled any notion that the Mongols were the forces of a Christian ‘King David’ or Prester John, as had been assumed on the first news of the attacks by Chinggis Khan’s forces on the Islamic world. It is true that the earlier optimism is echoed in the rumours that their goal was to retrieve from Cologne the bones of the Three Kings; it was for this reason that the Mongols were sometimes called Tarsenses (i.e. people of ‘Tarse’, as the country of the Magi was traditionally known). Such reports would persist even as late as the Mongol attack on Hungary in 1285. But speculation of this kind was dwarfed by the numerous reports depicting the invaders as hostile and bloodthirsty barbarians.

The Mongols occupied no place in the Western scriptural and encyclopaedic tradition. They had taken a mere two decades to burst upon the West’s horizons from nowhere – an unknown race from an unknown and far distant region. ‘Where had such a people lain hidden?’ asked Matthew Paris. The most precise answer given to this question was that they had come ‘from the furthest parts of Scythia’. It was tempting to identify them with more familiar enemies. As we saw (p. 69), some observers confused the Mongols who ravaged Hungary in 1241 with the Cumans. For others,
the newcomers were Saracens, a term normally reserved for the Muslims (though occasionally applied to the pagans of north-eastern Europe). One annalist, doubtless bemused by the rapid succession of events in Syria, made the Khwarazmian sack of Jerusalem in 1244 the work of the Mongols. Various etymologies were proposed for the name ‘Tartar’, by which the invaders were known in the West. One was that it was derived from a river in their homeland; Matthew Paris, for his part, linked it with the islands of Tarachonta, where the eighth-century geographer Aethicus Ister claimed that Gog and Magog had built a city.

Emerging from the vast wilderness that apparently extended for hundreds of miles to the east, the conquerors seemed to belong, as Rubruck would put it, to ‘some other world’. In ecological terms, it was a world not totally unheard of in the West, but its character was alien, and contemporary observers borrowed the vocabulary previously applied to other steppe nomads like the tenth-century Hungarians or the Cumans. For many, first and foremost, the Mongols were barbarians. Both Carpini and Rubruck apply the word to them at an early stage in their reports, although they do not employ it frequently. Simon of Saint-Quentin dismissed as ‘beastly humans’ the Mongols in Baichu’s camp who could not grasp the doctrine of papal primacy, despite the efforts of Ascelin’s party to expound it to them. They knew nothing of weaving and were clothed in the skins of animals. They did not practise agriculture and had neither villages nor towns. Rubruck saw no building, other than the imperial ‘capital’, Qaraqorum, and only one village in the course of his return journey; in fact, he learned that the conquerors had destroyed towns in Central Asia in order to extend the area of pasturage for their livestock. ‘Nowhere have they any lasting city’, he begins his survey of Mongol society, in terms borrowed from the Epistle to the Hebrews (xiii, 14); ‘and of the one to come they have no knowledge’. We should note the subtle connection here between pastoral nomadism and the lack of rootedness in any salvific belief. Influenced by St Augustine, European Christians in the Middle Ages, as in a later phase of contact with the outside world, turned to the city as the natural image of both the earthly and the heavenly community.

A number of writers, beginning with Henry of Livonia only a few years after the Mongols’ first appearance in the Pontic steppe and their victory over the Rus’ near the Kalka River in 1223, commented that they were unfamiliar with bread and devoured raw meat instead. Thomas of Spalato noted that the Mongols abhorred bread and believed that they drank a concoction of mare’s milk and blood. The papal envoys in turn drew attention to the fact that the Mongols did not eat bread, herbs or vegetables. Rubruck observed that they did not know how to catch fish and had no interest in fish other than those so large that they could eat their flesh like mutton. They had no wine of their own and were dependent on what was imported into the steppe; instead they drank fermented mare’s milk (qumis),
especially in the summer, wine made from rice or millet, or meat broth. The absence of or relative disregard for the three elements – bread, wine and fish – that played such a central role in the Western European diet (not to mention the Christian liturgical curriculum) was especially noteworthy.

Conversely, what the Mongols did eat comprised every kind of thing that was forbidden to Christians and fostered the image of an unclean people. A few authors writing soon after the assault on Eastern Europe, including Thomas of Spalato, mentioned that the invaders ate the flesh of clean and unclean beasts without discrimination, and this refrain would be taken up by the friars. They ate all their dead animals without distinction, noticed Rubruck, specifying horses as well as oxen and sheep, but he later added that the Mongol diet included mice, marmots and certain other small animals ‘which are good to eat’. The papal envoys had been still more damning. Simon of Saint-Quentin alleged that the Mongols fed on dogs, cats and rats – everything, in fact, except the she-mule. The unappetizing fare listed by Carpini included not merely dogs, wolves, foxes and mice but also lice and the afterbirth of mares. The Mongols’ uncleanness extended beyond the components of their diet. They neglected to wash dishes or utensils and did not employ napkins. Rubruck betrays particular irritation over their habit of voiding their bowels in mid-conversation, ‘moving away from us’, he says, ‘no further than one could toss a bean’.

A few of the writers who noticed the invasion, among them Matthew Paris, accused the Mongols of eating human flesh. On this topic the Rus’ cleric Peter and Carpini were alike cautious: the Mongols ate human beings only in emergencies, when other rations were exhausted (and, Peter assured the Council of Lyons, they invariably cooked it first). Rubruck had nothing to say on the matter. But Simon of Saint-Quentin gave himself a freer rein. The Mongols engaged in cannibalism for any of three reasons: out of necessity, for sheer pleasure and as a stratagem to instil terror into their enemies. Thus, he says, they sometimes eat captured rebels by way of punishment. Elsewhere in his report, we read of a variant form of cannibalism, since some Mongols quietly kill their elderly and infirm fathers, burn the bodies and sprinkle the ashes over their food.

From uncleanness it was but a short step to godlessness. The Mongols’ religion, thought one annalist, was to deny Almighty God and to kill men. They were ‘without religion [exlex]’, ‘without faith [perfidi]’. Carpini saw no reason to dissent. The Mongols had no religion. Although they acknowledged one God, creator of all things visible and invisible, they did not worship him with prayers or any kind of ceremony. They knew nothing of everlasting life or eternal damnation. The sins they recognized were ‘things invented by them or by their forebears’. Simon of Saint-Quentin remarked on their failure to observe abstinence on any day or at any season of the year. For him, Mongol ultimatums blasphemed by calling the qaghan ‘son of God’ and venerating him in God’s place, a charge found earlier, in Ivo
of Narbonne’s letter, and subsequently echoed in the Latin East during the
Mongol invasion of 1260. Both Carpini and Rubruck believed, errone-
ously, that the effigies (ongghod) in the Mongol encampments were idols
which they worshipped and failed to realize that these represented their
ancestors, whose spirits were conjured up by the shamans. The Mongols
set great store by divinations, soothsaying, auguries and incantations –
practices to which, says Rubruck, everyone in those parts was given. In
Carpini’s view, they perpetrated abominations, and the worship of God was
brought to nothing.

Shadows of the Apocalypse

The advent of a pagan nation from the east which was much more pow-
erful and destructive than earlier steppe invaders touched the apocalyptic
sensitivities of medieval Christians. In their endeavours to understand the
cataclysm that had befallen Eastern Europe, they naturally had recourse to
the historical and geographical material, culled from Scripture and from
pagan Antiquity, which was previously mentioned (pp. 20–2). Some com-
mentators adopted what might be called a broadly eschatological tone. For
Roger of Várad, the Mongol onslaught was a clear sign that the world was
hastening towards its end. Others saw the invasion as God’s chastisement
for human sin (a role, it is interesting to note, that looms large in apoc-
ryphal letters generated in Western Europe even as late as the invasion of
Hungary in 1285), and His chosen instrument as a people from Hell. But
the Mongols were seen as having a particular animus against Christianity.
Their express purpose – thought many, including Pope Gregory IX and the
Emperor Frederick – was to destroy the Christian Church and to annihilate
Christians. They showed no respect for any religious Order; they slaugh-
tered Christians without mercy and with no regard for rank, age or sex (a
detail which echoes more official pronouncements, like papal encyclicals
and the decree of the Lyons Council). They are commonly described as
satellites of Antichrist, and two of the letters incorporated in the Chronica
majora have Chinggis Khan branding captured children on the forehead
with his mark, a clear echo of the action of Antichrist (Revelation, xiii,
16). The Mongols are said to be accompanied sometimes by Amazons
or cannibals, at other times by heretics and by bogus or renegade Chris-
tians, who (naturally) egg them on to commit atrocities against churches
and ecclesiastical personnel. As the middle of the thirteenth century drew
near, these ideas may have taken on a new urgency, given the tendency of
disciples and admirers of Joachim of Fiore to associate the year 1260 with
the advent of Antichrist. It has been proposed that the Flagellant outbreak
of that very year was in part a response to the Mongols’ recent devastation
of Poland and their invasion of Syria.
The sense of foreboding is also manifest in the readiness of contemporary authors to juxtapose this grim new enemy with more familiar antagonists and ‘outgroups’ nearer home. The nightmare possibility of an alliance between the Muslims and Patarene heretics (Cathars) within Western Europe had been contemplated as far back as the 1190s, and the advent of the Mongols induced a similar paranoia. In 1223, Caesarius of Haisterbach had listed the Mongol attack on the Rus’ among a series of tribulations that had befallen Christendom, including Saladin’s victories and the rise of the Cathar heresy. The Emperor Frederick himself, in a letter of 1246, juxtaposed the Mongols with the Patarenes (a term which he applied to his enemies in the cities of Lombardy), doubtless as a means of enhancing his credentials as the champion of Christendom. It was especially tempting to link the Mongols with heterodoxy, in view of their known practice of recruiting members of every religious sect. From the 1250s onward a few authors connected them, explicitly or otherwise, with the recent phenomenon of the Pastoureaux, a movement among the rural poor of the French-Imperial borderlands in 1251 led by a mysterious figure called the Master of Hungary. The original aim was to cross the sea to bring much-needed succour to Louis IX of France, but the movement rapidly degenerated, as the undisciplined crowds, seeking scapegoats for the king’s failure, turned on clergy, friars and Jews and had to be suppressed by force. Two writers, in fact, suggestively move on to the Pastoureaux directly after their account of the Mongol invasion. In c.1267, we find a more adventurous spirit, Roger Bacon, speculating whether the so-called Master was an agent in the service of either the Muslims or the Mongols.

A more pernicious rationale would associate the Mongols with the Jews, a minority group which had come to be seen increasingly as posing an internal threat to Christians and Christendom in the course of the twelfth century. The linkage was the identification of the invaders with the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel. Matthew Paris was ready to discount the inconvenient fact that the Mongols did not speak Hebrew and knew nothing of the Mosaic law (or, in his view, any other). But elsewhere doubt was expressed about the equation, and Thomas of Spalato for one knew that the Mongols did not practise Judaism, Islam or Christianity. Unfortunately, elements in Germany were less sceptical and engaged in pogroms against the Jews in 1241, on the grounds that they were preparing to welcome the Mongols as deliverers and were attempting to ship arms to these their coreligionists in order to exact revenge for Christian persecution; the Jewish community in Frankfurt-am-Main appears to have suffered particularly virulent attacks. Despite contemporary claims, it is highly unlikely that the Jews saw the Mongols in this light. Jews in the Near East had felt at risk from Mongol attacks in the late 1230s along with everyone else and would evacuate Jerusalem on the eve of the Mongol occupation in 1260. What had impinged
upon Christian consciousness was the widespread excitement among the Jews as the approach of the year 5000 of their era (1240) fuelled messianic expectations. The fact that King David’s father had been named in the Historia gestorum David regis of 1221 as ‘King Israel’ (the Latin could equally be rendered as ‘King of Israel’) may have given a further boost to such hopes among Jewish communities over the past twenty years. They are perhaps mirrored in a Latin prophecy that circulated widely in 1241, foretelling inter alia the Jews’ deliverance from captivity. At least some Latin writers were well aware that the Mongols themselves did not distinguish Jews from other religious groups.

For many Western observers, the Mongols were self-evidently one of the peoples whose appearance had been prophesied by Pseudo-Methodius, just as the pagan Hungarians had been identified with Gog and Magog in the 890s. According to Thomas of Spalato, many scholars began, at the time of the invasion, to examine the Sermo and proposed that the Mongols were the forerunners of Antichrist. One was Albert Behaim, the archdeacon of Passau, who is known to have copied a text of Pseudo-Methodius’s work into his book of memorabilia. Matthew Paris was another. We have seen that he first resorted to Aethicus Ister to explain the name Tartar, but by 1245 he was certainly mindful also of Pseudo-Methodius’s prophecy concerning the sons of Ishmael. The list of those who were apparently convinced that the Mongols were indeed the Ishmaelites includes Henry Raspe, landgrave of Thuringia, and a Hungarian Benedictine abbot, in letters reproduced in the Chronica majora; various annalists; and the author of a prophecy in the form of a dialogue between Alexander and Aristotle which, together with Julian’s report and a number of letters concerning the Mongol menace, was copied into a manuscript at Ottobeuren in 1241.

One circumstance favouring the equation was the destruction of the ‘kingdom of Persia’ (i.e. the Khwarazmian empire), which had been announced in the Historia gestorum David regis and in papal letters in 1221 and which, according to Pseudo-Methodius, would precede or coincide with the advent of the Ishmaelites. Since Pseudo-Methodius had foretold of the Mongols, it was natural to endow them with traits that he had applied to the Ishmaelites or the Inclosed Nations. According to the Sermo, for instance, the Ishmaelite persecution would last for forty-nine years, and consequently we find the Rus’ cleric Peter giving this as the period of the Mongol dominion. The Ishmaelites would ravage a vast territory as far as the vicinity of Rome before suffering an overwhelming defeat at the hands of the king of the Greeks or Romans, and so Rome was believed to be the Mongols’ goal. Peter claimed that the Mongols themselves anticipated a bitter struggle with the Romans, and Ivo of Narbonne says that one motive for their advance was to chastise the greed and arrogance of the Romans, who had at one time oppressed them. Even the Emperor Frederick apparently thought that they were making for Rome.
Several notices of the Mongol invasion contain formulaic descriptions of the profanation of churches—killing priests at the altars, having sexual intercourse with their womenfolk in consecrated places, dressing their women in holy garments, stabling their horses among the graves of saints—which reproduce practically verbatim the conduct ascribed in the *Sermo* to the Ishmaelites. At times the invaders are also said to have come forth from islands; at others, to have broken out of a mountain range (sometimes called the Caspian mountains). In the former case, the islands could conceivably be ‘Tarse’, but more probably the allusion in both cases is to the Inclosed Nations, as portrayed respectively by Aethicus Ister or by Pseudo-Methodius. The Inclosed Nations followed a remarkably undiscriminating diet, including the flesh of dogs, mice, mares, snakes, scorpions, carrion, aborted foetuses, every kind of clean and unclean beasts and human beings, and, as we saw previously, such details were readily inserted into accounts of the Mongols. The author of the ‘Tartar Relation’, which is closely related to the *Ystoria Mongalorum*, substituted for Carpini’s phrase ‘afterbirth of mares’ simply the word ‘afterbirth’, which was more evocative of the *Sermo*. Our difficulty here, of course, lies in distinguishing between those writers who imputed certain characteristics to the Mongols, specifically because they saw them as the apocalyptic peoples mentioned by Pseudo-Methodius, and those who ascribed these same features to them but without any such conscious association.

The most striking evidence for Thomas of Spalato’s claim that Pseudo-Methodius was recruited to make sense of the Mongol invasion is to be found in a remarkable letter dating from c.1239–40, even before the attack on Latin territory. Here an anonymous Hungarian bishop recounts his interrogation of two Mongol captives. The two surviving versions of the letter differ slightly, and the bishop clearly had access to information from sources other than his prisoners; a good deal of the information that emerges can be related without any difficulty to known characteristics of the Mongol war-machine. Yet we are left with the overwhelming impression that Pseudo-Methodius dictated the agenda for this interview and, indeed, its outcome. In reply to a question about their origins, the prisoners said that they lived beyond some mountains and close to a river named Egog (unidentified); hence, the bishop concluded, they belonged to Gog and Magog. Asked how they had broken out of the mountains, they answered that it had taken their forebears three hundred years to remove all the trees and rocks that barred their way. The bishop enquired about their religion. They believed in nothing, they replied, and it was their intention to conquer the entire world. The bishop ascertained that the Mongol alphabet, which the prisoners alleged they had learned after emerging from the mountain barrier, was Hebrew. Those who had taught them this alphabet (in reality Uighur Buddhists) were pale men who fasted and wore long robes: the bishop inferred that these were Pharisees and Sadducees (and hence, although he does not say
so explicitly, he was dealing with the Ten Lost Tribes). Were the Mongols
discriminating in their diet? No: they ate frogs, dogs, snakes and all things
without distinction.

Clearly the quantity of information about the invaders that pointed
towards venerable and trusted prophecy was embarrassing; the problem lay
in deciding with which people to identify the Tartars. The author of the
apocryphal *Epistola prudenti viro*, which was in circulation by 1246, linked
them both with the Ishmaelites and with Gog and Magog. One annalist,
who seems already to have accepted the identification with the Ten Lost
Tribes, proceeded for good measure to add the duration of the Ishmaelite
domination (forty-nine years) and that specified for Gog and Magog (seven)
and forecast that the Mongols’ empire would last for fifty-six years.

Although the Ishmaelites (where the term does not simply denote Mus-
lims) and Gog and Magog were certainly peoples believed to exist in some
distant region, their significance at this point could not be purely geograph-
cal. Their association, by contemporary or near-contemporary observers,
with far-flung conquest and the devastation of 1241–2 carries overtones
that are undeniably apocalyptic. On the other hand, we should avoid
overstating the dimensions of this reaction. It goes without saying that
terseness and the absence of speculation about the Mongols’ origins and
significance are not necessarily an index of sophistication; such accounts
may simply be the work of authors less given to profound reflection. But
neither the letters of Popes Gregory IX and Innocent IV nor those of the
Emperor Frederick refer to the apocalyptic races; nor is any direct evidence
to be gleaned from the circumstantial account of Thomas of Spalato that
he saw the Mongols in this light. Even some of the more detailed annalistic
notices of the invasion are devoid of apocalyptic speculation. The chroni-
cler of St Pantaleon at Cologne tells us that he has heard much that is
incredible or utterly inhuman about the origins, religion and diet of this
barbarian race, but that since it is not yet confirmed, he will refrain from
inserting it at this juncture. He may, of course, have been deterred by the
fact that Carpini’s party halted in Cologne during their return journey in
1247, when Benedict dictated his relatively sober account to an anonymous
cleric of the city. The friars are especially conspicuous in this regard.
Albert, the author of the Stade annals and a convert from the Benedictines
to the Franciscan Order, had inserted a reference to Pseudo-Methodius in
the early part of his survey of world history, but he makes no link what-
soever between that author and the Mongols, being content with a vague
allusion to a prophecy by Hildegard of Bingen. None of the friars, in
fact, who wrote letters about the invaders in 1241–2 refers to apocalyptic
peoples, with the single exception of Jordan, Franciscan vice-minister in Poland
and Bohemia, who speaks in passing of the Mongols’ ferocity as having
been foretold in Scripture.
Corroboration from outside the Latin world?

Generally speaking, then, many – but by no means all – Western observers saw in the Mongols what they expected to find, namely forerunners of the Last Things as prophesied in Scripture and in the *Sermo* of Pseudo-Methodius. The attraction of the appeal to eschatological literature, of course, was that it provided solace: the barbarous nations would in time be overcome, and following the destruction of the Ishmaelites, at least, there would be peace. But this does not exclude the possibility that Catholic writers found their ideas corroborated by non-Latin or non-Christian sources or had even acquired them from that quarter. One external influence upon Latin Christians at this juncture was almost certainly the Orthodox Rus’. The Rus’ equated the Mongols with the Ishmaelites just as they had earlier occupants of the steppe, and the Russian chronicle tradition begins to invoke Pseudo-Methodius from the time of the very first Mongol attack in 1223.\(^\text{116}\) The Hungarian Friar Julian evidently owed a good deal to Rus’ informants: in a clear allusion to the *Sermo*, a Rus’ cleric had told him that the Mongols’ ancestors were the Midianites of the Old Testament (Judges, vi–viii), who for Pseudo-Methodius had formed part of the Ishmaelite race. The Rus’ churchman Peter voiced this same opinion at the Council of Lyons in 1245, even naming the wilderness from which the Mongols had emerged as ‘Etrev’ (i.e. Pseudo-Methodius’s ‘Ethrrib’; see p. 23).\(^\text{117}\)

Scholarship on the Mongols’ image in Europe, particularly the work of Axel Klopprogge, has done much to highlight the use that the Latin West, confronting an unknown and alien power in 1241, made of the *Sermo*, both directly and through Rus’ informants. This work tends, however, to neglect other avenues by which ideas may have reached Europe and served to lend conviction to Pseudo-Methodian prophecy. What little we know of Byzantine ideas about the Mongols does not suggest that the court of Nicaea served as a conduit to Latin Christendom in this respect.\(^\text{118}\) Among the Armenians there was apparently a perception that they were living in the last days before the advent of Antichrist and that Pseudo-Methodius enjoyed a place in their prophetic tradition, but greater weight seems to have been given to a fourth-century prophecy of St Nerses, which would attract Rubruck’s notice when he passed through Greater Armenia in 1254.\(^\text{119}\) There are, however, more promising avenues of enquiry. Modern scholars sometimes treat the West as if it were hermetically sealed from the non-Christian world, and two possible channels of information that have been ignored, I suggest, are reports current within the Islamic Near East and the Mongols’ own notions about their origins.

Pseudo-Methodian and related ideas are known to have been current among the Christian community in thirteenth-century Egypt, where even Muslims were affected by them.\(^\text{120}\) Islam’s own apocalyptic literature
The Mongol threat includes a tradition (ḥadīth) ascribed to the Prophet, to the effect that the first sign of the Last Things would be the irruption of the ‘Turks’ (denoting, in this context, the steppe peoples in general): it is quoted, for example, by the chronicler Jūzjānī, who had fled before the Mongols in 1221 and who wrote in Delhi c.1260. In Islamic cosmography, too, Gog and Magog had been enclosed by Alexander (known to Muslims as ‘Dhū l-Qarnayn’) behind barriers through which they would burst at the end of time (Qur’ān, xviii, 82–98). Now admittedly certain Muslim authors contemporary with the first Mongol assault on the Islamic world make only oblique references to Gog and Magog in connection with the invaders. For Ibn al-Athīr (d. 1233), the Mongols were the greatest disaster to afflict civilization other than Gog and Magog, while ‘Awfī (writing in 1232–3) saw them as the harbingers of those nations.

More relevant to our discussion here, however, are ideas that were current regarding the role of the Qara-Khitai empire as a barrier obstructing the expansion of the uncivilized steppe peoples who lived further east and consequently of the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad in undermining the Gūrkhan’s power. Both Ibn al-Athīr and Juwaynī allude to the way in which the Khwārazmshāh facilitated the Mongol irruption by removing the rulers of territories in their path. Other references are more specific. On his deathbed in 1200, Muḥammad’s father Tekish had allegedly warned his sons never to quarrel with the Qara-Khitai. Juwaynī’s version of this tale makes Tekish speak of the Qara-Khitai as a ‘wall behind which were terrible foes’. Juwaynī also tells us that his cousin, prior to the Mongol attack on the Khwarazmian empire, heard the Qara-Khitai likened to the ‘wall of Dhū l-Qarnayn’. This material is, of course, transmitted to us in a source that dates from as late as 1260, but the theme clearly has a longer pedigree, since it first appears in the memoirs of ‘Abd al-Latīf al-Baghdādi, known as Ibn al-Labbād (d. 1231–2), which were preserved in the chronicle of al-Dhahabī (d. 1348). Ibn al-Labbād, who travelled in northern Syria and Anatolia in 1221–2, already speaks of the Qara-Khitai as a barrier (sadd) opened by the Khwārazmshāh, and the image was to be employed by other writers.

Subsequently – by the 1250s, at least, but possibly as early as his death in 1231 – the Khwārazmshāh’s son Jalāl al-Dīn came to be seen in Syria as a barrier through which the Mongols had broken.

It is conceivable that these highly figurative phrases entered the Latin world from the camp of its Muslim neighbours and enemies and that in the process the images they conveyed were transmuted back into a physical barrier, helping to focus attention on prophetic material already to hand in the West. Similarly, tales about the Mongols’ cannibalism had long been current in northern Syria, for a woman allegedly told Ibn al-Labbād in Aleppo in 1222 how they had killed her two sons and drunk their blood. Rumours that the Mongols were cannibals had certainly reached Baghdad by the late 1240s. Muslim authors also drew attention, as their Latin contemporaries
would, to the fact that the Mongols ate carrion and dogs. Merchants from cities such as Mosul who were active in the commerce with the Mediterranean coast could have introduced such perceptions to Frankish Syria, in much the same way that traders had brought the count of Tripoli the heartening rumours of King David’s advance in 1221.

In deciding to what extent ideas transmitted from Rus’ were reinforced by stories circulating within the Islamic world, we admittedly find ourselves moving in the realm of conjecture. That the Mongols’ own beliefs about their origins came to the notice of Western Christians, however, is more certain. One tradition among them was that for many generations they had inhabited a valley called Ergene Qun, confined by impenetrable mountains and forests, but had eventually broken out by melting an iron mine with bellows. This tale bears a striking similarity to the origin-myths of the early Turks in the sixth–eighth centuries. It does not figure in our earliest Mongolian source, the ‘Secret History’, where the account of the origins of Chinggis Khan’s clan itself represents an amalgam of elements from the legendary history of the Turks and the Kitan. But the story surfaces often in Rashīd al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh (1303–4) and fleetingly in La flor des estoires of Hayton of Gorigos (1307). A brief and somewhat garbled version had already reached Jūzjānī by 1260 at the very latest. We cannot be sure whether Mongol elements had been present in the early Turkish legends or whether Turkish motifs were appropriated and carried over into the later Mongol tradition. These origin-myths were conceivably influenced by the Syriac version of the Alexander Romance, which was introduced to Central Asia by Nestorian Christians in or soon after the seventh century, and hence they sprang ultimately from the same soil as did Pseudo-Methodius. What had now transpired, however, was that with the appearance of the Mongols in Eastern Europe the movement of ideas was reversed, as details of their legendary origins found their way westward. In two instances, certainly, transmission to the Latin world was direct. The Hungarian bishop interviewing Mongol prisoners got the answer he did, about breaking through a mountain barrier (p. 147), not merely because of the way he framed his question but because the response he expected coincided with the Mongols’ own notions about their remote past. And the fabulous account of Chinggis Khan’s career which is found in both Carpini’s Ystoria and the ‘Tartar Relation’, and which clearly originated within the Mongol world, incorporates themes from the Persian Alexander tradition.

The contribution of the friars, 1245–55

This brings us to the friars. We have seen how their reports often confirmed and amplified what had been known for some years about the Mongols’ diet and customs. It is time to ask how far the friars’ information and perspective differed qualitatively from those of the annalists. Klopprogge
identifies a pronounced gulf between them. Whereas chroniclers describing the events of 1241–2 accounted for the Mongol attacks by reference to divine judgement or to apocalyptic prophecy, he suggests that the friars, drawing upon the methods of the school of Chartres, sought causes, rather, in human action and historical events (though not, in every case, events that a modern scholar would recognize as such), producing more down-to-earth, this-worldly explanations. The significance of an event in terms of sacred history might still be discernible, but it was no longer assigned any causative function.\footnote{140}

Now it is true that the friars’ reports attempt to find rational explanations for phenomena hitherto associated with the terrifying and the monstrous. Thus Carpini, for instance, accounts for the Mongols’ undiscriminating diet on the grounds of an earlier crisis in which they had been faced with a severe dearth of victuals.\footnote{141} Moreover, he may demonstrate a more accurate understanding of what Simon of Saint-Quentin portrayed as the Mongols’ consumption of the cremated remains of their dead (p. 143), for he relates how at a burial they sacrifice and eat a horse and then burn its bones in honour of the deceased.\footnote{142} Rubruck almost unconsciously furnishes an explanation for the consumption of raw meat when he describes how the lack of suitable fuel often obliged his party to eat meat that was only semi-cooked.\footnote{143}

Yet Klopprogge’s brilliant theory about the influence of Chartres grows less convincing on closer scrutiny. Even if we disregard the grave doubts that have been expressed regarding the role and significance of the School,\footnote{144} it is unlikely to have influenced the early Franciscans. In harmony with their founder’s views (and in sharp contrast with the Dominicans), they avoided academic pursuits. Rubruck had probably studied in Paris (a more important intellectual centre than Chartres). But Carpini – older by a generation and a busy administrator who had exercised responsibility in the Order almost since St Francis’s own day – can hardly have spent time in a school or university,\footnote{145} although it is true that Salimbene writes of him expounding to the monks at Sens whatever in his report seemed problematic or obscure and says not only that everyone regarded him as a man ‘of a most holy life \[sanctissime vite\]’ but also that he was ‘well read \[litteratus\]’.\footnote{146}

The friars in general were admittedly less given to apocalyptic speculation, perhaps, than were their contemporaries. The Franciscan Adam Marsh was clearly impressed by the insights of Joachim of Fiore, and already in the 1250s Matthew Paris was accusing the Mendicants of peddling Joachite ideas.\footnote{147} Yet, as we saw, only one of the letters written by friars from Eastern Europe in 1241–2 makes any reference to the Mongols as a subject of Scriptural prophecy. Nor did the Franciscan Alexander of Bremen, in his exegetical work on the Apocalypse (completed c.1249), credit them with any such role: although the sole reference to them occurs in the original draft of the work, dating from 1235 (when little was known of the Tartars),
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it was significantly not updated in the later version. The Anonymous of Passau, who may have been a Dominican, says nothing of the Tartars when briefly mentioning Gog and Magog in his treatise on the Antichrist, written in the 1260s. And there is no denying that the friars who travelled in Mongol Asia in the period 1245–55 make little or no explicit reference to the apocalyptic peoples. In his opening paragraph, the author of the ‘Tartar Relation’ makes clear his belief that he was living in the final stage of history, though he says no more on the subject, and this assumption, of course, did not necessarily imply a view of the Mongols as heralds of the Apocalypse. He believed that the nations Gog and Magog enclosed by Alexander the Great were Jews, and Rubruck enquired in the Caucasus region about these Jews, as Simon of Saint-Quentin and his Dominican colleagues had done seven years earlier. Simon himself contrived an improbable link between Gog and the name of the Qaghan Güyüg (for whom he invents an otherwise unknown brother called Magog), though it should be noted that he appeals not to Pseudo-Methodius but to Ezekiel.

Such preoccupations, of course, may have been geographical rather than prophetic in character. Yet certain matters touched on in the friars’ reports are simply too evocative not to have borne at least some apocalyptic content. When Simon devotes a few sentences to Mongol cannibalism or when Carpini remarks that the Mongols eat the afterbirth of mares, we can be fairly sure that they have one eye cocked on Pseudo-Methodius, since these are among the hallmarks of his unclean nations. The addiction to magic and necromancy was also reminiscent of the black arts practised by the Inclosed Peoples. It is difficult, moreover, to account for Carpini’s interest in the precise number of years (forty-two, he alleges) that had elapsed since the Mongols first emerged from their homeland without falling back on the Pseudo-Methodian frame of reference adopted by the Rus’ cleric Peter. Rubruck, in turn, more than once draws an analogy between the Mongols and the Children of Israel. Roger Bacon, having read Rubruck’s report and discussed it with him, was certainly not deflected by either experience from musing about the possible identity of the Mongols with the apocalyptic Gog and Magog, though he reached no firm conclusion. The Dominican author of the De ortu Tartarorum (1255) almost certainly viewed the Mongols through an apocalyptic lens.

It is important to set the friars’ reports in context. They undeniably reflect a greater degree of insight and sophistication than are to be detected in the observations of Matthew Paris and other chroniclers back in Western Europe. They asked questions and sometimes betray dissatisfaction with the answers they received. As they passed through Mongol Asia, they picked up many a story that belonged to the ‘outer world’ of the societies among whom they were moving. Carpini borrowed various tales from Rus’ clerics, and he recounts others that are transmitted by travellers within Asia as early as the eighth century: tales of a race with ox’s feet;
of a people whose females were human while the males had dog’s heads; of cannibalism. We know that such fables enjoyed a wide circulation. Only a few years earlier, a Muslim envoy from the Mongols had told the Ayyubid prince of Mayyafārīqīn about a headless people in the Far East, close to the land of Gog and Magog, whose eyes were in their shoulders and who lived off fish, and of another race, whose flocks were generated from seed sown in the ground. Rubruck was more sceptical, perhaps. He expressed doubt about the existence of the monsters described by Isidore and Solinus, and he makes no link between the Mongols and cannibalism. When, however, he heard that the Tibetans, who lay at some distance from his route, ate their dead kinsfolk as a mark of respect, he found no reason to reject something of which Solinus had written. The friars were creatures of their time, and if they found no evidence for a phenomenon that was part of the common stock of Western folklore, their reaction was often simply to relegate it beyond their now dramatically extended geographical horizons.

Notes

1 An earlier version of the bulk of this chapter appeared as ‘Medieval Christendom’s encounter with the alien’, Historical Research 74 (2001), pp. 347–69. I am grateful to the editor for permission to reuse much of the material here.
2 TR, §2, p. 4.
3 The idea surfaces also in a variant text of the account of the Mongols by the Rus’ cleric Peter (1244/5): OOLB ms. 446, fo. 267vb: intelleverunt etiam papam maiorem esse de mundo. On this, see Ruotsala, Europeans and Mongols, p. 155, n.15. The statement could, however, be mere flattery: see Jackson, ‘Testimony of the Russian Archbishop’, pp. 71, 74.
4 Meyvaert, p. 258 (tr. in Barber and Bate, Letters from the East, p. 159). See the clarification in Tanase, “Jusqu’aux limites du monde”, pp. 327–8.
9 SSQ, pp. 100–1 (= VB, xxxii, 43).
12 A survey of Western attitudes towards the Mongols from Julian onward is to be found in Gießauf, Barbaren, chap. 2.4.
appendix 2 ibid., Ruotsala prints Eudes de Châteauroux, ‘Sermo in concilio pro negotio Tartarorum’, which he dates (pp. 60–1 and n.2) to 1241/3 on the grounds that the pope has recently died after summoning a council and that the Mongols are depicted as an immediate threat. My own view, however, is that the sermon belongs to 1261, following the death of Alexander IV, and would have been delivered at a provincial synod in France (see p. 123 above): the reference to appeals from ‘the Holy Land, Tripoli and Antioch’, as well as from ‘Prussia and Livonia’ (see p. 127) would support this dating rather more than 1241/3. Another sermon in which Eudes preached the crusade against the Tartars, first printed in Jean Baptiste Pitra, ed., Analecta novissima. Spicilegii Solesmensis altera continuatio, 2 vols (Paris, 1885–8), II: Tusculana, pp. 328–31, is ed. and tr. in Christoph Maier, Crusade Propaganda and Ideology. Model Sermons for the Preaching of the Cross (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 144–51 (again probably from 1260–1, though Maier, pp. 25, 76, dates it to 1241).

16 Klopprogge, Ursprung, pp. 188–93.
17 Cf. the details in Dörrie, pp. 158–9, 166, 172, 179, with CM, III, p. 488. For the dates of the two reports and the journeys they describe, see Dörrie, pp. 137–9, and Mongolensturm, pp. 71, 96.
21 And reproduced by Brunel, ‘David d’Asby’. Guéret-Laferté, pp. 123–4, believes that the original was in French, but it is surely more likely that the report presented to the Council was in Latin and that the Turin ms. was a subsequent vernacular rendering.


26 CM, IV, p. 120; cf. also ibid., p. 77.


30 Tarachonta: CM, IV, p. 109, n.2 (citing the papal legate Otto), and VI, p. 497, n.1 (marginal note from BL, Cotton ms., Nero D I, fo. 85); at IV, p. 387, the link with Tarachonta in the report of the Rus’ cleric Peter is an interpolation by Matthew, and does not appear in the Burton annals version (Dörrie, p. 189) or in the variant text found in OOLB ms. 446 (see note 100 below). Cf. Otto Prinz, ed., *Die Kosmographie des Aethicus*, MGHQu. 14 (Munich, 1993), pp. 120–1. For the derivation from a river ‘Tartar’, see TS, p. 251; CM, III, p. 488 (‘Tar’), and IV, p. 78; PC, v, 2, p. 252 (tr. Dawson, p. 19); TR, §3, p. 4.

31 WR, i, 14, and ix, 1, pp. 18, 48 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 71, 97).


33 PC, ix, 5, p. 305 (tr. Dawson, p. 52). WR, as n.31.

34 SSQ, p. 105 (= VB, xxxii, 46).


37 WR, ix, 4, xxiii, 6, and xxxvii, 1, pp. 50, 114, 286 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 99, 147, 254).

38 Ibid., ii, 1, p. 18 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 72).


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41 TS, p. 284 (tr. in Mongolensturm, p. 252).
42 PC, iv, 8, p. 248 (tr. Dawson, p. 16). SSQ, p. 32 (= VB, xxx, 71), on bread alone.
46 WR, iii, 1, and v, 1–2, pp. 28, 34 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 79, 84).
47 SSQ, p. 40 (= VB, xxx, 78).
49 Ibid., iv, 8, pp. 248–9 (tr. Dawson, pp. 16–17); also TR, §54, p. 33. WR, vii, 1 bis, p. 42 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 90–1).
50 Ibid., xiii, 5, p. 64 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 108).
52 Dörrie, p. 191. PC, iv, 7, p. 248 (tr. Dawson, p. 16); cf. also TR, §54, p. 33.
54 ‘Continuatio Sancrucensis secundae’, p. 640.
56 PC, iii, 2, p. 236 (tr. Dawson, p. 9); cf. TR, §39, p. 25.
57 PC, iii, 9, p. 240 (tr. Dawson, p. 12); cf. TR, §42, p. 28.
58 PC, iii, 7, p. 239 (tr. Dawson, p. 11); cf. TR, §42, pp. 27–8, ascribing these taboos to the Mongols’ fear of their ancestors.
59 SSQ, pp. 34–5 (= VB, xxx, 74); cf. also p. 92 (= VB, xxxii, 34).
60 Ivo of Narbonne, in CM, IV, p. 275: principia [sic] suarum tribuum deos vocant. Thomas Agni di Lento in to all the faithful, 1 March 1260, in Menkonis chronicon, p. 548 (tr. in Barber and Bate, Letters from the East, p. 155).
63 PC, viii, 3, p. 294 (tr. Dawson, p. 44).
64 For a good introduction to medieval apocalyptic literature in the West, see Paul J. Alexander, ‘Medieval Apocalypses as historical sources’, AHR 73 (1968), pp. 997–1018.
65 RV, p. 134 (tr. in Mongolensturm, p. 140).
The Mongol threat


HDFS, VI:1, p. 257.

Peter, in Dörrie, p. 192. Cf. also ‘Carmina de regno Ungariae destructo’, p. 603: heretici apercius, securius incedunt, apostate iudicium non credunt.


‘Richeri Gesta’ (after 1264), pp. 310–11. Busson and Ledru, ‘Actus pontificum Cenomannis’, pp. 499–500 (and see n.55), where the Mongol invasion seems for this purpose to be deliberately removed from its chronological context.


CM, IV, pp. 77–8.

‘Richeri Gesta’, p. 310.

‘Richeri Gesta’, p. 310.


93 TS, p. 286 (tr. in *Mongolensturm*, p. 253).


96 Ibid., VI, p. 78.


100 The figure appears in the report of ‘Petrus archiepiscopus de Belgrab in Ruscia super facto tartarorum’, OOLB ms. 446, fo. 267vb, cited by Ruotsala, *Europeans and Mongols*, pp. 154–5; though abridged, this text may well be closer to the original here than the versions edited by Dörrie, which have thirty-nine years (see ‘Drei Texte’, p. 193). For Pseudo-Methodius’s data, see n.110 below.
101 Julian, in Dörrie, p. 178 (tr. in *Mongolensturm*, p. 107). TS, p. 286 (tr. in *Mongolensturm*, p. 253). For Rome and the king of the Romans, see Sackur, p. 80: *consurgunt... adversus Romanorum imperium filii Hismabel... et contradicunt regno Romanorum*; p. 83: *Romania corruptitur et in occasione erit* (Frenz and Herde, pp. 159, 163); cf. also pp. 68–9, 89–91 (Frenz and Herde, pp. 147–8, 170–1).


103 Frederick II to the Roman Senate, in *HDFS*, V, p. 1140.


106 Sackur, pp. 72–3, 92 (Frenz and Herde, pp. 152, 173).

107 TR, §54, p. 33: *adluv(i)ones*. Carpini’s text (p. 143 above) reads *abluviones iumentorum*.


111 Pace Schmieder, *Europa*, p. 207. Her comments are more appropriate when applied to authors who wrote some decades later: see ibid., pp. 263–8. For an example of *Ismahelites* as Muslims, see RV, p. 212 (tr. in *Mongolensturm*, p. 179; and see ibid., p. 220, n.208), who lists them among the races within the Mongol army; more generally, Smail Balić, ‘Der Islam im mittelalterlichen Ungarn’, *SOF* 23 (1964), pp. 19–35.


115 CM, VI, p. 80.
131 Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd, text p. 39 (tr. p. 41): his informant was a merchant from Khurāsān whose brother had been in the Khwārazmshāh’s service.

132 Ibn al-Athīr, XII, p. 360 (tr. Richards, III, p. 204); hence Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd, text p. 27 (tr. pp. 26–7).


136 Jūzjānī, Il, p. 99 (tr. Raverty, II, p. 937): here the emergence from enclosed mountains is placed early in Chinggis Khan’s career.


work, see Sabine Schmolinsky, Der Apokalypsenkommentar des Alexander Minorita. Zur frühen Rezeption Joachims von Fiore in Deutschland, MGH Studien und Texte 3 (Hannover, 1991), pp. 31–52 (pp. 35–6 for the Thatari).


150 TR, §1, p. 3: que in fine iam clarescunt seculorum. . . .


152 Ibid., pp. 90, 92 (= VB, xxxii, 32 and 34).


154 WR, xix, 4, and xxv, 10, pp. 92, 124 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 131, 156). DeWeese, ‘Influence’, pp. 56–7, sees this merely as symptomatic of the more positive view of the Mongols that was emerging.


159 Sibt Ibn al-Jawzī, Mirāt, VIII:2, pp. 733–4 (ad annum 638 H./1240–1): the brief lacuna in the text is to be filled from al-Jazarī (d. 1339), Hawādh al-zamān, Forschungs- und Landesbibliothek Gotha, ms. Orient. A1359, fo. 75v, who is here citing Sibt verbatim.


Kingdoms divided

In December 1273, a report by Bishop Bruno of Olmütz (Olomouc), submitted to Pope Gregory X in advance of the Second Council of Lyons, painted a depressing picture of the eastern regions of Latin Europe. Hungary was gravely afflicted by the turbulence of the pagan Cumans. Its queen (Elisabeth, the consort of István V) was a Cuman, and two of her daughters were betrothed to rulers from among the schismatic Rus’. Poland was under constant pressure from the pagan Lithuanians. It was through these territories that the Mongols had mounted attacks in the past, and they would surely do so again. The German princes were united only in their determination to have no master and were incapable of defending the Christian cause in Europe or the Holy Land.1

This last swipe at the Germans might have led Bruno on to the tendency of Latin rulers in general to fight one another rather than unite against the pagan enemy. Poland was progressively fragmented, as the various branches of the Piast dynasty carved Silesia, Mazovia and Kujavia into ever smaller duchies. Only Great and Little Poland seemed exempt from this fissiparous process, but the extinction of their two ruling lines – with the deaths of Bolesław V (‘the Chaste’) of Cracow in 1279 and of Przemysław II of Great Poland in 1296 – unleashed struggles for the inheritance among their surviving kinsmen. These troubles profited Poland’s neighbours, the Teutonic Knights and the margraves of Brandenburg, and encouraged the Bohemian king, Václav II (1278–1305), first to extend his suzerainty over several Polish duchies and then to occupy Cracow and secure his own coronation as king of Poland in 1300. Not until Václav’s death, followed by that of his young son Václav III and the extinction of the Přemyslid dynasty in 1306,
did Władysław Łokietek (‘the Short’), of the Kujavian line, embark in ear-
nest on the slow *rassemblement* of Piast Poland. He was finally crowned
king in 1320. It is a measure of the difficulties confronting him that his most
urgent priority was not to defend the kingdom against pagan neighbours
but to check the expansion of Bohemia under its new sovereign, John of
Luxemburg (1310–46), and to recover the city of Danzig (Gdań-
sk) and the
rest of Pomerellia (Pomorze), which had been bequeathed to Przemysław
II in 1296 and which the Teutonic Knights had misappropriated in 1308.2

Hungary too, as Bruno noticed, had other troubles. Béla IV had again
recruited several Cuman bands into his service in 1246 and had secured
their allegiance by marrying his son and heir István to the daughter of one
of their khans. But from the 1250s he was in conflict with King Ottokar II
of Bohemia, who in 1246 had inherited the extensive lands of the Baben-
berg dukes of Austria, and during the last decade of his reign, he was at
odds with István, to whom he had granted the royal title and a share of
the kingdom. In 1270, Bernard, abbot of Montecassino, recently returned
from a mission to the Hungarian court to arrange marriages between two
of István V’s children and the offspring of Charles of Anjou, king of Sic-
ily, could still comment favourably on Hungarian military strength.3 But
after the brief reign of István V (1270–2) the throne passed to his young
son László IV (‘the Cuman’, 1272–90), whose minority was dominated
civil war between rival baronial families. Although the king provoked
the resentment of the Hungarian nobility by his dependence on his moth-
ner’s often pagan relatives, this did not prevent a Cuman revolt in the early
1280s. Nor did the energy with which he crushed the insurgents dissipate
the mounting rumours that he consorted with pagans and had repudiated
his wife, Charles of Anjou’s daughter Elizabeth (Isabella), in favour of two
Cuman concubines. These reports reached Rome through the agency of
Lodomer, archbishop of Esztergom, and brought down upon László a series
of rebukes from Popes Honorius IV and Nicholas IV, who did not scruple
to communicate to other monarchs their fears that Hungary was reverting
to paganism.4

When, on László IV’s murder in 1290, the crown passed to a cousin,
András III, rival candidates appeared in the form of Charles Martel, a grand-
son of Charles I of Anjou and a son of the late king’s sister, and Václav II
of Bohemia, whose mother was a granddaughter of Béla IV. The Hungarian
nobility was divided. Charles Martel adopted the title ‘King of Hungary’
at once, as after his demise (1295) did his son Charles Robert (‘Carobert’);
Václav entered the country at the head of an army on András III’s death
(1301) and assumed the government on his son’s behalf. At the beginning of
the fourteenth century, Václav was styling himself king of Bohemia, Hun-
gary and Poland. His death in 1305 and that of Václav III in 1306 put an
end to these grandiose designs, but it was only in 1309 that the Angevin
Carobert finally secured the Hungarian crown.
The Curia was well aware of the perils of disunity. As far back as 1247, Carpini had warned that intelligence of Western dissensions would encourage the Mongols to attack, and in a sermon in 1261 Eudes de Châteauroux spoke of Christian disunity opening a path for them. The war between Hungary and Bohemia was a cause for particular concern. In 1254, Innocent IV had expressed anxiety that the quarrel between Béla and Ottokar might result in the subjection of Christian peoples to pagan rule. Urban IV hoped in 1262 that peace could be preserved between the Hungarian and Bohemian monarchs in order that the faithful of those parts might be strengthened in their efforts to resist the Mongols. In the previous year, in a letter to Richard of Cornwall, one of the two claimants to the imperial throne, he had lamented the wretched state of Christendom, shaken as it was by conflicts that were ‘more instinctual than internal’ and assailed from outside by fierce peoples, especially the Tartars.

The Latin world might have counted itself fortunate that after 1261–2 the Golden Horde itself was embroiled in war on its other borders – especially south of the Caucasus, where the territories disputed with the Ilkhans, it has been suggested, were more important to Berke and his successors than were the Rus’ lands (or, by extension, Latin Europe). We know less than we should like about the internal history of the Horde or its relations with other Mongol states, but one episode suggests that the rhythm of Mongol activity on the European frontier can be linked with developments elsewhere. Since Berke’s time, the khans had refused to recognize the Qaghan Qubilai, allying themselves with Qaidu and his confederates. Thus in 1276, when a group of princes operating in Central Asia on Qubilai’s behalf mutinied and arrested the qaghan’s son Nomoghan, they sent him to the khan of the Golden Horde, Mengü Temür (1267–80). In 1283, however, Mengü Temür’s brother and successor, Töde Mengü (1281–7), made his peace with Qubilai, returned his son to him and acknowledged his supremacy. It was possibly this development that prompted the Ilkhan Ahmad-Tegüder, in his second letter to the Mamlık Sultan in June 1283, to refer to the unity of the Mongol princes. The Jochids’ rapprochement with the Yuan empire and the Ilkhanate did not apparently last many years. But it perhaps gave the Golden Horde additional security in both the south and the east, releasing forces for a more forward policy in Europe; it would thus explain in part the surge of military activity from the mid-1280s – including major attacks on Hungary and Poland (see pp. 173–4) – which has been described as ‘the second Tatar-Mongol invasion of Central and South-Eastern Europe’.

Otherwise, the khans followed a more defensive policy. They were on occasions opportunistic, intervening when their Latin neighbours were in difficulties, but it seems that they launched their heaviest attacks when these outside powers had the temerity to encroach upon the Mongol sphere of influence. And divisions within the Mongol world often dictated restraint.
This was certainly the case after the rise of the Jochid prince Noghai, a great-nephew of Berke, who forged for himself a virtually autonomous principality in the south-western marches of the Golden Horde’s dominions. His position naturally aroused the suspicions of the khan at Sarai. Noghai had cooperated on a campaign in Eastern Europe with Mengü Temür’s nephew Töle Buqa (‘Teleboga’ in Latin sources) and was instrumental in his accession as khan (1287–91). But when the two men quarrelled, Noghai assisted Mengü Temür’s son Toqto’a to overthrow him. Noghai’s assumption of the title of khan from 1296/7 and his issuance of coins in his own name and that of his son Cheke without any mention of his overlord were a direct challenge to Toqto’a (1291–1312), and another civil war ensued, which ended with Noghai’s defeat and death in 1299/1300. Around the same time Toqto’a became embroiled in the politics of the Blue Horde. This is the name given to the eastern wing of the Jochid ulus, located in the steppelands north of the Aral Sea and ruled by the line of Orda, Batu’s elder brother. Toqto’a’s championship of its khan against a rival who was supported by Qaidu and the Chaghadayids meant that troops were siphoned off to participate in the struggle, which might otherwise have been available for campaigns in Hungary and Poland.

Propaganda and posture

In 1273, Bruno of Olmütz saw the Bohemian kingdom as Christendom’s sole bulwark against the pagan menace in Eastern Europe. As a subject of King Ottokar and perhaps also as an advocate of his candidature for the imperial throne, the bishop might have been expected to take this view, but partisanship of this kind was by no means confined to Bohemia. When Ottokar fell in battle against the combined forces of Emperor-elect Rudolf I and the Hungarians in 1278, it was an Austrian annalist who remarked that even the Tartars had known him as ‘the Iron King’. Yet Ottokar, who so distinguished himself on crusade against the pagan Prussians, is not known ever to have crossed swords with the Mongols. Under the year 1277, the annals of Niederaltaich describe how, over a period of twenty-four years, he had defended his territories against the incursions of Hungarians, Cumans and Tartars with strenuous effort and at considerable expense both in money and in the lives of his subjects. This is probably nothing more than second-hand Bohemian propaganda. Although his war with Béla IV in 1260 virtually coincided with the threat of a Mongol attack on Hungary, Ottokar complained to the pope that Béla had attacked him at the head of forces which included pagan Cumans and Mongols, as well as Muslims (‘Ishmaelites’) and schismatics such as Greeks, Bulgarians and Bosnians. It would become a standard charge against Hungary’s rulers, but similar accusations were levelled elsewhere. In much the same way, the bishop of Breslau (Wrocław) a few years later would denounce Boleslaw
the Chaste for entering Silesia at the head of countless thousands of ‘Rutenians, Cumans and Lithuanians’.\textsuperscript{20} It was always useful to stigmatize the enemy as one who employed pagans and schismatics. The army which Ottokar himself mustered against the German king in 1276 was rumoured to include infidels – possibly even Mongols.\textsuperscript{21}

A later Bohemian chronicler alleged that the Tartar ruler stood in such awe of Ottokar’s power that he sent the king rich gifts and addressed him as a beloved brother.\textsuperscript{22} Simply another dose of uncritical adulation, perhaps, but it has an authentic ring, if we recall how the Mongols tried to detach more distant states from neighbours whom they were planning to attack. Berke had tried to ensnare Béla in an alliance in 1259 (p. 127). Ottokar too is known to have received envoys from the Mongols.\textsuperscript{23} The fact that they also despatched an embassy to his son and successor, Václav II, in 1293\textsuperscript{24} – a year in which they invaded Poland (p. 174) – suggests that the Golden Horde was aware of his hostility towards Władysław Łokietek (as also, no doubt, his candidacy for the Hungarian throne in opposition to András III) and sought his neutrality or his cooperation.

For their part, the Hungarian monarchs from Béla IV onward had a vested interest in presenting their country as a ‘front-line’ state burdened with the responsibility of defending the whole of Christendom. Béla sought to exploit this image, of course, during the war with Bohemia, which, he claimed, had rendered his borders more attractive to the Mongols.\textsuperscript{25} His amazement in 1247 that the pope permitted Louis IX to leave Europe on crusade when Hungary was under threat (p. 109) might have been mere haggling over resources. As Nora Berend has shown, however, the king’s aim in promoting the idea that his realm was a bulwark was also to extort from the Curia concessions relating to the church within Hungary.\textsuperscript{26} The propaganda campaign seems to have been effective. When Dominican Master-General Humbert of Romans drafted his \textit{Opus tripartitum} for Gregory X in 1273, he observed that the Tartars no longer did Christians any injury except in Hungary\textsuperscript{27} – a verdict that scarcely did justice to Poland’s experience in 1259. The notion of a kingdom that was perilously exposed to infidel attack was well established by the beginning of the fourteenth century, when Pope Boniface VIII contrasted Hungary’s once flourishing condition with its present wretched state.\textsuperscript{28}

The posture adopted by Béla IV and István V did not mean that their claims were completely unfounded, but the reality was undoubtedly more complex than either their self-portrayal or the accusations of their enemies. Béla and his son were engaged in the difficult exercise of balancing their role as faithful sons of the Church against a pressing need to appease their new and formidable pagan neighbour. As Alexander IV had done before him, Urban IV strongly tried to discourage them from reaching some kind of diplomatic accommodation with the Golden Horde.\textsuperscript{29} But royal charters reveal that papal admonitions were ineffective. Béla is known to have received
envoys from the Mongols in 1263/4.\textsuperscript{30} In 1270, István rewarded a noble for faithful services that included two missions to the khan with the purpose of deflecting a Mongol attack.\textsuperscript{31} The fact that these diplomatic overtures bore fruit makes it likely that Hungary – denied military assistance in the crisis of 1241–2 and during subsequent alarms – opted to protect itself in the 1260s by paying tribute to the Golden Horde. In 1288, the hostile archbishop of Esztergom would accuse László IV of entering into a compact of submission to the Mongols;\textsuperscript{32} if indeed the charge was justified, the king was simply following the precedents set by his father and grandfather.

The Mongols and client states

In much of Eastern Europe, the Mongol threat was indirect. Here the Golden Horde could be seen as a malign power drawing into its embrace states that would otherwise have succumbed to Latin pressure and acknowledged Christian overlordship and the primacy of Rome. In the Baltic region, where the Teutonic Knights and the Poles already faced pagan Prussians and Lithuanians in addition to the Mongols,\textsuperscript{33} the situation appeared all the more delicate in view of the large numbers of neophytes who needed at all costs to be preserved from a pagan conquest. Occasionally a rumour is transmitted, as in 1263, of an engagement between the Mongols and the Teutonic Knights.\textsuperscript{34} But we know little about clashes between the Mongols and the Knights. The chief reason is that on this northerly frontier the Golden Horde acted alongside or through proxies like the Rus’ princes or the Lithuanians. Papal bulls that mention simply pagans or schismatics may in fact be referring to local, more traditional enemies, acting at the khan’s instigation or bolstered by a Mongol force.

The Prussian chronicles, which begin in the 1320s, provide sparse detail for the earlier period, and some encounters are known to us only from Rus’ sources. In 1269, for instance, the ‘great basqaq’ *Amraghan and ‘many Tatars’ joined the army assembled by Nevskii’s brother and successor, Iaroslav of Vladimir-Suzdal’, and the Germans were so cowed that they sent gifts to the Mongols and abandoned the region of Narva.\textsuperscript{35} The Mongols also lent assistance to Daniil’s progeny in Ruthenia, who had been tributary to the Golden Horde since the 1250s, had participated in the Mongol campaign of 1259 against Poland and had continued to engage in periodic hostilities with the Poles on their own account.\textsuperscript{36} Thus early in 1281, Leszek the Black of Cracow and Sandomir defeated near Goslicz a Mongol force which had entered his territory in support of Daniil’s son Lev I,\textsuperscript{37} and in 1302, the army with which Lev’s son Iury I failed to raise a Polish siege of Lublin included Lithuanians and Mongols.\textsuperscript{38}

The Lithuanians’ relations with the Golden Horde are less well documented than those of Rus’. As we saw, their territory had been devastated in 1258/9 (p. 127), and they were probably tributary to the khan in the
From confrontation to coexistence

1260s, when reports reached the Curia that they were in league with the Mongols. This is still more likely to have been the case in the early fourteenth century, as Lithuania began to absorb various principalities in western Rus’, such as Polotsk. It is noteworthy that, when in 1323 the Lithuanian Grand Duke Gediminas took Kiev and installed there as prince his brother Fedor, there was no question of discontinuing the principality’s tribute to the khan: we find Fedor on campaign a few years later, with a Mongol basqaq in his entourage.

Further south, in the Balkans, the situation was similar, and Noghai’s influence was felt particularly keenly. The Byzantine empire, newly re-established with the capture of Constantinople (1261), now lay within the penumbra of Mongol overlordship. The Emperor Michael VIII had endeavoured to maintain friendly relations both with the Ilkhans in Iran and with the Golden Horde. In c.1264, however, Berke sent an army to attack Thrace and secure the release of the exiled Seljük Sultan Kaykâ’ūs, whom the emperor had incarcerated, and from 1273, Michael allied with Noghai, giving him an illegitimate daughter in marriage and using him as a means of putting pressure on Bulgaria when its king menaced the empire’s northern frontier in 1273 and 1279. When Michael died in 1282, he had just welcomed in Constantinople a band of Mongol auxiliaries whom Noghai had sent to assist him against the despot of Thessaly; if we can trust the Byzantine chronicler Pachymeres, they mourned the emperor as wholeheartedly as did his own people.

Thereafter, however, relations between the Mongols of the Pontic steppe and the Byzantine empire cooled markedly. As the result of a major campaign against Bulgaria in 1284/5, Sâqchî (Isaccea), in the Dobrudja region, came under Mongol overlordship and coins were struck there in the khan’s name; direct rule was imposed at some point before 1296/7, when the town became the centre of Noghai’s new khanate. These developments brought Mongol power uncomfortably closer to Constantinople. There were inroads in 1284/5 and 1297, and, although Michael’s son and successor Andronicus II gave daughters in marriage both to Toqto’a and to his successor Özbeg (1312–42), this did not prevent the latter from mounting a series of Mongol attacks on Thrace during the emperor’s final years (1320, 1321, 1324). From some point in the late 1330s, the Byzantine port of Vicina Macaria in the Danube estuary underwent occupation by the Golden Horde. In 1341, just prior to Özbeg’s death, Andronicus III had to send an embassy to deflect a major attack by the khan’s forces on Constantinople. Demetrius Kydones, son of the emperor’s envoy on that occasion, Manuel Kydones, would later conclude that the Mongol devastations of Byzantine territory had facilitated the advance of the Ottoman Turks. But for a number of Western commentators writing in the early fourteenth century, before the rise of the Ottomans, the Tartars threatened Byzantium’s very survival. Muslim observers formed a similar impression, for the encyclopedist Ibn
Faḍl-Allāh al-ʿUmarī, writing in c.1338, was told of the Byzantine emperor’s repeated efforts to appease the khan.48

Bulgaria’s subjugation by the Mongols in 1242 had proved short-lived. The Hungarians occupied the city of Vidin in the 1260s and brought the Bulgarian kingdom under Hungarian suzerainty, but these gains lapsed early in the minority of the young László IV.49 A Byzantine chronicler comments that the Mongols were daily raiding Bulgaria in the 1270s.50 In 1280, its king – George Terter, a noble of Cuman extraction – acknowledged the khan’s overlordship and married Noghai’s daughter, and the Mongols extended their authority also over the minor dynasts who ruled in Vidin and Branchevo. Serbia too recognized Mongol overlordship in or soon after 1291, and its king had to send his son as a hostage to Noghai’s headquarters. When George Terter was expelled by a local boyar in c.1295, the Mongols launched another invasion of Bulgaria. Even Noghai’s downfall did not materially affect Mongol influence in the region, since a son of Toqto’a was now stationed in Sāqchī and along the Danube as far as the ‘Iron Gate’.51 Noghai’s fugitive son Cheke, who had briefly made himself master of Bulgaria (1300–1), was captured by George Terter’s son Svetoslav and murdered on the orders of Toqto’a; Svetoslav took over and acted as the khan’s dutiful subordinate.52 In 1308, an anonymous survey of southeastern Europe could accordingly still describe Bulgaria as tributary to the Tartars.53 Within two decades or so, yet another vehicle of Mongol influence emerged, in the principality of Wallachia. The Vlach prince Basaraba, who bore a Cuman name (though not necessarily himself of Cuman descent), could count on support from the Golden Horde in defying the Hungarian king from at least 1330 onward.54

The Mongol threat to the Latin West down to 1323

In its interventions in each of these areas, the Golden Horde was active on behalf of or exerting pressure upon schismatic rulers and hence constituted an additional obstacle to the ambitions of popes and Western secular princes. But to what extent did the Mongols threaten the security of Latin states themselves? The incidence of Mongol raiding during the first two decades after 1260 is difficult to gauge: as we saw, even when the Tartars are expressly mentioned, this does not necessarily indicate operations by the forces of the Golden Horde. Hungary may have suffered a series of raids from the Horde after 1272, since András III’s charter of liberties (1291) tells how the Mongols and Cumans had taken advantage of the minority of his predecessor, László IV, to attack the kingdom on frequent occasions.55 For what it is worth, Rashid al-Dīn’s informants around the turn of the century were likewise under the impression that Noghai had launched repeated inroads into Hungary.56
These were probably only minor raids, but the mid-1280s appear to have witnessed a shift in policy, with major attacks upon both Hungary and Poland in succession, which as we saw coincided with advances in the Balkans and should possibly also be viewed against the background of the Golden Horde’s relations with other Mongol powers. In Hungary, the dispute between King László and the Church and subsequently the upheavals caused by the Cuman revolt furnished new opportunities for the Mongols to exploit, and in the fourteenth century it was believed that they had been summoned by elements among the defeated Cumans who had taken refuge among them. The khan may also have been provoked by King László’s action, during the campaign to suppress the Cumans, in leading his forces into what would later become Wallachia – in the sonorous words of his charter, ‘beyond the mountains, around the confines and frontiers of the Tartars, which none of our predecessors had penetrated’.

If the Mongol invasion of Hungary at the onset of Lent 1285 was not on the scale of 1241–2, it was nevertheless a major enterprise. It was led by two prominent figures – Noghai and the future khan Töle Buqa – and was accompanied by Lev Daniilovich and others from among their Rus’ satellites. Even though the figures given by German annalists smack of hyperbole, the language of Hungarian charters certainly indicates that the numbers involved were considerable. The invaders ravaged as far as the Danube and entered Pest; László’s consort Elizabeth, from the safety of the walls of Buda, witnessed a spirited and effective sally by members of her household. The Mongols may still have been present in the kingdom in June. Although László himself headed an expedition into Transylvania from May to August, he probably did no more than harass their withdrawal; according to a contemporary letter and reports that reached Germany, it was the local troops – Saxons, Vlachs and Székely, the last fighting as light cavalry – who cut off their retreat in Transylvania and inflicted on them a serious reverse. Polish sources allege that the Mongols also suffered considerably from famine and some kind of epidemic.

In 1287, Noghai and Töle Buqa invaded Poland; according to the fourteenth-century *Vita* of St Kynga (Kunigunde, widow of Boleslaw the Chaste), they were in the country from 6 December until early February 1288. Töle Buqa failed to take Sandomir, while Noghai headed a similarly unsuccessful attack upon Cracow, which Polish annals place around Christmas. For their spirited resistance, the citizens of Cracow would later be rewarded by Leszek the Black with tax exemptions. We learn more about the campaign from a charter of László IV of Hungary, dated 1288, in which the king rewarded György, son of Szymon, for his services. While Leszek sought refuge in Hungary from the Mongols, his kinsman László had despatched a corps of Hungarian troops under György to aid the Poles. György engaged a force of about a thousand Mongols near Sandecz (now Stary Sącz), killing
In February 1288, Leszek in turn expressed his gratitude by giving György a villa in Sandecz. It was perhaps in reprisal for the aid given by László that the Mongols attacked the Szepes (Zips) region of Hungary later in the year, albeit on a smaller scale; here György again distinguished himself.

During those years when the Golden Horde was prey to civil war between Töle Buqa and Noghai (1290–1) or between the latter and Toqto’a (1298–9), the Latin world seems to have been spared Mongol raids, but they recommenced each time the Mongols’ internal conflicts had been resolved. A diploma of András III relates how, around winter in the second year following his coronation (i.e. 1291–2), the Mongols raided the Mačeva (‘Macho’) region and he had despatched troops against them. This incursion, from the south, indicates that Noghai’s forces were now using Bulgaria, or perhaps Serbia, as a base to attack Hungary (pp. 171–2). A charter of 1296 refers to a recent raid on Hungary, though it furnishes scant detail and in any case could conceivably refer to the inroad of 1291–2. There is documentary evidence, firstly, of a Mongol attack on the Leles region in Zemplén (in present-day Slovakia) in 1305. As for Poland, Mongol troops are found ravaging Sandomir in 1293, doubtless profiting from Łokietek’s war with King Václav of Bohemia. After this episode, no more Mongol incursions into Poland are mentioned until Özbeg’s reign (1312–42).

Frontier conditions and mentalities

If, by the last decades of the thirteenth century (chapter 8), Ilkhanid diplomacy was turning the Mongols of Persia into potential allies, no such aura attached to those of the Golden Horde. In Europe, fear of the Mongols was widespread, surfacing on one occasion in the most incongruous of places. During a widespread popular rising in the Utrecht region in 1274, it was apparently natural for the citizens, confronted by an unexpected and formidable attack by the rebels, to assume that the assailants were the Tartars. As late as 1330, the crusade strategist Marino Sanudo, like some latter-day Carpini, warned that the divisions in the Latin world would enable the Mongols to advance into France, Germany and Italy. In Eastern Europe, apprehensions of an imminent Mongol attack reverberated along a vast frontier – Latin Christendom’s longest land frontier with a pagan enemy. In 1286 the Teutonic Knights evacuated four of their Prussian strongholds on reports of the Mongols’ approach, sparked off, in all likelihood, by the preparations to invade Poland. The same invasion of Poland in 1340–1 (p. 178) that spawned rumours of an attack on Brandenburg also elicited an urgent appeal to the pope on the part of Prussian bishops and prompted a papal collector in western Hungary to despatch his funds to the greater security of Zagreb. The manner in which, alongside this Mongol campaign, contemporary chroniclers describe a near-simultaneous attack on Christian Spain by the Muslim ruler of Granada and his Moroccan allies
and an Ottoman Turkish advance against the Greeks, suggests a general sense of crisis. Late in August 1340, Pope Benedict XII himself juxtaposed these other enemies with the Mongol threat in a letter urging the French king to make peace with Edward III.81

The Hungarians alone shared an eastern and south-eastern border with the Mongol world that extended for hundreds of miles. For them, the ‘frontier’ was likely to be a yawning wilderness, from which the enemy might appear with no warning. In 1264, Pope Urban IV assigned the parish of Wynch (Felvincz, in Aranyos) to the archdeacon of Szatmár (now Satu Mare in Rumania), on the grounds that he was based ‘in the furthest part of the realm of Hungary, so that between him and the Tartars’ territory there is absolutely no human habitation’.82 The city of Milcov, once the centre of a bishopric, was described as ruined and devoid of Christian inhabitants in 1278.83 These eastern regions were bleak terrain for Latin forces. When the Hungarian King Louis (Lájos) crossed the Carpathians early in April 1352, on his way back from a campaign against the Lithuanians and Mongols, his horses had to feed on branches, and for an entire week the men ate nothing but beans. According to the Franciscan János of Eger, the king’s confessor, who has left us an account of this expedition, he and a colleague were so weakened by hunger that they were unable to mount or dismount without help.84 The climate did not necessarily smile upon the enemy either, of course. During the Mongol retreat from Hungary in 1285, Noghai made off to the safety of his winter quarters, but Töle Buqa’s troops were decimated in the freezing cold and were reduced to eating their mounts, dogs and dead comrades. The Volynian Chronicle has him arrive back with few survivors of his original force after crossing the Carpathians.85

Documents from thirteenth-century Hungary bear vivid testimony to the psychological impact of Mongol inroads. Nora Berend has drawn attention to the way in which the experience of 1241–2 had seared itself on the Hungarian collective memory, to the extent that it inaugurated a new semi-official chronology. Throughout the rest of his reign, Béla IV’s chancery employed phrases like ‘at the time of the Tartar persecution’ or ‘at the pestilential advent of the Tartars’, and the simple words ‘at the time of the Tartars’ became entrenched in the language of record.86 During the process for the canonization of Béla’s daughter Margaret in 1276, a number of witnesses established their ages by reference to the Mongol invasion.87 Subsequent onslaughts intensified the sense of disruption and loss, particularly that of 1285, which passed into Hungarian historiography as ‘the second Tartar assault’ and obliged chancery scribes to devise phrases like ‘the time of the first’ (or ‘former’) ‘Tartars’ – or even, in one case, ‘the main Tartars’ – for the invasion of 1241.88 In Poland the emotional imprint of Mongol devastation is less clearly discernible, but it manifests itself, perhaps, in the way that annalists regularly couple the name of Duke Henry II of Lower Silesia, for some years after 1241, with the poignant formula ‘who was slain by the Tartars’.89
There is no shortage of documentary evidence for the material and economic damage perpetrated by Mongol attacks after 1242. In 1296, the church of St Mary in Sandomir, which had been burned down in 1259, was still not fully rebuilt, and Pope Boniface VIII granted indulgences to anybody who assisted in the task. Pope Clement VI was told in 1343 that the abbey of St Andrew near Visegrád (in western Hungary), which had flourished before the Tartar invasions, had housed no monks for more than forty years. At some point in the later 1280s, László IV remitted half the revenue due from the inhabitants of Beszterce (Bistritz), ‘in very great measure annihilated or impoverished by the devastation and burnings of the Tartars’. Whether mounting lightning raids or, as in 1285, wide-ranging campaigns of devastation, the enemy were intent on acquiring able-bodied captives in large numbers, and Hungarian charters regularly give great prominence to the liberation of some thousands of their unhappy countrymen by those notables who defeated the Mongols. Serfs whom the invaders abducted but who subsequently escaped back to their homes without the aid of a ransom were legally free in the duchy of Sandomir, though an appeal addressed to Pope John XXII in 1327 suggests that their lords (in this case the church of Sandomir) were but imperfectly acquainted with this custom. Arrangements were made, presumably, for the ransoming of Christian prisoners (and would have imposed an additional burden on local communities), but regrettably the only extant charter documenting such efforts, in Hungary, is an eighteenth-century forgery.

Naturally the Mongols were not the only agents of destruction and sacrilege in Hungary. Many elements within the kingdom profited from the upheavals caused by the Mongol attacks to misappropriate ecclesiastical property, so that Clement VI would complain in 1344 that more than forty Benedictine houses had been illegally occupied over the past hundred years. In 1277, the archbishop of Kalocsa recounted the bloodthirsty career of a Saxon rebel whom he accused of adopting ‘Tartar’ practices, and eight years later King László himself referred to the mutual strife of the Hungarians in the same breath as Tartar and Cuman attacks. For a Hungarian cleric writing in 1321, past decades were an era of wickedness characterized by ‘both Tartar invasion and oppression by the tyrants of the land’ – a situation that, in his view, Divine Grace combined with King Carobert’s energies had done much to ameliorate. Other churchmen were less ready to discriminate among Hungary’s various afflictions and less fulsome about the king’s role. Protesting to Pope Benedict XII in 1338 about Carobert’s erosion of ecclesiastical rights, the kingdom’s prelates spoke of the vulnerability of their churches. Their sole means of resisting the encroachments of the lay power was to produce written privileges which had in fact been destroyed by fire in the course of two Tartar invasions. There were those in Eastern Europe who had clearly learned to turn Mongol visitations to good account.
The war over Ruthenia

Both László IV and András III cooperated with the Polish dukes Leszek and his brother Władysław Łokietek in the 1280s and 1290s against other enemies besides the Mongols, and these close relations were maintained into the Angevin era. Łokietek gave his sister Elizabeth in marriage to King Carobert in 1320, and under his son and successor, Casimir III (‘the Great’, 1333–70), the alliance served as a cornerstone of Polish foreign policy. As it became apparent that Casimir would leave no direct male heir and that
on his death the throne would pass to his nephew, Carobert’s son Louis I of Hungary (1342–82), Hungary’s Angevin rulers had a growing stake in Poland’s territorial integrity. The two powers shared additional concerns about the aggrandizement of the Luxemburg dynasty in Bohemia. They were also both still menaced by the Mongols, and for much of the fourteenth century, it is possible to treat of Polish and Hungarian relations with the Golden Horde together, particularly in relation to successive crises in Ruthenia.

Daniil’s descendants fulfilled in some degree the role which Pope Innocent IV had envisaged for their illustrious ancestor in the mid-thirteenth century (p. 100). While paying tribute to the Golden Horde, they also maintained amicable ties with Poland’s principal rival in the north, the Teutonic Order. In an agreement of 1316, Lev I’s grandsons, Lev II and Andrei, spoke of the friendship between their predecessors and the Knights and assured them of their readiness to protect the Order’s territories against the Mongols or any other aggressor. But in 1322/3 the brothers both perished, possibly in armed conflicts against the Lithuanians, and with them the Riurikid line in Ruthenia died out. Władysław Łokietek saw this as a crisis which would bring the Mongols into Poland in defence of their vital interests and in May 1323 wrote a pressing appeal to Pope John XXII. The pope was then heavily embroiled in a dispute with the Emperor Louis IV. Whatever his response, which has not survived, he may not have authorized a crusade against the Mongols until June 1325. By that juncture, a crisis had been averted through the enthronement of the Mazovian prince Bolesław, whose mother was a sister of the dead princes and who cemented his rule by converting to the Orthodox rite and assuming the style of Iury II. Although like his uncles he made a compact with the Teutonic Order in 1327 on the basis of their common hostility to the Mongols, he appears to have maintained the tribute which his predecessors rendered to the Golden Horde.

When Bolesław-Iury was murdered in March or April 1340 by boyars who resented his Latinizing policies, he left no issue; his heirs were his two brothers, who ruled in Mazovia. Casimir III, in concert with his ally Carobert, responded swiftly. In the course of two campaigns, in which he was joined by troops from Hungary, he occupied Lwów, seized the late prince’s treasure and asserted his authority over the principality of Galicia. The Mongols, summoned by Galician boyars who hoped thereby to avoid Latin rule, reacted in the winter of 1340–1 by devastating the region of Sandomir and mounting an abortive siege of Lublin, before Casimir checked them on the Vistula. According to a Bohemian chronicler, they were compelled to retreat by the harsh cold and heavy snow, while Özbeg’s attacks on Byzantium (p. 171) and the Chaghadayids in 1341, followed by his death early in the following year and a disputed succession, must have distracted the Golden Horde from further campaigning in Poland. Casimir had been reduced to detaching a leading boyar, Dmitrii Dič’ko, from the Mongols
and for a time recognizing him virtually as an independent prince in Galicia. Volynia, which the Lithuanian prince Liubartis had seized around this time, possibly on the khan’s behalf, lay beyond his reach. But the Golden Horde never succeeded in bringing Galicia back within its orbit, and from 1349, at least, Casimir styled himself Polonie et Russie rex.

Spasmodic war between Casimir and the Mongols continued well into the 1350s and may have been terminated only by the dissolution of the khanate in the civil war that followed the death of Özbeg’s grandson Berdibeg in 1359. By this time, Poland’s enemies in the east were acting in concert. Just as from the late 1340s, the Lithuanian Grand Duke Algirdas was ready to seek Mongol assistance in his conflict with Moscow, so the Golden Horde appeared a serviceable ally in his struggle with Poland. By 1351, Clement VI was aware of an alliance (confederatio) between Lithuania and the Mongols, and in this same year the Lithuanians devastated the Lwów region. In March 1352, when the Golden Horde and its Rus’ allies ravaged Polish territory and captured an unnamed city (probably Lublin), one source indicates that this invasion was mounted in support of the Lithuanians. When Louis of Hungary, who had already joined forces with Casimir on an expedition against the Lithuanians in 1351, led Hungarian and Polish troops on another campaign into Ruthenia in the late winter of 1352, he secured the nominal submission of the Lithuanian castellan of Belz, but the fortress is described as being ‘in the neighbourhood of the Tartars’, and his army was shadowed by the Mongols and the Rus’ as he withdrew. In November 1354, Pope Innocent VI, authorizing crusade preaching, spoke of Mongol assaults on Poland over the previous three years but duly named the Lithuanians alongside the Mongols as targets of the planned crusade.

That Casimir himself came to see Lithuania as a more formidable enemy than the Mongols is clear from a marked shift in his relations with the Golden Horde. He may have flirted briefly with the khan’s envoys in 1349, with a view to his operations against Liubartis later that year. The forfeiture of several important towns in Ruthenia during the Lithuanian campaign of 1350 furnished a stronger incentive to make use of the Mongols. Certainly Casimir was in league with them by 1356 when, in a vain request for the Teutonic Order’s assistance against the Lithuanians, he assured the Hochmeister that he had also secured the services of seven Mongol ‘princes’. The Knights, who had themselves effected a rapprochement with Lithuania, duly reported to Avignon in 1357 that the Polish king had submitted to the Golden Horde and had undertaken to pay tribute, thus bringing down on Casimir a rebuke from Pope Innocent VI. The seven Mongol princes surely commanded auxiliaries sent by the khan to assist his new client. During these years, confrontation with the Golden Horde alternated with bouts of negotiation. In 1363, the king asked Pope Urban V to provide a benefice for a cleric whose energies had been taxed ‘on numerous occasions in our embassies to the emperor of the infidel Tartars in order to make truces for
the repose of Christendom’. Just as in the 1260s the Hungarian court had negotiated with the Golden Horde for the sake of survival, so now the Polish king, in order to outflank and defeat the Lithuanians, had evidently been prepared to outbid them for Mongol support.

Yet despite such lapses, Poland under Casimir was beginning to acquire the status long aspired to by Hungary, that of a barrier (antemurale) against pagan aggression. Whereas after c.1354 Hungarian policy under Louis I became increasingly oriented towards the kingdom’s southern neighbours, the heretics and schismatics of Bosnia, Serbia, Wallachia and Bulgaria, and by the last years of the century it was focused on the Ottoman Turkish advance in the Balkans, conflict with both the Horde and Lithuania continued to play a part in Polish policy down until Casimir’s death in 1370 and beyond, during Louis’s own reign in Poland (1370–82). Thus Urban V, responding in 1363 to another request from Casimir, granted indulgences to any of the faithful who, over the next twelve years, aided him against the Tartars and the Lithuanians in the defence of his kingdom. In 1376, Louis’s representative in Galicia, Duke Władysław of Opole, asked Pope Gregory XI to transfer to Lwów the seat of the archbishop of Halicz (Halych), a town which lacked walls and was too remote and exposed, lying as it did between the Tartars and the Lithuanians. As we shall see, however, by this date mention of the Mongols was little more than a formal requirement.

In Hungary, King Carobert does not seem to have been unduly troubled by Mongol attacks. During a campaign against an unspecified rebel (most probably the Wallachian prince Basaraba) in the summer of 1324, he despatched a reconnaissance force into Mongol territory, perhaps with a view to the Mongol reaction to events in Ruthenia; two Mongol youths captured on this occasion were despatched as a gift to Pope John XXII in 1325. The Mongol incursion into Hungary in 1326, mentioned only by a chronicle writing in distant Prussia, was doubtless made in reprisal. Apart from this, the only other report of a Mongol invasion in Carobert’s reign is the vague rumour of an imminent attack, transmitted to the Venetian Senate in the spring of 1340, which may in fact echo the king’s efforts to assist his uncle Casimir in Galicia (p. 179).

Modern scholars have inferred a series of Mongol invasions, in 1332, 1334 and 1338, from references in contemporary papal correspondence. In striking contrast with the attacks of 1241–2 and 1285–8 and even with several lesser raids, however, these inroads have left no impression in the numerous royal and other charters that have come down to us. Nor, with one exception, does any of the papal letters in question offer direct evidence of Mongol invasions of Hungary at this time. John XXII’s bull of 1332, authorizing the recreation of the defunct bishopric of Milcov, simply refers to the visitation of 1241, which had been responsible for the destruction of the see. Other letters are highly unspecific regarding the enemy, as when Benedict XII in 1335 expressed his joy at Carobert’s recent victory over
pagan foes. Moreover, the popes tended, when mentioning the Hungarian king’s incessant conflicts with his non-Catholic neighbours, to give pride of place to schismatics. Thus John in 1332 referred only to hostilities with ‘Ruthenians [presumably Rus’] and other schismatics and infidels’, and Benedict in 1339 made no explicit allusion to the Mongols among Carobert’s pagan enemies. The exception to this general pattern, a letter of 1331 in which John felicitates Carobert on a recent victory over the Tartars, may refer to a genuine engagement, perhaps just prior to the king’s disastrous Wallachian campaign in 1330.

In King Louis’s reign we have more reliable indications of Mongol attacks upon Hungary. One is known to have occurred in or not long before 1348. In the spring of 1352, troops were being raised to fight the Mongols, and the pope was informed of a recent attack which may have formed part of their operations against Poland. In the following year, when Louis, fearing another Mongol invasion, ordered all the kingdom’s fortresses to be repaired, the Transylvanian stronghold of Várhegy (in the county of Sáros, now Délulă-Cetăţii in Rumania) was said to have been damaged in the latest Mongol attack. But the Hungarian kingdom was now strong enough to take the offensive. In February 1345, the ispán of the Székely (and future voivode of Transylvania), András Lachkfí, entered Mongol territory and defeated and captured a Mongol commander named *Otlamish, who was married to the khan’s sister. The following year witnessed another victorious campaign by the Székely, as a result of which the surviving Mongols are said to have fallen back upon the Black Sea coast. In the wake of these triumphs, Clement VI seems again to have tried to re-establish the bishopric of Milcov, though without effect, since Innocent VI, nominating yet another bishop in 1353, spoke of the see as long vacant.

The crusade against the Mongols

The struggle for Ruthenia from 1340 marks the point at which crusading machinery begins to be applied to the Polish and Hungarian theatres of war on a regular basis. In analysing papal crusading policy, we have to distinguish different levels of concession: the grant to individuals of a spiritual privilege, i.e. the indulgence or full pardon for sins, often equated expressly with the indulgence conferred on those who went to fight in the Holy Land; the authorization of crusade preaching (over a geographical area which might well vary considerably) on behalf of one or more Christian kingdoms; and the grant of ecclesiastical revenues to a Christian ruler to support a campaign.

Popes authorized remarkably few crusades against the Mongols in Eastern Europe after 1261. In June 1265, Clement IV, alerted by Béla to the danger of an imminent attack, ordered the crusade to be preached against the Mongols in Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, Brandenburg, Austria, Styria
The Mongol threat and Carinthia. In 1288, Nicholas IV, in a letter that was chiefly concerned with the charges of sub-Christian behaviour against King László, ordered crusade preaching in Hungary, Poland and Bohemia should the Mongols make any attempt against Christian peoples. Apart from these, it seems that the Curia issued no other bulls for the crusade against the Mongols until the second quarter of the fourteenth century.

In 1340 Casimir, anticipating a Mongol reaction to his operations in Galicia, took the precaution of seeking aid from Pope Benedict XII, who in August ordered Polish prelates to arrange for the crusade against the Mongols to be preached in Poland, Hungary and Bohemia. Benedict was keen to reach a settlement: soon afterwards, in a letter to Özbeg that related primarily to Catholic missionary activity in his dominions, he urged the khan to abandon his hostile intentions and undertook to make amends should the Hungarian and Polish kings prove to have done him any unwarranted injury. Benedict’s successors adopted a less eirenic stance. In 1343, Clement VI granted Casimir a tenth of the revenues of the archbishop of Gnieźno and his suffragans for two years, on the grounds that the Polish kingdom was under frequent attack by Tartars, Rus’ and Lithuanians. From March 1351, he granted a further tenth for four years and ordered the Polish prelates to institute crusade preaching in Poland, Hungary and Bohemia in order to defend Poland against the Tartars. Innocent VI renewed the grant in 1355 for another four years.

On the basis of the distinction previously drawn (p. 181) between different levels of concession in papal crusading policy, it seems that in the eyes of the Curia, the Hungarian monarchs had less reason than the Poles to expect a Mongol attack. Certainly the papal response to the Mongol threat to Hungary (as opposed to the conflict in Ruthenia) seems remarkably tepid. In 1325, John XXII refused Carobert’s request for a subsidy from neighbouring kingdoms on the grounds that no precedent existed for such a grant. In another bull he responded to a letter from Carobert which had evidently rehearsed his kingdom’s sufferings over the decades at the hands of the Tartars. Recognizing the Hungarians’ tribulations, the pope was prepared to grant full pardon of their sins for all who died fighting in defence of the faith in Hungary or in neighbouring regions, against Tartars, other pagans or schismatics. A later bull, in 1334, repeated this concession – and the tribulations – verbatim; Carobert himself was included, a privilege reissued in 1339 by Benedict XII.

But the papacy went no further. It is true that John XXII called Carobert an ‘athlete of Christ’; that for Benedict XII he was striving to be a wall of defence (murum defensionis) for Christian peoples; that Innocent VI, granting King Louis a tenth in 1356 for the war against the papacy’s local opponents in Italy, would praise him for having kept the Tartars at bay; and that Clement VI awarded Louis any lands he might wrest from pagans or schismatics. Significantly, however, Clement’s grant of a four-year tenth to
Louis in 1352 was the first time that a pope had assigned substantial crusading revenues to a Hungarian monarch. The purpose on that occasion was not to promote a crusade but to reimburse the king for the heavy expenditure he had incurred in withstanding Mongol attacks, and even this has the appearance of a quid pro quo, since Clement seems to link the concession with Louis’s recent release of some distinguished Neapolitan prisoners. The terminology employed in papal bulls suggests a consistent distinction, if not one that is altogether clear. The Hungarian kings and those who died fighting the Mongols within their dominions were offered ‘full pardon for their sins’ (plenam veniam peccatorum); the Polish king and those who rallied to his banner were usually vouchsafed ‘that indulgence which was granted by our predecessors to those who cross to the Holy Land’. Most importantly of all, no Avignon pope authorized a crusade for the defence of Hungary (as opposed to preaching within Hungary for the defence of Poland).

What is the explanation for this seemingly cavalier treatment? By 1352, certainly, the papacy was trying to draw Louis into its own struggles in central Italy and may well have been reluctant to let him become too embroiled on his eastern frontier. But the Italian embarrassments date from too late a stage to account for the papal stance in the 1340s. Favour towards Poland has to be seen, perhaps, against the background of the Curia’s satisfaction at the restoration of the Polish monarchy in 1320 and frustration at its own incapacity to secure justice for the Polish king from the Teutonic Knights; it is also likely that the papacy gave priority to campaigns which would guarantee the retention of freshly-annexed Orthodox Galicia. There is, of course, an additional, simpler and more obvious explanation: namely, that popes had come to attach less weight to Hungary’s situation than to the danger facing Poland, despite – or even, perhaps, because of – the calls for help that had reached them with remorseless regularity ever since the time of Béla IV.

The effectiveness of crusading appeals is quite another matter. The crusades for the defence of Poland failed to attract the international support that the papacy intended. The most spectacular claims surround the expedition which Benedict XII summoned on Casimir’s behalf in 1340, when two chroniclers speak of large numbers of crusaders moving to the Poles’ assistance. But other sources suggest that Casimir’s appeals to his Latin neighbours had fallen on deaf ears. In a letter of June 1341, Benedict himself would acknowledge that Casimir had not received the reinforcements he needed. According to John of Winterthur, the Emperor Louis IV observed: ‘Since they are powerful and mighty kings, let them defend themselves against infidel attack’. Louis’s relations with the Polish king at this time were admittedly chilly. But in considering the question of German non-participation, we cannot fail to be struck by the contrast with the crusading reinforcements available every winter to the Teutonic Knights in Prussia and Livonia.
The decline of the Golden Horde and the rise of Lithuania

Two circumstances combined to make the anti-Mongol crusade redundant in Eastern Europe. One was Mongol collapse; the other was the escape of Lithuania from the khans’ orbit and its rapprochement with Poland. The Golden Horde may already have been gravely weakened by the onset, in 1346, of the Black Death which, in the verdict of one Hungarian chronicler, had inflicted such losses on the Tartars that Louis I was able to embark on his invasion of Naples with equanimity. Then, following the deaths of Jānībeg (1357) and his son Berdībeg (1358/9), the khanate sank into prolonged internecine war, in which sometimes as many as three or four khans vied for recognition by the amirs and for possession of major centres like Sarai, Qirim (Krim) and Azāq. In the core Golden Horde territories, princes of Batu’s line (which may have died out during the 1360s) had to compete with the progeny of his brothers, and from the 1370s onward the khans of the Blue Horde, descendants of Jochi’s son Toqa Temūr, also entered the lists; Orus Khan of the Blue Horde, who had already appropriated Khwārazm, took Sarai itself in 1374/5. For much of the period 1360–80, the dominant figure in the western Pontic steppe was the amir Mamai, who made and unmade khans and contrived to maintain some kind of suzerainty over the Rus’ princes, though he seems never to have been in a position to intervene in Polish or Lithuanian affairs. In any case, he suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the prince of Moscow at Kulikovo Pole in 1380 and was shortly overthrown by Toqtamish, a kinsman of Orus Khan who had recently supplanted the latter’s son as khan of the Blue Horde. Toqtamish briefly reunited the Golden Horde, and from this point onward the two Jochid polities nominally formed a single khanate.

Toqtamish, a more powerful figure who reimposed overlordship on Moscow (1382), threatened to make the Mongols again a force to be reckoned with in the politics of Eastern Europe. Yet, like so many previous khans, he manifested a greater interest in Khwārazm and the lands south of the Caucasus than in those to the west of the Pontic steppe. Although indebted for his sovereignty in the Blue Horde to the Turco-Mongol conqueror Temūr-i Lang (‘the Lame’; hence ‘Tamerlane’), whose dominions extended from Central Asia to Iraq, he turned against his benefactor and launched audacious attacks upon Azerbaijan in 1385–6 and upon Transoxiana in 1387–8. Temūr retaliated with two campaigns (1391 and 1395–6) in which he crushed Toqtamish and ruthlessly sacked the khanate’s principal towns, Sarai, Qirim, Astrakhan and Bulghār; Toqtamish was replaced with another descendant of Toqa Temūr named Temūr Qutlugh. Henceforth it was as a fugitive seeking to regain power from Temūr’s nominees that he influenced the politics of the Latin world.

The impact of these upheavals is clearly visible along the Golden Horde’s western frontiers. In March 1373, Pope Gregory XI, authorizing
preparations for a crusade against the Ottomans, extended it to include the Tartars, with whom, he was told, the Turks had negotiated an alliance, but two weeks later he was writing of the Mongol threat to Hungary in terms that suggest it was a thing of the past, superseded by the Turkish menace. On the south-western periphery of the Horde’s territory, the Vlach principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were emancipated from Mongol overlordship; Moldavia instead accepted Polish suzerainty in 1387. In several ports along the Black Sea coast, a series of treaties between 1380 and 1387 replaced the khan’s sovereignty with that of Genoa (p. 275). Around the Danube estuary, a de facto autonomous principality briefly emerged under ‘Demetrius, princeps Tartarorum’, but Demetrius, whose merchants were the subject of a commercial agreement with Louis I in 1368, may have lost his southernmost territory in the Dobrudja to a local despot named Dobrotich, who owed a loose allegiance to the Byzantine emperor. Louis himself was able to occupy part of Bulgaria in 1365, and for a time thereafter its king paid tribute to Hungary.

It was the Mongols’ former clients and allies in pagan Lithuania who were best placed to profit from the situation. The Grand Duke Algirdas had already exploited the Golden Horde’s troubles in c.1362 when, in a campaign that pushed deeper into Mongol territory than any previous expedition, he defeated the khan’s forces at the battle of the ‘Blue Waters’; subsequently he built up his influence in Podolia through the agency of the sons of his brother Koriatias. On his death in 1377, Algirdas was succeeded by his eldest son Jogailo (Jagiello), who in 1386 married Louis’s younger daughter Jadwiga (Hedwig), was officially baptized a Christian and was crowned king of Poland as Władysław II. His authority in Lithuania was at first disputed by his uncle Kiestutis and then, following Kiestutis’s death (1382), by the latter’s son Vytautas (Witołd), but in 1392 the cousins reached an agreement which inaugurated an era of close cooperation. Jogailo effectively left Vytautas in control of Lithuania as Grand Duke but seconded him in his struggle with the Teutonic Order and with the Golden Horde.

The Lithuanian ruling dynasty’s dalliance with the notion of baptism had been fitfully in progress since the 1250s, and under Grand Duke Gediminas (1315–41/2) had become a vital tool of diplomacy. In 1324, it had even encouraged Pope John XXII to write to Gediminas to ask him to help defend Christendom from the infidel (by which he surely meant the Mongols). Even before his rise to power, Vytautas had proved an able exponent of what was by then the traditional Lithuanian policy vis-à-vis the papacy. Gregory XI, who as recently as 1373 had appealed to Algirdas, Kiestutis and other Lithuanian princes to accept Christianity and had urged King Louis to spare no efforts to bring this about, commended Vytautas in 1378 for his efforts against the Tartars and for his persistence in the unity of the Christian faith and obedience to the Holy See, and granted him the right to have his personal confessor absolve him of his sins on his deathbed.
A pagan member of a pagan dynasty that fewer than thirty years earlier had been in league with the Mongols was now being fêted by the Holy See as if he were a faithful Catholic.

If the Lithuanian rulers were at last being incorporated in the family of Christian princes, there was another side to their diplomacy. The fact that Władysław-Jogailo had received a crusading indulgence from the Roman Pope Urban VI in 1388 for his war against the Turks and Tartars did not prevent him in 1393 from making a pact with Toqtamish by which he undertook to pay tribute in return for a grant of Rus’ territory. And after Temür’s campaigns into the Pontic steppe, Poland and Lithuania were the obvious external powers to which Toqtamish could turn. He threw himself on Vytautas’s mercy and was settled with his followers in the neighbourhood of Vilnius and Troki (1397). A large body of his former troops are known to have abandoned him in 1397/8 and pushed south into the Balkans to enter the service of the Ottoman Sultan Báyezid, who subsequently grew suspicious of their leaders, however, and had the leaders executed. They were not the only Mongol group operating in south-eastern Europe. Early in 1402, we are told, a coalition comprising King Sigismund of Hungary, the Wallachian voivode Mircea and the Tartars took advantage of the Sultan’s difficulties in order to encroach upon his territories. We do not know which Golden Horde khan these particular Tartars represented: they may have been the so-called White Tartars at whose hands the Hungarian and French troops fleeing northward in the wake of their defeat by the Ottomans at Nicopolis in 1396 had allegedly suffered no harm. Whatever the case, the episode parallels the situation further north where, over the next twenty years or so, Lithuania and Poland were allied with Toqtamish’s sons against Temür Qutlugh and his successors, who were supported by the new strong man, the amir Edigü (or Edigei).

Vytautas and his allies suffered a signal check in an engagement on the Vorskla, a tributary of the Dnieper (12 August 1399), which effectively curtailed the Lithuanian Grand Duke’s plans to further his hegemony in Eastern Europe. Toqtamish, who had deserted the Lithuanians in the heat of battle, fled in 1401 into western Siberia, where he was eventually run to ground and killed in 1405/6 by the troops of Temür Qutlugh’s successor Shādībeg. The Castilian envoy Ruy González de Clavijo, travelling through Persia and Transoxiana in 1404, heard a rumour that Toqtamish was in friendly contact with his old enemy Temür and was seeking the latter’s support against Edigü. Whatever the truth of this, the alliance with Toqtamish’s line nevertheless held good and served Vytautas well. Toqtamish’s sons, headed by Jalāl al-Dīn, first took refuge with the prince of Moscow and then, disslodged during an abortive attack on the city by Edigü (1408), moved into Vytautas’s territory and were settled successively near Kiev and in the vicinity of Troki, where the Burgundian knight Ghillebert de Lannoy noticed their presence a few years later.
It is a measure of the Golden Horde’s weakness that Edigü and his protégés were not merely unable or unwilling to follow up the victory of 1399 but, in the wake of the Moscow campaign, even made unsuccessful overtures to Vytautas with a view to gaining Lithuanian support against their rivals. Instead, the Grand Duke assisted successively Jalāl al-Dīn (1412) and, following his overthrow by Edigü, another of Toqtamīsh’s sons, Kerim Berdī (1413/14), to establish themselves as khans over part of the Horde’s territory. In 1418, yet a third brother who currently enjoyed Vytautas’s backing defeated Edigü and obliged him to flee into the Crimea, whence he made peace with the Grand Duke shortly before his death (1419). Edigü was the last figure to wield anything like strong authority in the Golden Horde; certainly none of the numerous khans who presided over its disintegration into the khanates of the Crimea, Astrakhan, Kazan and Kasimov in the mid-fifteenth century was a worthy successor.

The princes of the Golden Horde continued to play a useful role in the politics of Christian Eastern Europe. During Jalāl al-Dīn’s brief reign as khan (1411–12), Sigismund of Hungary sought his alliance, as part of his vendetta against the Venetians in the Black Sea. When Vytautas and Władysław-Jogailo inflicted a decisive defeat on the Teutonic Knights at Tannenberg (15 July 1410), they had the support not only of Rus’ troops but also of a Mongol contingent headed by Jalāl al-Dīn and representing Toqtamīsh’s heirs. It is unclear how far the rest of Latin Christendom was aware of these alliances until the Teutonic Order’s proctors, in the full glare of the Council of Constance (1414–15), denounced the Poles for using pagans in this fashion. Certainly, around the turn of the century the papacy had been very ill-informed about the situation. In 1398, Roman Pope Boniface IX had ordered crusade preaching in Poland, Lithuania and neighbouring territories for the war against ‘Tartars, pagans, Turks and other barbarian nations’, and on the news of the disaster on the Vorskla, he authorized the collection of an ecclesiastical tenth to defend Władysław-Jogailo against Tartar invasion – on neither occasion aware, it seems, that the conflict was at least in part between two Mongol factions and that the Poles were allied with one of them.

The Grand Duke of Lithuania was just one, if perhaps the most successful, of a number of princes who were now in a position to meddle in the internal affairs of the Golden Horde and to enlist or discard the military support of Mongol princes at will. Like their cousins the Ilkhans, the khans of Jochi’s line had moved from being the scourge of Christian peoples to being seen as possible allies but with an important difference. Whereas in the Near East, the projected Ilkhanid-Latin alliance was designed in part to serve the interests of the Mongol rulers themselves in bringing down their most formidable external enemy, the Mamlūk empire, in Eastern Europe cooperation was sought by displaced or insecure rulers with a view to destroying their rivals among Jochi’s numerous descendants. They had
been reduced, moreover, to serving as an auxiliary in the conflicts of others. The Mongols were no longer the dominant power in this region but simply one among several more evenly-matched elements – Poland, Lithuania, Moscow and other Rus’ principalities, the Teutonic Knights – which competed for tribute and territory.

Notes

4 PC, viii, 6, and ix, 44, pp. 296, 327–8 (tr. Dawson, pp. 45, 68). TR, §61, p. 36, had advocated that Western rulers make peace in order to coordinate resistance. Eudes de Châteauroux, ‘Sermo in concilio’, in Ruotsala, Europeans and Mongols, p. 160: discordie inter christianos parant viam tartaris; for the date, see n.13 at pp. 154–5 above.
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21 ‘Thomae Tuscii Gesta imperatorum et pontificum’ (down to 1278), *MGHS*, XXII, p. 525.


30 MOL, DL 104886 (8 April 1264 = *HO*, VIII, p. 96, no. 76): they are named as *Vybar filiu [s] Beubarch [?]*, Abachi and Tamachi.

31 MOL, DL 104888 (10 Dec. 1270 = *AUO*, XII, p. 7, no. 3; *DIR*, I:1, pp. 347–8, no. 258); cf. also DL 67344 (*anno 1268 = HO*, VIII, p. 111, no. 89). The first


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55 MOL, DL 30586 (= CDH, VII:2, p. 141; UBGD, I, p. 173, no. 242). Where the printed texts show a lacuna after Tartari, the words et Cumani are faintly discernible in the original. Cf. also Humbert of Romans, as cited in n.27.


58 MOL, DF 277873 (anno 1288): cum. . . de finibus et terminis tartarorum quos nemo predecessorum nostrorum peragaverat ultra alpes . . . accessisset (= CDH, V:3, p. 410; DIR, I:1, p. 485, no. 390; EO, I, p. 274, no. 438). The campaign is also mentioned in DF 251669 (27 June 1286, confirmation dated 25 Aug. 1291): in diversis expedicionibus . . . specialiter ultra alpes in confinio tartarorum (= CDH, V:3, p. 316; HO, VI, p. 316, no. 229). Spuler, Die Goldene Horde, p. 66, proposes that the Mongols attacked because disease among their cattle made it necessary to restock with booty and victuals.


61 MOL, DL 1229: potencialiter cum omni ipsorum multitudine (= CDH, V:3, p. 399); DL 1298: cum omni milicia ipsorum (= AUO, XII, p. 497, no. 413); same phrase in DF 253331 (= AUO, V, p. 20, no. 13; UBGD, I, p. 169, no. 239). See also DL 28502: maximam partem regni nostri vastibus diris et spoliis peragasset (= CDH, V:3, pp. 452–3; UBGS, p. 148, no. 151; MES, II, p. 254, no. 233; SO, I, p. 22, no. 18; DIR, I:1, p. 488, no. 393).

62 CDH, VII:2, p. 110. For the advance as far as Pest, see ‘Chronici Hungarici compositio’, p. 472.

63 MOL, DL 105994 (14 June 1285): in praesenti persecucione Tartarorum (= CDH, V:3, p. 301; MES, II, p. 197, no. 177).

64 AKO, nos. 3361–2, 3372, 3374–5, 3387: he was in Gyulafehérvar by 27 May, in Szepe by 21 July, in Szerencs by 1 Aug., in Sarus by 14 Aug., and at Zólyom by 11 Sept. Salimbene, Cronica, II, p. 871 (tr. Baird et al., p. 586), heard that the Mongols had made peace with the king.

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68 Alexander of Roes, ‘Noticia seculi’, p. 74, mentions their savage devastation of Poland.
70 For what follows, see MOL, DL 57222 (= CDH, V:3, pp. 394–6); Gyula Pauler, A magyar nemzet története az Árpádházi királyok alatt, 2 vols (Budapest, 1899), II, pp. 398–9.
73 CDH, VII:4, p. 237 (no. 244): nuper Tartari regnum Hungariae invaserant.
74 MOL, DL 69658 and DL 69939 = Vincent Sedláček, ed., Regesta diplomatica nec non epistolaria Slovaciae, 2 vols (Bratislava, 1980–7), I, pp. 239, 260 (nos. 518, 572): both documents refer to events of 1307, tercio anno post exitum Tartarorum, meaningtwo (not three) years after the Tartars’ departure.
77 Jan van Beke, Chronographia (c.1346), ed. H. Bruch (The Hague, 1973), p. 221 (I owe this reference to Peter Hoppenbrouwers).
78 Sanudo to the bishop of Ostia (1330), in Kunstmann, ‘Studien’, pp. 779–81; see also his letter to Philip VI of France (1332), ibid., pp. 797–8.
82 UBGS, p. 82 (no. 82) = UBGD, I, p. 90 (no. 103).

83 CICO, V.2, pp. 59–60 (no. 27) = VMH, I, p. 337 (no. 552) = DIR, I:1, pp. 429–30 (no. 345): all the editions read *multo* in error for *milco*.


86 Berend, *At the Gate*, pp. 37–8. For examples from László IV’s reign, see, e.g., Erzsébet Látkóczki Kondorné, ed., *Árpád-kori oklevelek a Heves megyei levél-tárban* (Eger, 1997), nos. 28, 30, 31, 34.


91 ASV, Reg. Vat. 137, fo. 156v (no. 554).

92 MOL, DF 247222 (confirmation by András III, 10 Feb. 1291, of László’s own confirmation of 27 May 1290); *per vastus et incendia Tartarorum plurimum sunt destructi et depauperati* (= AUO, IX, p. 518, no. 289; UBGD, p. 138, no. 142; UBGD, I, p. 149, no. 211; DIR, I:1, pp. 462, 491, nos. 371, 397).

93 E.g. MOL, DL 57222 (anno 1288 = CDH, V:3, pp. 394, 395); DL 1229 (anno 1288 = CDH, V:3, p. 399); DL 28502 (18 Sept. 1289 = CDH, V:3, p. 453; UBGS, p. 148, no. 151; MES, II, p. 254, no. 233; DIR, I:1, p. 488, no. 393); DL 1298 (anno 1290 = AUO, XII, p. 497, no. 413); DF 262705 (22 Aug. 1298 = CDH, VI:2, p. 151).


96 MOL, DF 207181.


98 MOL, DF 248553 (= CDH, V:3, p. 289; MES, II, p. 200, no. 180).

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103 Rowell, Lithuania Ascending, pp. 95–7; ibid., pp. 100–11 for a thorough discussion of the sources.

104 MPV, I, pp. 72–3 (no. 83).

105 For the impact of this dispute on papal policy in Eastern Europe in 1323–5, see Rowell, Lithuania Ascending, pp. 217–21.


108 Ibid., p. 123 and n.8, citing Jan of Czarnków (d. 1384), ‘Kronika’, MPH, II, p. 622; see also John of Vittring, Liber certarum historiarum, II, p. 218. Pope Benedict XII certainly thought the principality had paid tribute to the Mongols: CICO, VIII, p. 112 (no. 53) = VMP, I, p. 434 (no. 566). But Zdan, p. 521, believes it was totally independent. For the 1327 agreement, see PUB, II, pp. 387–8 (no. 582); more generally, Knoll, Rise, p. 122.

109 The recent despatch of Hungarian troops to Poland is mentioned in MOL, DL 3309 (15 May 1340 = AO, IV, p. 26, no. 20); see also DL 68845 (17 Sept. 1342 = MES, III, pp. 473–4, no. 625).

110 For these events, see Knoll, Rise, pp. 126–33; and cf. Rowell, Lithuania Ascending, pp. 264–9. The principal sources are ‘Rocznik Traski’, pp. 860–1 = ‘Continuatio annalium Polonorum (i)’, MGHS, XIX, pp. 661–2 (Traska tells us he was a participant); (with virtually identical wording) ‘Rocznik małopolski’, pp. 199–200 = ‘Continuatio annalium Polonorum (iii)’, MGHS, XIX, pp. 661–2; and Jan of Czarnków, ‘Kronika’, pp. 621–2. The Mongol siege of Lublin dated 1337 in ‘Rocznik Świętokrzyski’, MPH, III, p. 78 (which does not mention an attack ad annos 1340–1), must refer to this invasion, pace Knoll, Rise, pp. 107 (and n.100), 123 (and n.9), 125. A letter of Benedict XII summarizes recent events: CICO, VIII, pp. 111–12 (no. 53, 29 June 1341) = VMP, I, p. 434 (no. 566). The otherwise fanciful account by John of Winterthur, Cronica, pp. 181, 182–5, accounts for the Mongol invasion more or less correctly.


116 Detailed account by János of Eger, inserted in ‘Chronicon Dubnicense’, pp. 163–5. For this and the 1351 campaign, see Knoll, Rise, pp. 149–51.
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117 CICO, X, pp. 97–9 (no. 52, 4 Nov. 1354) = VMH, II, pp. 10–11 (no. 18); for the grant of a tenth, VMP, I, pp. 556–7 (no. 739, 22 Nov. 1354); MPV, II, pp. 75–7 (no. 113, 12 Feb. 1355).


119 PUB, V, pp. 197–8 (no. 349). Knoll, Rise, pp. 156–7; also pp. 159–60 for the Order’s agreement with Lithuania.


121 PUB, V, pp. 400–1 (no. 421).


125 CICO, XII, pp. 386–7 (no. 197) = VMP, I, p. 719 (no. 967).


130 CICO, IX, p. 191 (no. 122b) = CDH, VIII:3, pp. 635–7 (no. 287) = UBGD, I, pp. 455–6 (no. 499). It seems to have remained a dead letter, since in the following year the pope transferred the newly-appointed bishop to the see of Nitra; and see p. 181 and n.138.


135 VMH, I, p. 815 (no. 1249, 15 July 1352) = DIR, I:2, p. 25 (no. 19): perfidi Tartari et infideles alii regno tuo et terris ibi subjectis confines et contigu regnum...

136 SO, I, pp. 62–3 (no. 48) = DIR, I:2, pp. 32–3 (no. 25).

137 These campaigns are described by János of Eger (above, n.84), in ‘Chronicon Dubnicense’, pp. 151–2; and by János of Küküllő (d. 1394), De vita et gestis Ludovici regis Hungariae, now lost but incorporated in both ‘Chronicon Dubnicense’, pp. 167–8, and Chronicon Budense (completed 1473), ed. J. Podhradczky (Buda, 1838), pp. 276–7. András’s campaign is referred to in MOL, DF 274724 (16 Oct. 1349, transcribed in a document of 1357 = CDH, XI, p. 550), and DF 208867 (= MES, IV, p. 169, no. 137), which mentions the Rus’ alongside the Tartars.


For a bull of 1325 wrongly dated to 1314, see n.147. There was a similarly long gap after 1265 (though for a different reason) in the issuance of crusading bulls to the Teutonic Knights in the Baltic region: Axel Ehlers, ‘The crusade of the Teutonic Knights against Lithuania reconsidered’, in Murray, Crusade and Conversion, pp. 21–44 (here pp. 26–9).


143 CICO, VIII, pp. 105–6 (no. 49); full text in VMH, I, pp. 638–9 (no. 960) = DIR, I:1, p. 662 (no. 527).


146 VMH, I, p. 501 (no. 771) = DIR, I:1, p. 594 (no. 470).


150 VMH, I, pp. 815–16 (no. 1249, 15 July 1352) = DIR, I:2, pp. 25–6 (no. 19); see also VMH, I, pp. 816–17 (no. 1250); for the release of the Neapolitans, ibid., p. 818 (no. 1253); Housley, Avignon Papacy, p. 71.

151 Though Knoll, Rise, p. 176, suggests that even the monies promised to Poland were insufficient.

152 CICO, VIII, p. 112 (no. 53) = VMP, I, p. 434 (no. 566).

153 František, ‘Chronica Pragensis’, p. 430 = ‘Continuatio Francisci Pragensis’, p. 565. John of Winterthur, Cronica, pp. 182–3, after saying that the emperor withheld his assistance, has crusaders from neighbouring regions overwhelming
the Mongols in Hungary! According to Galvano Fiamma, ‘Opusculum’, p. 41, §18, the kings of Poland, Hungary and Bohemia were assisted by ‘numerous Germans’. See generally Knoll, *Rise*, pp. 99–100.


155 For this first period of civil war, see Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, pp. 109–27.

156 Orus was fourth and Toqtamish fifth in descent from Toqa Temür’s son Urüng-tash, according to the Chinggisid genealogy in *Muʿizz al-ansāb* (1426/7), BN ms. Ancien fonds persan 67, fos. 25v–26r, printed in *IKPI*, III, pp. lii–lii (also Russian tr. in *SMIZO*, II, p. 61), and adopted by D. DeWeese, ‘Toqtamish’, *Enc. Isl.*, in preference to the traditional descent of both Orus and Toqtamish from Orda, which is given by Spuler.


158 VMH, II, p. 135 (no. 271, 23 March 1373) = DIR, I.2, p. 201 (no. 149): *sese cum Tartaris vicinis Regno Ungarie ad invadendum ipsum Regnum... impetatis funiculis colligarunt*; see also VMH, II, p. 138 (no. 272) = DIR, I.2, pp. 204–5 (no. 150).


165 VMP, I, pp. 748–9 (no. 1015); ibid., p. 695 (nos. 934–5), for the letters of 1373.


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171 Dietrich von Nyem, De scismate libri tres (1410), ed. G. Erler (Leipzig, 1890), p. 330 (addendum from the Paderborn ms.): he thought that these Tartars were Temür’s subjects.


179 For the controversy at Constance, see Christiansen, Northern Crusades, pp. 231–41; Schmieder, Europa, pp. 189–92.

180 VMF, I, pp. 769–73 (nos. 1041–3). Sarnowsky, ‘Teutonic Order’, p. 258. Muldoon, Popes, p. 100, believes that Boniface IX, and his successors prior to the Council of Constance, were uninterested in the infidels on Latin Christendom’s north-eastern frontier.

HOSTILITY SUSPENDED
In the light of their attacks on Latin territory in 1241–4 and in 1259–60, the Mongols had emerged quite simply as the greatest threat confronting Catholic Christendom, so that in 1260 the Frankish leaders at Acre had chosen to cooperate with the more familiar Muslim demon as a means of staving off an attack by Hülegü’s forces. But beginning in 1262, in the wake of the dissolution of the Mongol empire, Hülegü and his successors made a series of overtures designed to gain Latin collaboration in the war against the Mamlūks. These diplomatic contacts, which continued into the early fourteenth century, were made with the popes and with Western European sovereigns, particularly the French and English kings and sometimes also those of Aragon and Sicily. Only minimally and rarely did they involve the Near Eastern Franks, who were now a negligible quantity. In any case, the Mamlūk Sultans Baybars (1260–77) and Qalāwūn (1279–90), informed of these negotiations between their enemies by their highly efficient intelligence network, were encouraged to embark on the reduction of the Latin outposts in Syria and Palestine, a process completed in 1291.

The Ilkhans’ quest for a synchronized attack

There is no doubt that Hülegü was concerned to avenge ‘Ayn Jālūt, and indeed to prosecute his dynasty’s traditional mission by reducing Syria and Egypt. The fact that the Mamlūks originated among the nomadic Qipchāq and hence would have been classed as refugee ‘slaves’ of the Mongols (p. 67) may have given added edge to the struggle. Yet the collapse of the Mongol empire had left Hülegü in an exposed position. To his rear were hostile kinsmen who coveted his territories: it is not surprising that he and his successors tended to reside in the steppelands of Azerbaijan and the
Transcaucasus, close to the frontier with the Golden Horde. The existence of an independent Mamlūk Sultanate, moreover, served as an incitement to Muslim client rulers within his own dominions to intrigue with the Mamlūks and even to rise in revolt, as the prince of Fārs (in south-western Persia) did in 1263. In the circumstances, it was necessary to look around for external allies.

In April 1262, fewer than two years after Kitbuqa’s overthrow, Hülegū wrote to Louis IX, announcing his intention to attack the Mamlūks and proposing that the French monarch send his fleet to blockade Egypt by sea. It is unclear whether the letter, of which the only known manuscript has survived in Vienna, ever reached Paris. A report by Ilkhanid envoys to the Second Council of Lyons in 1274 would allege that Hülegū had sent ambassadors to Pope Urban IV and to ‘all kings and princes overseas’, but that – like Sartaq’s envoy in 1254 (p. 107) – the party had been intercepted in Sicily. King Manfred, against whom the pope was then organizing a crusade to deprive him of his kingdom and who was in contact with the Mamlūk regime, packed the Mongol embassy off by ship. According to Urban IV’s letter to Hülegū, Exultavit cor nostrum (undated but belonging to 1263/4), a certain John the Hungarian had arrived, claiming to be the Ilkhan’s envoy and alleging that Hülegū was greatly attached to the Christian faith and contemplated baptism, but he carried no letters of accreditation. Conceivably John was one of the envoys whose effects had been confiscated by Manfred; yet although he is mentioned by name in Hülegū’s letter to King Louis, he is not there described as its bearer. We cannot be sure, therefore, that all these details relate to one and the same embassy.

Urban had particular reason to welcome John’s revelations, since he had learned that the Mamlūk Sultan Baybars had broken his truce with the Franks and was threatening Acre. In the absence of any credentials supporting John’s story, Exultavit cor nostrum was cautiously welcoming and added that Urban was instructing Guillaume d’Agen, the newly-elected patriarch of Jerusalem and papal legate in the east, to investigate further. Yet we do not know the sequel to Exultavit cor nostrum. Although a papal bull of January 1264 focuses on the Egyptian threat and makes no mention of the Mongols whatever, it is noteworthy that in July of that year – surely after John the Hungarian brought news of Hülegū’s desire to embrace Christianity – Urban was still referring to the Mongols in the Near East as a formidable enemy in the same breath as Mamlūk Egypt. Not until Clement IV’s pontificate (1265–8), it seems, did the Curia begin to entertain the possibility that the Ilkhan might serve as an ally against Baybars. Interestingly enough, there is evidence that this contingency was contemplated more widely from about the same time, since the ‘Book of Sidrac’, which dates from some point after 1268, includes a prophecy that the Mongols would not merely defeat the Muslims but would in time become friends of the Franks.
Contact was apparently resumed by Hülegü’s son and successor Abaqa (1265–82). Learning of the projected crusade (the Eighth) against Egypt, he despatched envoys late in 1266 or early in 1267 both to Pope Clement and to Jaime I of Aragon, who had taken the cross and whose plans were the most advanced. From Clement’s response, it is clear both that Abaqa had written at least once before and that he had just learned of Manfred’s overthrow by a crusading army under Charles of Anjou. In his reply to the pope, dated 1268, the Ilkhan explained apologetically that his previous missive had been written in Mongolian because his Latin secretary was absent from court, and he promised to send troops under his brother Ejei to aid the Christians. He may have been spurred on by the recent Mamlūk capture of Antioch (May 1268), whose prince, it will be recalled, had been tributary to the Ilkhan since 1260; a Mongol ‘resident’ (basqaq, shihna) was still based there when the city fell. Unfortunately the envoys chanced to meet ambassadors from Baybars in Genoa, and a full-blown skirmish ensued in the city’s main square before the Genoese separated the combatants. One purpose of the Mongol embassy of 1268 was to meet Louis IX, who had just taken the cross, and his brother Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily.

In the event the Aragonese expedition foundered in a storm in the Western Mediterranean in the autumn of 1269, and the French crusade in 1270 was diverted to Tunis, where yet another embassy from Abaqa arrived to find that Louis had just died and his son and successor Philip III was preparing to re-embark for France. Only the English contingent, under the Lord Edward (the future Edward I), sailed on from Tunis and made contact with the Mongols. In September 1271, Abaqa asked Edward to coordinate his activities with those of the Mongol general Samaghar, whom he was sending against the Mamlūks. But in fact the Mongol force that raided as far as Hārīm and Afāmiyya in October was relatively modest in size and retreated on Baybars’s rapid advance. The Sultan was not faced by any junction of his enemies; Edward’s simultaneous attack on Qāqūn (Caco) in September was a feeble affair, and he left Palestine in September 1272 without any effective military collaboration between crusaders and Mongols having taken place.

Abaqa next sent a delegation to the Council of Lyons, which had been summoned by Pope Gregory X for 1274. The unscheduled arrival of the Mongol envoys created a great stir, particularly when their leader and possibly members of his suite voluntarily underwent a public baptism. They were escorted by David of Ashby who, as chaplain to Thomas Agni, bishop of Bethlehem and papal legate in Palestine, had been despatched to Hülegü in 1260 and had remained with the Mongols ever since. Abaqa’s Latin secretary Richardus delivered a report, to which reference has already been made (p. 204), outlining the course of Western–Ilkhanid relations under Hülegü and his son, and assured the assembly of his master’s continued determination to drive the Mamlūks from Syria. Les fais des Tartares, David of Ashby’s account of the Mongols, was probably submitted to the Council.
Although the only known manuscript is now lost, the chapter on Mongol methods of waging war has survived in transcript; it was doubtless written with joint military action in mind.23

Another embassy to Europe in 1276–7, headed by the brothers John and James Vassalli, who are described by a French chronicle as Georgians but who were probably Greeks, likewise bore no fruit. From Philip III’s court, John crossed to England and conveyed the Ilkhan’s apology for the failure to collaborate in 1271 to King Edward I,24 whom David of Ashby had already visited after the Council, early in 1275.25 When the ambassadors left Europe in 1277 after being received by the short-lived Pope John XXI, they were accompanied by envoys to Abaqa from Charles of Anjou, who had just purchased a claim to the kingdom of Jerusalem and had sent troops to take over the government at Acre. The content of his message and the purpose and outcome of another embassy, which he despatched to the Ilkhan in August 1278 and which included the bishop of Odense, are alike unknown.26 In a letter discovered only recently in the Vatican Archives and bearing a date equivalent to 21 November 1279, Abaqa responded to a mission headed by the Franciscan Gerard di Prato and despatched by Pope Nicholas III a few months earlier than that of Charles; the two Western embassies were apparently at his court simultaneously. Commenting on the Franks’ failure to mount a campaign against Egypt, the Ilkhan also betrayed his disenchantment with papal appeals to embrace Christianity by refusing Gerard and his party leave to travel on to Qubilai’s court.27

Abaqa made no attempt, however, to profit from the removal of Baybars, who died at Damascus in 1277 on the way back from an invasion of Anatolia. A relatively minor raid was launched on Aleppo in the late summer of 1280,28 and it was not until 1281 that the Mongols moved into northern Syria in strength under the Ilkhan’s brother Mengü Temür. Prior to this, Abaqa made a last bid to secure Western European cooperation by sending an embassy to Edward I.29 Troops and provisions had also been demanded from Acre in the summer of 1280,30 and both Bohemond VII of Tripoli and King Hugh III of Cyprus were urged to join forces with the Mongols. But Hugh’s arrival was delayed, and the new Mamlûk Sultan Qalâwûn was able to position his army between Mengü Temür and the Franks on the coast; it seems that only some Hospitallers from Margat (Marqab) participated in the campaign.31 Although the ensuing engagement near Ḥimṣ on 30 October 1281 was indecisive and the Sultan’s army was badly mauled, most of the Mongols dispersed in search of plunder and Mengü Temür had to relinquish the field to the Mamlûks.32 Both he and the Ilkhan died in the following year.

The brief reign of Abaqa’s brother and successor Tegüder, who had adopted Islam and assumed the style of Sulṭān Aḥmad (1282–4), was marked by the opening of negotiations with Egypt. Dr Allouche has shown that this step was rather less revolutionary than it appears and that Aḥmad’s
letters to Qalāwūn were just as uncompromising as the previous ultimatums. Far from abandoning his predecessors’ expansionist designs and seeking a peaceful *modus vivendi*, as was once thought, the new Ilkhan was making a fresh endeavour to secure the Mamlūks’ submission, on the grounds that they could now have no objection to acknowledging the sovereignty of a fellow Muslim.33 This policy, which met with a cool response from Qalāwūn, was in any case jettisoned when Aḥmad was overthrown and killed by his nephew, Abaqa’s son Arghun. In his correspondence with Western rulers, Arghun would take care to portray his uncle, unfairly perhaps, as a ruler whose Islamic faith had led him to turn his back upon tradition.34 News reached Europe that a Muslim ruler had been supplanted by one who was well disposed towards the Christians.35

The *débâcle* of 1281 conceivably persuaded Arghun that victory over the Mamlūks would elude him unless he enjoyed the cooperation of the Latin West.36 Like his father, he made strenuous attempts to court the Catholic world, sending four missions to Europe in the course of a brief reign (1284–91).37 The first (1285), which was accompanied by an envoy from Qubilai named ʿĪsā Kelemechi (Mong. *kelemechi*, ‘the Interpreter’), brought Pope Honorius IV a letter (in barbarous Latin) offering to divide ‘the land of Sham, namely Egypt’ with the Franks following the ‘removal’ of the Saracens who lay between Arghun’s dominions and the West.38 The next embassy, which arrived in the summer of 1287, during the vacancy in the Holy See following Honorius’s death, was headed by the Nestorian monk Rabban Ṣawma, a close associate of the Catholicus Yahballaha III. Rabban Ṣawma, who occupied the time until the election of Nicholas IV in 1288 with visits to Philip IV of France and to Edward I of England at Bordeaux, was treated with great distinction but left only with many assurances of support and no promise of concrete assistance.39 In 1289–90, a third embassy from Arghun waited upon the pope, Philip and Edward and undertook to rendezvous with the French king outside Damascus in February 1291.40 A last mission, which arrived in the summer of 1290, was still in Europe late in August 1291, when Pope Nicholas heard the appalling news of the fall of Acre and the other remaining bastions of Frankish rule in Palestine. He wrote at once to Arghun, urging him once again to be baptized but this time adding an exhortation to move against the Mamlūks; the Ilkhan, however, had died some months previously (9 March 1291).41 The pope himself died in the following year, without having launched the crusade he longed for.

For all his efforts, the joint operations Arghun desired had failed to come about. Only a contingent of 800 Genoese arrived, whom he employed in 1290 in building ships at Baghdad with a view to harassing Egyptian commerce at the southern approaches to the Red Sea. As Genoese policy since 1261 had centred on cooperation with the Mamlūks (p. 130), this represented a major realignment, provoked, it seems, by Sultan Qalāwūn’s crushing defeat of the Armenians in 1285 and by the simultaneous emergence of
a Venetian threat to Genoese interests in the Black Sea. In any event, the project came to nothing when the Genoese government backed down and disowned it, making a new treaty with the Egyptian Sultan, and the sailors split into factions and slaughtered one another at Baṣra.\textsuperscript{42}

Although Edward I’s envoy Geoffrey de Langley visited the court of Arghun’s brother and successor, Gaikhatu, in 1292,\textsuperscript{43} neither Gaikhatu (1291–5) nor his cousin, Baidu (1295), is known to have sent an embassy to the West, and contact with Europe was resumed only under Arghun’s son Ghazan (1295–1304). Ghazan, paradoxically, was a Muslim convert, having been induced to profess Islam by the prominent amir Nawrūz, to whom he owed his enthronement, and very probably also by the spread of Islam within the ranks of the Mongol élite.\textsuperscript{44} By assuming the style of Pādishāh-i Islām (‘Sovereign of Islam’) and thus the status of head of the Muslim world, he issued a direct challenge to the pretensions of the Mamlūk regime and its puppet ‘Abbasid Caliph.\textsuperscript{45}

Encouraged by the infighting among the Mamlūk élite and goaded also by Egyptian campaigns against Lesser Armenia and by the sultan’s support for a disaffected Mongol noyan in Anatolia, Ghazan first took the field in the winter of 1299. In the Ḥimṣ region on 22 December, the Ilkhanid army inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mamlūk Sultan, Qalāwūn’s young son al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, who fled back to Egypt. The whole of Syria and Palestine, evacuated by their Mamlūk garrisons, lay open to the Mongols, who entered Damascus on 31 December. But Ghazan’s forces in turn withdrew early in February 1300, leaving the country to be reoccupied by the Mamlūks. In a second campaign, beginning in the late autumn, the Ilkhan reached the vicinity of Aleppo by January 1301. But on this occasion the winter rains rendered the terrain unsuitable for an engagement, and the Mongol van under Qutlugh Shāh ventured no further than Qinnasrīn. Extricating his troops from the mud with some difficulty, Ghazan retired into Mesopotamia in February.\textsuperscript{46} His third and last Syrian campaign, in the spring of 1303, was a disaster. The Ilkhan himself retired soon after crossing the Euphrates, leaving his army under the command of Qutlugh Shāh, who was defeated by the Mamlūks at Marj al-Ṣūffār, near Damascus, on 20 April.\textsuperscript{47} In the autumn, while preparing a fourth invasion of Syria in order to avenge this humiliation, Ghazan fell ill. He died on 11 May 1304.

Whereas Abaqa had committed himself to an attack upon the Mamlūks only after several attempts to secure Western cooperation, Aḥmad had sought the Mamlūks’ submission without any recourse to the West at all and Arghun had persisted in the quest for a Western alliance right down to his death without ever taking the field against the mutual enemy, Ghazan adopted a different policy. He had already embarked upon his first invasion of Syria when he entered into contact with the Latin world, sending embassies to King Henry II of Cyprus and to Pope Boniface VIII and probably to other Western rulers.\textsuperscript{48} The pope’s reply congratulating him on his victory
reached Ghazan’s court in the spring or summer of 1301. The Ilkhan sent back the papal envoy with a second Mongol embassy and followed this up with a further mission in April 1302.49

The king of Cyprus made some attempt to mount his own operations in harmony with the Mongols’ movements. In the autumn of 1299, he sent two galleys to occupy Botrun and to rebuild the fortress of Nephin, while a larger fleet of sixteen galleys made what amounted to no more than a demonstration at Rosetta and outside the harbour of Alexandria before touching briefly at Acre, Tortosa and Maraclea. More serious was the expedition led in 1300, in response to another appeal from Ghazan prior to his second attack on Syria, by the king’s brother Amaury, titular lord of Tyre and constable of the kingdom of Jerusalem – the first attempt since 1291 to restore the Latin settlement in the Holy Land and to coordinate military activity with the Ilkhan’s forces. The Templar Master, Jacques de Molay, seems to have been particularly enthusiastic about the campaign.50 At the head of a combined force of Cypriot knights and Templars, Amaury occupied the small island of Ruad (Arwād), off the coast near Tortosa, but Qutlugh Shāh’s army did not appear and the Cypriots withdrew. In 1302, after a brave resistance, the small Templar garrison on Ruad was compelled to surrender to a Mamlūk army.51

We can infer that Ghazan was losing patience with Western rulers from his letters to Henry II of Cyprus in 1299 and to Edward I in 1302, both of which mention repeated failures to respond to Ilkhanid requests for military action.52 And it was several years before his brother Öljeitū (1304–16) embarked on aggression against the Mamlūks. Almost at the beginning of his reign, he received a joint embassy from the qaghan, Qubilai’s successor Temür Öljeitū, and the Mongol rulers of Central Asia, informing him that they had made peace (p. 131). Shortly afterwards, Toqto’a, the khan of the Golden Horde, sent envoys to the Ilkhan to indicate his adhesion to this general settlement. Öljeitū was quick to pass on the good news to the pope and the kings of France and England. His letter of 1305 to Philip IV of France, which alone has survived, announces the end of the hostilities that had raged for forty-five years (i.e. since the death of Möngke in 1259) and the recognition of Temür Öljeitū as sovereign throughout the Mongol world; the Ilkhan also expressed his satisfaction that Western European rulers were likewise now at peace and hinted at the consequences for their mutual enemies.53 Pope Clement V was sufficiently encouraged to speak in 1307 of the Ilkhan’s restitution of the Holy Land to Western hands as a strong possibility,54 and a second embassy from Öljeitū in that year cheered him ‘like spiritual sustenance’.55 But the Ilkhan’s primary concern, it appears, was to deal with opponents nearer home, in northern and eastern Persia, and even, it seems, independent Muslim India,56 and it was not until 1312 that he attacked the Mamlūk empire, investing the fortress of al-Raḥba on the Euphrates; this campaign too was a failure.57 Whether the last known embassy from Öljeitū
to a Western monarch (Edward II) in 1313 was connected with it, we do not know; but during the years 1321–3 his young son and successor, Abū Saʿīd, engaged in successful peace negotiations with the Mamlūks. By this juncture, at one level, the progressive Islamization of the Ilkhanate might be deemed to have undercut the need for an alliance with the Christian West.

In many respects, the Mongol occupation of Syria in 1299–1300 represents the high watermark of Mongol–Latin relations. However ephemeral, it caused a great stir in Western Europe. There was nothing particularly novel about this. Rumour had already made the ‘king of the Tartars’ in person attend the Second Council of Lyons, where he was allegedly baptized and received a crown at the pope’s hands. Over-optimistic reports had likewise circulated in connection with Baybars’s invasion of Anatolia and his death in 1277 (supposedly at the hands of the Mongols, who had then reconquered the Holy Land), and with Mengü Temür’s campaign in 1281, when a cluster of chroniclers registered the sultan’s defeat and capture and the Mongol reoccupation of Antioch ad annum 1282. A story had surfaced in c.1280 about the birth to the Ilkhan’s wife, a daughter of the Armenian king, of a monstrous child, which at baptism became completely normal, whereupon the Ilkhan converted to Christianity and went on to wrest Jerusalem from the Mamlūks; in 1299–1300, this tale would be repeated in connection with both Ghazan and his brother. In 1288 and 1293, even more fantastic reports are found in the Hagnaby chronicle regarding Mongol victories over the Muslims: on the latter occasion (when rumour may have grossly distorted an Egyptian retreat following the capture of Qalʿat al-Rūm in 1292), the Sultan’s brother was allegedly captured and Muslim prisoners forwarded as gifts to various Western monarchs, including Edward I.

Ghazan’s operations in 1300, however, achieved the greatest prominence of all, in part because, as Dr Sylvia Schein has indicated, they coincided with the Jubilee Year proclaimed in Rome by Pope Boniface VIII. The Mongol campaign rapidly acquired the flavour of an epoch-making Christian triumph in which the Ilkhan appeared to fulfil the role that had long awaited Prester John. Word spread that the kings of ‘Greece’, Armenia and Cyprus had recovered the Holy Sepulchre with Tartar assistance. The false rumour retailed by the doge of Venice that the Egyptian Sultan had been taken prisoner seems swiftly to have turned into a report of his death. The Ilkhan had also signalled his capture of Jerusalem by being baptized. It was even reported that following the occupation of Damascus and the return of the entire Holy Land to the Christians, he had gone on to conquer Egypt. Although Franciscan friars appear to have been responsible for spreading these reports, some of them may have originated with Frankish prisoners who had escaped from Mamlūk captivity. The Armenian king was supposed to have sent a message to Henry of Cyprus with a knight who had been liberated at the fall of Damascus, and the alleged release by the Sultan of a knight who had been a prisoner in Cairo for several years was turned into
An ally against Islam? The Mongols in the Near East

The mechanics of Ilkhanid diplomacy

In their successive attempts to secure assistance from the Latin world, the Ilkhans took care to select personnel who would elicit the confidence of Western rulers and to impart a Christian complexion to their overtures. Rabban Šawma was only one of a number of Nestorian clerics who were included in Ilkhanid embassies: Solomon Arkaun (Mong. erke’ün, ‘priest’), the bearer of Abaqa’s letter in 1268; Ḥisā Kelemechi in 1285; and ‘Saábédin’, who accompanied Šawma in 1287 and who later visited Europe as part of the embassies of 1290 and 1302. But expatriate Franks also played an increasingly important role. The scribe and Latin interpreter (notarius . . . ac interpretes Latinorum) Richardus, who accompanied the possibly abortive embassy of 1262 and who subsequently drafted the report of Aqa’s envoys to the Council of Lyons in 1274, may be identical with the Latin secretary whose temporary absence from court in 1267 had prevented the Ilkhan’s chancery from writing in Latin. In the previous twenty years, Genoese were especially prominent, like Tommaso Banchrinus (‘the Banker’) de’ Anfossi, who accompanied Arghun’s first mission in 1285, or Buscarello de’ Ghisolfi, a quiver-bearer (qorchi) in the Ilkhan’s guard (keshig), who brought Arghun’s letters of 1289 and 1290 and Ghazan’s of 1302. Öljeitü’s letter in 1307 was delivered by Tommaso Ugi of Siena, his ildūchi (‘sword-bearer’). Ghazan additionally sought to instil confidence into Western rulers by appointing to oversee the Christian resettlement of the Holy Land his Pisan agent Pericciolo (‘Isolo’, ‘Chol’) Bofeti da Anastasio, who carried his letter to King Henry of Cyprus and of whose existence the Papacy had been aware for several years, since Nicholas IV had addressed a letter to him as far back as 1289. When writing to Boniface VIII, Ghazan further induced the Nestorian Catholicus Yahballaha III and the Jacobite Patriarch Dionysius to send their own letters to the pope.

During Abaqa’s reign, Ilkhanid embassies to Latin rulers were accompanied by the envoys of other Christian princes. His missions to Jaime I of Aragon in 1268–9, to Louis IX in 1269 and to the crusading army at Tunis in 1270 arrived with the ambassadors of the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus, whose illegitimate daughter was one of Abaqa’s wives, and his envoys joined the Council of Lyons not long after the delegation from Byzantium. Michael, who in the mid-1260s had been a client, rather,
of the Golden Horde, was a recent addition to the Ilkhan’s orbit. It was perhaps hoped, by associating him with the Mongol mission, to enhance its Christian credentials, though the emperor, threatened by the plans of Louis’s brother, Charles of Anjou, to restore the Latin empire of Constantinople, had his own reasons for courting the French king, and Abaqa may well have been concerned also to register support for his father-in-law. In 1277, the Vassallis brought, in addition to Abaqa’s own letters, one for Edward I from the Ilkhan’s protégé, King Leo III of Lesser Armenia. In view of the fact that the kingdom of Lesser Armenia was the most important of the Ilkhan’s client Christian states and played an assiduous role in Ilkhanid campaigns against the Mamlūks, it is surprising that Armenian envoys are not known to have travelled west with Mongol embassies on subsequent occasions. Yet the Armenian kings remained in contact with Edward, addressing five appeals to him between the fall of Acre in 1291 and 1307. Since the elimination of Latin Syria, Lesser Armenia, as Pope Boniface VIII reminded the English and French monarchs in 1298, was in the front line of Mamlūk attack.

The Ilkhan’s ambassadors and on occasions the letters they brought emphasized their master’s goodwill towards the West and his favourable treatment of his Christian subjects. At the very outset, in 1262, Hülegü’s letter described him as ‘kindly exalter of the Christian faith’. Both Abaqa and Arghun took care to mention the Christian faith of the late Doquz Khatun. Abaqa’s missive of 1267, too, claimed that he loved Christians and protected their churches, though in 1279 he would make it clear that such favour was in recognition of the Christian faith of his grandmother Sorqaqtani. Arghun’s first letter, in 1285, drew attention to Chinggis Khan’s edict which, he alleged, exempted Christians from tribute and made them ‘free’ in his territory. Whoever was responsible for this last statement was guilty of precisely the same dissimulation as Eljigidei had practised in 1248 (see p. 103), since the exemption, firstly, applied not to Christians at large but only to priests and monks and, in the second place, covered not just Christian holy men but also the ‘religious class’ within every other confessional group. It is possible that these distortions reflect the influence of Christian servitors at the Ilkhanid court, eager to appeal to the recipient through his cultural/religious referents. Alternatively, they could represent modifications made by Christian scribes to an original draft, since the translation process might prove highly complex, involving at least one intermediate language, and might offer the translators (a limited) freedom of manoeuvre. In 1254, Rubruck had suspected the Armenians who translated Louis IX’s letter to Sartaq of giving it a more forceful rendering in order to convey the impression that the French king was seeking Mongol military assistance against the Muslims.

The return of Jerusalem and the rest of the Holy Land to Latin rule also formed part of these Ilkhanid initiatives. Hülegü informed Louis IX that he had handed over the Holy City to the Franks already, during the brief
Mongol occupation in 1260 (although, as we have seen, this is nowhere indicated in any of the Muslim sources, still less in the Frankish appeals for help to the West), and the claim was reiterated in 1274 by Aqa’s envoys, who also alleged that he and his father had regularly freed Christian slaves and had them escorted to the Mediterranean coast. Aqa alluded to his concern to defend the Christian territories under his rule (doubtless primarily the kingdom of Lesser Armenia); and both he and, ten years later, Arghun offered to restore Jerusalem to the Franks after its recovery from the Muslims.

Sometimes a pope’s reply reveals that Mongol ambassadors amplified the Ilkhan’s letters by word of mouth, stressing their master’s sympathy towards Christianity and his desire for baptism. We are fortunate to have a written copy of Buscarello’s oral statements to Philip IV in 1289. Buscarello assured the French king that, after the Mamluk capture of Tripoli earlier that year, the Ilkhan had angrily executed four of his principal Muslim amirs for expressing pleasure at the news. Aqa’s envoys at Lyons had reminded their audience that Hülegü’s chief wife Doquz Khatun – like Sorqaqtani, a Nestorian and a princess of the former royal dynasty of the Kereyit – was a daughter of Prester John. They further alleged that Hülegü had revealed to David of Ashby many intimate secrets of his heart, which he had never vouchsafed to anyone else, regarding his conversion to the faith and his baptism. Information of this kind could serve to distract the popes from the ambassadors’ diplomatic goals. In 1277, the Vassallis asked John XXI to send suitable personnel to instruct both the Ilkhan and his uncle, Qaghan Qubilai, in the faith, so that the sole result of their embassy was a Franciscan mission intended to go as far as China, bearing letters from the pope’s successor, Nicholas III, in which Aqa and Qubilai were invited to embrace Christianity, and the Ilkhan was requested to use his good offices with his uncle; as we saw earlier, Aqa did not allow the party to proceed. Arghun’s envoys in 1289 told Nicholas IV of Qubilai’s attachment to the Roman Church and to the Latins in general and (allegedly on the Ilkhan’s behalf) urged the pope to despatch Western religiosi to China – thus prompting in turn the mission of the Franciscan John of Montecorvino. We shall see later (Chapter 11) that such requests sprang not so much from any specific leanings towards Christianity as from a desire to acquire new techniques from religious ‘specialists’ of every kind. During Arghun’s reign, the impression that the Ilkhan was on the verge of becoming a Christian was conveyed in such a way as to set in motion a diplomatic pas de deux. Rabban Šawma having assured the Cardinals in 1287 that the Ilkhan wished to be baptized in Jerusalem once it was taken from the Mamluks, Nicholas IV urged Arghun to be baptized at once: this was not a step to be postponed, and God would be more likely to smile upon the campaign. Arghun effectively disowned Šawma’s claim by querying whether baptism was necessary at all.
The Ilkhans and Christianity

We have already examined the religious attitudes of members of the Mongol imperial dynasty, and the alleged Christian leanings of the Ilkhans in particular will now be considered. As we have seen (pp. 102–7), from a relatively early date stories had been current in Eastern Christian circles about the conversion of prominent Mongols – stories which, with the possible exception of those surrounding Sartaq, were always overblown. Similar hopes were centred on Hülegü, especially in the wake of the sack of Baghdad, where the Christian population appears to have escaped the general massacre. From c.1262, at least, it looks as if the Ilkhan encouraged such sentiments and promoted a widespread myth of his own Christian leanings. In much the same way as he spoke to David of Ashby about his sympathy towards Christianity, so he appeared to open his heart to the Armenian historian Vardan Arewelci, who visited his court in 1264. Hülegü told Vardan and his companions that he had been a Christian since birth, through the influence of his mother Sorqaqtani. Vardan assured him that Christian clergy ‘by land and by sea’ were praying for him. But by his death in the following year, we are told, Hülegü had been led astray by the ‘astrologers and priests of some images called Šakmonia’, i.e. Buddhist lamas (toyins). The Buddhists even persuaded him to build an idol-temple, where he prayed and where ‘they worked whatever witchcraft they desired upon him’. Vardan’s contemporary, Kirakos Ganjakeci (d. c.1272), says that Doquz Khatun tried in vain to wean him away from his dependence on the toyins. Hülegü was the last Ilkhan, in fact, to be buried according to traditional Mongol custom, whereby even live female slaves were interred alongside their master to serve him in the afterlife. It was perhaps for this reason that when, according to Vardan, Doquz Khatun asked the clergy to celebrate Mass for her husband’s soul, the Armenians refused, though the Nestorians complied.

Such expectations of imminent conversion did not, apparently, attach themselves to Hülegü’s successors, but apart from Ahmad-Tegüder, they gained a reputation for being at least well disposed towards Christians. Arghun, in particular, is described by the Dominican missionary Ricoldo of Montecroce as ‘a man given to the worst villainy, but for all that a friend to the Christians’. Yet once again, as in the case of earlier Mongol sovereigns, the evidence is equivocal. Arghun is known to have made the pilgrimage to the shrine of Abū Yazīd at Bīstām to pray for victory over his uncle; he frequented the company of Buddhist lamas and died from the effects of a life-prolonging drug which one of them had prescribed. Rashīd al-Dīn charges Baidu with excessive favour towards Christians, and Hayton apostrophizes him as ‘a good Christian’; but more than one Christian source depicts even Baidu as a late convert to Islam. Ramón Lull claimed that during his stay in the Near East he had heard rumours of Ghazan’s desire for
a more certain knowledge of Christianity; he had become a Muslim, allegedly, when this knowledge was not forthcoming. This is surely wishful thinking, but it echoes earlier reports of conversations between Christians and Ghazan’s great-grandfather Hülegü. Öljeytü had a rather more ‘turbulent conversion history’: in the course of a comparatively short career, he was believed to be in turn a Nestorian, a Buddhist, a Sunnī Muslim of first the Hanafī and then the Shāfiʿī school and a Twelver Shīʿī, before possibly reverting to Sunnism. Apart from his baptism in 1291, which brought an overjoyed response from Nicholas IV (the prince was named Nicholas in the pope’s honour), all these tergiversations apparently passed unnoticed in the Latin West. No envoy from either Ghazan or Öljeytü informed the pope or any Western monarch that his master was a Muslim convert, with the ludicrous result that in 1307 Edward II wrote to Öljeytü applauding his intention of ‘extirpating the abominable sect of Mahomet’.

In any case, the careers of Ghazan and Öljeytü demonstrate that personal religious preferences exerted little or no influence on foreign policy. Hayton, it is true, admits that Ghazan had been converted to Islam and that in the opening months of his reign he had treated Christians with great harshness, but this is blamed on unnamed Muslim amirs who had since been executed for treason, i.e. Nawrūz and his brothers, who had fallen from grace in 1297. And Hayton further proceeds to make out that Ghazan thereupon became pro-Christian and anti-Muslim. This is both to misrepresent the Ilkhan’s personal stance and to confuse domestic with foreign affairs. The repressive measures taken against Christians in the first two years of the reign were indeed discontinued in 1297, but Ghazan’s attitude towards territorial aggrandisement at the expense of the Mamlūks was consistent throughout the reign and was essentially that of his predecessors. Öljeytü’s harsh proceedings against his Christian subjects did not prevent him from making war on Egypt.

We have seen how the Franks of Palestine are accused of failing to profit from a Mongol alliance in 1260 and opting instead for their own ruin by assisting the Mamlūks. A more extravagant development of this idea sees a Mongol–Frankish entente as administering such a blow to Islam that Christianity would have become and remained the dominant religion in the Near East. That the alliance did not come to pass, the argument tends to run, was the responsibility of the West. This verdict is already foreshadowed in works dating from the fourteenth century, largely under the influence of Hayton of Gorigos. Thus Jean Le Long (d. 1383) suggests, in his reworking of Hayton’s treatise, that the Tartars for the most part jettisoned Christianity and embraced Islam because, while they themselves were engaged in a titanic struggle with the Muslims, the Christians of the West did little or nothing to aid the Holy Land. A glance at the history of the Golden Horde hardly inspires confidence in such an analysis. There the Mongol khans adopted not the faith of their Rus’ tributaries but Islam – the religion of
the wealthiest and culturally most advanced of their territories, Khwārazm. The Ilkhans, governing an overwhelmingly Muslim population in the still more prosperous regions of Persia and Iraq, were bound in any eventuality to tread the same path.

The Mongols and Syria: ecological considerations

Evidently the Latin Christians’ domination of the sea lanes provided a major incentive for Hülegü and his successors to court their assistance. There was, however, another powerful reason for the Ilkhans’ desire to enlist Western military aid – the nature of the terrain. Although Professor Amitai argues that the logistical difficulties of operating in Syria may have been overstated, the region clearly afforded only limited pasturage for a large army of Inner Asian horsemen. Muslim writers had commented on the relative dearth of grassland in Syria in 1216, a few years before the advent of the Mongols, when the citizens of Aleppo stood in fear of an invasion by the nomadic Qipchāq cavalry of the Khwārazmshāh. Hülegü himself alluded to the problem in his letter of 1262 to Louis IX: he had withdrawn the bulk of his army from Syria two years earlier not merely because the season required the Mongols to move to cooler uplands but additionally because both provisions and grass were almost exhausted. It was surely for this reason that, whereas in an earlier period both in Eastern Europe and in northern China the Mongols’ horses were quite unused to fodder and depended on grass, during Ghazan’s campaigns, the Ilkhan’s army was accompanied by great numbers of camels carrying fodder for its mounts. Even so, the ‘Templar of Tyre’ ascribed Ghazan’s slow pursuit of the defeated Mamlūk army in 1299 to a shortage of grass which weakened his horses. The hot season, moreover, presented further problems. Rashīd al-Dīn suggests that Ghazan’s withdrawal from Syria early in 1300 with the bulk of his army was prompted by the approach of the hot weather. We have seen (pp. 80–1) how in northern Syria in the summer of 1244 the Mongols’ horses suffered damage to their hooves, and both Fidenzio of Padua and Hayton mention that the strength of the summer heat prevented the Mongols from staying in the country. It seems that the region threw up more hazards for the Ilkhans’ cavalry than merely a dearth of pasturage.

In China, a country likewise ill-suited to nomadic cavalry operations, the Mongols circumvented the difficulty by employing Chinese infantry in large numbers. In Syria and Palestine, they proposed to overcome a parallel problem by recruiting an ally whose forces were seemingly more at home in the terrain. The horses which were offered to Western crusading leaders – 20,000 or 30,000 to Philip IV by Buscarello in 1289, 100,000 to the same ruler by Öljettī’s envoys in 1305 and (possibly) 200,000 to Clement V by Tommaso **ildüchi** two years later – were presumably not the Inner Asian ponies that the Mongols themselves traditionally rode but larger animals capable of carrying a heavily-mailed Frankish knight.
The problems of collaboration

Why, then, did the diplomatic contacts between the Ilkhanate and the West fail to lead anywhere? In the first place, the very circumstance that impelled the Ilkhan to solicit Latin help – conflict within the Mongol world – also undermined their efforts to avenge ʿAyn Jālūt. In 1270, the Chaghadayid khan Baraq, supported by Qaidu, had devastated Abaqa’s eastern provinces, an outrage to which the Ilkhan retaliated in 1273–4 with the sack of Bukhārā.127 During Ghazan’s second Syrian campaign in 1300–1, Chaghadayid forces exploited his absence by ravaging Fārs (though Hayton exaggerates when he claims that invasions by Qaidu’s forces compelled the Ilkhan to withdraw from Syria on two occasions).128 And to the north, the khans of the Golden Horde were ever alert for opportunities to attack Ilkhānid Azerbaijan. In blaming Abaqa’s past failure to move against Egypt on the fact that Mongol Persia was surrounded by mighty enemies,129 his representatives in 1274 were not altogether disingenuous.

It is important, secondly, that we do not consider the Latin response in isolation from the difficulties that beset the crusade to the east in the latter half of the thirteenth century. To judge from the attention vouchsafed by successive popes, Western monarchs and publicists, we may well doubt whether enthusiasm for the crusade to the Holy Land really was in a state of decline.130 But antipathies and conflicts within the Latin world, particularly after the Sicilian Vespers and the onset of the Angevin–Aragonese war in 1282–3, could only serve to distract precisely those rulers to whom the Franks in Syria and Palestine – and of course the Ilkhan – addressed their appeals. This was brought vividly home to Rabban Ṣawma in 1287, when from the roof of his lodgings in Naples he witnessed the Aragonese trouncing the Angevin fleet in the bay below.131 Contemporary opinion within Europe saw the persistence of strife among Western monarchs as a major impediment to crusading efforts. Marino Sanudo would link the loss of the Holy Land with the War of the Vespers, and Edward I, in his letter of 1303 to Ghazan, was doubtless sincere in blaming such conflict for the failure of Latin princes to launch the desired attack on Egypt during the past three decades.132

Even without such domestic distractions, the promotion of a major expedition to the east, representing the combined efforts of Latin Christian powers, was a time-consuming and cumbersome business.133 This Edward I implicitly acknowledged in 1275 by his inability to tell Abaqa when the crusade would arrive in Palestine because the pope had not yet set a date and in 1290 by his promise to inform Arghun once the pope consented to his departure.134 The pope for his part had to tell the Ilkhan in 1267 that he would notify him of the timetable once he had consulted the various monarchs.135 When Arghun in the summer of 1289 appointed a rendezvous with the French king outside Damascus in the early months of 1291, he envisaged
a schedule to which no major crusade could have adhered. We might note in passing that in 1271 the Lord Edward, already in Palestine at the head of a relatively small and manoeuverable force, had proved unable to respond in time to the advance of Ilkhanid forces into northern Syria, and Abaqa may have been referring to this episode in 1279, when he reminded the pope that in the past Western armies had failed to appear and the Mongols had therefore withdrawn. Ghazan appears to have been still less sensitive to the inability of Western rulers to mount campaigns as expeditiously as the Mongols themselves.

In some measure this lack of synchronization was due to the increasingly intricate nature of crusade planning. By the Second Council of Lyons, crusade strategists were coming to believe – and Pope Gregory X accepted – that successful operations against the Mamlūks raised logistical problems which had not been anticipated at the time of Louis IX’s invasion of Egypt in 1249–50 and which demanded more complex solutions than anyone had hitherto envisaged. From around the time of the Council, the crusade came to be viewed as a two-stage affair, involving a preliminary, small-scale expedition (passagium particulare) designed to secure a bridgehead, with a second and much larger force (passagium generale) following it, perhaps two years or so later. Not all the authors of crusade treatises over the next few decades made use of this distinction in their works, but there is little doubt that the popes and the Latin monarchs, who were now seen as indispensable to the crusade against the Mamlūks, embraced it. One problem, therefore, lay in deciding at which juncture cooperation with the Ilkhan’s forces should occur. Another was the lack of any Frankish base on the Syro-Palestinian coast after 1291. Had the Mamlūk Sultans left a single bastion in Christian hands – wrote a well informed observer some decades later – the Latins would have been able to inflict considerable damage on the Muslims at the time of Ghazan’s incursions.

The ultimate aims of Ilkhanid policy

On the other hand, we should not lose sight of the character of Mongol diplomacy, as noticed in Chapter 2. It is striking that court historians in Mongol Iran – Rashīd al-Dīn and Waṣṣāf – make no mention whatsoever of the Ilkhan’s dealings with the Christian West; in fact, they barely allude to the Franks at all. We might have ascribed these authors’ silence to nothing more than the proverbial lack of Muslim interest in Frankish affairs throughout the Middle Ages and beyond. But such unconcern would be especially surprising in Rashīd al-Dīn, whose name appears on the seal on the reverse of Ghazan’s letter of 1302 to Boniface VIII and whose Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh included a section on the history of the Franks. An alternative explanation is that Ilkhanid contacts with the Latin world were simply embarrassing. Writing for a prince who styled himself ‘Sovereign of Islam’,
neither Rashīd al-Dīn nor Waṣṣāf could afford to draw attention to negotiations which were designed to obtain infidel assistance against Ghazan’s coreligionists in the Mamlūk Sultanate.143

Another reason for the reticence of these Ilkhanid authors is that the overtures to still independent Latin rulers appeared to entail the abandonment of the Mongol programme of world-conquest – or, rather, they required its suspension. In this context we should recall the conciliatory tone adopted by the embassy of the Mongol general Eljigidei to Louis IX, then in Cyprus on crusade: as we saw (p. 103), this nurtured the idea that important figures in the Mongol high command, including Qaghan Güyüg, were Christians. Eljigidei’s cordial letter, wishing Louis well in his expedition and containing no demand for submission, differed markedly in tone from the ultimatums hitherto sent to Western potentates by the Mongols, though his intercession on behalf of Eastern Christians required the Franks, in effect, to comply with one of the yasas promulgated by Chinggis Khan.144 It was the oral statements of Eljigidei’s envoys, however, which gave rise to the most optimistic assessments. They told Louis that their master planned an attack on Baghdad in the summer of 1249 and asked him to direct his crusade against Egypt so that the Caliph would receive no help from that quarter. Yet for all the excitement generated in Western Europe, some in the crusading army expected no good to come of the exchange of embassies,145 and at least one contemporary observer was sufficiently astute to see that the Mongols were apprehensive about the crusaders’ objective and that their purpose was to deflect the crusade away from territories, like Aleppo and Anatolia, which lay within their current sphere of operations (and towards Egypt, in which they had no immediate interest). In his view, the assurances about the Christian faith of leading Mongols were merely part of the ploy.146 Eljigidei’s overture to King Louis was surely an example of the conciliatory tactics by which the Mongols aimed to disarm the suspicions of distant rulers and to which Carpini had drawn attention (p. 49).

All that had changed since 1248, in terms of purpose, was that the Latins were required to attack the same enemy rather than to distract a different one. To judge from material from the Mongol era preserved in the Yuan shi, Qaghan Qubilai and his successors retained a strong sense that their rule extended potentially over the known world – over those who had yet to submit as well as over those who had demonstrated their obedience.147 Nor had the Ilkhans discarded the programme of world-conquest any more than had their Yuan cousins.148 Here the attitudes of Ilkhanid court historians are more informative. It is noteworthy that Rashīd al-Dīn, when mentioning foreign nations, still thinks it worthwhile to say whether or not they are ‘in rebellion’ against the qaghan.149 Waṣṣāf, describing the Central Asian Mongols’ overture to the Qaghan Temür Öljeitü in 1304 which brought about a general peace in the Mongol world, has them list the external enemies on whom the various khanates should concentrate their attention rather
than engaging in internecine wars. Those confronting the Ilkhanate are said to comprise North Africa (Maghrib), Egypt, Rûm (probably the Byzantine empire) and, most significantly, the Franks.\textsuperscript{150} The Ilkhans’ own sentiments are harder to elicit. Ghazan’s boast in 1300 to the Mamlûk Sultan that the contingents ranged under his banner now included Franks\textsuperscript{151} was doubtless part of normal diplomatic swagger. But although Abaqa adopted a more conciliatory tone than his father had done, the surviving letters which Hülegü’s other successors addressed to Western princes generally employ the language of command rather than entreaty.\textsuperscript{152} And that the old claims had still not been jettisoned even in relation to Latin Christendom also emerges from two of these letters – the one dating from the very beginning of negotiations with the Franks, the other from their final phase.

Though no ultimatum of the kind to which the West had grown accustomed, Hülegü’s letter of 1262 nevertheless contains a sonorous restatement of Heaven’s mandate to Chinggis Khan. It begins with the opening words of the Epistle to the Hebrews (i, 1):

\begin{quote}
God, Who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in time past unto the fathers by the Prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto [but Hülegü then continues] our grandfather Chinggis Khan through Teb-Tenggeri, his kinsman, disclosing to him events which would miraculously come to pass in future times and declaring to him through the said Teb-Tenggeri: ‘I am the one all-powerful God in the highest, and I have set thee to be lord over the nations and kingdoms and to be ruler of the whole earth, to root out and to pull down, to destroy and to throw down, to build and to plant’.\textsuperscript{153}
\end{quote}

With yet another (slightly adapted) quotation here, from Jeremiah (i, 10), the Ilkhanid chancery was engaged in an audacious bid to recruit Judaeo-Christian Holy Writ into the service of the Mongol world-order by embedding within it the transmission of Heaven’s mandate to Chinggis Khan through the shaman Teb-Tenggeri. Possibly this was the work of the Latin Christian scribe Richardus, who is known to have accompanied the embassy, though it was almost certainly done with the Ilkhân’s own sanction. Hülegü then devotes considerable space to a catalogue of rulers who had resisted the Mongols and who had accordingly been crushed. The proposal, at the end of the letter, to attack Egypt by sea is somewhat peremptory, as if Hülegü is well aware that Louis has at no time gone through the proper formalities of submission but, given the urgency of the situation, is not minded to press the point.\textsuperscript{154}

In the second letter, written to Louis’s grandson Philip IV in 1305, the Ilkhan Öljeitû announces the general reconciliation of the Mongol khanates in vivid language with his statement that their postal relay-stations were now linked up once more ‘from Nangiyas [i.e. Southern China], where the sun rises, as far as the Ocean Sea [talû dalâî]’. This last phrase long puzzled
commentators, but – as Professor Sinor demonstrated – it denotes not the Mediterranean (which might indeed have been described as one border of the Ilkhanate) but the Ocean which was believed to surround the Eurasian land mass. Öljaitū’s phrasing, in other words, indicated that Mongol dominion extended to the world’s very limits. This was not a notion of reality to which any Catholic ruler could assent, and the phrase was tactfully omitted from the two Italian translations made at Philip’s court by the Europeans who accompanied the embassy. Edward II of England, too, was led to believe that the letter described Mongol rule as extending merely to ‘the frontiers of Outremer’.

Here, then, we have two letters, whose dates frame the era of Western–Ilkhanid negotiations and in which the idea of world-domination, though muted, is still in evidence. More importantly, the second letter was written in the immediate aftermath of the reunion of the Mongol empire, when at least one court historian in the Ilkhanate includes the Franks among the powers whom Hülegü’s descendants would now be free to attack. We cannot exclude the strong possibility that, had the newly-restored Mongol unity persisted and had a successful alliance with the West achieved the destruction of the Mamlūk Sultanate, the Ilkhans would then have turned upon the Franks of Cyprus and Greece. There would have been nothing particularly incongruous about this, of course: it was by such methods that the Mongol empire had grown under Chinggis Khan and his immediate successors.

Reservations in the West

One last reason for the unproductive character of Western–Ilkhanid diplomacy was surely the reserve with which the Mongols were viewed in Western Europe. This was in part, of course, the legacy of the ultimatums and of the devastation perpetrated in 1241–2. And it is worth noting that there appears to have been a considerable delay before writers in the Latin West became aware of the disintegration of the unitary Mongol empire and learned to distinguish between the Ilkhans’ policy, which involved working with the Catholic powers, and that of their cousins and enemies in the Golden Horde, who continued to menace Poland and Hungary. Matthew Paris, as we saw, had heard of the Mongols’ internal crisis of 1250–1. Thereafter, however, we find remarkably little reference in Latin sources to the strife among Mongol princes. The author of the Flores historiarum knew only that the Mongols of Persia had been prevented from joining the Lord Edward in 1271 because of losses owing to ‘internal oppression’. Roger Bacon seems to have been the sole author who was aware of these interne-cine conflicts, which he attributed to the divisions of territory among the princes made by Möngke and which for him explained the Mongols’ failure to conquer the world. Otherwise, Polo and Hayton are the earliest writers to describe frankly the wars among the khanates. On occasions, Ilkhanid
envoys alluded to their master’s embarrassments, as Abaqa’s envoys did in 1274. But it was incumbent upon them to broach the subject delicately: a forthright exposition of the difficulties might further have discouraged Western rulers from relying upon a Mongol alliance.

It is true that two early fourteenth-century writers, reflecting on the Mongol pretensions of a bygone age, drew highly positive conclusions. In their eyes, Eljigidei’s embassy in 1248–9 had marked the onset of friendlier relations; the Mongols had surely demonstrated their sincerity in courting the West by the fact that their overtures had begun when their mood was actually more uncompromising than now. But a greater number of Western voices recalled Mongol excesses. The Mongols believed that they were the true masters of the world, wrote Ricoldo of Montecroce in the 1290s, and that the whole world had been created for their pleasure and was under an obligation to present them with tribute and gifts; his verdict was echoed a few years later by the author of the Memoria Terrae Sanctae. Even Hayton—the most committed advocate of Western–Mongol collaboration, as we saw (pp. 124–5)—felt bound to say that the Ilkhan would not readily listen to European advice and to enter a caveat that the two allied armies should follow different routes because if they came into close proximity, the crusaders would find Mongol bluster and arrogance intolerable. Perhaps a similar perception had prompted the author of the Via ad Terram Sanctam, which betrays more sympathy than the Memoria for the Mongol alliance, to recommend that the two forces avoid contact.

On balance, if the numerous recovery treatises composed from c.1290 onward are an index of public opinion in the Latin West, the idea of active cooperation with the Mongols found little favour there. The space allowed to the Ilkhan’s forces in these projects is relatively limited; in some they are not referred to at all. Where they are mentioned, the author is usually ready to notice their eagerness for collaboration than to recommend it himself. Fidenzio of Padua, writing in 1290/1, had been an exception. He took it almost for granted that if crusaders followed the land route across Anatolia, the Turks would not dare to harass them out of deference to the Ilkhan’s authority, and he believed that the Ilkhan would send aid to a crusading army in Syria. But most authors took a less sanguine view. It is possibly significant that the Mongol alliance does not figure in the crusading proposals drawn up in 1306 by the Masters of the Temple and the Hospital, Jacques de Molay and Foulques de Villaret, at the request of Pope Clement V. These and other authors writing after 1303, of course, may have omitted the Mongols from their calculations on the grounds that the Ilkhan’s forces had so far made a poor showing against the Egyptian army. Already a treatise by King Charles II of Naples (c.1295) had alluded to the Mongols only in the context of their three defeats at Mamlûk hands, and in 1318 Guillaume Adam would ascribe the Mongols’ victories over the Egyptians purely to the Georgian troops who fought alongside them.
Although a slightly later memorandum drafted by Villaret (1307/8) does envisage a Mongol invasion of Syria, there is no explicit reference to cooperation. Rather, he proposes a Frankish assault on Egypt when the Mamlūk army is distracted by the Mongol attack and deprecates the course of action adopted in 1300, when the Franks had made for Tortosa, Egypt had been left unharmed and the Mamlūks (he alleges) had rejoiced. This same strategy of attacking the Nile delta would be advocated by King Henry II of Cyprus in c.1311 on the grounds that the Sultan’s troops in Syria would not dare move to Egypt’s assistance for fear of a Mongol invasion. The role that these two documents reserve for the Ilkhan’s army is an ancillary – indeed, almost an incidental – one. More underlies this, perhaps, than attachment to the long-established ‘Egyptian strategy’, and objections to a landing in Lesser Armenia on the grounds that the climate was insalubrious or that the Armenians were useless allies. Such objections were certainly voiced. But it is noteworthy that one Western writer, describing the Hospitallers’ refusal to participate in the Ruad expedition, makes them complain of being deceived by Ghazan’s promises in the past, and doubtless Molay, Villaret and King Henry were all disillusioned by the Mongols’ failure to move to the rescue of the Frankish bridgehead in 1300–1170 – this despite the fact that the Mongol general Qutlugh Shāh ascribed the retreat on that occasion to Ghazan’s illness, as would Hayton later.

But the Latins’ reticence very probably sprang from another consideration also. It was fuelled, that is, by the Mongol tactics of subterfuge with which the West had been familiar for some decades. It was no doubt for this reason that successive pontiffs responded to Ilkhanid requests for military collaboration by stressing the desirability – indeed the necessity – of the Ilkhan’s prior entry into the Christian fold. It was impossible to trust the word of an unbeliever, as Pope Alexander IV assured the Hungarian king in 1259, and God would surely be more inclined, in any case, to smile on the enterprise of a Christian Mongol prince. When in the following year Alexander wrote of the Mongol practice of simulating friendship towards Christians, he must have had in mind the disappointing outcome of Eljigidei’s overture to Louis IX. His view certainly found literary corroboration in the accounts of Carpini and Simon of Saint-Quentin, which Vincent of Beauvais’s encyclopedia had done so much to publicize. Small wonder that suspicions were voiced about Ilkhanid intentions. Alfonso X of Castile is supposed to have warned King Jaime of Aragon against the Mongols in 1269: they were, he said, ‘a very deceitful people’. ‘God knows whether they were genuine envoys or spies’, wrote Guillaume de Nangis of the Vassalli brothers in 1276. Scepticism was expressed, too, about the motives of the Mongol envoys baptized at Lyons in 1274, although the author of the Flores historiarum observed prosaically that they had not come on account of religious faith but to form an alliance. The Latins had to weigh the possibility that Arghun’s alleged eagerness for baptism might be just another
attempt to dupe them. And even authors who favoured cooperation with the Ilkhan’s forces – Fidenzio and the later writer Garcia d’Ayerve, bishop of Leon (1319) – were under no misapprehensions about the impulse behind Ilkhanid diplomacy: the Mongols simply hated the Mamluks more than the Franks.178

The idea of the missed opportunity of a Mongol alliance rested on three undeniable facts and two quite groundless assumptions. The three facts are (1) that the Mongol empire contained large number of Eastern Christians, (2) that various Mongol princes, princesses and generals expressed a partiality for Nestorian Christianity and (3) that from 1262 onward the Mongols of Iran actively sought Frankish cooperation against the Mamluks. The two groundless assumptions are (1) that Christian sympathies within the Mongols’ ranks had more than a short-term impact on external policy, and (2) that friendly Mongol overtures could be taken at face value. What happened after the break-up of the empire in 1261/2 was not so much a change of goal as a tactical adjustment. It is only when we recognize that adjustment – the pursuit of expansion by exploiting the mutual antipathies of foreign powers – that we can identify it as what the Mongols had been doing, to a lesser degree, since Chinggis Khan’s own era.

Notes


5 Spuler, Die Mongolen in Iran, p. 119; other examples in Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, pp. 151–2.

6 Meyvaert, p. 259 (tr. in Barber and Bate, Letters from the East, p. 159).


9 Lupprian, pp. 217, 219 (no. 41). This letter, the two halves of which had become separated (*Reg. Urbain IV*, nos. 2868, 2814 *bis*), was redated to 1264 by Jean Richard, ‘Le début des relations entre la papauté et les Mongols de Perse’, *JA* 237 (1949), pp. 291–7, repr. in Richard, *Les relations*; but cf. n.11 below.


12 *LTC*, IV, pp. 81–3 (no. 4893).


14 *Reg. Clem. IV*, I, p. 392 (no. 1131, 1 Oct. 1266): *contra Saracenos adjuvantibus Tartaris* (though the context is a *reductio ad absurdum*: whether they or other non-Latin allies against the Muslims were thereby entitled to the indulgence). Eudes de Châteauroux had come to see the Mongols as potential allies by the late 1260s: Ruotsala, *Europeans and Mongols*, p. 67.


16 For what follows, see Richard, ‘La croisade de 1270’.


28 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, pp. 183–4, 185.


34 Lupprian, p. 246 (no. 49).


37 For these relations, see J.-B. Chabot, ‘Notes sur les relations du roi Argoun avec l’Occident’, ROL 2 (1894), pp. 566–629; Lupprian, pp. 77–82.

38 Lupprian, pp. 245–6 (no. 49). ‘Sham’, strictly speaking, denoted Syria and Palestine.


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50 Jacques de Molay to Jaime II of Aragon, 8 Nov. [1301], in Heinrich Finke, ed., *Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens*, 3 vols (Münster, 1907), II. *Quellen*, pp. 3–4 (no. 3); tr. in Barber and Bate, *Letters from the East*, p. 168.


53 Mostaert and Cleaves, *Les lettres*, pp. 56–7. Öljeitü would have learned of the Peace of Caltabellotta (1302) from Edward I’s letter of 12 March 1303 to Ghazan: Rymer, I:4, p. 22. It is referred to also, indirectly, in Rashīd al-Dīn’s history of the Franks (1303/4), which speaks of the submission of the son of
the Aragonese king to the pope and (wrongly) of the Angevin recovery of Sicily: Jahn, Frankengeschichte, facsimile of Persian text, fol. 421r (German tr. pp. 92–3); Rawshan edn, p. 122. Cf. also the reference to peace in Hayton, iv, 12, Fr. text p. 236, Latin text p. 350.


56 See Jackson, Delbi Sultanate, p. 225.

57 Boyle, ‘Dynastic and political history’, p. 403.


60 Soranzo, p. 222 and n.1.


64 Hagnaby chronicle, BL. Cotton ms. Vespasian B XI, fos. 32v, 34v. The prisoners are said to have reached Edward’s court circa festum assumptionis beate Marie, i.e. 15 Aug. 1293. For the Qal’at al-Rūm campaign, see Angus Stewart, ‘Qal’at al-Rūm/Hromgla/Rumkale and the Mamluk siege of 691AH/1292CE’, in Hugh Kennedy, ed., Muslim Military Architecture in Greater Syria from the Coming of Islam to the Ottoman Period (Leiden, 2006), pp. 270–80.


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74 For a survey of such personnel, see Aigle, ‘De la “non-négociation”’, pp. 408–11; tr. From “non-negotiation”’, pp. 170–3.


76 Lupprian, p. 221 (no. 42).


81 Louis Bréhier, ‘Une ambassade byzantine au camp de saint Louis devant Tunis (août 1270)’, in Mélanges offerts à M. Nicolas Iorga par ses amis de France et des pays de langue française (Paris, 1933), pp. 139–46. For the hypothesis that Abaqa was expressing support for Michael, see Tanase, ‘Jusqu’aux limites du monde’, p. 338.

82 Kohler and Langlois, ‘Lettres inédites’, p. 56.


84 Simon Lloyd, English Society and the Crusade 1216–1307 (Oxford, 1988), pp. 27, 251–2, 255. A letter from Het’um II to Edward on the fall of Acre (1291)
appears in Bartholomew Cotton, *Historia Anglicana*, pp. 219–23; it is preserved also in BL Royal ms. 12 D XI, fo. 15v (with Edward’s reply at fos. 16v – 17), and in Lambeth Palace Library ms. 221, fo. 225v.


89 Tanase, “*Jusqu’aux limites du monde*”, p. 349.

90 Lupprian, p. 246 (no. 49).

91 See the discussion in Aigle, ‘Letters of Eljigidei, Hülegü, and Abaqa’, pp. 152–7. For a striking example, see p. 221 and n.155.


95 Lupprian, pp. 221, 248 (nos. 42, 50).

96 Chabot, p. 611.


98 Lupprian, pp. 234–6 (no. 46), 238–41 (no. 47).

99 Ibid., p. 256 (no. 54).

100 Ibid., pp. 253–4 (no. 53).

101 Ibid., p. 266 (no. 57). For the Mongol perspective on salvation, see pp. 311–12.


109 Only in the BN ms. of Rashid al-Dīn, ed. in Karl Jahn, *Geschichte Ğazān Hān’ız* (London, 1940), p. 82a; not in Rawshan and Mūsawī edn. Hayton, iii, 37–8,
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111 Judith Pfeiffer, ‘Conversion versions: Sultan Öljeytü’s conversion to Shi’ism (709/1309) in Muslim narrative sources’, *MS* 22 (1999), pp. 35–67 (esp. pp. 36–7, 43).

112 Lupprian, pp. 272–3 (no. 61).

113 Fr. text pp. 191, Latin text p. 316. The version of events in ‘Gestes des Chiprois’, p. 844, §§593–4 (tr. Crawford, p. 150), is very similar.


120 Meyvaert, p. 258 (tr. in Barber and Bate, *Letters from the East*, p. 159).


126 1289: Chabot, p. 611. 1305/7: *Reg. Clem. V*, III, p. 332 (no. 3549), has 200,000; but John Burgundi to Jaime II of Aragon, 26 June 1307, in Finke, *Papsttum*, II, p. 38 (no. 25), shows that only 100,000 of these were meant for the crusaders; the rest would be carrying Mongol warriors. See further Amitai, ‘Whither the Ilkhanid army?’, pp. 253–4.


131 Budge, *Monks of Kūblā Khān*, p. 171.

132 Sanudo to Philip VI of France (1334), in Kunstmann, ‘‘Studien’’, p. 803. Rymer, I:4, p. 22. For the emphasis on peace ‘behind the lines’, see Björn Weiler, ‘The

See Lloyd, English Society, especially chaps. 1–2.


Lupprian, p. 222 (no. 42); and cf. p. 232 (no. 45: 13 March 1275).


139 Rashīd al-Dīn’s ‘correspondence’ (mukātabāt), which does contain references to Mongol–Frankish relations, appears to be an apocryphal collection dating from the fifteenth century: A. H. Morton, ‘The letters of Rashīd al-Dīn: Ilkhanid fact or Timurid fiction?’, in Amitai-Preiss and Morgan, Mongol Empire, pp. 155–99. For a spirited but unconvincing attempt at rehabilitation, see Abolala Soudavar, ‘In defense of Rašid-od-din and his letters’, Studia Iranica 32 (2003), pp. 77–120.


143 Guy, a household knight of the viscount of Melun, 1249, in CM, VI, p. 161. See also John of Garlande, De triumphis, p. 128: Tartareae gentis rex sacro fonte renasci poscit, sed caveat Gallica turma dolos.

144 SSQ, pp. 97–8 (= VB, xxxii, 41): some of this may represent parenthetical comment by VB himself.


146 E.g. Hungary: Rashīd al-Dīn, I, p. 667 (tr. Thackston, p. 231); Japan and ‘Lūchak and Khaynām [Hainan?]’: ibid., II, pp. 911–12 (cf. trans. p. 316). The latter phrase seems to designate the main islands S. and E. of China, and
‘Lūchak’ (Marco Polo’s ‘Logiak’) therefore possibly represents Liuqiu, the Chinese term for Taiwan in the Yuan era (Fiaschetti, p. 138), although Pelliot, Notes on Marco Polo, II, pp. 767–70, looks for it elsewhere in Southeast Asia.


153 Meyvaert, p. 252 (cf. trans. in Barber and Bate, Letters from the East, p. 156).


156 Flores historiarum, III, p. 29: intestina tirannide perierunt. This notice is conceivably just an anachronistic echo of the upheavals of 1251.

157 OM, I, p. 369: qui regnum divisit istis principibus Tartarorum, qui nunc regnant et discordant ab invicem; p. 370: Quae [i.e. gens Moal] si esset concors. ; p. 400: Nisi enim Dominus . . . permitteret seminari discordias inter eos frequentes, jam totum mundum occupassent.

158 Antony Leopold, How to Recover the Holy Land. The Crusade Proposals of the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries (Aldershot, 2000), p. 112. Schmieder, Europa, p. 89, believes Western observers swiftly came to distinguish the Ilkhans from the Golden Horde khans. Yet they may still not have been fully aware of the hostility between the two powers.

159 Guillaume Adam, Tractatus quomodo Sarraceni sunt expugnandi, ed. and tr. Giles Constable, William of Adam. How to Defeat the Saracens (Washington, DC, 2012), text pp. 58, 60. ‘Directorium ad passagium faciendum’ (possibly by Raymond Étienne, c.1332), in RHCDA, II, p. 504.


161 Hayton, iv, 27, Fr. text p. 251, Latin text p. 361.

162 Via ad Terram Sanctam, in Paviot, Projets de croisade, p. 178.

163 Fidenzio of Padua, ibid., pp. 148, 161–2; also in BBTS, II, pp. 51, 57.


165 Guillaume Adam, Tractatus, text p. 58.


170 Leopold, p. 115.


173 See the comments of Tanase, ‘Une lettre en latin inédite’, pp. 344–5.

174 Rymer, I:2, p. 60: *simulant se ad Christianos privatae affectiosis habere prop- ositum*. The letter is also found in ‘Annales monasterii de Burton’, p. 497.


176 Guillaume de Nangis, ‘Chronicon’, p. 565; see also his ‘Gesta Philippi tertii’/*Vie de Philippe III*, pp. 510/511.


The rise of Temür

Although those who wrote about Temür’s career during his lifetime gave no date for the conqueror’s birth, a convention among his later biographers would place it in 736 H./1335–6. The year was highly emblematic: it had witnessed the death of the last undisputed Ilkhan, Abū Sa‘īd, the effective collapse of the Ilkhanate and the division of its territories among a number of largely non-Mongol dynasties. Temür and his political opponents within the Mongol world acted out their lives on a stage dominated by the figure of Chinggis Khan. He and his historians believed (or wanted others to believe) that he was engaged in the restoration of Chinggis Khan’s world-empire. Temür’s own origins lay not in Ilkhanid Persia but in the Chaghadayid khanate in Central Asia, the territory known to Western Europeans as Medium Imperium, ‘the Middle Empire’, or (much less accurately) as Media and Imperium Medorum. The history of this polity is ill-documented and more obscure than that of any of the other Mongol states, but it seems that from c.1347 it was split into two khanates. In the western part, comprising Transoxiana, the tribal amirs disputed power in the name of a series of feeble and ephemeral khans belonging to the lines of Chaghadai and (sometimes) of Ögödei. Here Islam had made significant advances, and the rulers were semi-sedentarized. In the east, by contrast, where Islam was only beginning to make any headway, the Chaghadayid khans retained real power and their lifestyle was characteristically that of the steppe nomad. This region was popularly called Mughalistān (‘Mongolia’), though to their western neighbours in Transoxiana, its Mongol inhabitants were known as Jata (allegedly ‘robbers’).
Temür belonged to the ruling clan of the Turkicized Mongol tribe of the Barlas, which occupied the pasturelands around Shahr-i Sabz (Kish) in Transoxiana. In the upheavals which followed the murder of the leading warlord and khan-maker, Qazaghan, in 1358, he first collaborated with the Chaghadaiid khan of Mughalistan, who invaded and briefly subdued Transoxiana in 1361–2 and then allied with Qazaghan’s grandson Ḥusayn in order to defeat and expel the invaders. It was in the course of a local conflict in eastern Persia, where the two men had taken temporary refuge, that Temür received the wounds which partially disabled him and gave rise to his sobriquet ‘the Lame’ (Persian, -i lang; Turkish, aksak). By 1370, when he broke with Ḥusayn and overthrew him, Temür had become the paramount figure in the western Chaghadaiid polity.

During the next few decades, Temür welded the Chaghadaiid nomads into a more effective war-machine by gradually transferring administrative offices and military command from the old tribal leaders to men chosen from his own personal following. To cement his authority over the military, he led them in successful expeditions against external enemies: the khans of Mughalistan; the successor dynasties that had arisen from the débris of the Ilkhanate; the Sultanate of Delhi, which had defied numerous Chaghadaiid attacks in the past; and the Mamlûk Sultanate of Egypt and Syria. We have seen how he intervened, too, in the politics of the Blue Horde, where he promoted his client Toqtamish, and was drawn into attacks on the Golden Horde when Toqtamish turned against him. Temür’s policy was one of indirect rule: he replaced his vanquished enemies with princes – usually from the same dynasty – who would act as his dutiful subordinates, furnishing troops for his campaigns and guaranteeing the payment of tribute. The plunder and slaves from the cities sacked by Temür’s troops flowed back to adorn and enrich his ‘capital’ at Samarqand. At the time of his death in February 1405, he was on the threshold of an ambitious campaign to reduce China, the only constituent part of the former Mongol empire that he had not so far attacked.

Temür’s historians would embellish the role played by his thirteenth-century forebear, Qarachar of the Barlas tribe, one of Chaghadaï’s leading noyans, in the history of the Chaghadaiid khanate. And twenty years or more after Temür’s death, a bogus claim to common ancestry with Chinggis Khan himself would be advanced for him and his dynasty. His marriage to two Chaghadai princes entitled him to the style of küregen (‘son-in-law’) traditionally borne by those who married into Chinggis Khan’s dynasty. Yet Temür was not of Chinggisid descent. He ruled but did not reign. His title was simply ‘Great Amir’, and at no time did he assume the dignity of khan. Down until 1402, at least, he acted in the name of two successive shadow khans of Chaghadai’s ulus, on whose behalf he asserted that Persia belonged to the Chaghadaiids by virtue of Chinggis Khan’s original distribution of territories. Both these shadow khans were members, in fact,
of Ögödei’s line, and on occasions Temür claimed to be redressing the displace-ment of that branch of the Chinggisid dynasty by the Toluids in the 1250s (p. 119), a posture that may have been designed to enhance the universalist character of Temür’s rule.¹⁰

However Turkicized his ancestry, Temür was – and acted like – a Mongol noble. Though not untouched by sedentary culture, he was the nomadic leader of an army of nomads.¹¹ A Muslim, he was accompanied on his campaigns by a portable mosque.¹² His forces were known as ‘Chaghatays’, both to their enemies in Asia and to the Latin observers who brought back reports about the conqueror; they also appear in Western sources under the time-honoured guise of ‘Tartars’. The roots of Timurid military success which attracted the attention of these Europeans were those we have earlier met with in the campaigns of Chinggis Khan: tight discipline, skilful tactics, superb generalship and techniques of terror designed to obtain rapid submission and to deter future revanchisme. In this last respect, Temür may have consciously emulated Chinggis Khan. The question whether Temür’s bad faith towards some of those who accepted his guarantee of safety and yielded to his forces or the sadistic cruelty which made his name a byword renders him less worthy of admiration than his model is not one that can detain us here. What should be said is that he was undeniably inferior in administrative genius to his great precursor, so that when he died his empire splintered far more rapidly.

His operations in Mesopotamia and the Caucasus eventually brought Temür into conflict with the Ottoman Turks in Anatolia. Under Sultan Murâd I (1359–89) and his son and successor, Bâyêzîd I Yilderim (‘the Thunderbolt’), the Ottomans had made spectacular territorial gains at the expense of the Byzantine empire and other Christian powers of the Balkans and had even begun to threaten Latin Europe. In 1396, Bâyêzîd had scored a decisive victory at Nicopolis, on the Danube, over a crusading army led by King Sigismund of Hungary and including French and Burgundian contingents. By the turn of the century, the Ottoman Sultan’s meteoric advance was a matter of grave concern to all the Christian powers in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, whether the Byzantine empire, the Latin kingdom of Cyprus, Venice and Genoa and their colonies, the autonomous Venetian and Genoese lords of the various Aegean islands or the Knights Hospitallers at Rhodes.

Temür’s first overtures towards the Ottomans were amicable in tone. As early as c.1395 he was endeavouring to draw Bâyêzîd into his struggle with the recalcitrant Toqtamish by offering him all the Golden Horde’s territory west of the Dnieper.¹³ The Sultan, apprehensive regarding Temür’s activities on his eastern flank, did not respond. Temür required no pretext to attack the Ottomans, since their core territories had once formed part of the Ilkhanate, but their readiness to shelter fugitive princes whom he had displaced and Bâyêzîd’s attack on Temür’s protégé, the ruler of Arzinjân
(Erzincan), provided an additional incentive. Temür began in 1400 with the reduction of Sivas, which Bāyezīd had recently occupied but then turned his attention to the Mamlūks, invading Syria and sacking Damascus in 1401. Only thereafter did he deal decisively with the Ottomans. On 28 July 1402, the Chaghatay army crushed Bāyezīd’s forces near Ankara, and the Sultan spent the last few months of his life as a captive accompanying Temür on his travels, while his sons fought over their inheritance. This did not amount to much, since one result of the Chaghatay victory was that the Ottomans’ Anatolian provinces largely passed back into the hands of the various Turkish dynasties which had ruled there prior to the conquests of Bāyezīd and his father; Temür further fuelled the brothers’ squabble by accepting pledges of allegiance from each of them in return for promises of his support. Temür’s last operation in Anatolia was an attack in December 1402 on the Latin Christian fortress of Smyrna (now Izmir), which was held by the Knights Hospitallers. The castellan defiantly rejected his demand for surrender, and the place was taken by storm. The sources suggest that the knights themselves escaped by sea, though we do not have to believe the allegation that they had made a pact with the conqueror; in any event, the Greek refugees left behind were slaughtered. Shortly afterwards an advance on Phocaea, where a great many ‘Franks’ had taken refuge, was bought off with the offer of tribute; representatives from one or two of the Latin-held islands in the Aegean also waited on the conqueror. Then Temür, who lacked the naval power necessary to proceed beyond the Straits and may have anticipated a dearth of pasturage for his forces in the Balkans, withdrew eastward on the first stages of his long return march to Samarqand.

**Temür and the Christian powers**

The Byzantine capital of Constantinople had been under siege by Ottoman forces since 1394, and the Emperor Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425) had left in 1399 on a tour of Western Europe with the aim of securing desperately-needed assistance. The Castilian envoy Clavijo subsequently heard that the emperor’s nephew and regent, John VII, had reached an agreement with Bāyezīd, undertaking to surrender Constantinople and become his subordinate if the Ottoman Sultan was victorious over Temür. But John and the Genoese in Pera were simultaneously in diplomatic contact with the Central Asian conqueror. In the summer of 1401, Temür had sent to Constantinople two envoys, the Dominican Francis and a Muslim, to discourage them from making peace with Bāyezīd, on the grounds that Temür himself was about to attack the Sultan. John and the Genoese may have incited Temür against the Ottomans; they had certainly promised him the tribute hitherto yielded to the Sultan and acquiesced in his demand to bar the Straits in order to prevent Turkish forces in Europe crossing to Bāyezīd’s assistance. In August 1402, after his victory over Bāyezīd, Temür again sent word to
Constantinople and Pera, warning the authorities there to keep their galleys in readiness so that the remnants of the defeated Ottoman army could not flee across the Straits. Further embassies from the conqueror were in Pera in January 1403 and in the late summer; we do not know whether they came with the same purpose.

On two occasions – in May and in August 1402 – Venetian galleys complied by sailing to the Dardanelles. A Genoese annalist reports that in the wake of Temür’s first embassy the colonists at Pera hoisted his banner, and Temür’s court historians record the arrival of envoys from ‘the king [malik] of Istanbul’ (presumably John VII) offering submission and tribute in October 1402. Yet overall the response to the conqueror’s overtures was ambivalent. Certain Genoese and Venetian sea-captains, alert to the possibilities of profit, disregarded all these undertakings, first allowing reinforcements to reach Bāyezīd and later shipping fugitives from his shattered army to safety. The Venetians on the island of Samos, too, gave asylum to Turkish refugees.

The Emperor Manuel had been cheered, it seems, by the news of Temür’s capture of Sivas. And he and his beleaguered subjects rejoiced when reports reached them of Bāyezīd’s downfall at Ankara: for one Greek writer, Temür’s victory signalled an intervention by the Virgin herself. But the Byzantine rulers were under no illusions. Early in 1403, Manuel, who had not yet arrived back in his capital, was urging that the Straits be blocked against Temür. Two years later, his ambassador assured newly-elected Roman Pope Innocent VII that the purpose of the conqueror and his Tartars was not merely to overwhelm Constantinople and the neighbouring region but to attack all Christian territory and destroy Christians everywhere. The pope in response granted Manuel what was in fact a highly unusual privilege for a Byzantine emperor, namely the right to select churchmen to preach the crusade against Temür and his armies in the Two Sicilies, Hungary, the Balkans and Romania. Even allowing for hyperbole that was designed to elicit the fullest Western assistance, Byzantine anxiety about Chaghatay operations, it seems, had not abated significantly.

Reports of Temür’s advance had been reaching the West since his first campaigns of devastation in the Caucasus. As early as 1394 the Venetian Senate was urging Manuel II to stand firm against the Ottomans, on the grounds that Bāyezīd was distracted by Temür’s activities. Then in 1395 the Chaghatay forces sacked Tana, on the Sea of Azov, and destroyed the Venetian outpost there; despite the friendly assurances given earlier to Tana’s envoys, the representative of Temür who escorted them back to the town proved to have been spying with a view to the impending attack. It has been suggested that the attack sprang simply from Temür’s policy of wrecking the economy of the Golden Horde khanate rather than out of any hostility specifically towards Europeans, though this would hardly have softened the blow. Among the Venetian possessions lost in the flames were the privileges...
conferred on the community by successive khans of the Golden Horde. In January 1401, the Venetian Senate, alarmed by fresh reports of Chaghatay operations in the Near East, instructed its representatives in Crete to send up-to-date information on his movements and authorized its consul in Alexandria to withdraw to Crete should Temür reach the city.

Around this time the Mamlūk Sultan, who was at Damascus seeing to the city’s defences, received an offer of naval assistance against Temür from the king of Cyprus and the Genoese at Famagusta, but such was the disarray within the Egyptian high command that the approach was ignored. Both Venetian and Catalan merchants suffered losses when the Chaghatay army sacked Damascus in the first months of that year. And in a highly garbled account, an English chronicler alleged that pilgrimage to the Holy Places had become more difficult as a result of the sack of Jerusalem. The Roman Pope Boniface IX drew attention to the fact that ‘the son of Perdition, Thamurlang, known as Themir Aksak, the oppressive conqueror of Asia’, was persecuting Christians and threatening the very survival of the faith in those parts. In 1403, Venetians in Syria reported fears of a fresh invasion by Temür.

King Martin I of Aragon would have been kept abreast of events in the Near East by the Catalan mercantile communities in Damascus and Alexandria. Writing to the Avignonese Pope Benedict XIII in March 1403 after learning of the sack of Smyrna from its castellan, Iñigo d’Alfaro (who may have been Aragonese), he described the perpetrator as ‘the arrogant Belial called Tamerlan’. At this stage it is possible that Martin, who for some years had been concerned to provide aid for the Byzantine empire, was told by Greek envoys of the presence of one of Bāyezīd’s sons at Temür’s headquarters and was misled into thinking that Temür had made common cause with the Ottomans. When in June the king responded to a letter from Emperor Manuel announcing the joyful news of Bāyezīd’s overthrow, he expressed pleasure but referred, in measured tones, to the Sultan’s capture by ‘an infidel like himself’. And although the letter which Martin wrote to Temür in April 1404 addressed him cordially, it pointedly attributed Bāyezīd’s defeat to the hand of God, who ‘does not permit unjust aggression long to flourish or ill-will against Christians who serve the Lord to be spread’ – a thinly-veiled warning, perhaps, that Temür’s own conduct risked bringing down on him the fate of his vanquished enemy.

Whatever his usefulness in ridding Christendom of the Ottoman Sultan, Temür represented potentially an even greater menace, and his presence in Anatolia posed a serious dilemma for all the Christian powers. According to Clavijo, he reacted angrily to the news that the Greeks and Genoese had helped the fleeing Ottomans and thereafter conceived a deep antipathy towards Christians; a later writer blamed the sack of Smyrna on this assistance given to Temür’s enemies. The biographer of Jean Le Maingre, the celebrated Maréchal de Boucicaut and governor of Genoa for Charles VI
of France, believed that Christendom had no reason to expect better treatment from Temür than it would have received from Bāyezīd, had he lived. In January 1403, Boucicaut deputed a group of ambassadors to negotiate with various powers in the East, including the Turks and Temür; they were to make alliances and wage war as they saw fit. As a result, within the next few months, John VII, Venice, Genoa and the Hospitallers of Rhodes entered into a treaty with Bāyezīd’s son Süleymān Çelebī, who controlled the Ottoman possessions on the European side of the Straits: one object of the agreement was to secure his assistance against Temür with ships and men if need arose. According to a contemporary report by the Venetian lord of Andros, Pietro Zeno, the Christian powers decided to send galleys to rendezvous with Süleymān should Temür display any intention of crossing into Europe.

The apprehensions roused among the Latins by Temür’s operations, however, were by no means invariably mirrored in the rumours that circulated in Western circles or in the diplomatic activity which followed. We know nothing of the purpose of the embassy which Venice had sent to him late in 1399 or early in 1400; nor are we told the errand of the three emissaries from the Master of the Hospital who were with him by April 1403. But the sack of Damascus in 1401 and the massacre there of a group of Muslim divines, which was rumoured to have shocked the Islamic world, may well have helped to nurture a more favourable impression of the conqueror in the West. The chance fact, too, that some houses in the Christian quarter escaped the conflagration, as reported several years later by an Italian merchant who had been resident in Damascus, possibly reached Europe at an earlier date. And as the news of the Ottoman débâcle at Ankara reverberated far and wide, some reacted more positively than the Aragonese king. Sigismund of Hungary wrote in 1404 that divine clemency had used the Tartars to eliminate the Turkish savagery. We might discount this on the grounds that the principal aim of his letter was to denounce the enmity of Pope Boniface IX, which prevented him moving against the Turks. But already in the late summer of 1402, rumours were current that Temür was well disposed towards the Christian powers and sought perpetual peace with them; a report from Constantinople that Temür had offered to restore to Manuel II all the territories lost to Bāyezīd gave rise to considerable optimism in the West.

Doubtless for this reason, other states, apart from those with vital interests in the Levant, were keen to make contact with the newcomer. At the very beginning of the century, the Castilian King Enrique III had sent out two ambassadors to ascertain the relative strength of Temür and of Bāyezīd, and after his triumph at Ankara, the victor sent them back to Castile with a Muslim envoy of his own, bearing gifts and a cordial letter. Enrique responded with a further embassy, which embarked near Cadiz in May 1403, was well received by the conqueror in Samarqand and began its return journey in November 1404, though without having received from Temür any reply to
the Castilian king’s missive. Temür, who was said to have fallen gravely ill, was probably no longer interested in campaigning against the Ottoman Sultanate and in any case may simply have turned his attention to the campaign against China. The chief Castilian envoy, Ruy González de Clavijo, has left us an account of the mission, which is usually regarded as the most important single Western source on Temür and his empire.

Of greater significance in the contemporary diplomatic context than the Castilian embassy, however, were the peregrinations of the Dominican John, archbishop of Sulṭāniyya. In 1398/9 John, accompanied by his fellow Dominican, Francis, had headed an embassy from Temür to Charles VI of France and had also visited Henry IV of England, taking letters from both monarchs back to the conqueror. In the wake of Ankara, John was despatched to France and Italy a second time, with letters from Temür and his son Mīrān Shāh (whose appanage included the archbishop’s own seat, Sulṭāniyya) and spent several years travelling around Western capitals. During this time he wrote two works: a short account of Temür (1403), of which a partial Latin translation was later incorporated in the Chronographia regum Francorum, and a longer description of the world, entitled Libellus de notitia orbis (1404). He left the courts of France, England and Aragon (1404), as well as the headquarters of the Teutonic Order in Prussia (1407), with letters for Temür; but in 1412 he had still not returned to the Near East. By this juncture, Temür had in any case been dead for seven years, and Mīrān Shāh had fallen in battle (1408) with the Qara Qoyunlu Türkmens, who were busy appropriating the westernmost regions of the Timurid empire.

The roots of misperception

The mission of John of Sulṭāniyya appears to have been designed to counter hostile perceptions of Temür in the West. Alongside the Persian original of Temür’s letter to Charles VI there has survived a contemporary Latin translation drafted, in all probability, by John; it is followed by the Latin version of a letter to the Frankish kings and princes in general from Mīrān Shāh, of which the original is no longer extant. Significantly, whereas the Persian text of Temür’s letter mentions only the desirability of commercial relations between Temür’s dominions and the Franks (as does Mīrān Shāh’s letter), the Latin rendering goes beyond this and speaks of a common hostility to Bāyezīd. The reply of Henry IV of England suggests that the translation of Temür’s letter to him (assuming it was identical with that to Charles VI) had been similarly doctored. Like the Westerners who had accompanied Ilkhanid embassies in an earlier generation (p. 211), John of Sulṭāniyya embellished the messages entrusted to him in order to elicit a warmer response.

In some degree, of course, John’s élan fed on the elimination of Bāyezīd, which had brought a reprieve for the Byzantines and other Christians in the Balkans. He observed, for instance, that the Albanians hoped now to be
delivered from the Ottoman yoke by the Serbian prince Stefan Lazarevich. But when it came to Temür’s more direct impact on Christians, John may have been somewhat disingenuous. He was perfectly well aware that Christians were to be numbered among the victims of Temür’s cruelty alongside Muslims. Yet he alleged that at Sivas the conqueror had spared the Greeks among the population when the rest were buried alive. He claimed too that, as a result of conversations with himself and his fellow Dominican Francis, Temür’s animosity towards Christians had been mitigated: now far more tolerant, he was especially well disposed towards Latins. The archbishop further professed to believe that Temür had attacked Bāyezīd out of affection for the Christians who were allied with him. But John was sufficiently realistic, of course, when taking charge of the English king’s reply, to delete a sentence that warmly urged Temür to accept baptism. He was keener, perhaps, to trumpet the virtues of the conqueror’s son Mīrān Shāh. Mīrān Shāh is described as a wholehearted Christian and as much loved by Latin Christians in the east—an assertion readily taken up by the Western rulers whose courts the archbishop visited. Clavijo, who met the prince, says nothing whatever of any Christian leanings, merely describing the insane conduct for which Temür eventually removed him from the governorship of Tabrīz. Since this included the destruction of mosques, it conceivably promoted the idea that Temūr was pro-Christian. John’s propaganda was ably seconded by others with whom he made contact during his tour of Western Europe or whom he may have influenced indirectly. The compiler of the Chronographia regum Francorum, in reproducing the archbishop’s memoir on Temūr, omits the statement that Christians too suffered from the conqueror’s savagery. And Dietrich von Nyem, who had become a close friend of John, claimed that Smyrna would have escaped destruction had the Hospitaller castellan only hoisted Temūr’s standard on the walls, as advised by ‘a Christian bishop’ (probably Francis, who had been briefly bishop of Nakhchivan). Wild rumours that Temūr’s forces had taken Jerusalem and that he and his troops had converted to Christianity reached England and found their way into the historical works of Thomas Walsingham (d. c.1422). For the Genoese annalist Giorgio Stella, writing around 1405, Temūr was neither a Muslim nor a ‘Tartar’.

One piece of information which circulated as a result of John’s journeyings in Latin Europe was that Temūr and his son had released the Christian slaves they found in the defeated Ottoman army and had sent them in the direction of Constantinople. In this context, at least, Dietrich von Nyem sounded a more sober note, giving the Chaghatay forces no credit and instead ascribing the safe arrival of these Christian slaves solely to the intervention of Latin (i.e. probably Genoese) ships from Pera. Some confusion may have arisen from the fact that Temūr’s embassy to the Castilian king was accompanied by two high-born Christian women who were believed to have been slaves in Bāyezīd’s household at the time of his defeat. Around
this time, too, some of the Frankish soldiers taken at Nicopolis in 1396 made their way home to Europe. The chronicle of S. Denis, specifying ‘the Great Count of Hungary’ and an illegitimate son of the late count of Savoy, claims that Temür had released both of them from captivity at Bursa. The second can be identified as Humbert, count of Romont (son of Amadeus VII), who arrived back in Chambéry in February 1404. The first has been identified as the Palatine Eustache of Illsua, though the evidence suggests that he died in Ottoman captivity. In any case, no other source confirms that the prisoners owed their deliverance to the Chaghatay forces. It is more likely, on chronological grounds, that they were released, rather, by Süleyman when he occupied Bursa, as part of his attempt to reach an accommodation with the Christian powers; his treaty with them in 1403 certainly provided for the release of Greek and Italian prisoners. Whatever the truth and whoever the ‘Great Count’, the two prisoners were more fortunate than lower-ranking soldiers captured at Nicopolis. Far from gaining his freedom after Ankara, the Bavarian Johann Schildberger, who later wrote an account of his adventures, simply exchanged one master for another. A similar fate may have befallen the Hungarian knight Nicolaus Gerecz.

We have encountered these themes – especial favour towards Christians, the release of Christian slaves found in the army of a defeated Muslim enemy – before, in various contexts: the first rumours of Mongol conquests that reached Damietta in 1221; the efforts of the Ilkhans Hülegü and Abaqa to secure Latin assistance against the Mamluks; and especially the stories that rapidly grew up around Ghazan’s spectacular Syrian campaign of 1299–1300, when Jerusalem had passed, if only for a few months, into Mongol hands. The enthusiastic reception which Temür’s operations met with in the West should be viewed through a similar lens. No more than his Mongol precursors was he actuated by a sense of equal status in dealing with European powers. The nineteenth-century editor of his letter to Charles VI commented on the superior, even careless, tone in which the French king was addressed. And in fact Clavijo several times heard Temür refer to Enrique III of Castile, whom he allegedly saw as the greatest of Western potentates, as his ‘son’ – just as his model Chinggis Khan had addressed the Khwārazmshāh on the eve of their conflict (see p. 48).

How should we assess Temür’s approach to religious matters? A second-generation Muslim at the very least, he justified his conquests, in part, by the duty to safeguard and expand Islam. A Western author depicts him as taking pride in the capture of Smyrna, which had defied successive Muslim Ottoman Sultans, and there is nothing inherently implausible in this. Temür relied in some degree on Muslim spiritual advisers, frequented the company of Muslim theologians and enjoyed taking part in religious debate. He also set great store, apparently, by the support and guidance of sufis and dervishes – Muslim holy men – and sought their support prior to particular campaigns. The tale of
his meeting with Khwāja ʿAlī, head of the community at Ardabil and a successor of Shaykh Ṣafi al-Dīn (the ancestor of the Safavid dynasty, which would rule over Persia from c.1500), is probably apocryphal, but Clavijo heard that the conqueror had lodged with the leading dervish of a village near Erzurum. We might expect to find this preoccupation with religious guidance and legitimation in any ambitious Muslim prince. Yet conversely there was nothing intrinsically Islamic about such attachments. Pagan Mongol rulers had patronized saints from different religious communities, including Muslims. No doubt Temür’s favour towards John of Sulṭāniyya and his fellow Dominican Francis sprang from the same roots. The sanction of holy men was an essential element in a steppe leader's claim to rule. That Temür had by no means abandoned the more traditional beliefs of the steppe peoples is clear from his fascination with magic. He claimed in addition to possess supernatural powers, to experience visions and to have mounted to Heaven on a ladder under the guidance of an angel.

Temür’s attitude towards Christianity is somewhat difficult to fathom. His early correspondence with Bāyezīd in 1395 had praised the Ottoman Sultan as a holy warrior against the infidel and had alluded to the presence of infidels (i.e. Christian Poles and Lithuanians) among the confederates of Temür’s own enemy Toqtamish. In a more recent letter, on the eve of his attack on Bāyezīd, he again mentioned with approval the Sultan’s conflicts with the Franks and expressed reluctance to embark on a campaign in Anatolia which could only hearten Islam’s enemies, and he subsequently issued a similar disclaimer when addressing Ottoman envoys. All this, of course, could have amounted to little more than subterfuge. Temür’s court histories and his own record alike suggest that he was content to leave Christian rulers in place, subject to the provision of tribute (generally interpreted as the Islamic poll-tax on unbelievers, the jizya) – rather as his Ottoman antagonist was accustomed to do. Thus Temür was perfectly willing to accept the submission and tribute of the Frankish island of Sāqiz (Chios) at the end of 1402. It is true that after his defeat in 1394, the Georgian King Bagrat V had been obliged not only to pay an annual tribute but also to become a Muslim. But although the king subsequently apostatized and Georgia thereby incurred further attacks, this was probably an isolated case. The same stipulation to abjure the Christian faith does not appear to have been imposed on his son and successor, Giorgi VII. Nor was the Emperor of Trebizond, in becoming tributary to Temür, additionally required to become a Muslim. Given that the only Christian power on the Asiatic mainland which Temür eliminated was the tiny Hospitaller enclave at Smyrna, his hostility towards Christianity begins to seem less striking. But against this it could be argued that Smyrna was the sole Christian-ruled bastion which the conqueror’s armies were really in a position to destroy prior to his withdrawal from Anatolia.
Where Christians were not the sovereign authority, moreover, they undoubtedly fared badly. This was not just an incidental result of the havoc wrought by Temür’s troops, to which Armenian writers bear eloquent witness.\textsuperscript{101} It was part of a deliberate policy. At Tana, Persian sources indicate that the Muslim population was separated from the infidels and was spared; the rest were massacred and their goods pillaged.\textsuperscript{102} In the towns of Anatolia, similarly, the Christians were enslaved while the Muslims merely paid a ransom.\textsuperscript{103} Clavijo heard that Temür had ordered the demolition of Christian churches in Greater Armenia.\textsuperscript{104} The policy does not appear to have been implemented universally: the Armenian lord of Mākū and his subjects (including a Dominican convent) were left unharmed,\textsuperscript{105} and Clavijo found ‘a fine church’ still standing at Erzurum.\textsuperscript{106} Yet overall there can be little doubt that the Chaghatay campaigns had gravely disrupted the fortunes of the Eastern churches and had hamstrung the endeavours of Latin missionaries (see Chapter 11). As late as 1406, King Martin was responding to an appeal for financial assistance from the monastic community of St Catherine on Mount Sinai, who had been impoverished thanks to Chaghatay depredations.\textsuperscript{107} Apart from an extremely terse allusion in the \textit{Libellus},\textsuperscript{108} however, John fails to notice the deleterious effects of Temür’s campaigns on Eastern Christians.

It is, in fact, difficult to resist the impression that this solitary – though extremely active and well travelled – churchman was largely responsible for the persistent and widespread view of Temür not merely as a potential ally but also as a potential convert to Christianity. He may, of course, have genuinely believed this, but we should be prepared to identify other motives behind his propaganda. One motive is not far to seek. In the \textit{Libellus} the archbishop outlines an Armenian prophecy that had come to his attention, concerning an oriental ruler who would attack the Muslims and join forces with the victorious Franks advancing from the west.\textsuperscript{109} Suitably reworked to incorporate unmistakable allusions to Temür (‘a man named Iron’, from ‘Media’), this, it seems, was an older prophecy, attributed to the fourth-century St Nerses, which Rubruck had heard as he passed through Armenia in 1255;\textsuperscript{110} Armenian manuscript colophons testify to its resilience during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{111} From the \textit{Libellus} it is clear that John accepted the prophecy as genuine and as already in part fulfilled. He may have hoped to promote a crusade against Muslim princes whose strength had been profoundly sapped by Temür’s campaigns. All this has to be seen in the light of his overriding concern, namely to revive the faltering Latin mission in the Near East, which he evidently felt had been neglected by the Roman popes.\textsuperscript{112}

For all the sanguine expectations regarding Temür’s motives and ambitions, diplomatic contact with him bore no fruit. He was the last ‘Tartar’ potentate whose operations fostered the illusion that he might become an ally against the major powers of the Islamic Near East or – better
still – convert to the Christian faith. When such hopes recurred later in the fifteenth century, they focused on Muslim princes who were not Mongols, such as Uzun Hasan (d. 1478), the leader of the Aq Qoyunlu Türkmens and ruler of Mesopotamia and western Persia. Uzun Hasan’s achievements included the destruction of the rival Türkmen confederation of the Qara Qoyunlu (1467) and – ironically – the overthrow of the Timurid sovereign of Khurâsân and Transoxiana (1469), who had briefly appeared to be on the point of recreating Temûr’s empire. But Uzun Hasan’s humiliation by the Ottomans at Bashkent in 1473 removed any chance he had of providing effective assistance to the Western powers.113 In the sixteenth century European publicists continued to flirt with the idea that particular Muslim rulers might act as a promising counterweight to Ottoman power but with equally disappointing results.114

Clavijo and John of Sultânîyya both testify to their gracious treatment at Temûr’s hands. In the Near East, the blow he dealt the Ottoman Turks appeared to offer the ailing Byzantine empire a reprieve for a further fifty years;115 in the Pontic steppe, his assault on Toqtamish effectively delivered the coup de grâce to the Golden Horde. Such exploits have helped to reinforce the notion that Temûr was a potential ally of the Catholic world. It is true that this Muslim ruler does not, at first sight, appear an orthodox exponent of the Islamic jihâd. His credentials as a holy warrior rested on nothing more than warfare with minor Hindu chieftains, with the Christians of Georgia and with the Knights Hospitallers. The great majority of his campaigns were directed, in fact, against fellow Muslims, who were called upon, moreover, to endure his most appalling acts of barbarity, leading John of Sultânîyya to opine, in all seriousness, that Temûr had destroyed three-quarters of the world’s Muslim population.116 All this served to obscure the fact that Temûr’s interest in correspondence with rulers in Latin Europe extended only as far as they might prove valuable trading partners – and as their hostility towards the Ottomans and the Mamlûks made them useful adjuncts to his efforts to extend his dominions. In this latter respect, at least, he was a true successor of the Ilkhans.

Notes

1 I have transliterated the Turco-Mongol form of this name (Tu. temûr, ‘iron’), in preference to the Persian and Arabic form, Tîmûr, usually employed in secondary literature.
5 For the origins of this designation, see Dai Matsui, ‘Dumdadu Mongol Ulus “The Middle Mongolian Empire”’, in Rybatzki et al., Early Mongols, pp. 111–19.
6 See Peter Jackson, ‘Chaghatayid dynasty’, Enc.Ir.; also idem, Mongols and the Islamic World, p. 199.
12 Clavijo, p. 196 (tr. Le Strange, p. 272).
16 On Phocaea, see Alexandrescu-Dersca, La campagne, p. 90.
18 Clavijo, pp. 27–8 (tr. Le Strange, p. 52).
23 Iorga, ‘Notes’, pp. 81, 83, 84.


27 Clavijo, p. 94 (tr. Le Strange, p. 136). Letter of Gerardo Sagredo, in Alexandrescu-Dersca, La campagne, pp. 131–2; some of the Turks were robbed and murdered by the Italians (ibid., pp. 83–4). Luttrell, ‘Crisis’, p. 158.


31 Iorga, ‘Notes’, p. 264.

32 CICO, XIII:1, pp. 278–82 (no. 139).

33 MHSM, IV, p. 332; abstract in RDSV, I, p. 203 (no. 860).


49. Clavijo, p. 94 (tr. Le Strange, p. 136).
54. Iorga, ‘Notes’, pp. 228, 239.
55. See Dietrich von Nyem, ii, 30, p. 173.


70 Henry IV to Temür, in Ellis, *Original Letters*, p. 57, note f.


73 Clavijo, pp. 114–15 (tr. Le Strange, pp. 162–3). For his conduct, see Beatrice Forbes Manz, ‘Mirān Shāh b. Timūr’, *Enc.Isl.*.


80 Clavijo, p. 4 (tr. Le Strange, p. 25); our only source for the identity of the two women is the supplementary comments of the late sixteenth-century writer Gonzálo Argote de Molina, ibid., p. 255 (tr. Le Strange, p. 340, n.5).
88 Clavijo, pp. 158, 159, 160 (tr. Le Strange, pp. 221, 222; at p. 223, Su fijo, quera Su amigo is rendered ambiguously as ‘the good friend of Timur and his son’); cf. also p. 200 (tr. p. 277).
96 Sari ‘Abd-Allāh Efendi, Munsha’āt, text in Togan, ‘Timur’s Osteuropapolitik’, p. 294; see also ibid., pp. 280–1, 284.
98 Nizām-i Shāmī, I, p. 269. Sharaf al-Dīn ‘Ali Yazdī, ed. ‘Abbāsī, II, p. 344/ed. Urunbaev, pp. 869–70 (tr. Pétis de la Croix, IV, pp. 58–9). For ‘Sāqiz’ (described by Shāmī as a town and by Yazdī as an island) as Chios, see S. Soucek, ‘Sakiz’, Enc.Isl.2 Pétis de la Croix transliterated the name of its Latin lord (given as STH by Shāmī and as SBH or SYH by Yazdī) as ‘Chibo’, but the name garbled in Arabic–Persian script could conceivably be SNH = Zeno, i.e. Pietro Zeno, lord of Andros, who is known to have been in Chios in Sept. 1402 (letter of Gerardo Sagredo, in Alexandrescu-Dersca, La campagne, p. 133).
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100 Clavijo, p. 75 (tr. Le Strange, p. 111).
103 Aubin, ‘Comment Tamerlan’, p. 99.
104 Clavijo, pp. 89–90, 95 (tr. Le Strange, pp. 130, 138).
105 Ibid., pp. 101–3 (tr. Le Strange, pp. 144–7).
106 Ibid., p. 96 (tr. Le Strange, p. 139).
108 John of Sulṭāniyya, Libellus, p. 118.
109 John of Sulṭāniyya, Libellus, Graz Universitätsbibliothek ms. 1221, fo. 57v; the passage is reproduced (with omissions) in Kern’s edn, pp. 99–100. There is a vague echo of this prophecy – though attributed to St Gregory (the Illuminator) – in Dietrich von Nyem, ii, 30, p. 176.
111 Sanjian, Colophons, index s.v. ‘Nerses’ (esp. p. 94).
115 But see Nicol, Last Centuries of Byzantium, p. 316.
The Mongol regimes and the growth of a world system

By the end of the thirteenth century, Western merchants had gained access to a ‘world system’ – or, rather, what has been called ‘a network of interlinked sub-systems’, connecting an ‘archipelago of world cities’.

This network was not, of course, ‘global’ in the modern sense, but it represented an incipient globalization of the Old World. It may indeed have begun to emerge well before the era of Mongol hegemony, during the period when the Seljūks dominated south-western Asia and the semi-nomadic Kitan-Liao united under their rule present-day Mongolia and the northernmost provinces of China.

But the advent of the Mongols undoubtedly provided the impetus for a quickening of economic activity throughout the Eurasian land-mass. In some measure this reflected the union of much of the continent under a single government and a reduction in the frequency of ‘protection’ costs, but equally it arose from the pronounced interest in trade manifested by Chinggis Khan and his successors. As we shall see in Chapter 12, the Mongols also presided over intercultural exchanges to an unprecedented degree across Eurasia.

We noticed (p. 39) how the poverty and weakness of the twelfth-century Mongols were bywords among their descendants. One result of the far-flung conquests of Chinggis Khan was the emergence of a Mongol leadership whose purchasing power was considerably magnified and who, according to Carpini, owned great wealth in gold, silver, silk and precious stones.

This new élite constituted an attractive market for merchants, mainly Uighurs and Muslims travelling even from distant regions of western Asia. Our sources depict Mongol khans and Ögödei in particular welcoming merchants who made the long journey to Qaraqorum – a new city largely
comprising consumers – and paying them inflated prices for goods that were not available within the steppe economy.\(^5\) This is why traders within independent territories on occasions identified their own interests with a Mongol victory: Lahore fell in 1241, according to Jūzjānī, because merchants in the city, whom the Mongols had issued with permits to traffic beyond the Indus and the Hindu Kush, deliberately undermined the governor’s efforts to defend it against the besieging Mongol army.\(^6\)

The destructiveness of the initial conquests, which were often accompanied by considerable slaughter and displacement of populations, was partly offset by the attempts of Mongol regimes to promote economic revival.\(^7\) What success attended these efforts is a matter of debate. In Persia they are associated especially with the reign of Ghazan, who stabilized the land-tax, reduced or abolished the imposts on trade and crafts and reformed the currency, though it has to be borne in mind that our principal informant is Rashīd al-Dīn, who as that Ilkhan’s chief minister is by no means a disinterested source in presenting these measures as highly effective.\(^8\) Of the sincerity of the Ilkhan’s intentions there can be little doubt: his personal wealth depended in good measure on the tax revenues from trade and crafts (as opposed to agrarian revenues, which supported the costs of administration).\(^9\) Ghazan’s concern was shared even by Mongol princes whose subjects were predominantly nomadic pastoralists, like Qubilai’s great rival Qaidu. At a quriltai he convened in Central Asia in 1269, Qaidu and his fellow princes agreed that their nomadic followers should be confined to grazing lands and should abstain from pasturing their livestock in agricultural zones. His chief minister, the Muslim Masʿūd Beg, reformed the coinage in the 1270s, and Qaidu and his ally, the Chaghadayid khan Du’a, founded the town of Andijān (in Farghāna) in the 1280s, apparently with the aim of fostering commerce.\(^10\)

As Professor Allsen has demonstrated, the Mongol ruling class did not act merely as the passive recipients of new merchandise or preside benignly over the growth of commercial traffic within their empire; they assiduously promoted the diffusion of goods and techniques.\(^11\) Among the most striking symptoms of their new-found prosperity were luxury textiles – the gold brocades known in Western Europe as *panni tartarici*, ‘Tartar cloths’ – which were used for various purposes, notably for the robes donned by rulers and nobles on ceremonial occasions or bestowed as gifts, and to cover and line the tents of the imperial dynasty and the grandees.\(^12\) Mongol regimes obtained these textiles in part as booty and tribute but also through trade and officially-sponsored manufacture.\(^13\) They served as one index of high status for a society in which, unlike feudal Western Europe, the horse performed no such function because the possession and use of horses were so widespread.\(^14\)

The relationship between the Mongol leadership and foreign merchants was thus an intimate one. As early as c.1203, two Muslim traders are found
among the few close adherents of the future Chinggis Khan. For a time, until Möngke put a stop to the practice, merchants received from Mongol sovereigns the tablets of authority, known as *paizas*, which were bestowed on ambassadors and others engaged on imperial business, guaranteeing them safe-conduct within the empire, the use of the postal relays and other privileges. The reason was that many long-distance merchants entered into contracts with the Mongol government, which advanced them the capital to enable them to import the commodities the Mongols desired: traders who enjoyed this contractual relationship with the regime were known as *ortogh* (from Turkish *ortaq*, ‘partner’). In Mongol China, at least until the reforms of Qubilai, a number of them proffered large cash advances to the rulers and acted as tax-farmers, a development heartily deplored, but unsuccessfully resisted, by Chinese and Kitan bureaucrats.

**The trade routes**

Since the twelfth century, successive Egyptian sultans had deliberately prevented the Latin merchants who flocked to Alexandria from gaining access to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The victory at ‘Ayn Jâlût in 1260 brought most of Syria, including the major centres of Aleppo and Damascus, under direct Mamülük control. During the years 1268–91, moreover, the cities on or close to the Syrian coast that had served Latin merchants as a springboard for journeys into the hinterland – Antioch, Acre, Tyre and Beirut – also fell to the Mamülüks, and although Western merchants continued to trade with cities like Aleppo, the routes inland were consequently barred to Europeans in much the same way as that through Egypt and the Red Sea. In any event, since ‘Ayn Jâlût the territory along the Euphrates was a war-zone, disputed between the Mamülüks and the Ilkhans. The overall effect of the Mongol advance into Persia and Iraq had been to deflect the trade-routes northward and, to a lesser degree, eastward. The coastal cities of Syria and Palestine and the Seljük port of Antâlya alike lost out to ports situated within the territories that owed allegiance to the Mongols.

The three principal western termini for trans-Asiatic trade during the Mongol era were Tana, near the Muslim settlement of Azâq, where the Don flows into the Sea of Azov; Laias (Laiazzo; Ayas), on the Gulf of Alexandretta; and Trebizond (now Trapezunt), on the southern shore of the Black Sea. Tana, lying in the dominions of the Golden Horde, became the western terminus of the more northerly route to ‘Cathay’. Two commercial manuals have come down to us, both from Florence, which deal, *inter alia*, with the Asiatic trade and which utilize information from a common source. The first, by an unknown author and relatively short, dates from c.1315; the second is the celebrated work of Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, an employee of the Florentine banking-house of the Bardi, who wrote at some point in the 1330s. Both authors list the main halting-places along this, the so-called
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Tartar route: twenty-five days to Astrakhan (‘Ghattarghati’/ ‘Istarchati’; Pegolotti’s ‘Gittarcan’ = Ḥājjī Tarkhān) with carts drawn by oxen (but only twelve days with horse-drawn carts); thence one day by water to Sarai, further up the Volga; eight days by water to Saraiikh (‘Little Sarai’; the anonymous author calls it ‘Saracingho’, Pegolotti ‘Saracanco’) on the right bank of the Ural (Yayīq) River; thence fifty days to Uṭrār (‘Oltarre’, or ‘Ioltrarre’ as Pegolotti calls it), on the lower Sir-daryā. At Saraiikh a road branched off to Ürgench (in Khwārazm), described in the handbooks as ‘a good place for merchandise’, which gave its name to a highly-esteemed type of cloth (‘organdi’); from here it was possible to travel across the Hindu Kush to Ghazna (in present-day Afghanistan) and on to Delhi, the capital of an independent Muslim sultanate that dominated northern India.

From Uṭrār, following one of the long-established ‘silk routes’, used by traders at least as far back as the era of the Roman empire and the Han dynasty, it was another forty-five days’ journey with asses to Almalīgh (‘Armalicchio’ or ‘Armalecco’), a principal residence of the Chaghadayid khans, and thence it took seventy days, again with asses, to reach Ganzhou (‘Chamesu’, Pegolotti’s ‘Camesu’). The Mamlūk encyclopedist Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-ʿUmarī, many of whose informants were merchants, says that the road passed through Qaraqocho, though he was told that the journey from Almalīgh to Ganzhou lasted a mere forty days. At this juncture, the two Florentine writers appear confused, asserting that from Ganzhou it took forty-five days on horseback to reach the river that flowed down through the great port of Hangzhou or Quinsai (Pegolotti’s ‘Cassai’ is closer than the anonymous author’s ‘Chamesia’) and that from here Khanbalīgh, the Yuan capital, was another thirty days distant. Al-ʿUmarī furnishes a more plausible itinerary with the statement that it was a forty-day journey from Ganzhou to Khanbalīgh, from where it took the same time to reach Hangzhou (‘Khansā’), either overland or by water.

The other two western termini both belonged to client princes: Laias lay in the kingdom of Lesser Armenia, and Trebizond was the capital (since 1204) of the Greek empire of that name which paid tribute to the Mongols. Laias, assiduously built up by King Het um I, who since 1246 had been attracting the Italians with privileges and exemptions, was a favourite haunt of merchants from Latin Cyprus; from here the Polos twice set out on their eastward journey across Asia. The roads from Laias and from Trebizond converged at Sivas (Pegolotti’s ‘Salvastro’) to convey Western traders through Arzinjān (Erzincan) and Erzurum to the important city of Tabrīz (‘Tauris’); Edward I’s envoy Geoffrey de Langley followed this route from Trebizond to Tabrīz in 1292. Since Abaqa’s reign, Tabrīz had been one of the Ilkhans’ principal residences, which they had adorned with many fine buildings. Marco Polo observed that goods arrived in the city from India, Baghdad, Mosul and Hurmuz (‘Cormos’), and indeed Tabrīz served as the gateway to the Persian Gulf and the flourishing port of Hurmuz – in Polo’s
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words, ‘a town of very great trade’, where valuable merchandise arrived from India in profusion, though the climate was insalubrious. 29 From Hurmuz, the enterprising European merchant could take ship for India and the Far East.

Alternatively, one could travel due east from Tabriz along the road that passed south of the Alburz mountains into Khurāsān. From Khurāsān the route to China30 passed in a north-easterly direction across the river Oxus (Amū-daryā) into the territories of the Chaghadyid khanate and through the important cities of Bukhārā, Samarqand and Kāshghar. From Kāshghar, whence numerous merchants, according to Polo, travelled abroad to engage in commerce, the more southerly of the two silk routes led into the qaghan’s dominions, crossing the desert through Cherchen and Lop (on the Lop Nor) to the Chinese cities of Shazhou and Ganzhou. In this last-named place, Marco says, the three Polos stayed for a year on certain business of which, frustratingly, he tells us nothing.31

The Pax Mongolica: the hazards of trading in the Mongol world

For all the favour that Mongol princes exhibited towards traders, the now venerable concept of a Pax Mongolica is open to question.32 Pegolotti’s pronouncement, in the 1330s, that the northerly route from Tana to Cathay was safe for travelling merchants both by day and by night33 has attained a certain notoriety. Many historians today would tend to be sceptical about the existence of a Pax, at least between the splintering of the empire in 1261–2 and the termination of a series of inter-Mongol conflicts in c.1315. It has been observed that the term Pax Mongolica can refer only to ‘a more or less stable political situation across lands separately ruled by Mongols which for about a century allowed for the flow of goods and peoples across continental Eurasia’,34 and in all probability the situation Pegolotti describes (if indeed it ever obtained) was true only for a decade or two around the time he wrote.35 We might be well advised to look for evidence of peaceful conditions within an ulus rather than across the breadth of Asia.

Whatever commonality of interest bound Mongol khans and merchants and whatever efforts were made to foster trade and protect trade routes, instances abound of disruption caused by war. In the early 1260s, Marco Polo’s father and uncle were first obliged to prolong their journey instead of returning south through the Caucasus, on account of the outbreak of the titanic struggle between Hülegū and Berke; then, when they were on the point of setting out for the Far East, conflicts in Central Asia held them back in Bukhārā for three years.36 During the 1280s, the Uighur principality, lying athwart one of the silk routes, was fiercely disputed between the troops of Qubilai and those of Qaidu and his Chaghadyid subordinates.37 Thereafter, the struggle continued on a broader front. In 1291, returning
Ilkhanid envoys and the papal ambassador Montecorvino, setting out from opposite ends of Asia, took the decision to journey by sea (the former taking with them all three Polos), in order to avoid the hostilities between Qaidu and the qaghan’s frontier forces; in a letter written in 1305, Montecorvino, while conceding that the northerly land route was in general shorter and safer, added that the fighting had now rendered it too hazardous for some time and indeed had prevented any news reaching him from Europe over the previous twelve years.\textsuperscript{38} Respite, when it came, might prove ephemeral. In 1344, it was reported at Kaffa that the road through the Chaghadayid dominions (\textit{caminum imperii de medio}) was open once more, probably in the wake of a few years’ hostilities with the Golden Horde.\textsuperscript{39} Yet only a short time later, in \textit{c}.1347, the pope’s ambassador Marignolli would opt to leave China by sea because conflict (this time among the Chaghadayids themselves) had again rendered the land route impassable.\textsuperscript{40}

Merchants figured among an enemy’s assets, and just how much protection they could count on in time of war is grimly in evidence in 1263–4, when Hülegü and Berke each inaugurated a campaign in the Caucasus by deliberately slaughtering groups of \textit{ortoghs} in the other’s service.\textsuperscript{41} When Noghai sacked Kaffa in 1298/9 in the course of his struggle with the Khan Toqto’a, European merchants were among those killed and despoiled.\textsuperscript{42} Nor was it a matter only of discord between rival Mongol khanates. Pegolotti admitted that mercantile interests could suffer in the turbulence unleashed by the death of a ruler.\textsuperscript{43} In 1342, the Venetians at Tana complained of difficulties after Özbeg’s death,\textsuperscript{44} and in \textit{c}.1339 a Latin merchant, ‘Gillottus’, shared the fate of Franciscan friars in an anti-Christian pogrom which broke out in Almaligh following the death of the pagan Chaghadayid khan, Yesün Temür, and the enthronement of the Muslim ‘Alī Sulṭān.\textsuperscript{45} In Persia, chaos ensued on the demise of the Ilkhan Abū Sa‘īd (1335) and especially, as we shall see later in the chapter, after the collapse of Ilkhanid rule and the rise to power around \textit{c}.1340 of non-Chinggisid dynasties.

We should not forget that Latin merchants were accustomed to difficulties in more familiar territories such as Byzantium and Muslim Egypt and Syria – whether arrest and confiscation of property or even bloody pogroms. In 1296, the inhabitants of Constantinople, at Genoese instigation, massacred the Venetians in the city. Westerners experienced, too, the obstructions thrown up by contemporary non-Mongol princes like the Bulgarian king and the emperor of Trebizond; the latter, currently in dispute with Venice, misappropriated some of the Polos’ goods as they made their way home in \textit{c}.1295.\textsuperscript{46} The risks attending trade within Mongol Asia were not necessarily much greater than in the eastern Mediterranean, if perhaps more frequent.

The journey by sea might well be thought to have sidestepped the crises induced by inter-Mongol warfare, and the sea route appears to have grown increasingly popular during the Mongol era. But clashes, for instance, between petty rulers in the Persian Gulf, who financed their political
Western traders and adventurers

Ambitions through piracy against shipping, could disrupt traffic for years on end. And the sea voyage carried other hazards of its own. Marco Polo commented dismissively on the Arab ships that sailed between the Persian Gulf and India, in which the planks were not nailed but lashed together with twine made from coconut husks, with the result that the vessels often failed to withstand the rigours of the Indian Ocean. The maritime voyage to China, moreover, could take more than twice as long as the overland journey because of the monsoons. Montecorvino estimates that it could last up to two years (as opposed to five or six months by the northerly land route), and indeed Polo mentions having been stranded on Sumatra for some months by adverse weather.

It has to be borne in mind, too, that our sources are more likely to mention instances of the disruption of trade – especially overland trade – than they are to comment on periods in which it continued relatively unhindered for years on end. And indirect evidence suggests that the era of Mongol hegemony witnessed a growing ‘interconnectedness’ between different parts of Eurasia. Professor Akinobu Kuroda has drawn attention to the sudden expansion in the availability of silver from the last quarter of the thirteenth century down to the middle decades of the fourteenth, involving the issuance of silver coinage in unprecedented quantities in regions as diverse as England, Egypt and Northern India. What underlay this was very probably the unloading of a large volume of hoarded silver by the Mongols following their conquest of the Song empire in the 1270s, accompanied by the prohibition of the use of coin within China in favour of paper money. A further consequence of this situation was the emergence of a commensurability across Eurasia, as prices and values came to be expressed in terms of a particular quantity of silver by weight.

Overall, it may be that the disruption caused by inter-Mongol warfare was of less importance in the eyes of traders than a number of other circumstances that acted, rather, as a spur to commercial ventures: the injection of enormous quantities of plundered goods and capital into the Eurasian commercial network; a general reduction in the incidence of customs tariffs consequent upon the union of much of Asia under a single imperial regime (and even, after c.1260, its division into a relatively restricted number of large-scale polities); Mongol support for the development of urban centres; the presence of a multiplicity of sizeable nomadic courts; and a boost in demand for certain products, especially luxury items and slaves.

Western mercantile enterprise

There had been a Latin mercantile presence in the Frankish-held coastal towns of Syria and Palestine since soon after 1100 and in Constantinople for longer still. During the twelfth century, both Venetians and Genoese appeared in the Black Sea (the ‘Greater Sea’, as it was known in the
Latin world). In the wake of the Fourth Crusade, the Venetians obtained a privileged position in the former Byzantine dominions, including three-eighths of the city of Constantinople, and of ‘Romania’ as a whole, in full sovereignty (1204). But despite this, the evidence suggests that the scale of Venetian commercial activity in the Black Sea during the era of the Latin empire of Constantinople was modest. Insofar as the northern shores were concerned, it centred on the port of Soldaia (Sūdāq to the Muslims), in the Crimea; here Marco Polo’s uncle and namesake would come to own a house at some point after 1268 and from here also his two brothers had set out on their first journey in c.1260.

But it was the Genoese who would make the running in the Pontic region. Thanks to the Treaty of Nymphaeum, which they had sealed with the Nicaean Emperor Michael VIII in 1261, they replaced the Venetians in Constantinople following its recovery by Michael later that year, a development that compensated them for their expulsion from Acre in 1258 during the War of Saint-Sabas. In 1267, another agreement with Michael gave them their own quarter in Pera, to the east of the Golden Horn. Only at this juncture, apparently, did they begin to make their presence felt in the Black Sea. Soldaia, which was flourishing at the time of Rubruck’s visit in 1253, was rapidly supplanted by the base that the Genoese created at Kaffa (the ancient Theodosiopolis) in the Crimea (‘Khazaria’ or ‘Gazaria’, as the peninsula was known, after its one-time masters) from c.1275. Whether the recent loss of Tabrīz obliged the khan of the Golden Horde, for his part, to seek an outlet to the Mediterranean via the Straits and thus made him all the readier to enter into agreement with the Genoese, is open to question.

In some degree Italian commercial involvement in the Mongol world reflects the burgeoning prosperity of Western Europe by the thirteenth century. Symptomatic of this prosperity was the issue of a gold currency for the first time since the Carolingian era, with the minting of the Florentine florin and the Genoese genovino from 1252 and of the Venetian ducat from 1284; gold coinage did not emerge definitively in states outside Italy until well into the following century. From the later decades of the thirteenth century, too, the use of water to power the throwing mills that produced silk in northern Italy greatly increased capacity and hence the demand for raw silk. Although the Latin world undoubtedly lagged some considerable distance behind China in terms of both economic development and scientific achievement, its own technical expertise did nevertheless enable it to manufacture goods that would find a market in Asia. There had been a boom in cloth production, spearheaded by the Flemish towns, since the late twelfth century, and Western merchants carried with them finished woollen and linen cloths. The inventory of a Venetian merchant’s effects, drawn up in Tabrīz in 1263, shows that he had set out with linens from Germany, Lombardy and Venice and with woollen cloth from Milan.
Yet the Italian commercial activity surveyed in this chapter owed less to the vigour of the European economic system than to the welcome that merchants obtained from Mongol khans and the favourable environment that the Mongols had created in their vast Eurasian dominions. Moreover, although the Italian presence in the Black Sea has been regarded as a model for fifteenth-century Portuguese expansion, we should note that the primary impulse behind it was quite different. Both Venice and Genoa were vulnerable to commercial embargo by enemies in their hinterland and sought access to the plentiful supplies of grain and other agricultural products that the Black Sea offered; for this we have the testimony of a contemporary Venetian chronicler. What actuated the two Italian communes, in other words, was not so much commercial profit as the threat of famine and the quest for political security. We shall see that this incentive to maintain the Black Sea trade outlasted the era of trans-Asiatic commerce by several decades.

Nevertheless, the advent of the Mongols in the Pontic steppes greatly enhanced the economic importance of the region. Not for nothing did Brătianu describe the Black Sea in this era as a plaque tournante (an idiomatic, if loose, rendering in English might be ‘revolving door’). It now stood at the meeting-point of two previously separate commercial networks – one a maritime Mediterranean system, the other a system embracing the Eurasian land-mass. By the time of Marco Polo’s book, at the end of the thirteenth century, the Black Sea had become a major focus of Latin commercial activity. Polo – or perhaps, rather, an unknown Tuscan writer who composed an epilogue to his book in the early fourteenth century – denied any necessity to describe the Black Sea region because so many Venetian, Pisan and Genoese traders plied its waters and were daily recounting their experiences back home, but this may have been no more than a literary device.

In the first half of the fourteenth century, the Genoese enjoyed the reputation of being in the lead over a much broader geographical area, whether for commercial operations in the Near East or for personal experience of China. Professor Balard has demonstrated how active Genoese traders were throughout the Mongol dominions during this period. Word had reached Polo that they had recently begun to sail in the Caspian. Rashīd al-Dīn thought that all the Frankish merchants who visited North Africa, Egypt, Syria, Rūm or Tabrīz took ship from Genoa (though possibly his informant hailed from that city). When Guillaume Adam recommended launching ships on the Red Sea in order to sabotage Egypt’s commerce with the Indian Ocean, he proposed that the task be entrusted to the Genoese, as the people readiest to venture into distant parts. It was the Genoese brothers Ugolino and Vadino Vivaldi who in 1291 disappeared after embarking on the first known attempt to reach India by way of the Straits of Gibraltar, though whether they planned to sail around Africa or west across the Atlantic – whether, in other words, their voyage should be seen as anticipating Da
Gama or Columbus – we do not know. Most suggestive of the city’s pre-eminence, perhaps, is that Pegolotti’s handbook cites Genoese equivalents for the weights and measures in use on the route to ‘Cathay’.69

Goods of Chinese provenance had reached the West for some centuries, more recently through the agency of Muslim middlemen.70 But the date at which Latin traders first made direct contact with China is uncertain. In 1247, to judge from Carpini’s silence on the subject, there were no Western merchants to be found east of Kiev.71 The men from ‘Fulang’ (‘Franks’; one of the terms the Chinese used for Europe) who visited Qubilai’s court at Shangdu in 1261 are described as blonde and as originating from a land where the sun did not set; it has been suggested that they were from Novgorod.72 The Polos were conceivably the first Latin Europeans to visit China; the next may well have been Pietro da Lucalongo, probably a Venetian, who accompanied Montecorvino on his outward journey in 1291–3.73 And it was Venetian merchants who brought back Montecorvino’s first letter in c.1305.74 Possibly, therefore, the Venetians can claim to have reached the qaghan’s dominions in advance of their rivals. Yet in China too, the Genoese subsequently acquired a certain advantage. Documentary evidence indicates that Genoese merchants were involved in direct trade with the Far East in greater numbers and invested greater sums than their Venetian counterparts. The two children of an Italian merchant who are commemorated on tombstones of 1342 and 1344 at Yangzhou belonged to the Genoese Illioni family. A Latin bishop of Zaitun (the Persian name for Quanzhou, adopted also by Europeans), reporting the value of the pension he received from the qaghan, quoted the estimate of Genoese merchants. When Boccaccio, writing in the 1350s, introduced into his Decameron a fictional story set in Cathay, he appealed to the authority of ‘certain Genoese who have been there’.75 All but one of the fifteen Europeans who participated in the embassy from Qaghan Toghan Temür to Pope Benedict XII in 1336–8 were Genoese.76

Valid conclusions about Western commercial activity in Mongol Asia are not derived easily from the highly fragmentary source material, which emanates almost exclusively from the Latin side. Western merchants – though not always their names – surface in the letters of missionary friars and the martyrological accounts, which will be examined in the next chapter. These do not, of course, tell us anything about the nature of the merchants’ business, the size of the investment and the profit or loss made; here we are dependent on documentation preserved in the state archives of the Italian mercantile cities. At this juncture a word is required concerning contracts. The form of contract traditionally employed by Italian merchants in recent decades to finance commercial voyages was called commenda by the Genoese and colleganza by the Venetians. The partner who remained at home (known as the stans) bore all the risks but stood to gain the lion’s share (in Genoa, three-quarters) of the profits; the life of the contract was limited
to the duration of the journey. This was especially appropriate for trading ventures to distant and barely-known regions of Asia. Around the turn of the thirteenth century, however, the commenda-type partnership would be superseded – at least within the relatively familiar territory of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea – by more permanent forms of association. Merchants tended, rather, to remain at home and deal with agents who resided permanently in the European trading-posts (comptoirs); alternatively, several members of the same family might pool their capital and operate from different centres.77

The contracts themselves have not survived. Instead, we have notarial instruments from certain brief periods, such as the acta of the Genoese notaries, Lamberto di Sambuceto at Kaffa in the Crimea and Antonio di Podenzolo at Kilia, in the Danube estuary, from the years 1281–90 and 1360–1 respectively. The problem with this kind of material is that it is often highly reticent. The instrument concerned with the departure of Benedetto Vivaldi from Genoa in 1315 speaks only of a voyage to ‘Romania’, when we know from other sources that he in fact proceeded as far as India.78 Such reticence was not necessarily due to a reluctance on the trader’s part to spell out the nature of his business – still less his destination – for the benefit of would-be competitors; in a colleganza contract, the stans might well allow the geographical sphere of operations to remain vague simply from a desire to leave the travelling partner the maximum freedom of manoeuvre.79 More informative, of course, are the surviving decisions made by the commercial magistracy of the mother city in cases of dispute, when the journey was already completed.

The texts of a number of treaties with the Ilkhans and the khans of the Golden Horde, relating to Western commercial activity in their dominions, have survived from the fourteenth century. Some useful details can also be gleaned from the regesta of the deliberations for the period from 1329 onward of the Senate at Venice, where the government kept stricter control over commerce than did its Genoese counterpart and despatched an official convoy (muda) to the east every year.80 We possess, lastly, the two fourteenth-century commercial manuals from Florence which were previously mentioned. Naturally these handbooks do not constitute direct evidence, as would commercial documents; as has been pointed out, they tell us more about what merchants ideally expected to find in the East than what was in fact accessible.81 But the data they provide on such matters as commodities and routes are not altogether to be dismissed.

Commodities and profits in the trans-Asiatic trade

Tabrīz became the principal focus for the operations of Italian merchants in Persia, which have been so thoroughly examined by Professor Paviot.82 Given the city’s international trading connections, it was possible for
merchants to obtain there the majority of the articles they sought from India or the Far East. As we have seen, at least one Venetian trader had visited Tabrīz by 1263; the Genoese first appear there in 1280, and a Genoese con-
sul was in residence by 1304.83 The Venetians obtained full trading rights
in the Ilkhanate in successive treaties with the Ilkhans Öljeitü (1306) and
Abū Saʿīd (1320).84 By the 1320s, there are indications of a sizeable Italian
community in Tabrīz, and in 1341 the Genoese were numerous enough to
warrant the creation of an officium mercancie.85 Marco Polo tells us that
Tabrīz specialized in the production of cloth of gold and of silk, and that
European merchants purchased there precious stones in large quantities –
testimony confirmed by the anonymous Florentine manual.86 Pegolotti adds
that one could buy incense, leather, coral, bits of amber, mercury, tin, ver-
milion and furs such as ermine, leopard and marten.87 Tabrīz also served
as a distribution centre for the many different kinds of raw silk mentioned
in our sources, since they all originated within the Ilkhan’s territories: silk
was produced in Merv (in Khurāsān), Lāhijān, Gilān and Gurgān or Jurjān
(regions lying just south of the Caspian), and Ganja and Tālish (both in
Azerbaijan). Of these, the last named type was the most highly-priced of
all.88 It should be stressed that silk from these regions had been reaching
Italy for some time already – from Merv at least since 1191 and from the
Caspian regions since the 1230s.89

By Pegolotti’s era, the products of India and the Far East – spices such
as pepper, ginger and saffron; silk, cotton, linen and pearls – were similarly
available at Tana.90 There were attractions, nevertheless, in proceeding fur-
ther. The wares to be obtained from China that were especially valued were
spices and silk; although porcelain was manufactured in the great port of
Zaitun, only a few examples appear to have reached Europe prior to the
fifteenth century.91 The term ‘spices’ (spezierie) was frequently deployed
in a wider sense to embrace all the products of the East.92 Even in its nar-
rower sense, it subsumed dyestuffs, drugs and aromatic gums, as well as
culinary additives, and thus comprised pepper, ginger, cloves, cinnamon,
nutmeg, sugar, indigo, Brazil-wood, incense, aloes, shellac, galingale, mace
and ‘dragon’s blood’.93 Of these commodities, pepper was the most impor-
tant. Marco Polo describes the enormous quantities of pepper that reached
Zaitun and Quinsai and cites a customs official for the latter city’s daily
consumption of 43 basket-loads of 223 lb each.94 The chief sources of sup-
ply in the Yuan era were Java and the Malabar coast.95 European merchants
did not venture in person as far as Java, but they are known to have visited
Malabar and very probably obtained pepper also in the ports of China,
where imports from south-east Asia were available for a proverbially low
price. The Franciscan Odoric of Pordenone, whose interests extended well
beyond the harvesting of souls, was amazed at the cheapness of ginger
in Canton (‘Censcala’, i.e. Chīn-i kalān, ‘Great China’) and of sugar at
Zaitun.96
The volume of Chinese silk imported into the West is a matter of controversy. According to Pegolotti, it deteriorated considerably during the long overland journey, with the result that *seta catuia* (or *catuxia*, ‘Cathay silk’) became – by a pun that is lost in translation – *seta cattiva*, ‘rogue silk’, and sold for a lower price on the Genoese market than did silk from any other region of Asia. Professor Bautier is convinced that this cheapness reflected its quality rather than plentiful supply, since for him documentary evidence indicates that Chinese silk imports were outstripped by other varieties in terms of volume also. The counterargument rests on a twofold basis. Firstly, the evidence Bautier adduces for the low price of Chinese silk in the West is taken exclusively from the years 1338–40; in 1333, the prices fetched at Genoa had been almost 25% higher. And, secondly, taking the period as a whole, in the great majority of cases our sources speak only of *seta* without mentioning its provenance: possibly, therefore, imported Chinese silk was so familiar that it was unnecessary to be more specific. It should also be noted that Odoric comments on the remarkable cheapness of silk in China.

Linked with the price of silk is another controversial question: the number of Western merchants who participated actively in trade within Yuan China. Bautier’s position is as follows. When Chinese silk first reached Italy, in 1257–61, it was clearly obtained in Tabrīz or Laiais; there could have been no question of Europeans accompanying it from its place of origin. Accordingly, we have no reason to believe that all the Chinese silk imported into Europe at a later date was necessarily fetched direct from the Far East by Latin traders. In any case, he argues, the low esteem enjoyed by *seta catuia* hardly rendered the long journey worthwhile. Against this, Lopez points to the satisfactory profit realized on purchases of Chinese silk at its source (perhaps as high as 200%), while Balard cites unpublished documents that make no reference to silk but mention other, unspecified merchandise which may well have been more profitable and hence have justified the journey to the Far East. On balance, those who argue that by 1320 voyages to India and China were no longer an adventure but were a routine experience for Genoese and Venetian businessmen seem to have carried the day. Yet one symptom, possibly, of the relatively small number of Europeans involved in trade beyond Persia and the Pontic steppes is the apparent lack of any official intervention on the part of the home governments (see pp. 272–3).

It was necessary that the commodities carried out east by European merchants should weigh no less than the anticipated purchases (and weight was a particularly important consideration on the long overland journey to China) and bring in a return that would more than suffice to pay for them. Pegolotti advised his readers to leave Venice or Genoa with cloth, to sell it in Ürgench for silver ingots, and to travel onward with no other medium of exchange except, at most, a few rolls of high-quality textiles which would be light to carry; at the frontier of the qaghan’s dominions, the ingots would
be changed for paper currency. Among the commodities sold at Tana, he mentions wax, iron, tin, copper, pepper, ginger and all the ‘great’ spices, cotton, madder, tallow, cheeses, linen, oil and honey. Some of these were imports from the West: we know of Italian traders who brought tin to Kaffa and Tana.

The best opportunities, perhaps, came in the form of a business deal with a Mongol khan. Mongol rulers are known to have set especially high value on horses and jewellery, commodities which Qaghan Toghan Temür’s envoys to the pope requested on their master’s behalf in 1338. The list of objects that the Central Asian conqueror Temür particularly desired, as transmitted by John of Sultāniyya in 1403, is longer: luxury textiles of various kinds, coral, crystal and other goblets inlaid with gold and silver, silver vessels studded with polished emeralds ‘as are found in France’, fine camels from Cyprus, exotic fish-teeth, ‘banquiers’, impressive tapestries, high-quality saffron, large and strong horses, large dogs and large mules from Spain. Marco Polo tells us that his father and uncle, on their first journey in c.1261, sold their merchandise in Constantinople and used the profit to buy jewels – of amber or crystal – which they presented to Berke Khan of the Golden Horde. In return the khan entrusted them with goods worth twice the value of the jewels, which he sent them off to sell. Thus did the European merchant slip easily into the role of ortogh.

Many of those Europeans who ventured deep into Asia remain unidentifiable, particularly in the missionary accounts. Among those who made the journey to China and whose names have come down to us are Venetians – members of the widely-travelled Loredano family and the partners Andriolo Balanzano and Francesco Condulmer, who had a venture insimul ad Cataiam at some point prior to 1350. But the Genoese loom larger, like Andalò di Savignone, who made at least two journeys to China, was in Khanbaligh in 1330, participated in an embassy from the qaghan to Pope Benedict XII in 1338 (see p. 280) and travelled back east with John of Marignolli, the newly appointed archbishop of Khanbaligh. The brothers Ansaldo and Jacopo Oliviero, setting out in 1333, were later joined in China by their nephew Franceschino. A member of another group who made the journey to the Far East was Tommasino Gentile, left behind at Hurmuz owing to illness and obliged (not long before 1343) to return home via Tabrīz, thereby infringing the Genoese boycott of the city and provoking the lawsuit from which we learn all we know of this episode. Turning to India, we know similarly of three Italian traders – two Genoese and a Pisan – encountered by Friar Jordan in Gujarāt in c.1321, and two more Genoese, Benedetto Vivaldi and Percivalle Stancone, who were active in the subcontinent around the same date. A Venetian societas headed by Giovanni Loredano made an unusual journey overland to northern India in the years 1338–43: lured, no doubt, by the fabled munificence of Sultan Muḥammad ibn Tughluq, they travelled from Ürgench to Ghazna (then a Chaghadayid possession) and on
to Delhi.\textsuperscript{114} The destination of the Genoese partners whose contract, dated 1343, envisages that they may end up \textit{tam in partibus Catay et Indie quam in quibuscumque aliis partibus mundi} is regrettably unknown.\textsuperscript{115} For the most part, these men belonged to a relatively restricted group. They tend to bear names that recur often in the affairs of the Commune of Genoa or in the list of doges of Venice. We might expect that in view of the magnitude of the required investment, participation was confined to the well-to-do and that newcomers were debarred.\textsuperscript{116} Even so, Lopez is able to adduce evidence involving figures who were definitely outside the patrician class and concludes that society on this far-flung frontier of European endeavour was ‘open’, ‘almost democratic’.\textsuperscript{117}

Some of these long-distance traders never saw their home city again: Jacopo Oliviero and his nephew died in China; Giovanni Loredano, in the region of Ghazna; Benedetto Vivaldi, in India. This might entail the forfeiture of a considerable investment. Since the twelfth century, Muslim rulers like the Egyptian sultans had entered into commercial treaties with European city-states, whose merchants were thereby guaranteed the sort of rights that in the Islamic world had been traditionally enjoyed by \textit{musta\textquotesingle minān} – non-Muslim visitors in receipt of protection (\textit{amān}).\textsuperscript{118} One of these concessions was that the dead trader’s property should be entrusted, in the absence of an accompanying relative, to any of his co-nationals (though Marco Polo indicates that this was not the custom in Hurmuz, where the ruler confiscated the goods of dead foreign merchants).\textsuperscript{119} Since the late twelfth century, commercial agreements with Greek governments had begun to include similar guarantees.\textsuperscript{120} In the Mongol dominions, by contrast, only a brother (or an associate who claimed to be a brother) could obtain the goods of the deceased.\textsuperscript{121} Of all the agreements made by Mongol khans with the Venetians which have come down to us, that issued by the Ilkhan Abū Sa\textquotesingle ʿīd in 1320 alone stipulates that such goods be handed over to the Venetian consul.\textsuperscript{122}

One may well ask what level of profit could be made on protracted journeys into Asia. In 1321, Marino Sanudo would state that the articles which reached the West through the Ilkhan’s dominions, particularly ginger and cinnamon, were superior in quality to those which were channelled through Alexandria because these latter were impaired in the course of the long sea journey.\textsuperscript{123} He was, of course, advocating an embargo on trade with Egypt, and the claim may have been disingenuous, but if it contained any truth, it would help to explain the persistence of Westerners in seeking and using alternative routes. What ultimately decided whether Latin merchants made the journey across Asia or to the Far East, or instead refrained and fell back on Muslim intermediaries, was not so much considerations of security or danger as the cool calculation of profit and loss.\textsuperscript{124}

If duties payable to Mongol rulers in western Asia were relatively low, they could still be a subject for acrimonious dispute. By the terms of Özbeg's
diploma of 1333, Venetian traders were liable to the payment of a commercial tax (commercium) of 3% on all transactions, except those involving pearls, precious stones, gold, silver and gold thread. The treaty of 1347 raised the tax to 5%, so that in 1350 Venice was engaged in further negotiations with Jānībeg, doubtless in order to secure a reduction. In 1360 the Senate, having learned of the assassination of the khan Berdībeg and resolved to send two ambassadors to his successor, was unable to find any willing candidates and was forced to entrust the task instead to Jacopo Cornaro, the newly appointed consul who was on his way to Tana. Despite the parlous situation in the Golden Horde, he appears to have enjoyed some success. By 1369, the commercium stood at 4%, though Venetian merchants were complaining that the Genoese paid only 3% and the Senate hoped to obtain a further reduction from Mamai.

The documents examined by Lopez suggest that a return of 100% on the initial investment was not improbable and that the profit could soar to 500% on a long-distance venture; Tucci estimates the profits from the Delhi enterprise of 1338–9 at between 120% and 160%. Such gains, of course, have to be set against the fact that the capital might be tied up for a few years. It is also true that according to Polo the costs of transport incurred in the great Chinese ports were markedly higher than those payable on the overland route – at Zaitun, 30% for small-bulk, high-value merchandise, 40% for aloes and sandalwood and for heavier goods, and 44% for pepper – and that the duty payable to the qaghan stood at 10% (compared with the 3%–5% levied in the Golden Horde territories). When this outlay is taken into account, merchants were paying on average half of the value of the goods exported. Yet the cheapness of so many commodities in China seems amply to have compensated them: Polo adds that traders still made a weighty profit.

The decline of trans-Asiatic ventures

It is clear that European trade directly with India and the Far East was short-lived. The years c.1320–c.1340 were its heyday – the era in which Western merchants, relatively few in number, travelled beyond Tana and Tabrīz, to participate personally in commercial ventures in the Indian sub-continent, in Central Asia or in China. But this should not be overstated. Some Latins admittedly still visited China after this period, like the Genoese Gabriele Basso, who died not many years before 1363. The Genoese merchant who, according to the Songe du Vieil Pelerin of Philippe de Mézières, had recently arrived in Cyprus after spending fifty years in China (‘Inde le Major’, as it sometimes appears in medieval Western sources) may have left at the time of the final expulsion of the Yuan in 1368. Possibly the very last Latin to trade in China was the merchant ‘Niegulun’ (Niccolò?) from ‘Fulin’ (i.e. the land of the Franks), who according to a Ming dynasty source
had been stranded in the country at that point and was despatched by the
new emperor with a letter for his ‘king’ in 1371.132

It is conventional to attribute the collapse of trans-Asiatic trade to a
whole range of crises in the fourteenth century. In 1322, the Mamlûk Sultan
sacked Laiaš, which was, as we saw, a major terminus of one of the principal
overland routes, and in 1337 the Egyptians finally occupied the city.133 This
latter blow coincided with the disintegration of the Ilkhanate: after 1340,
the journey to China by way of Persia tended to be abandoned in favour
of the more northerly route from Tana.134 The Ilkhan’s successors in Azer-
baijan, the Chobanid rulers Ḥasan and his brother and successor Ashraf
(themselves of Mongol extraction), seem to have been particularly prone to
robbing and attacking foreign merchants. Exasperated by Ḥasan’s murder-
ous attacks on their nationals, the Venetians in 1338 issued a ban (devetum)
on trade with Tabrīz, as did the Genoese in 1340/1. A later Genoese chroni-
cler put the losses in 1344 – when Ashraf lured European merchants back
only to despoil them – at over 200,000 Genoese pounds.135 Italian traders
may have suffered no greater harm than did their Muslim counterparts, who
in 1352 were reported to have been emigrating from Persia to the Mamlûk
sultanate for some years.136 In the early 1360s, the Jalayirid ruler Shaykh
Uways, who had supplanted the Chobanids at Tabrīz, contrived to attract
Venetian merchants back into his dominions, but the failure of the experi-
ment led to a fresh ban.137

Another contributory development was undoubtedly the Black Death,
the pandemic generally believed to have originated in the steppes of Central
Asia (though there is no agreement as to the precise nature of the disease,
the vectors by which it was transmitted to the West or the reasons for its
recurrence over the following decades).138 It may have raged in the Cha-
ghadaiid dominions from c.1338 and have been present in Muslim India
as early as c.1335.139 Indeed, a handful of deaths in partibus Catagii, con-
centrated in the early 1340s, has prompted the suggestion that Europeans
abandoned China because of pestilence rather than the political upheavals
preceding the collapse of Mongol rule.140 The recurrent struggle between
Venice and Genoa – the War of the Straits in 1350–5, followed by the War
of Chioggia in 1376–81 – may also have had a disruptive effect on trade in
the Black Sea (though their thirteenth-century conflicts had not prevented
the Italians from assiduously building up their respective positions in the
East); the situation deteriorated still further, perhaps, with the collapse of
the Golden Horde into internecine strife after 1360.

Possibly the single most important circumstance behind the eclipse of the
transit traffic along the so-called Tartar route and through the Black Sea
was the resumption of commerce between the Italian mercantile cities and
the Mamlûk empire in 1345.141 By 1395, the volume of spices that reached
Venice via Alexandria and Beirut dwarfed the quantity that passed through
Tana, and it has been argued that the fall in volume at Tana was purely
relative. What effect the sack of the town by Temür in 1395 had is uncertain. In 1436, the Venetian traveller Giosafa Barbaro wrote nostalgically of the flourishing condition of Astrakhan prior to Temür’s campaigns in the Pontic steppe in the 1390s. But possibly the conqueror’s activities had little impact on a trade that was already greatly diminished. Writing in 1404, John of Sulṭāniyya mentions Moscow as the best point of departure for merchants travelling to China. Temür’s attack may therefore have deflected some trade far to the north. Whatever the case, men did not cease to dream of the revival of the Tana route – the chief impulse behind King Sigismund’s dealings with the Golden Horde khan, Jalāl al-Dīn, in 1412.

One element in all this which has not received sufficient attention is the impact on the Western European and Iranian economies of bullion flows between Europe and the Ilkhan’s dominions from the late thirteenth century to the 1320s. As we saw, gold currencies were slowly making their appearance in the West from the mid-thirteenth century onward, but in the Islamic world, the currencies were in silver, which was relatively overvalued. To put it in simple terms, Latin merchants brought silver to exchange for the gold (most of it arriving through the Gulf from southern India) that enjoyed greater prestige in Europe; the Ilkhans themselves manipulated the ratio of the two metals (usually 1:10) with a view to enhancing their revenues. By the mid-1320s, a dramatic shift had occurred in the relative values of gold and silver; the ratios were equalized, and the profitability of the bullion trade had greatly diminished. After 1340, the price of silver was rising once more, so that in 1352 the ratio was 1:5. The collapse of the bullion trade surely underlies both the economic difficulties that afflicted the Ilkhanate and its neighbours and other trading-partners during the 1330s and 1340s and the bankruptcies of Italian banking firms like the Bardi and the Peruzzi in 1345. But this is a subject that requires a good deal of further research.

In accounting for the demise of Italian participation in trans-Asiatic trade, it is important not to forget the domestic economic situation – the role of fourteenth-century economic stagnation in Western Europe in the process. In Venice, for instance, the state authorities had taken steps to rein in the currently high level of investment in maritime commerce by limiting, at intervals, the proportion of an individual’s capital that could be invested: the Capitulare navigantium, promulgated in 1324, set the maximum at the amount of capital for which an individual was officially liable to make forced loans to the state. As the century progressed, these forced loans themselves acted as a further brake on the economic capacity of the wealthier citizens. Economic restrictions at home made long-distance trade less alluring than other opportunities that were opening up closer at hand, like those that beckoned when the Genoese wrested the Aegean island of Chios from its Byzantine garrison in 1346.

On occasions, the home governments were ready to intervene in order to secure an amelioration of conditions for their merchants. In this context, two
recent papers by Professor Nicola Di Cosmo are of cardinal importance. In one he has pointed out that the turmoil in the Golden Horde from the 1360s onward, far from administering the death-blow to Genoese interests in the region, coincided with the very period in which the Genoese intensified their control over Pontic trade (discussed later in the chapter). In a second paper, he has distinguished two zones within the Asian trade networks: one, in which Italian traders were active as private individuals and owed nothing to any action on the part of their home governments; the other, in which these governments established direct relations with the Mongol khans in the interests of commerce. The former zone comprised China and Central Asia, the latter the Black Sea region and (to a lesser extent) Iran. There is no sign of Italian consuls in the ports of China, regulating the affairs of their co-nationals; nor is the Venetian Senate or the Genoese government known to have sent diplomatic missions to negotiate with the qaghan (or with the Mongol regimes in Central Asia), as they did to the Ilkhans and to the rulers of the Golden Horde. This readiness by the metropolis in Europe to influence foreign rulers on behalf of its nationals is yet another variable in the equation. Without it, Italian traders were dependent exclusively on the capacity or the willingness of Mongol sovereigns to guarantee a favourable environment for commercial activity, and when the Mongol regime failed them – as it did in China, Central Asia and Persia – there was nothing left to render their presence worthwhile.

The Pontic zone

The Pontic zone retained its importance for considerably longer. The depth of Italian involvement in Central Asia and the Far East at no time remotely approached the levels in the Black Sea region, where the relative proximity of the headquarters of the Golden Horde khans stimulated economic activity and the khans themselves promoted the growth of several new urban centres. The terminology employed in discussing Western mercantile operations can be misleading, and we have to distinguish between the successive stages in which an Italian presence manifested itself: intermittent to regular visits by Genoese or Venetian ships; the construction of warehouses for the storage of goods; the growth of a settlement, centred on a church, a bakery and baths; the appointment by the mother city of a consul to preside over the affairs of its citizens; and the recognition of some degree of extra-territoriality through an official treaty with the Mongol khan. A Genoese consul is first encountered at Kaffa in 1281, at Trebizond in 1290, at Vicina (in the Danube estuary) in 1298 and at Tana in 1304. Despite the setback of 1261, the Venetians did not lag far behind. Michael VIII, reconciled with them, granted them in 1277 the right to pass the Straits, and in 1285 his son Andronicus II gave them a still more advantageous treaty. In 1288, they registered the importance they attached to the region by appointing a
consul in Soldaia with authority over the whole of the Crimea. In 1319, they secured their own quarter in Trebizond. It is clear that the Venetians were already trading in Tana from the beginning of the century; a Venetian consul first appears there between 1317 and 1325. Yet it was not until 1332 that they obtained an agreement with the Khan Özbeg permitting them to establish a base at Tana in return for the annual payment of a land-rent (terraticum) and a commercial tax (commercium) on all goods that passed through their hands.

The growing commercial hegemony of the Genoese in the Pontic region constitutes the most impressive monument to their energies. They had two aims: to assert their own sovereignty over Kaffa at the expense of the rulers of the Golden Horde and to exclude their principal competitors from obtaining an autonomous base in the Black Sea that might rival Kaffa. The former aspiration gave rise to tensions and even full-blown hostilities with the Golden Horde rulers. In 1308, Toqto’a sacked Kaffa on the grounds that the Genoese were kidnapping and enslaving his subjects; perhaps, too, he resented their close relations with his enemy, the Ilkhan. In the wake of this attack, the town was abandoned for five years. We are more fully informed about the prolonged conflict that broke out between the Italians and the khan Jānībeg in 1343, entailing the massacre of Western merchants in the Horde’s territory and a three-year siege of Kaffa. The pretext
was the death of a Mongol notable at the hands of a Venetian merchant in Tana, but a number of observers saw as the real cause of Jānībeg’s attack the previously mentioned ambitions of the Genoese (the khan’s actions may also have been linked with the difficulties the Venetians were experiencing at both Trebizond and Tabriz in the early 1340s).162 The Venetian Senate, acting in concert with the Genoese, prohibited all journeys to Tana, while endeavouring unsuccessfully to reach an accommodation with the khan. In 1345, Pope Clement VI authorized a crusade against Jānībeg in order to relieve Kaffa – the only known instance of a crusade in defence of a Latin population within Mongol territory.163 The following year, in a possibly apocryphal incident immortalized by the contemporary writer Gabriel de Mussis, the khan’s forces catapulted into the city the heads of comrades who had died of the plague and thereby accelerated the transmission of the Black Death to Western Europe.164 In 1347, the two Italian powers made their peace with the khan separately, though the Venetians received less favourable terms than the Genoese.

Kaffa, described by a Venetian observer in 1404 as a huge city which could scarcely contain its populace,165 was then only the foremost among Genoa’s network of Black Sea ports. In the Crimean peninsula, the Genoese had occupied the fortress of Cembalo (Balaklava) at some point around 1350, as an additional bulwark for Kaffa,166 and in 1365 Soldaia (which the Venetians had lost in 1343 and failed to retrieve), subsequently extending their authority over the eighteen settlements in its rural hinterland. Around the northern and western Black Sea littoral, they held Vicina (operational until c.1350); Licostomo, in the Danube estuary, seized in c.1350, during the War of the Straits167 and the seat of a Genoese consul by 1372;168 Mau-rocastro at the mouth of the Dniester; and Illice, in the Dnieper estuary, purchased from the Mongols at the beginning of the fifteenth century.169

In the years 1380–7 the Genoese at Kaffa finally achieved sovereign status through a series of treaties with the khan Toqtamish, initially by dint of their support against Mamai, more latterly as the price of their neutrality during his campaigns into Temür’s territory. These agreements gave Genoa full possession not only of Kaffa itself but also of a number of trading-posts around the north-western coast of the Black Sea.170

In their second aim, the Genoese were ultimately less successful. For well over half a century, they made difficulties for their principal competitors. Returning to Kaffa in 1316, Genoese merchants were forbidden to trade with the Venetians at Soldaia.171 In particular, as early as 1268, Genoa was striving to deny the Venetians the opportunity to ensconce themselves further east at Tana. After the Venetians’ treaty with Özbeg, tensions with their Genoese neighbours in Tana ran high, so that in 1341 the Venetian Senate asked the khan to grant its nationals a different quarter of the town, at some distance from that of the Genoese.172 Even during the conflict of 1343–7 with the Golden Horde, which had pushed the two Italian powers
into a temporary alliance, the Genoese continued to work for the removal of their competitors from Tana. Their efforts were unavailing: in 1347, the Venetians returned to Tana by virtue of a new diploma from the khan and remained there without further interruption until the town was sacked by Temür’s forces in 1395. Reoccupying Tana in the early fifteenth century, they held on until it fell to the Ottomans, perhaps before Kaffa was taken in 1475.

If the Genoese efforts to limit and control Venetian activity in the Black Sea ultimately failed, we might note, nevertheless, that Tana was the only base which the Venetians successfully developed; they gained little from Jānībeg’s grant in 1355 of the insignificant port of Provato, between Kaffa and Soldaia. Moreover, in contrast with the Genoese in their commercial outposts further west after the 1380s or indeed with Crete and Venice’s other island possessions in the Aegean, the Venetians never enjoyed sovereign rights over Tana. For this reason it is less appropriate to talk of a Venetian ‘colony’ here than of a ‘concession’.

The importance of the Pontic region is borne out by the behaviour of the Italians, which does not suggest that they viewed these outposts as dispensable or peripheral. After the Genoese returned to Kaffa in 1313/16, the home government thought it worthwhile to appoint a commission of eight of its citizens, the Officium Gazarie, to oversee Genoese interests in the Black Sea. The Genoese entrenched themselves still more strongly in the city, embarking on an extensive fortification programme from 1316 onward to replace the earlier wooden palisade, and this work was still further extended following the siege by Jānībeg, though the size of the garrison was never adequate. So too the Venetians – though less successful than their rivals – took steps to fortify Tana in the early fifteenth century after its sack by Temür. Evidently the Europeans were not unduly disheartened either by the periodic hostility of the Golden Horde or by the political vicissitudes of the region.

The fact is that Italian involvement in the Black Sea cannot be understood purely in the context of a transit trade in luxury products from the Far East. For only a few decades – perhaps for about thirty years after c.1315 – was this a major focus of Genoese and Venetian activities in Tana and Kaffa. Of the 900 or so documents drawn up at Kaffa by Lamberto di Sambuceto in 1289–90, only five mention silk (from Merv) and very few reveal a trace of spices; none is concerned with Tana. The Florentine manual of c.1315 says that spezierie were available at Tana in only limited quantities, except for sugar and saffron; as we have seen, spices loomed larger here by Pegolotti’s time.

The chief articles of trade were furs and slaves. In 1253, Rubruck had noticed the lively traffic at Soldaia, where merchants from Rus’ met those from Anatolia and exchanged the furs of the northern forests for cotton cloth, silk and spices. Since the advent of the Mongols, the northern Rus’
principalities had been obliged to pay tribute mainly in pelts. Under pressure from the Golden Horde, luxury furs from the northern forests – sable, lynx and ermine – were channelled southward through Bulghär to Sarai. The Italians in the Tana–Kaffa region thus had access not only to the squirrel and beaver furs obtainable locally, for which in 1320 Genoese traders ventured as far as Sarai itself, but mounting quantities of much more valuable pelts. These are mentioned by Pegolotti but not by his anonymous predecessor, suggesting that in the 1330s their arrival in the Pontic region may have been still recent. The flow of northern furs grew with the development of closer relations between the Golden Horde khans and the princes of Moscow, who in the late 1320s wrested control over the northern routes from their kinsmen, the princes of Rostov.

Italian merchants had been engaged in the Pontic slave traffic as early as 1246, when Innocent IV endeavoured to secure the release of Christian slaves – Greeks, Bulgarians, Vlachs and Rus’ – whom they were selling to the Muslims. Within a short time, however, these were probably greatly outnumbered by ‘Tartars’. Marco Polo brought back with him a ‘Tartar’ slave, Peter, whom he freed in his will in 1324. Tartar slaves were among the most frequent and most valuable exports to Western Europe from both Tana and Kaffa. In this context the term ‘Tartar’ also denoted Cumans and peoples from the eastern coast of the Black Sea – Circassians, Abkhaz and Georgians. Of those who were genuinely Mongols, many would have been prisoners of war enslaved in the numerous conflicts between the various khanates, even in regions as distant as eastern Asia. Muslim authors report a glut of slaves on the Egyptian market in 1288, following a victory by Qaidu over Qubilai’s forces in present-day Mongolia; there is no reason to doubt that a proportion of the captives would have found their way instead to the Crimea. Particularly in the wake of the depopulation caused by the Black Death in Europe, Tartar slaves were required for working the land in Venetian Crete; a good many were employed in a domestic capacity in Italian households, where they appear right down into the fifteenth century; and they turn up even as far west as the Iberian peninsula. Towards the end of the fourteenth century, the Venetian government attempted to limit the number of slaves carried by vessels from Tana, though to no avail. Another important and still more lucrative element in this commerce was the large number of adolescent Cuman/Qipchak males shipped through the Straits to Egypt, to be bought by the Sultan and his amirs, reared as Muslims and trained as mamlûk troops. Such traffic in vital war material was roundly condemned by successive popes and crusade theorists – and continued, nevertheless, to be pursued by Italian merchants. Professor Balard suggests that slave-dealing at Kaffa peaked around 1410–20 and declined steadily only thereafter.

Among the principal attractions of the Pontic region, moreover, were its own products: fish (particularly sturgeon) from the Danube delta, the Sea
of Azov and also the Caspian;\textsuperscript{192} honey and wax from the lower Danube; wheat and millet from a vast hinterland extending to the west and north of the Black Sea; cattle- and horse-hides from the steppe nomads; salt from the lands east of the isthmus of Perekop (which according to Rubruck was in great demand in Rus’ and was bringing Batu and Sartaq a considerable revenue) and from the lakes between the Danube and the Dniester;\textsuperscript{193} copper from Kastamonu;\textsuperscript{194} and alum, also from Anatolia and a mineral indispensable to the dyeing process. Two Italian businessmen, one of them Genoese, had secured a monopoly of the sale of alum from the Seljuk Sultan as early as the mid-1240s; but by 1290 the Genoese enjoyed exclusive rights.\textsuperscript{195}

These Black Sea ports served a market that was largely regional. Around 1290, some of the fish and most of the salt from the Don estuary were taken to Trebizond, and the vessels that carried these goods brought back alum.\textsuperscript{196} Constantinople imported foodstuffs from the western littoral of the Black Sea.\textsuperscript{197} The corn from the Russian plains exported through Kaffa, which Pegolotti thought was the best of the entire Pontic region,\textsuperscript{198} was the chief source of supply for the cities on the southern coast of the Black Sea, not least Trebizond, and this trade too was in the hands of the Genoese and Venetians.\textsuperscript{199} Yet the Pontic zone also served as a lifeline – an irregular and vulnerable lifeline, admittedly – for their mother cities (see p. 263 above). The years 1384 and 1406, when Kaffa alone furnished Genoa with 36\% of its known imports of grain,\textsuperscript{200} were doubtless exceptional, but in 1390–1, corn from Kaffa made up 10\%–14\% of Genoa’s own supply, while ‘Romania’ provided a further 16\%–18\%.\textsuperscript{201} The importance of Black Sea wheat to the Venetians (who were less dependent on it than were the Genoese) is clear from the fact that a dearth of grain in Venice pushed the Senate into seeking peace with Jānībeg in 1347.\textsuperscript{202} In times of crisis, of course, Kaffa itself was obliged to import grain – from Italy, from ‘Romania’ or even from the southern Black Sea coast; and after 1420, the direction of the grain trade, which had run fairly consistently from north to south, would go into reverse.\textsuperscript{203}

The salience of the Pontic zone was accentuated in the second half of the fourteenth century by the development of routes linking Genoa’s entrepôts along the western littoral with Central Europe, where the Hungarian and Polish kings had pushed back the Mongol frontier and were keen to promote the prosperity of their newly-acquired dominions.\textsuperscript{204} One of these routes began at Licostomo in the Danube estuary and passed through Wallachia to the Hungarian town of Brassó (Braşov), whose merchants received extensive privileges from King Louis I in 1358 and 1369. The other – of slightly later date since it is first attested in 1386 – started from Maurocastro, traversed Moldavia to Lwów and thence passed through Poland to the Baltic.\textsuperscript{205} Participation in this burgeoning trade compensated the Genoese for their failure to subordinate Venetian operations in the Black Sea to their own interests. Together with a flourishing network of local commerce, it
guaranteed the florescence of Kaffa and other Genoese trading-posts well after the traffic in luxury items had dried up – and indeed right down to the Ottoman occupation in the late fifteenth century.

The Polos and other Western adventurers in the Mongol dominions

If the Mongols were instrumental in the growth of trade both within and beyond their dominions, they played an active and major role, too, in the nurturing of inter-civilizational contacts through the movement of people. This was not just a question of transporting prisoners in large numbers from one end of Asia to the other; it further included the patronage and employment of experts in a great many fields, namely those that could be deemed of interest to Mongol rulers: medicine, astronomy and astrology, diplomatic skills and – more mundanely – languages, since an empire of this size stood in considerable need of the services of translators and interpreters. In the Yuan empire, many of those involved belonged to the class termed in Chinese semu ren (‘Miscellaneous Peoples’) – Western and Central Asians and Europeans – who enjoyed a status higher than that of the Kitan, Jurchen and Han Chinese and second only to the Mongols themselves.

The most celebrated Western visitor to the Mongol world does not emerge from his book as primarily a merchant. True, some attention is given to the products of each city or region, but Marco Polo’s book is no commercial manual of the sort produced by Pegolotti three decades or so later. It has been proposed that such was the original character of the work, obscured thanks to the intervention of Rustichello. More recently, this view has been challenged, in part on the grounds that the book contains numerous observations that are of no commercial interest and that it antedates the commercial handbooks (with the exception of that produced by a Pisan writer in 1278) by several years. Rather, Polo comes across as a young man whose accomplishments rendered him in some measure valuable to the Mongol administration in China, even if he did not rise, as his book alleges, to the rank of provincial governor of Yangzhou (it has been suggested that he was merely in charge of the government salt monopoly in the city). What he tells us might suggest that the skills for which the Polos were particularly valued were diplomatic and even nautical. The Yuan government, clearly concerned to revive China’s maritime trade, despatched a series of missions to peninsular India and Ceylon from 1278 onward, but some of these arose from the qaghan’s own keenness to acquire exotica like the alms-bowl of the Buddha. Marco himself clearly spent a significant proportion of his time in Qubilai’s service at sea, on journeys designed to secure precious items for the imperial collection.

The Polos, then, occupy the point on the spectrum where Western merchants blend with another group: those Latins (mainly Italians) who sought
remunerative service with Mongol rulers. One possible means of self-enrichment was to be selected as an envoy; in Central Asia, the distinction between merchant and ambassador was traditionally blurred in any case. We have seen how the Ilkhans employed expatriate Latins in their negotiations with the West, notably the Genoese Buscarello de’ Ghisolfi and the Pisan Isolo di Anastasio. Giovanni Villani tells of Guiscard Bastari, a fellow Florentine who had been at the Ilkhan’s court since childhood, returning to the West in 1300 as part of Ghazan’s embassy to Boniface VIII; he was the chronicler’s informant concerning current events in Syria. Relatively late examples are the two Genoese, Andrea di Nascio, who served the last Yuan emperor, Toghan Temür, as ambassador to Pope Benedict XII, and Andalò di Savignone, who accompanied the embassy (and was long believed to have been the ambassador).

Another path to profit was simply to pass oneself off as an envoy. Rubruck was told of a cleric from Acre named Theodolus (alias Raymond), who had been at the qaghan’s court a year or so before the Franciscan’s own arrival. Having attached himself originally to the embassy of Andrew of Longjumeau (1249), he remained in Central Asia following Andrew’s return and contrived to be sent on an embassy from Möngke to the pope; but en route, at the court of the Nicaean Emperor John III Vatatzes, his imposture was detected, and he was thrown into prison. ‘Hoaxers like this scurry about all over the world’, explains Rubruck, ‘and if the Mongols can catch them they put them to death’. We encounter another example in 1276, when the Vassalli brothers warned Edward I of England that a certain Catalan was masquerading as the Ilkhan’s ambassador, in order to acquire gerfalcons as gifts for his supposed master and to sell them later for a handsome profit.

Other expatriate Westerners merely sought to sell their military, administrative or even medical talents to Mongol rulers. After an early encounter with Western valour which is described by Simon of Saint-Quentin – when they compelled two Latins captured at Arzinjān in 1242 to engage in a gladiatorial contest, only to suffer heavy casualties as the antagonists turned their swords on the audience – the Mongols seem to have proved more accommodating towards European warriors. Bargadin, a soldier of fortune from Metz mentioned by Philippe de Mézières, would have fitted into this category – assuming, of course, that he genuinely existed. Philippe says that the man spent eight years at Khanbaligh in the qaghan’s service and claims to be indebted to him for certain details in the Songe du Vieil Pelerin. Authentic or not, however, Bargadin represents a familiar type. A corps of Frankish mangonel experts accompanied an Ilkhanid army which took Herat in 1307, and Genoese mercenaries fought in Mamai’s army against the prince of Moscow at Kulikovo Pole in 1380. In 1301, Isolo di Anastasio, himself an expatriate who represented Ghazan on various diplomatic missions, interceded for a fellow Pisan, Strena di Bonfante, who had at one
MAP 10.2 The Mongol world after 1260 (showing Latin missionary and commercial outposts)
time served the Ilkhan against the Mamlūks but had since been captured by the Neapolitans during a naval engagement with the Sicilian fleet.\textsuperscript{221}

Military expertise was not, of course, the only kind the Mongols valued. The Lombard physician whose stories about the situation in Western Europe so disturbed Montecorvino had probably come out to China with the aim of capitalizing on his skills.\textsuperscript{222} What we are told of other expatriates does not indicate the precise talents that might have rendered them useful. In 1328, recognition of his citizenship was granted to Isaccho Venier, who as a child in 1291 had fled from Acre \textit{ad partes ulteriores Tartarorum} and had now returned to Venice after thirty-seven years’ absence.\textsuperscript{223} And as late as 1394, a Majorcan was reported to be freshly back in Aragon from the Great Khan’s dominions after an absence of forty years.\textsuperscript{224} If he had indeed been in China within the three decades or so preceding his homeward journey, he would have witnessed the fall of the Yuan and the establishment of the native Ming dynasty.

We have no way of ascertaining how many Latin Christians took up residence in the Mongol dominions in the later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. And whether they played any part in the transmission of Chinese technical knowledge is uncertain – assuming that such transmission occurred. Just as Marco Polo’s role in the introduction of spaghetti has been discredited as the product of late sixteenth-century English credulity, so the West’s indebtedness to the Chinese for the development of, say, gunpowder, the compass or printing remains subject to serious doubt.\textsuperscript{225}

Notes


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10 See generally Biran, Qaidu, pp. 97–105.

11 Allsen, Culture and Conquest, passim.


14 Ibid., p. 27–45.


22 For the most thoroughgoing information on routes across the western half of the Mongol empire, see W. Barthold, An Historical Geography of Iran, tr. Svat Soucek and ed. C.E. Bosworth (Princeton, NJ, 1984), and V. L. Egorov, Istoricheskaia geografija Zolotoi Ordy XIII–XIV vv. (Moscow, 1985). Dorothea Krawulsky, Iran – Das Reich der Ilhān, Beihefte zum Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients, Reihe B Geisteswissenschaften, 17 (Wiesbaden, 1978), provides a gazetteer.


24 For what follows, see ibid., pp. 286–8, 315–16; Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, La pratica della mercatura, ed. Allan Evans (Cambridge, MA, 1936), p. 21. For Saraichik and Ürgench, see Egorov, pp. 124–5, 126, respectively.


26 Ibn Fadl-Allāh al- Umarī, Masālik, ed. and tr. Lech, Das mongolische Weltreich, p. 30 (German tr. p. 111). On Quinsai (from Xingzai, ‘provisional capital’, the
name given to Hangzhou in the last days of the Song), see generally A. C. Moule, *Quinsai, with Other Notes on Marco Polo* (Cambridge, 1957).


30 Apparently described in MP, II, pp. 4–22 (tr. Ricci, pp. 60–75; tr. Latham, pp. 48–60), *passim*.


33 Pegolotti, p. 22.


36 MP, I, pp. 119–20 (tr. Ricci, pp. 3–4; tr. Latham, pp. 2–3). On the latter occasion, only Ramusio’s text blames war for the delay (cf. Ricci trans., p. 4); in the former case, Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, I, pp. 94–5, thought Berke’s attack on Byzantine Thrace (p. 171 above) a more likely explanation.


38 MP, I, pp. 132–3 (tr. Ricci, pp. 15–16; tr. Latham, pp. 10–11), a section absent from the Tuscan or French–Italian texts; for the date 1291, see John H. Pryor,
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41 Waṣṣaf, lithograph edn, pp. 50–1 (ed. Hammer-Purgstall, I, text p. 98, tr. p. 94).

42 Thus according to Mamlūk authors: see Jackson, Mongols and the Islamic World, p. 219.

43 Pegolotti, p. 22.

44 RDSV, I, p. 49 (no. 138).


53 See Jacoby, ‘Marco Polo’, pp. 194–8, demonstrating that Marco senior is unlikely to have been resident in Soldaia or even in Constantinople as early as 1260, as previously thought.
56 Ciocîltan, ibid., pp. 147–50 and *passim*.
70 References in Reichert, *Begegnungen*, p. 81.
71 Guzman, ‘European clerical envoys’, pp. 59–60. Those at Kiev, listed by PC, ix, 51, p. 129 (tr. Dawson, p. 71), include a number of Italians.
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72 Herbert Franke, ‘Sino-Western contacts under the Mongol empire’, *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 6 (1966), pp. 49–72 (here pp. 54–5), repr. in his *China under Mongol Rule*.


87 Pegolotti, pp. 26–7.


90 Pegolotti, p. 24.

93 Listed by Bautier, *Les relations économiques*, p. 293.
101 Lopez, ‘Nuove luci’, pp. 100–1, and ‘Nouveaux documents’, pp. 446–7, pointing out that the family of one of the Genoese merchants named had been active in Laïas for some decades; for the documents, see ‘Nuove luci’, pp. 129–31 (nos. 1–5).
104 Pegolotti, pp. 22–3.


DVL, I, p. 243 (no. 125).


The percentages vary in the different ms. traditions, and only Ramusio’s version contains the remark about profits: see MP, V, p. 130 (cf. Ricci trans., p. 264, and Latham trans., p. 209).


Boase, ‘History of the kingdom’, p. 31. The latter date is often given incorrectly as 1347.


This is not the place to discuss these questions, on which there is an enormous literature. Recent scientific work on the pandemic includes Nils Chr. Stenseth, Noelle I. Samia, Hildegunn Viljugreim, Kyrre Linné Kaurrud, Mike Begon, Stephen Davis, Herwig Leirs, V.M. Dubynskiy, Jan Esper, Vladimir S. Ageyev, Nikolay L. Klassovsky, Sergey B. Pole and Kung-Sik Chan, ‘Plague dynamics are driven by climate variation’, PNAS 103, no. 35 (29 Aug. 2006), pp. 13110–15; Brian H. Bossak and Mark R. Welford, ‘Did medieval trade activity and a viral etiology control the spatial extent and seasonal distribution of Black Death mortality?’, *Medical Hypotheses* 72 (2009), pp. 749–52; and Boris V. Schmid, Ulf Büntgen, W. Ryan Easterday, Christian Ginzler, Lars Walloe, Barbara Bramanti and Nils Chr. Stenseth, ‘Climate-driven introduction of the


140 Lopez, ‘Nouveaux documents’, p. 457. For what little is known of the plague in late Yuan China, see William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (Oxford, 1977), pp. 162–4; and see the map in Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, fig. 7 at p. 172. See also p. 271 above.

141 Ashtor, Levant Trade, pp. 65–70.


150 On Chios, see Balard, La Romanie génoise, I, pp. 119–26.


152 Nicola Di Cosmo, ‘Venice, Genoa, the Golden Horde, and the limits of European expansion in Asia’, in Schmieder and Schreiner, Il Codice Cumanico, pp. 279–96. Cf. also his ‘Circostanze e limiti dell’espansione veneziana in Oriente

153 See generally G. A. Fyodorov-Davydov, The Culture of the Golden Horde Cities, tr. H. Bartlett Wells, BAR International Series 198 (Oxford, 1984), esp. pp. 8–32, though the conceptual framework is unhelpful and the idea that the khans emancipated themselves from control by the qaghan’s representatives only at the end of the thirteenth century must be discarded.


160 Ciocîltan, Mongols and the Black Sea Trade, pp. 163–8.


162 Berindei and Veinstein, pp. 122–3, n.42.


167 Certainly by 1358/9, when they prevented Venetians from buying corn there: DVL, II, p. 58 (no. 31).

For these and other Genoese strongpoints, see generally Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, I, pp. 156–62.

Virgil Ciocîltan, ‘Reichspolitik und Handel. Die tatarisch-genuesischen Verträge von 1380–1387’, MN 1 (1994), pp. 261–78. The same author (*Mongols and the Black Sea Trade*, pp. 178, 180–1, 184–6; and cf. also 204) argues that Özbeg had granted extraterritorial status to Genoese Kaffa in 1313/16, though, as he concedes, the direct evidence has not survived. See ibid., pp. 225–33, 236–40, for the treaties of 1380–7.


184 For the Cumans, see Charles Verlinden, ‘Esclavage et ethnographie sur les bords de la mer Noire (XIIIe et XIVe siècles)’, in Miscellanea historicum in honorem Leonis van der Essen (Brussels and Paris, 1947), pp. 287–98 (here pp. 288–92, 297–8).

185 Baybars al-Manṣūrī, Zubdat al-fikra, p. 262, and al-Nuwayrī, Niḥāyāt al-ʿarab, XXVII, pp. 354–5, both ad annum 687 H.: the details of the war in Mongolia are confused. See Biran, Qaidu, p. 63 and n.219.


190 Berindei and Veinstein, p. 133, n.80, citing Pegolotti, p. 380.


193 Berindei and Veinstein, pp. 131–2.

194 Berindei and Veinstein, pp. 131–2. Cf. also Berindei and Veinstein, pp. 131–2.

Hostility suspended

198 Pegolotti, p. 42.
201 Balard, La Romanie génoise, II, p. 762; see generally ibid., I, p. 149, and II, pp. 758–68, for the export of Pontic grain to Genoa.
204 For mid-fourteenth-century efforts by the Bohemian and Hungarian kings to increase trade with Western Europe, see Balázs Nagy, ‘Transcontinental trade from East-Central Europe to Western Europe (fourteenth and fifteenth centuries)’, in Nagy and Sebők, Man of Many Devices, pp. 347–56 (here pp. 348–50).
208 There is a prodigious quantity of scholarship on Marco Polo and his travels: see the extensive bibliography in Hans Ulrich Vogel, Marco Polo Was in China. New Evidence from Currencies, Salts and Revenues (Leiden, 2013).
210 Hyde, ‘Ethnographers’, pp. 188–9. Larner, Marco Polo, pp. 73–4, points out that, in any case, handbooks of the La pratica della mercatura type were designed to circulate only within the author’s own immediate milieu and could not be allowed to fall into the hands of competitors. For the handbook of 1278, see now David Jacoby, ‘The Pisan commercial manual of 1278 in the Mediterranean context’, in Cardini and Lemut, eds., Quel mar che la terra inghirlanda, II, pp. 449–64. For a restatement of the case for Polo as a merchant, see Joan-Pau Rubiés, Travel and Ethnology in the Renaissance. South India Through European Eyes, 1250–1625 (Cambridge, 2000), p. 81 and n.109.
211 As suggested by Pelliot, Notes on Marco Polo, II, p. 834. But cf. the objections of Critchley, pp. 78–9, and Larner, Marco Polo, p. 65, and now the detailed consideration in Vogel, Marco Polo Was in China, pp. 348–64.
Western traders and adventurers


216 WR, xxix, 7–13, pp. 166, 168, 170 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 184–7); on their fate, see also viii, 2, p. 44 (tr. p. 94).


218 SSQ, pp. 73–4 (= VB, xxxi, 146).


The Mongols’ emergence on the eastern borders of Latin Christendom might not have seemed to offer promising conditions for the spread of Christianity. But through their conquests, vast tracts of Asia which hitherto had either lain beyond the West’s horizons or had been under Islamic rule and hence closed to Christian proselytism were now subject to a regime which permitted the propagation of all faiths. From the late 1240s, moreover, heartening news was reaching Western Europe: that the Mongols believed in one God; that certain members of the Chinggisid dynasty – Sartaq, Sorqaqtani and, later, Doquz Khatun – were Christians or harboured Christian sympathies; and that large numbers of Christians (mostly adherents of the ‘separated’ churches – the Nestorians, or East Syrians, and the Jacobites – but also including Greek Orthodox and Armenians) lived under Mongol rule. These circumstances drew members of the newly-founded Mendicant Orders, the Franciscans and Dominicans, into Asia in the hope of converting the Mongols and their subjects. The fragmentation of the Mongol empire into rival khanates after 1261–2 in no way curtailed the opportunities for Latin missionaries. Indeed, the Ilkhans’ eagerness to obtain Western collaboration against the Mamlūk Sultanate seemed to heighten the possibility that they might embrace the Christian faith. We should not forget that the missionaries’ task was an urgent one and charged with eschatological significance. From the pontificate of Gregory IX onward – and thus from a date preceding the advent of the Mongols – the issuance of a whole series of bulls commencing with the phrase ‘Cum hora undecima’ (‘Since it is the eleventh hour’) bore witness to the conviction that the Last Things were not far off, but, conversely, it was axiomatic that Christ would not return until the Gospel had been preached to all the nations of the world.
The growth of the Latin mission

We must discount, as evangelistic enterprises, the journeys of Carpini, Ascelin and Andrew of Longjumeau in 1245–51, which (even though the embassies of 1245 carried a letter inviting the Mongol ruler to embrace Christianity) were essentially diplomatic in character. The first missionaries, properly speaking, known to have visited the Mongol world were the Franciscans William of Rubruck and Bartholomew of Cremona, who set out in 1253 from Louis IX’s crusade headquarters in Palestine for Sartaq’s territory in the Pontic steppe. In part they were motivated by rumours that the prince was a Christian. But Rubruck’s primary purpose, he tells us, was to bring spiritual comfort to a group of German slaves in Central Asia of whose existence Andrew had learned, though in the event he was unable to make contact with them. During his return journey through Greater Armenia in 1255, Rubruck met a party of five Dominicans, whose intention was to preach in Sartaq’s domain, but the letter they carried from Pope Innocent IV referred *inter alia* to the Mongols’ Christian captives. The combination of aims recurs during these early years, when the plight of Latins whom the Mongols had enslaved may well have been paramount.

We do not know what became of the five Dominicans or of Bartholomew, who remained behind when Rubruck returned to the West. Nor is it clear when these first attempts were followed up. There may have been a Franciscan presence in the Golden Horde territories for several years by 1278, when the Hungarian provincial minister reported to the pope the large number of conversions the friars had achieved; at some point prior to 1280, they secured a diploma from the khan Mengü Temür. A letter written by a Franciscan named László (Ladislaus) from Kaffa in 1287 reveals that a Franciscan Vicariate of Tartaria aquilonaris (‘Northern Tartary’) was in existence and that his Order had convents in Kaffa, in Soldaia (Sūdāq) and in Sarai, as well as a house in Qirq-yer. The Dominicans reached the Golden Horde territories a little later and were established at Kaffa in or soon after 1298. In the Ilkhanate, the Franciscans had a convent at Sivas in the 1270s and establishments in Salmās by 1284 and Tabrīz by 1287; there were Dominican houses in Sivas and Baghdad by the time Ricoldo of Montecroce arrived in the east in c.1288.

On the other hand, it is unlikely that any Latin missionaries reached the qaghan’s dominions in the Far East during the forty years following Rubruck’s departure. The population of China was more diverse, perhaps, in religious terms than any other part of the Mongol empire. Here were to be found communities belonging to the different Christian sects, including Greek Orthodox, Jacobites and Armenians, as well as Nestorians; Muslims; Manichaeans (whose survival, at one time subject to doubt, is now certain); Buddhists, including representatives of the lamaistic Buddhism of Tibet; Daoists of various schools; and Confucians. If we can believe Marco
Polo, Qubilai himself asked the two elder Polos (perhaps c.1267) to return to the pope and to bring back a hundred Christian priests to instruct his people.\(^{10}\) Doubts are attached to the authenticity of this incident, and the story may be designed merely to boost the Polos’ credit back in Europe. Reports that Qubilai was a Christian certainly reached the West in 1277, through the Ilkhanid ambassadors John and James Vassalli (pp. 206, 213). Yet the six Franciscans, headed by Gerard of Prato, whom Pope Nicholas III sent in response never reached the Far East but were sent back from Persia in 1279 with a safe-conduct and a slightly acerbic letter from Abaqa (see p. 206).\(^{11}\)

The election in 1288 of Jerome of Ascoli as Pope Nicholas IV seemed to inaugurate a new phase in the history of Latin missions.\(^{12}\) Nicholas was the first Franciscan to occupy the Holy See and the pontiff whose court Rabban Ṣawma had visited on behalf of the Ilkhan Arghun (p. 207). In 1289, he despatched eastward as his legate, with letters for both Arghun and Qubilai, the Franciscan John of Montecorvino (d. c.1328), who had recently acted as the Curia’s representative in Lesser Armenia. Unlike Gerard twelve years earlier, Montecorvino was allowed to proceed from the Ilkhanate to China. Leaving Tabrīz in 1291 and spending en route thirteen months among the St Thomas Christians on the Coromandel coast (Maʿbar), he must have reached Khanbaligh in 1294, following Qubilai’s death and the accession of Temür Öljeitü.\(^{13}\)

For many years, Montecorvino worked alone; a Dominican companion had fallen ill and died in India. Apart from a few laymen – one of them the Italian merchant, Pietro da Lucalongo, who accompanied him out to China from Tabrīz and purchased the plot in Khanbaligh on which he built his first church; the other a visiting physician from Lombardy who spread disturbing rumours about the state of the Church and the Franciscan Order in Europe – the Franciscan seems to have had little personal contact with fellow Latins and none at all with other friars until the arrival of a German colleague named Arnold in c.1304.\(^{14}\) Despite this handicap, Montecorvino initially achieved a considerable triumph by converting Körgüz (‘King George’), the Nestorian ruler of the Önggüt to the north-east of the great bend in the Yellow River and a son-in-law of the late Qaghan Qubilai. Körgüz built a church for the Franciscan in his capital, Tiande (‘Tenduc’), and brought the majority of his people over to the Roman obedience. But his death in 1298–9 in the war against the Chaghdayids destroyed these promising shoots; his son, baptized John in honour of his Latin sponsor, was a minor, and Körgüz’s brothers, committed Nestorians, took the new converts back into the Nestorian fold.\(^{15}\)

When news of Montecorvino’s solitary and herculean endeavours at length reached the West, Pope Clement V responded by making him archbishop of a new Latin see of Khanbaligh, with ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the entire Mongol world, and the bull *Rex regum* (23 July 1307)
nominated seven Franciscans to act as his suffragans in China. A number of these appointees died in India en route, but three reached their destination, of whom only one, Andrew of Perugia (d. 1332), survived Montecorvino himself. In this way, the Order of St Francis for a short time enjoyed a monopoly of episcopal office in Asia, but on 1 April 1318, the bull *Redemptor noster* of Pope John XXII withdrew the Ilkhan’s dominions and ‘India’ from the archdiocese of Khanbaligh and subjected them to a second province staffed by Dominicans. The new archiepiscopal see was centred on Sultāniyya in Azerbaijan, one of the Ilkhan’s chief halting-places: those of its suffragans who resided in Iran were based at Sivas, Tabriz, Dih-i Khwāraqān and Marāgha. Not only the Mongol empire but the whole of Asia (together with Ethiopia) was now divided between two vast Catholic provinces. Generally speaking, we have no reason to doubt that the Franciscans and Dominicans cooperated harmoniously where they came into contact, though just a hint of the competitive spirit in which some members of the two Orders back in Western Europe viewed the task surfaces in an account of a dispute at the papal Curia in 1322.

The geographical expansion of Latin Christendom represented by these new sees was remarkable. In the Golden Horde lands, still part of the province of Khanbaligh, Kaffa was a bishopric by 1318; Tana, by 1343 at the very latest; Ürgench (in Khwārazm), by 1340. Within the Chaghadayid khanate (the so-called *Imperium Medium* or *Imperium Medorum*) – which belonged to Sultāniyya – Almaligh, the khans’ principal residence, had a Latin bishop by 1328, and Samarqand, as a major centre in the western part of the khanate, received episcopal status in the following year. From the Crimean peninsula to the major Chinese ports extended a network of Franciscan and Dominican houses, strung out along the routes followed by the Western traders who were often the friars’ travelling-companions and provided financial support for their activities. It has to be borne in mind that the purpose behind the creation of the archbishoprics of Khanbaligh and Sultāniyya was not simply the spread of the Gospel to the Mongols; it was also to minister to the growing numbers of Latins in the Mongol world, whether merchants or missionaries and, at least in theory, to subject them more closely to papal control, and – no less importantly – to bring heterodox Christian communities under the authority of Rome.

Montecorvino died in 1328. His one long-term success, it appears, was among the Alans, Christians of the Greek Orthodox rite who had been transported across Asia from their homeland in the Caucasus to serve as part of the imperial guard. It was the Alans who, with the backing of the qaghan and last Yuan emperor of China, Toghan Temür (reigned as Shundi, 1333–70), wrote to the pope in 1336 asking for a new metropolitan to succeed their much-lamented pastor. The embassy which Pope Benedict XII sent back to Khanbaligh in 1338 was headed by the Franciscan John of Marignolli, who spent three years in China (1342–5). His mission has the
distinction of being the only medieval papal embassy to have left an imprint in contemporary Chinese historiography, on account of the fine European horse included among the gifts it brought. Thereafter, the archdiocese of Khanbaligh slides into obscurity. Guillaume du Pré, appointed in 1370, may have been martyred during the journey out to China, though an entry in the Ming dynastic annals, mentioning the despatch in 1371 of a Frankish envoy ‘Pula’ (Pré?), could refer to him. Charles of France, probably his successor, is mentioned as long dead by Archbishop John of Sulţāniyya in 1404. In 1410, John himself was made administrator of the see, suggesting that the papacy did not consider it worthwhile to appoint a new incumbent.

A number of circumstances were responsible for the disappearance of the far-flung Latin missionary communities. One was the impact of the Black Death (1347–9), which had a catastrophic effect, both in the mission field and on potential recruitment in Western Europe: all but three religious in the fifteen convents in Persia were wiped out, so that Pope Clement VI had to begin afresh in 1349. Another important element was the onset of the Great Schism (1378–1417): the cleavage which split the allegiances of Latin Christian states between rival popes at Rome and at Avignon risked diluting papal attempts to sustain the Orders’ activities and was blamed by Dietrich von Nyem for a slackening of missionary effort, though both pontiffs continued to manifest a concern for the East.

By this date, in any case, Christianity had long been losing ground to its main competitors. In the qaghan’s dominions, victory went to the Buddhists. The ruling strata in the three westernmost Mongol states, by contrast, adopted Islam, and Ghazan in the Ilkhanate (1295), Özbeg in the Golden Horde (1313) and ‘Alī Sulṭān in the Chaghadayid dominions (c.1339–40) each inaugurated an uninterrupted sequence of Muslim khans. We should note that this did not always bring with it an immediate check on the friars’ activities. Although Ghazan’s accession was accompanied by a persecution of Eastern Christians, this was discontinued after a few months (p. 215). In the Golden Horde, the shift was in the opposite direction. Özbeg issued the Franciscans in 1314 with a diploma requiring their prayers for his dynasty and, more importantly, authorizing them not only to preach the Gospel but to build churches and even to ring their church bells, in flat contravention of the Shari‘a. But the church in Soldaia had been converted into a mosque and permission to ring bells had been withdrawn by 1323, when Pope John XXII wrote to the khan in protest. Guillaume Adam believed that the Mamlūk Sultan had induced Özbeg to order the confiscation of all church bells. Özbeg’s son and successor Jānībeg was apparently still more hostile towards Christianity.

In time, the phenomenal advance of the rival faith announced itself by a series of martyrdoms, as friars who now lacked the protection of old-style Mongol even-handedness were outspoken enough in their preaching publicly to denounce the Prophet Muḥammad. Not the least notable of these
martyrdoms was that of a group of Franciscans in Chaghadayid Almaligh during ʿAlī Sulṭān’s brief reign, which was commemorated in a fresco in Siena by the artist Ambrogio Lorenzetti.32 Temür’s rise in Chaghadayid Transoxiana and his brutal campaigns of conquest in Persia and the Near East during the period 1380–1405 further undermined the viability of the surviving missionary outposts. In the Far East, the Mongol dynasty, the Yuan, was expelled from China in 1368, and, although the xenophobia of their Ming successors has been overstated,33 it seems at least that the Latin missionaries ceased to benefit from the favourable patronage they had enjoyed under the qaghans. Whatever the reason, all traces of the Franciscan presence were eradicated so thoroughly that no memory of it lingered when the Jesuit Matteo Ricci arrived over two centuries later.

Missionary writings

Catholic proselytism in Mongol Asia has left behind rather less source material than we should wish. In contrast with precursors from a more heroic age in the history of Christian evangelism, only one of the missionaries, the Franciscan Odoric of Pordenone (d. 1331), has a vita dedicated to him, and even this is an exiguous piece, of which almost half is devoted to the miracles that followed Odoric’s death and which claims that in the sixteen years he spent overseas he baptized 20,000 souls.34 As a window onto the methods adopted by Latin missionaries and the problems they encountered, Rubruck’s long Itinerarium stands alone. No subsequent document affords such rich insights, for instance, into the Mongols’ attitudes to religious matters; indeed, Rubruck is our chief source for Mongol cultic practice in the era prior to its permeation by Buddhism in the sixteenth century.

The experiences of later missionaries are recounted in much briefer documents: three letters from Montecorvino (though the first, preserved only in a medieval Italian translation, is problematic); two which his suffragans at Zaitun (Quanzhou), Peregrine of Castello and Andrew of Perugia, sent to their brethren in the West (in 1318/19 and 1326/7 respectively); a handful, belonging to the years 1314–23, from the Franciscans working in the Golden Horde territories; and a few from 1338–40, recounting the recent activities of Franciscans in the Chaghadayid khanate and their martyrdom. It is important to bear in mind that these documents are frequently designed to elicit the despatch of reinforcements for the missionaries, a purpose that may have coloured what the friars have to say. Thus the Franciscan letter of 1323, for instance, depicting the prospects for evangelization in highly optimistic terms, is sadly at variance with the situation arising from the advent of a Muslim convert khan, Özbeg.35 A more dispassionate observer, possibly, is the anonymous Franciscan author (at one time incorrectly identified with John of Cori, archbishop of Sulṭāniyya) of a report on Asia for Pope John XXII in the early 1330s, which devoted some space to the state of the
Mongol mission.36 In addition, various writings have come down to us from the Dominican Ricoldo of Montecroce (d. 1320), who preached the Gospel in the Ilkhanate in the last decade of the thirteenth century.37 Benedict XII’s ambassador, John of Marignolli, provides only meagre data in the account he wrote in 1353 after his return to Europe and which he embedded in a chronicle of Bohemia, and a little information can be gleaned from the Relatio of Odoric, who visited the bases of his fellow Franciscans in China during the 1320s. Both these last two authors, however, display greater interest in recounting marvels than in the progress of the Christian mission.

Although it would be anachronistic to speak of ‘missionary theory’ in the context of Catholic proselytism in the Mongol dominions,38 some writers – mainly back in Western Europe – did address theoretical matters. The English Franciscan Roger Bacon derived much of his information from Rubruck, whose Itinerarium he read and whom he met in person, and in his Opus maius of c.1267, which included a classification of the world’s religions,39 he put forward his ideas on how to convince pagans of the truth of the Christian faith.40 More pragmatic, perhaps, was Ricoldo’s so-called Libellus ad nationes orientales (c.1291) which, despite the title usually attributed to it, is in fact a guide for missionaries regarding the errors of Eastern Christians, Jews, Muslims and Tartars and how to tackle them.41 The voluminous works of the Franciscan Ramón Lull (d. 1315) also contain scattered recommendations for the successful conduct of the mission. These writings can be supplemented by the letters sent by Innocent IV (1245), Nicholas III (1278), Nicholas IV (1288) and John XXII (1329) to Mongol rulers, which contain an exposition of the faith, and by the Capitula fidei produced between 1296 and 1299 by Giles of Rome at the behest of Pope Boniface VIII and allegedly sent to the qaghan in China.42

To rely upon documents of this last type, of course, is to assume that the methods of proclaiming the Gospel in the field were determined by the perspectives of the Holy See or of ‘high’ theology. In practice, the popes tended expressly to leave it to the missionaries themselves to propagate the faith by whatever means they deemed appropriate.43 The early missionary journeys themselves – beginning with Rubruck’s – sprang, for the most part, from the initiatives of individual friars rather than of the Curia, and the popes tended to react on an ad hoc basis to reports from the mission field with the issuance of privileges for the Mendicants and the establishment of new sees. Yet it may be misleading to depict papal interest as spasmodic.44 The formation at Avignon in 1369 of a large dossier of documents pertaining to Catholic relations with schismatics and infidels (since the pontificate of Clement V, for the most part) testifies to an abiding papal concern for missionary matters.45 And the vision of certain popes certainly left its imprint on the structure of missionary activity in the East, notably John XXII, who went far beyond the traditional creation of sees in tandem with the Christianization of individual peoples by partitioning the Asian continent into two enormous
spheres of influence, allotted respectively to the Mendicant Orders as proxies for the plenitude of papal authority.46

Methods and obstacles

It is perhaps advisable at this stage to establish what was meant by ‘conversion’, drawing, as far as possible, on what popes and Latin missionaries indicate as their goal. Here we need to bear in mind the warnings of Karl Morrison that the ‘conversion experience’ itself does not possess any kind of uniformity, that it is in any case beyond the historian’s reach and that we are dealing – and can only deal – instead with the metaphors for that experience found in our thirteenth- and fourteenth-century texts, which reflect a different range of premisses and understandings from our own.47 It is clear from the letters of Montecorvino and his suffragans that they regarded baptism as the essential first step. But this formal act of adhesion in itself, of course, was not enough; the process of conversion was an ongoing one, marked by the abandonment of idolatry and an exclusive and deepening commitment in proportion to the continuing operation of the Holy Spirit. When word reached Pope Innocent IV in 1254 that Sartaq had been baptized, he wrote expressing his delight but also urged the Mongol prince to keep in mind the commandments, to publicize his new-found faith and to make his pious conduct an example to his subjects.48 In practice, however, the number of friars in any particular field at one time meant that they were able to do little more than baptize; catechism was hardly feasible.49

Innocent IV’s plea reminds us that the tactic historically adopted by Christian missionaries was to win peoples over through their rulers. Individual churchmen in the eleventh and twelfth centuries had successfully engineered the conversion of princes in the Slavic and Baltic worlds; the sources from a more remote age depict small groups of men, or even single missionaries, convincing pagan Germanic kings of the truth of Christianity and, with the support of these royal acolytes, baptizing thousands of their subjects in a single day.50 This policy of conversion from above – which Ricoldo was advocating vis-à-vis the Mongols in the 1290s, on the particular grounds that ‘the common people are so doltish and bestial that they are in no way willing to be converted unless they are promised a monetary reward’51 – seems to have been favoured initially by the Franciscans in Mongol Asia. We are told of the conversion of the subject ruler of Bashkiria at some point in the second or third decade of the fourteenth century, ‘with his wife and children and many followers [multa familia]’ (although this appears to be contradicted by a Franciscan missionary’s letter).52 Körgüz, says Montecorvino, ‘brought over the greater part of his people to the Catholic faith’; according to Peregrine, the prince had personally converted several thousands in one day. His death was a heavy blow to the Franciscan’s hopes: had he only lived, asserts Peregrine, the whole of his people and kingdom would
have been subjected to Christ and even the qaghan transformed. But on his arrival in the Far East, Montecorvino had found the qaghan already ‘grown old in idolatry’, and it is significant that, as he well realized, he enjoyed a place at the court of Temür Öljeitū not by virtue of his status as a missionary but as the pope’s representative. Temür Öljeitū’s successors proved equally resistant to evangelism. We know of no other prince in eastern Asia who followed Körgüz’s example, and when Clement V set up a network of missionary sees in 1307, he did so regardless of the fact that none of the Chinggisid khans had been converted.

Among the nomads in general, the missionaries’ tactics enjoyed scant success. Ricoldo alleged, in vague terms, that certain ‘kings and queens’ and men and women of noble birth had been converted but conceded that as yet the Tartars had not come over in great numbers. Even without the qaghan’s example, Montecorvino claimed in 1306 to have baptized approximately 6,000 souls in Khanbaligh. Yet just over twenty years later, Andrew of Perugia admitted that the friars had converted none of the Jews or Muslims in China and that though many of the ‘idolators’ (Buddhist) had been baptized, they did not adhere strictly thereafter to Christian practice. Possibly the surprising statement by John of Marignolli, that missionary efforts in China had reaped ‘a great harvest of souls’, is based on baptisms rather than on longer-term criteria. It has frequently been observed that the friars’ successes in China, such as they were, were confined to the schismatic Christian communities, like the Orthodox Alans, the Armenians and the Nestorians – all of them, significantly, belonging to churches that in some measure recognized the primacy of Rome. Some or most of the Nestorians would have been Mongols. But Mendicant activity seems to have had no impact whatsoever on the Han Chinese majority of the population and in fact to have ignored them.

On the face of it, there seemed no good reason why the Mongols should not embrace Christianity. Bacon thought that they were on the verge of accepting the faith. A few years later, the Dominican Master-General, Humbert of Romans, was equally sanguine. For Ramón Lull, their lack of a religion in any proper sense meant that they would more easily be convinced by argument. Ricoldo pointed to a paradox here. The Tartars appeared to be the most distant from the truth, since they had neither understanding nor religion other than the law of nature, no temples, no fasts, nor any external prop (adminiculum) to connect them to the spiritual life. And yet, as experience showed, they required less effort to be brought closer to the Christian faith and converted. In Ricoldo’s hierarchical schema, they could be won over more readily than the Muslims; the Muslims more readily than the Jews; and the Jews more readily than Eastern Christians. His tone had changed, however, by the time he wrote his Epistolae ad ecclesiam triumphantem (letters that borrowed, aptly enough, some of the vocabulary of St. Augustine’s Confessions and City of God, likewise written in the
shadow of major catastrophe), sometime after 1291. There he could observe gloomily that the Tartars had for the most part embraced Islam—an allusion to the formal adoption of Islam by the Ilkhan Ghazan in 1295.

In the friars’ own letters, two obstacles to their success surface frequently: language and numbers. Rubruck had complained repeatedly of the inadequacy of his interpreter—a man, he assures us, who was ‘neither intelligent nor articulate’ and whose preferred method of translation, the friar discovered, once he had himself acquired a little knowledge of the language, was ‘to say something totally different, depending on what came into his head’, with the result that Rubruck chose rather to remain silent. In the conclusion to his report, he urged that any future representative from the West be accompanied by a good interpreter or, better, several. Ramón Lull picked out the lack of linguistic expertise as the primary reason for the meagre harvest of the mission. The problem continues to figure in the letters of the Franciscans in China: Peregrine described himself and his colleagues in 1318 as quite unskilled in the learning of languages. But Montecorvino claims to have acquired an adequate knowledge of ‘the Tartar language and script’, enabling him to translate the New Testament and the Psalter. Letters from Franciscans in the dominions of the Golden Horde, moreover, reveal that he was by no means alone in his achievement, commenting as they do on the alleged advantage that English, German and Hungarian friars enjoyed over their Romance-speaking brethren when it came to learning the languages.

As far back as 1254, the Dominican Master-General Humbert of Romans had ordered brethren who travelled to the Mongol world to acquire the necessary languages beforehand, and several voices were raised—including Bacon’s—in favour of the establishment of schools of languages in the West. The decree of the Council of Vienne (1312), authorizing the creation of chairs in eastern languages at Oxford, Paris and Bologna, was a belated response to the problem—and surely an inadequate one, since Persian, Turkish and Mongolian were not among those listed. Friars tended to acquire a knowledge of Turkish once they had arrived in the steppe (as Paschal da Vittoria, for instance, did at Sarai in the mid-1330s). The production of that part of the Latin–Turkish vocabulary, the Codex Cumanicus, devoted to missionary purposes (and written in the middle decades of the fourteenth century), indicates the onset of a more methodical approach, as does the existence of a Persian translation of the Gospels, produced in 1338 in Persia or the Caucasus region. Yet learning the languages, as has been pointed out, did not necessarily enable the missionary to express intricate theological concepts.

As far as possible, the missionaries endeavoured to make good the deficiencies of the spoken word with the grandeur of the liturgy, the beauty of the chant and of bell-ringing, and the use of pictures. In the first church he had built in Khanbaligh, just a stone’s throw from the palace of Temür Öljëitu, Montecorvino tells us that he installed three bells and that the
qaghan was delighted by the singing of his choirboys, which he could hear from his chamber. Skilful borrowing of ideas from the host culture also played a part: the cross Montecorvino set over his church in Khanbaligh was red, a colour associated with good luck by Buddhists and Daoists.

The isolation of the missionaries was a formidable problem. ‘The harvest is great, but the labourers are few’ (Matthew, ix, 37) is a common refrain. Montecorvino claimed that because he had no colleague in China and was unable to leave the qaghan’s court, he needed a few fellow workers in order to retrieve the ground lost among the Önggüt since Körgüz’s death and that if only he had possessed two or three helpers, the qaghan himself might have been baptized. There had never been such outstanding progress in the world at any time since Gregory the Great, the Franciscans of the Golden Horde territories assured the West in 1323 – if only enough helpers were available.

Jordan of Séverac in 1328 offered a similar analysis of the situation in India: through preaching, two or three hundred friars could bring more than 10,000 people annually to the Christian faith. ‘We lack nothing so much as the brothers we long for’, wrote Peregrine in 1318. Reading Montecorvino’s thinly-veiled complaint that he had received no letters from his brethren in Persia or Ricoldo’s lament that ‘many tearful letters seeking reinforcements [succursu]’ from the Dominican Master who had sent him had gone unanswered, we might be forgiven for thinking that it was all a matter of manpower and mutual support. But even when new personnel were despatched eastward, there was no guarantee of their safe arrival: the heats of southern India took a heavy toll of the Franciscans sent out to China by Clement V in 1307.

Rubruck reveals that the Nestorians of Inner Asia (as distinct from those of Mesopotamia) had retained down the centuries a strong sense of the primacy of Rome. It might therefore have been expected that the friars would find ready allies among the Nestorian communities, but generally speaking this was not the case. We have seen already how sharply Nestorian attitudes towards the Mongols differed from those of the West (pp. 102, 106–7). Latin missionaries also misunderstood, for example, the Nestorian view of the crucifix, assuming that the Nestorians were ashamed of Christ’s Passion, when in fact the cross venerated in the Eastern church was that of the Second Coming (Parousia). It may be that misapprehensions of this kind underlay the failure of the Latin Church to use the Nestorian wives of Mongol khans as intermediaries, a possibility grasped only fleetingly during the pontificate of Nicholas IV (1288–92). We find the Franciscans in the Golden Horde lands complaining that the local Nestorians actively opposed them. Montecorvino’s dealings with the Nestorians in China, too, were far from harmonious. He complains that the Nestorians at court traduced

Hostility suspended
him to the qaghan and obstructed his efforts as best they could: otherwise, he might have baptized a further 30,000 souls. An anonymous Franciscan, writing a few years after Montecorvino’s death, went further: had it not been for Nestorian obstruction, the archbishop ‘would have converted the entire country to the Christian and Catholic faith’. At stake here, perhaps, was the Nestorians’ concern to safeguard their privileges, to which Peregrine draws attention, against the newcomer.

Rubruck, it is true, was on terms of friendship and mutual respect with one Nestorian priest, who acted as an archdeacon to the rest. Yet otherwise the Franciscan seems to have regarded many of the beliefs and practices of the local clergy with dismay and contempt. At one juncture he delivers himself of a ringing condemnation: the Nestorians were greedy and corrupt, drunkards, usurers and simoniacs. It should be said that Rubruck met no representative of the higher clergy and that he mentions only one Nestorian monk, with whom he did not apparently have personal contact. But his strictures failed to take into account the situation of a church that had no access to the landed endowments of its Western counterpart and had not, moreover, passed through the crucible of the Gregorian Reform.

As a remedy for the problems of both language and numbers, it was vital to train up a priesthood from among the indigenous populations. Over the years Montecorvino bought forty pagan boys, whom he instructed in Latin and the Divine Office: by 1305, eleven knew the office, and several were employed in copying psalters. The Franciscans in the khanate of the Golden Horde, too, used the alms they were given in order to purchase native children, to whom they taught writing and the Christian faith; some of the boys had become clerics and are described as ‘excellent proselytizers’ (optimi conversores). The difference, it seems, was that here the instruction given was less thoroughgoing than that envisaged by Montecorvino for the child oblates he trained. Yet from the absence of any reference to native-born Catholic priests by Peregrine and Andrew several years later, there is reason to doubt that even Montecorvino’s efforts were crowned with any long-term success.

In the Pontic steppe, at least, some of the friars adopted the nomadic way of life, in order to maximize the opportunities for conversion. From their letters it is clear that the Franciscans in the east saw their own lifestyle, with its emphasis on poverty, hardship and peaceful conduct, as the means whereby infidels and schismatic Christians were brought over to the Catholic faith. No doubt this emphasis had its disadvantages. Rubruck, who for some time was believed to be an official envoy, found that he received inferior lodgings, presumably because he had brought no costly gifts. The Mongols were astounded at this diplomatic faux pas. At Möngke’s court, Rubruck evidently deemed it important to assure the qaghan that he had not accepted any of the gifts of money that had been distributed among the Christians at court and that the Franciscans were men of peace. But
whether the nomads really placed as great a value on these qualities as the friars supposed, we cannot say (see also p. 139). There seems little doubt, moreover, that some of the later Franciscan missionaries – and perhaps the Spiritual Franciscans in particular – saw their own martyrdom as a desirable end in itself rather than merely as the by-product of a fearless presentation of the Gospel. This stance may have owed something to contemporary apocalypticism, though it is also possible, of course, that martyrdom was conceived of as positively influencing the would-be convert.

In 1255, Rubruck had warned the Dominicans he met in Greater Armenia that, as mere preachers, little heed would be paid to them, and in his report to Louis IX he recommended that no more friars journey to the Mongols in a missionary capacity; rather, a bishop should be sent with the status of papal legate. An envoy to the Mongols was permitted to say whatever he wished, was always asked if he wanted to say more and was assured of a hearing, whereas a private individual could only reply to questions put to him. This might purport to explain why in their final interview Rubruck was unable to expound the Christian faith to Möngke, but it ignores the fact that, as we have seen, the despatch of an ambassador to the Mongols, whatever his privileges, was taken to indicate submission – the very reason why Louis had been unwilling to send any more envoys to the Mongols after Andrew of Longjumeau’s return in 1251 and why Rubruck had been at pains from the outset to deny that his was a diplomatic mission.

Nevertheless, the observation points up one of the difficulties under which the missionary laboured: the absence of any association between the mission and political power. This is not to claim that nomadic rulers in Inner Asia had invariably opted for a faith that aligned them with a strong sedentary state: in the late eighth century, the choices made by the Khazar and Uighur qaghans – of Judaism and Manichaeism respectively – seem to have represented a deliberate attempt to dissociate themselves from the religious affiliations of the Byzantine empire, the Muslim Caliphate and imperial China. That said, from the missionary vantage-point there was an important difference between the efforts to evangelize the Turco-Mongolian nomads and the successful conversion of barbarian peoples in Europe in earlier centuries. Unlike the Roman monks and clerics who had baptized Frankish and Anglo-Saxon kings, for example, the Catholic missionaries of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries did not represent, in Mongol eyes, a superior civilization. And in contrast with, say, the situation in the southern Baltic, there was no question of the propagation of the Christian faith in the Mongol world being supported by the threat of military force. In this respect the closing decades of the thirteenth century were an unpropitious time for the Christian cause, with the progressive dismemberment of the tiny Latin enclaves on the Syro-Palestinian coast, though Ricoldo’s assertion that the Saracens and the Tartars alike jeeringly charged Christians with asking ‘Where is our God?’ is probably just a rhetorical flourish.
Mongol attitudes and Latin failure

The tendency in the secondary literature has been to seek to explain the demise of the Latin mission in Mongol Asia rather than the modesty of its achievements while it lasted. Some of the circumstances just reviewed may well have applied to both: the small number of friars; the terrible isolation so clearly in evidence in their letters to the West; the difficulty of working through unskilled interpreters or of learning, and translating into, unfamiliar languages like Mongolian and Turkish. It is also important to bear in mind that the susceptibility of the Mongol rulers to Christianity had been overstated. In the mid-thirteenth century, following the return of the papal envoys in 1247–8, dread of the Mongols had been tempered in some small measure by the perception that they were not polytheistic barbarians but believed in one supreme God. At one level, this optimism in Western ecclesiastical circles in the middle and later decades of the thirteenth century was part of the wider phenomenon of ‘the dream of conversion’, which also embraced the Islamic polities of western Asia and North Africa. In the Mongol case, of course, it was encouraged by Eastern Christians, particularly the Nestorians (pp. 102–6), and by the promotion of Christians (among others) with administrative expertise to serve the new regimes within Muslim territories (p. 124). Mongol openness in faith-related matters, however, was two-edged; it was easy to ignore the fact that Muslims could profit from the situation in much the same way as Christians. Already in 1260, Juwaynī had been forcibly struck not merely by the privileges the conquerors had bestowed on Muslim holy men (along with those of other faiths) but by the way in which the Mongol conquests had facilitated the spread of Islam into regions where it had not previously penetrated. And twelve years previously, Simon of Saint-Quentin had apparently been the first Western observer to comment that many within the Mongol armies were adopting Islam. Berke was just the most eminent among a considerable number of Muslim converts.

Yet to notice Western over-optimism is ultimately to beg the question why Mongol sovereigns proved so much more resistant than pagan dynasts in Europe in an earlier generation. We should perhaps ask ourselves whether cultural impediments prevented Chinggisid rulers and their Turco-Mongolian nomadic subjects from being attracted to the brand of religion that the friars offered. By this I am not referring not so much to clashes between Christian norms and specific Inner Asian practices, like the consumption of qumis (fermented mare’s milk), or to divergent attitudes towards alcoholic consumption in general or towards death and burial. Such discordances undoubtedly existed, and at one juncture there is even a hint that potential nomad converts objected to paying tithes. But similar difficulties in other societies within Europe at an earlier date had not stopped ‘barbarian’ princes and their subjects from embracing Christianity, and we know that in
the contexts of marriage and dress, for instance, the papacy was concerned not to make the transition for newly-converted Mongols too hard. Nor does the progress of Islam in Mongol Asia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries seem seriously to have been impeded by comparable obstacles, like the Mongols’ rejection of the Islamic slaughter-ritual. I have in mind, rather, some deeper antithesis between the Christian faith, as preached by the friars, and the cultural orientation of the nomads, specifically their attitude to the numinous.

Intent as the Mongols were on sharing the world only with subject peoples, they also had to share it with a plethora of spirits: those of their ancestors – which were well disposed and were revered, particular individuals or groups being deputed to care for the ancestors’ images (ongghod) and to supervise their cult – and hostile spirits – which Western observers had no hesitation in describing as demons. It was the task of the shaman (Mo. böge; Tu. qam) to diagnose the activity of these latter powers and to guard against them by means of charms, incantations or some method of appeasement that might involve the exposure and punishment of some person who had offended them; he was also responsible for exorcisms, prophecies, the prescription and conduct of festivals and ceremonies designed to influence the weather. There is no dearth of testimony that by the mid-thirteenth century Mongol rulers manifested a heavy dependence upon shamans and fortune-tellers.

And yet the nomads were ready – indeed, eager – to borrow from each and every religion whatever met their needs. Entering the Pontic steppe in 1253, Rubruck found himself in a world that would, on the surface, have been familiar to any Catholic cleric moving among the Franks in the sixth century or among the Anglo-Saxons in the seventh: a world of syncretistic belief and practice, where Christ had often simply been co-opted into a pantheon of spirits. He saw the burial-mound of a recently-deceased nomad chief, in whose honour the remains of sixteen sacrificed horses were hung on high and for whom qumis and food had been left above the grave; ‘and for all that’, he tells us, ‘they were claiming that he had been baptized’. When his little party passed through an especially hazardous stretch of the Tarbaghatai range, their guide asked them to recite some auspicious mantra to keep at bay the demons which were known to haunt the region. The friars recited the Credo and the Pater noster, and in view of the inadequacy of his interpreter Rubruck also wrote them down for the Mongol attendants to use, presumably as an amulet.

A case in point is what the friars took to be reverence for the Cross. Rubruck repeatedly witnessed members of the qaghan’s family – even princesses who were known to be adherents of ‘the soothsayers and idolators’ – kiss or revere the Cross. Möngke’s youngest brother, Arigh Böke, who allegedly acknowledged that Jesus was God, made the sign of the Cross like a bishop. Odoric of Pordenone reported that the qaghan venerated
the Cross seventy years later. What these Western observers did not realize was that the use of the Cross, *inter alia*, as a magical device to secure protection against spirits in this life, even by the Nestorian communities, already had a long history in Central Asia. In these circumstances, it was quite possible for an individual prince to make some gesture that implied the acceptance of, say, Christianity while continuing to sanction and observe the ‘shamanistic’ practices of his forebears or favouring another religious group altogether.

In much the same way as the nomads relied upon their own religious specialists to foretell the future, to ward off the unwelcome attentions of hostile spirits and the like, so they valued the skills and prayers of ‘holy men’ of all faiths and sects. The recognition that Rubruck belonged to this category brought about an improvement in the way he was regarded and treated. On his outward journey he was taken to the encampments of ‘wealthy Mongols’ to give them his blessing, and he later observed that Möngke wanted all the different religious groups to pray for him; for, he says, ‘they like one to pray for their lives’. This requirement is included in the diplomas issued to the religious, like those conferred, for instance, on the Rus’ clergy by Mengü Temür of the Golden Horde in 1267 and on the Franciscans in China by Qaghan Buyantu (reigned as Renzong, 1311–20) in 1314. In the 1320s, the friars were still expected to pray for the qaghan’s life and to give him their blessing on ceremonial occasions. Writing to Benedict XII in 1336, Toghan Temür asked for his blessing and to be remembered in the pope’s prayers.

The Mongols were not practising what has been termed ‘celestial insurance’, as if actuated by a sense that any particular religion might be right. Rather, in their eyes all faiths were right, i.e. they were equally valid ways of approaching Heaven, Tenggeri (other than in those areas where they contravened nomadic practice). ‘God has given mankind several paths’, Möngke told Rubruck. This was more than a matter of *Realpolitik* (although it was that, certainly); it was also an expression of the deep-rooted cultural orientation of the steppe peoples.

Importantly, Chinggis Khan and his successors distinguished those who ‘truly prayed to Heaven’, who practised, that is, a life of sanctity and whose prayers were accordingly efficacious, from those whose lives fell short of the required standard and whose prayers had no power to move Heaven. From what Rubruck tells us of his final audience with Möngke, this distinction appears to have been in the qaghan’s mind. So too Möngke’s brother Hülegü, in conversation with the Armenian Vardan, questioned the value of prayers from any Christian not ‘on God’s path’. Mere ritual was of little worth alongside a holy life, as the Ilkhan Arghun pointed out in 1290, when he politely rejected Nicholas IV’s request that he be baptized: ‘Now, saying that I have not accepted baptism [silam], you are offended and harbour sentiments [of discontent]. [Yet] if one prays to Eternal Heaven alone and
Mongol princes thus drew a contrast not between ‘true’ and ‘false’ religions but between the minority (within each and every confessional group) living a saintly existence and the rest. The Mongols were especially exercised about the means of gaining eternal life, but they understood this in a biological sense to mean the prolongation of life rather than in the sense of life everlasting in the world to come.

When Chinggis Khan had summoned the Daoist patriarch Changchun (Qiu Chuji), head of the Quanzhen (‘Complete Purity’) Daoist sect, to his campaign headquarters in 1222, he had been under the impression that the old man had reached the age of 300 and had access to some elixir of longevity. Rubruck testifies to the rumour among the nomads that the pope was 500 years old. The prayers of the different religious groups were valued not for their efficacy in bringing rewards in an afterlife but for their influence over conditions in this life. And, as Marco Polo was apparently well aware, the index of Heaven’s favour – whether bestowed on a prince or on the common people – was worldly success. For these reasons, incidentally, the suggestion that shamanistic activities were not in competition with the exercise of other faiths is misleading.

Hence the privileges which the Mongol rulers bestowed upon holy men, a policy that, as we saw (p. 47), dated back to Chinggis Khan himself; initially extended to specific individuals, these privileges were broadened under his successors to embrace whole categories. Naturally, in exempting Christian priests and monks, Buddhist and Daoist monks and Muslim scholars (’ulamā) from taxation, forced labour and military service, the Mongol government also saw these elements as useful agents in securing the submission of the local populations. ‘Have you won over the common people for me?’, Chinggis Khan wrote to Changchun in 1223. But the primary impulse behind the exemptions conferred on members of the ‘religious classes’ was that they were seen as allies in securing health and fortune for the dynasty and in the day-to-day struggle with Nature and with hostile spirits.

While the Mongol imperial dynasty patronized religious specialists of many different kinds, it also treated all confessional groups even-handedly. When the official cult of the imperial ancestors was adapted to the Chinese model, Qubilai refused to preside over it as required by Confucian tradition; so too did most of the Yuan Emperors. Whatever his favour towards Buddhist scholars, moreover, it is clear that he and his immediate successors avoided constituting Buddhism as anything like a state religion. Although the Daoists had been defeated in the great public debates organized by Möngke and himself in 1256–8, he nevertheless continued to show favour to the Quanzhen Daoist sect; the persecution of the Daoists in 1281, which was probably sparked by the failure of the Japanese campaign, was
short-lived.\textsuperscript{152} Even Körgüz, whose adhesion to the Roman faith proved to be the pinnacle of Montecorvino’s achievement, is known from Chinese sources to have given hospitality to Confucian \textit{literati} and provided them with funds for the construction of Confucian temples just as he did for Montecorvino’s church.\textsuperscript{153} The same reluctance to abandon the position of neutrality enjoined by Chinggis Khan seems to characterize the Ilkans down to – and even following – Ghazan’s conversion to Islam. After the initial persecution of the Christians and Jews, Ghazan in effect reintroduced Chinggis Khan’s prescription by exempting the ‘religious class’ within both communities from payment of the Islamic poll-tax (\textit{jizya}). Although his brother and successor Öljeytü is described as having ‘a kind of hatred of the Christians’, it was not, it seems, until the reign of Öljeytü’s son Abū Sa‘īd (1316–35) that Christian clerics were again subject to the poll-tax and that Islam assumed the trappings of a cult that had the exclusive patronage and support of the administration.\textsuperscript{154}

The Mongol rulers’ even-handedness, defying neat boundaries, was liable first to fuel and then to dash hopes of conversion to Christianity – or indeed of conversion to any other faith. Qubilai, according to Marco Polo, acknowledged that there were four prophets – Jesus Christ, Muhammad, Moses and the Buddha – and claimed to honour and revere all four.\textsuperscript{155} During his reign he manifested, in the words of his modern biographer, a series of ‘chameleon-like transformations’.\textsuperscript{156} The same might be said of Toqto’a, khan of the Golden Horde (d. 1312), who reputedly was baptized, died a Christian and was buried in a grave belonging to the Franciscans.\textsuperscript{157} A report reached Western Europe that Toqto’a was ‘highly favourable to the Christians’, while his antagonist Noghai (who may have adopted Islam as early as 1270) was written off as ‘the worst necromancer and a persecutor of everything good’\textsuperscript{158} – despite the fact that, according to the Franciscan László, Yailaq, Noghai’s chief wife, had accepted baptism in 1287 and that he himself had treated the Franciscans with favour.\textsuperscript{159} In some measure, what underlay this perspective was Toqto’a’s victory over Noghai, which terminated the latter’s policy of aggressive expansion in Christian Eastern Europe. According to Muslim observers, on the other hand, Toqto’a remained an ‘idol-worshipper’ and (in time-honoured Mongol fashion) showed favour to religious men of all faiths, though he preferred Muslims. One of his sons, who predeceased him, was also partial to Islam and enjoyed hearing the Qur’ān recited, though he did not understand it; he had allegedly intended to leave no other faith but Islam in his territories.\textsuperscript{160} The spiritual peregrinations of Toqto’a, who apparently convinced Christians and Muslims alike that they enjoyed his special favour, strikingly recall the contradictions surrounding the religious attachments of Möngke and his mother Sorqagtani which we noticed earlier (p. 105). It would be unjust to blame all these sanguine reports on nothing more than the wishful thinking of the religious communities in question; their aspirations were nurtured by the attitudes and policies of the rulers themselves.
It is necessary to dispel certain misconceptions here. The Mongol khans’ stance is not to be equated with either tolerance or indifference.\textsuperscript{161} Admittedly, remarks by contemporary Western observers appear to furnish some warrant for such a view. For Jacopo d’Acqui (citing a version of Marco Polo), the Mongols did not care which God was worshipped in their dominions: ‘if only all are faithful to the lord Kan, and quite obedient, and give therefore of the appointed tribute, and justice is well kept, thou mayest do what pleaseth thee with thy soul’.\textsuperscript{162} ‘Each and all are allowed to live according to their own sect’, wrote Andrew of Perugia in 1326; ‘for this is their opinion, or I should say their error, that every man is saved in his own sect’.\textsuperscript{163} But though the Mongol government permitted the propagation of all faiths, it also demonstrated a considerable interest both in enforcing certain Inner Asian customs on its sedentary subjects and in forbidding actions that were taboo in steppe society. Thus in 1246 a Rus’ prince was obliged to practise the levirate (marriage with a brother’s widow), which was contrary to Christian teaching; for a time in the early 1270s, the levirate was harshly enforced in Qubilai’s China, and at different times Muslims in Mongol territory fell foul of prohibitions against washing in running water or slaughtering an animal by cutting its throat.\textsuperscript{164} In certain respects, therefore, many of the qaghan’s subjects experienced Mongol rule as decidedly intolerant.\textsuperscript{165}

**The accent on inclusivism**

If I have spent so long on the steppe-dwellers’ approach to religious matters, it is because it helps us to see two possible reasons why the Christianity represented by the Mendicants was less attractive to the Mongols than were the teachings of its rivals. The first has to do with its relationship to these other faiths, the second with its attitude towards the spirit-world of Inner Asia.

Since the Mongols’ approach to religious matters was pluralist and syncretistic, they valued what might be termed inclusivism. Professor Richard Fox Young has examined Rubruck’s account of the public debate between Buddhists, Christians and Muslims which was convened on Möngke’s orders in 1254 and in which the Franciscan opened as the champion of the Christian viewpoint. If we can believe Rubruck himself, his performance was a *tour de force*; later it duly won the admiration of Bacon.\textsuperscript{166} He supposedly showed himself superior in dialectic both to his Nestorian allies and to his Buddhist antagonist. When he had inquired of the Nestorians the previous evening how they intended to proceed, they proved incapable of doing anything but quoting scriptures which had no validity in the eyes of their opponents. Rubruck also had to dissuade them from commencing the debate by attacking the Muslims, with whom, as he pointed out, they shared a common monotheistic tradition, so that it was preferable to begin with the Buddhists. During the debate itself, the Buddhist, who wanted to discuss the creation of the world and the fate of souls after death, was manoeuvred
onto the friar’s chosen ground and vanquished by dint of Augustinian arguments about the essence of God and the nature of evil. Now Rubruck undoubtedly furnishes a one-sided account of the proceedings, inflating his own success and doing less than justice to his Buddhist opponent, of whose religion he had only a defective knowledge. But it was not, in any case, Western scholasticism that won souls in Inner Asia. Rubruck admits that at the conclusion of the debate nobody declared, ‘I believe, and wish to become a Christian’. The remark may be targeted at the ineffectual methods of the Nestorians, who had taken over from him in the debate, or at the proceedings as a whole, but it certainly applies in equal measure to the failure of Rubruck and his eastern confrères.

Young argues that the attraction of Buddhism to the qaghan lay in its inclusivism, i.e. that Buddhist teaching was inherently more capable of coexisting with and even absorbing Mongol folk religion. This, it should be noted, is a far cry from the older notions that the Mongols perceived shamanistic practices as inferior to the foreign faiths they were encountering and hence no longer ‘adequate to the spiritual needs of world conquerors’ or that Möngke was seeking ‘more than a personal faith’ and saw shamanism as ‘no permanent basis of unity for the diverse peoples of the empire’. Young’s more nuanced and persuasive thesis is consonant with what is known of the tactics of Buddhist missionaries, who sought to bring local, indigenous deities and cults within the ambit of their own world-picture. For a time Daoism had won Chinggis Khan’s favour because, by dint of Changchun’s tactics, it had been able to pose as embracing all ascetic groups in China. The Daoists had advanced the claim that the Buddha was merely an incarnation of Laozi and that Buddhism was consequently a vulgarized form of Daoism. But in the public debates of 1256–8 between adherents of the two faiths, when it emerged that Daoist philosophy, like that of the Confucians, ‘posed a strict dichotomy between Chinese and barbarians’, and that the books on which they based their denigration of Buddhism were forgeries, the Daoists lost ground to the Buddhists. Earlier (p. 105) I cited a statement attributed to Möngke – that Buddhism was like the palm and the other faiths like the fingers. This aphorism, of course (whether Möngke actually voiced it or not), may tell us more about the way in which the Buddhists wanted to portray their religion to the qaghan, i.e. as the fons et origo of all other teachings.

Now at this level Christianity could not compete with Buddhism. For all its universalist claims, it did not come across as an inclusive faith. It stood over against the rest, in opposition to them. What was unacceptable was the adoption of such a faith, involving the rejection of ancestral custom: such, at any rate, must be the sense of a Franciscan’s letter of 1323, where the Mongols are said to esteem steadfastness, namely remaining in the sect to which their parents had adhered. This may well be the significance also of the view imputed to the Tartars by Jacopo d’Acqui (probably on Marco Polo’s authority), that
Christ was a proud Lord who was unwilling to be associated with other gods.¹⁷⁶ And certainly the political pretensions encapsulated in papal letters were matched by an equally exclusive theological position on the part of the missionaries. The phrasing of the anonymous Franciscan report of the 1330s suggests that one powerful reason for Nestorian opposition to Montecorvino was his relentless insistence that they acknowledge Roman primacy, without which, he told them, they could not be saved.¹⁷⁷ ‘Be absolutely sure’, Rubruck told Batu in 1253, ‘that you will not possess the things of Heaven without having become a Christian. For God says, “He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned”’ (Mark, xvi, 16). At these words, he tells us, Batu gave a slight smile, and the other Mongols began to clap in derision; it was with difficulty that the friar and his interpreter were able to continue.¹⁷⁸ We learn more of this episode from a story found in a collection of Franciscan exempla and derived ultimately from King Het’um of Lesser Armenia, who passed through Batu’s encampment in 1254, not long after Rubruck. ‘The nurse’, Batu had allegedly told Rubruck:

\[
\text{begins first to let drops of milk fall into the child’s mouth, so that the sweet taste may encourage the child to suck; only next does she offer him the nipple. Thus you should have first persuaded us in simple and reasonable fashion, as this teaching seems to us to be altogether alien. Yet you immediately threatened everlasting punishment.}¹⁷⁹
\]

It looks as if the Christianity purveyed by the Franciscans in Asia may have had a relatively exclusive and uncompromising image.

In much the same way as Christianity appeared less inclusive than Buddhism, so it may have contrasted with Islam. Not that Islam, which sets its face resolutely against any hint of polytheism or idolatry, is obviously an ‘inclusive’ faith: Rubruck met Muslims who shunned the Buddhist monks and were unwilling even to talk about them.¹⁸⁰ But an apparently bizarre incident during the public disputation of 1254 may be relevant here. After the demolition of his Buddhist opponent, the Nestorians prevailed upon the Franciscan to stand down so that they could at last engage with the Muslims, but the latter refused to argue with them, conceding that everything in the Gospel was true.¹⁸¹ This somewhat surprising admission raises the question whether the interpreters had misunderstood, since the Muslims presumably spoke in Persian, the lingua franca even in the eastern reaches of Mongol Asia.¹⁸² But the statement could simply have reflected the fact that certain Qur’anic verses speak favourably of Jesus and that Muslims regard Christianity as an incomplete version of the revelation fulfilled in Islam¹⁸³ – as being in some measure, therefore, subsumed within Islam. This claim to inclusiveness contrasted sharply with the Christian view of Islam, which had sometimes been treated as a Christian heresy but was more often dismissed as arrant nonsense or a diabolical invention.¹⁸⁴
The salience of magic

A second reason why the Christianity of the friars lost out to its non-Christian competitors has to do with its reaction particularly towards the spirit-world of the nomads. No less significant than the inclusivism of the Mongols’ religious policy was another element in their mindset, which has frequently been left out of the equation: their abiding interest in magic. The concern they displayed about techniques for the prolongation of life, which we noticed earlier, was just one aspect of it. True, for the steppe peoples, as for Western Christians, there was ‘good’ and ‘bad’ magic: they did indeed punish severely certain types of sorcery, aimed at harming or killing others. But in general they were interested in ways of influencing or controlling Nature, in order to secure military victory for instance, and of predicting the future. To Qubilai, it has been said, ‘the better religion was the one that could perform the more impressive feats of magic’. One of the principal reasons he valued his Chinese adviser Liu Bingzhong so highly was Liu’s command of the occult sciences, which had won the Mongols many victories. Qubilai was not an isolated case, however. When Möngke asked the Confucians what use they were for magic or healing, he was posing a question that might have been voiced by any other Chinggisid ruler.

This fascination with magic and healing accounts for the pronounced sympathy displayed by the Mongol qaghans in China not for Chinese Buddhism but for the Tibetan lamaistic variant, since, as Marco Polo observed, the Tibetans were renowned as the most skilled enchanters and astrologers in the world. In this regard, incidentally, Buddhist lamas by no means monopolized the qaghan’s favour: after the conquest of southern China in 1279, Qubilai patronized the Zhengyi (‘True Unity’) Daoists there, who (unlike the Quanzhen sect) had never abandoned the quest for the prolongation of life and whose leaders enjoyed a reputation for magical skill, notably in the vanquishing of demons and in the use of charms to influence the weather. Ricoldo describes the hold that Buddhist lamas (he uses the Persian term bakhshiš) enjoyed over the Ilkhans in Iran: they were honoured above all men; they were familiar with the magic arts, consulted demons, performed numerous miracles and foretold future events. For him the lamas’ influence constituted the greatest obstacle to the salvation of the Tartars. Ironically, Ricoldo was writing when the lamas’ influence was just about to give way to that of Muslim sufi dervishes. Although Professor Amitai has argued persuasively that the ascendancy of the sufis was not based on any resemblance to the shamans, there are hints in the Islamic sources that the earliest Muslim Ilkhans – Aḥmad-Tegüder and Ghazan – valued them too for their mastery of magical techniques.

Rubruck spoke truly, therefore, when he ended the account of his final interview with Möngke by saying, ‘If I had possessed the power to work miracles, as Moses did, he might perhaps have humbled himself’. And he
later told Bacon, it seems, that he would have enjoyed a warmer welcome had he known a little about the stars but that the Mongols had despised him since he was ignorant of astronomy. Members of the several religious groups who flocked to the qaghan’s court knew that they would be required to demonstrate skill in magic. Rubruck mentions a Muslim soothsayer and a Rus’ one in Möngke’s encampment. The Muslims benefited from the fact that the Qur’ān accepted auguries and the use of charms and condemned only those magical devices which were designed to harm other human beings. Nestorian priests in turn countenanced and indeed shared in sorcerous practices: Marco Polo heard a story that they had predicted Chinggis Khan’s victory over Prester John by means of divination (though in this case the incantations were taken from a psalter).

The only respect in which the Mendicants could compete was in healing. The Franciscan Francesco of Alessandria, who miraculously cured the Chaghadayid khan (? Yesün Temür, d. c.1339) of a malignant tumour (cancro et fistula), gained his confidence to the extent that the khan called him his father and entrusted his son to be reared and baptized by the friar. Similarly, the Franciscans both in Chaghadayid Central Asia and in China were believed to be winning souls by casting out demons. But in other respects the Catholic Church had, by this stage, set its face against any attempt to influence Nature by the practice of magic. This, for the friars, would have represented intercourse with the demonic and was another source of friction between them and many of their eastern brethren. Rubruck criticized Nestorian priests for participating in such pagan rites and upbraided the Armenian monk Sargis for consulting the Muslim soothsayer.

One of the chapters of Marco Polo’s book is entitled, ‘Why the Great Khan Does Not Become a Christian’. When Polo’s father and uncle, in the course of their first visit to Qubilai, asked why he privately (so we are told) regarded Christianity as the superior faith and yet did not embrace it, he explained to them that he was in no position to do so. Were he to convert, the ‘idolators’ among his ‘barons’ would ask him what he was about, given the Christians’ inability to perform the tricks and miracles at which the ‘idolators’ themselves excelled. It was to prepare for the defeat of idolatry and his own baptism that he supposedly urged the elder Polos to bring back a hundred learned Christians from Western Europe. The story is doubtless muddled, the interview a fabrication; but I suggest that, if we discount the Qaghan’s secret preference for Christianity and the predictable snipe at the Nestorians, this passage does encapsulate a perceptive comment on the challenges confronting Catholic evangelism in Mongolia.

I have tried to suggest some reasons for the restricted appeal of Western Christianity to the Mongols and their nomadic subjects. Whatever the superficial resemblance between the pre-Christian cults of their European ancestors and the ‘paganism’ and ‘idolatry’ they encountered in Mongol Asia, Latin missionaries were confronted by a problem that they failed to
grasp. It was of paramount importance for Mongol rulers to remain above all faiths and sects, utilizing for their own purposes, whether governmental or personal, the specialist resources found within each. They were ready to patronize and even to participate in cultic practices that contributed to those ends and that did not conflict with their ancestral customs. The ‘religious classes’ of all faiths and sects, like the nomads’ own shamans, were valued for whatever power they might exercise over Nature by prayer or by thaumaturgy. For the friars, conversely, such eclecticism meant no belief at all. In this milieu, the very rigour of the Mendicant Orders, their uncompromising hostility towards any accommodation with paganism, rendered the missionaries – for all their physical and spiritual resources – less well equipped to thrive than either their competitors or their more supple and adaptable precursors who had worked among pagan peoples in Europe. Their efforts were accordingly doomed to failure. But we need to set that failure in context by asking whether thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Mongol princes embraced, in a full sense, any of the universal religions. Our principal sources for the Yuan regime in China are Buddhist, as those for the Ilkhanate are Muslim: it is conceivable that when, like Latin writings, they describe preferences and conversions, they merely mask attitudes that were in fact considerably more complex.

Notes

2 See the introduction to the Jackson and Morgan trans., p. 42; Richard, La papauté, pp. 78–9.
7 Richard, La papauté, pp. 95, 130.
8 Ibid., p. 115.


12 Ryan, ‘Nicholas IV and the evolution of the eastern missionary effort’, pp. 81–95.


18 ‘Cronica della Quistione insorta nella Corte di Papa Giovanni XXII a Vignone, circa la povertà di Cristo’, in Francesco Zambrini, ed., *Storia di Fra Michele minorita come fu arso in Firenze nel 1389, con documenti risguardanti i Fratticelli della povera vita*, Scelti di curiosità letterarie inedite o rare del secolo XIII al XIX 50 (Bologna, 1864), pp. 59–82 (here pp. 69–70); according to the editor (p. xxxiii), this source (the work of a Franciscan, ‘N[icolaus]’) dates from no earlier than 1377 (I owe this reference to Ann Fielding). For the disputation, see also Andrew Jotischky, ‘The Mendicants as missionaries and travellers in the Near East in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries’, in *Allen, Eastward Bound*, pp. 88–106 (here p. 88).

19 See Tanase, “*Jusqu’aux limites du monde*”, pp. 428–34.


40 *OM*, II, pp. 372–6; on the religion of the Tartars, see also ibid., pp. 386–9.
The *Libellus* is printed in Dondaine, ‘Ricoldiana’, pp. 162–70: see ibid., pp. 139–41, on the purpose of the work.


Lupprian, p. 211 (no. 39).


See Alexandra Sanmark, ‘The role of secular rulers in the conversion of Sweden’, in Martin Carver, ed., *The Cross Goes North. Processes of Conversion in Northern Europe, AD 300–1300* (York, 2003), pp. 551–8; this article is broader in geographical scope than the title suggests.


John of Marignolli, ‘Relatio’, in *SF*, p. 529 = ‘Kronika Jana z Marignoly’, p. 496; Yule, *Cathay*, III, p. 215, misconstrues the phrase to indicate that Marignolli’s own party was responsible.

Alans: WR, xi, 1, p. 56, claiming that they accepted all Christians without distinction (see also Jackson and Morgan trans., p. 102 and n.2). Armenians: see p. 18 above. Nestorians: see pp. 18, 99, 306.


63 Bacon, Opus tertium, ed. Little, p. 70. See also ‘Opus tertium’, in Fr. Rogeri Bacon opera quaedam hactenus medita, ed. J. S. Brewer, RS (London, 1859, only vol. I published), p. 86, where Bacon envisages that the Tartars might be converted pro majori parte.


65 Ramón Lull, ‘Petitio ad Coelestinum V’ (1294), in BBTS, I, p. 374; cf. also his ‘De fine’, i, 5, p. 266.


68 WR, xiii, 6, p. 64 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 108); see also xxv, 8, and xxvii, 4, pp. 124, 138 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 156, 167).

69 Ibid., epilogue, 5, p. 320 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 278).

70 Schmieder, Europa, pp. 139–40.


78 Schmieder, Europa, pp. 141–2.

Hostility suspended


82 Reichert, Begegnungen, p. 77.


102 Ibid., pp. 122–3.


104 WR, xxxiii, 7, and xxxiv, 2, pp. 244, 258 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 229, 236–7).


111 In practice, that is. Innocent IV had enunciated the principle that the papacy was entitled to intervene militarily against a pagan society which tolerated customs contrary to the natural law or which obstructed and persecuted Christian missionaries: Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers and Infidels, chaps. 1 and 2.


116 SSQ, p. 47 (= VB, xxx, 84): to what extent they were simply eastern Christians or included ethnic Mongols is unclear (see Richard’s n.5 ibid.).


124 WR, viii, 4, p. 46 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 95–6).


142 A vital point stressed by Atwood, ‘Validation by holiness’, p. 253.
143 As Carpini had observed of the shamans’ activities: PC, iii, 9, p. 240 (tr. Dawson, p. 12).


147 Atwood, ‘Validation by holiness’, p. 254. The passage there quoted from Polo, regarding the Mongols’ attitudes before their exposure to Buddhist influences, is not in Ménard’s edn; but see Ricci trans., p. 162, and Latham trans., pp. 128–9.


151 Yuan even-handedness is stressed by Sechin Jagchid, ‘Chinese Buddhism and Taoism during the Mongolian rule of China’, MS 6 (1980), pp. 61–98 (here pp. 90–1), repr. in his Essays, pp. 94–120 (here p. 113).


156 Rossabi, Khubilai Khan, p. 141; for his patronage of different groups, see ibid., pp. 141–7.

157 DeWeese, Islamization, pp. 98–100. This is to assume that the ‘Coktoganus’ mentioned by Franciscan sources was indeed Toqto’a, which is by no means certain: Tanase, “Jusqu’aux limites du monde”, pp. 413–15, discusses the question.

158 Ptolomy of Lucca, Annales, p. 237.

159 Tanase, “Jusqu’aux limites du monde”, pp. 392–3; links these circumstances with Noghai’s current bid to carve out his own khanate and to bring the Balkans, Hungary and Poland within his orbit; see also ibid., pp. 402–5, 419.

160 al-Birzālī (d. 1339), al-Muqtafā, in SMIZO, I, p. 173 (Russian tr. 174), cited by DeWeese, *Islamization*, pp. 112–13 (though his understanding is that the prince became a Muslim): see now the edn by ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Salām Tadmuri, 4 vols (Ṣaydā, 1427 H./2006), IV, p. 93. The stance of Toqto’a’s son may of course have been merely propaganda for the Mamlūks’ benefit.


162 Marco Polo, tr. Moule and Pelliot, I, p. 96: for the original text, see Michiel, ‘Il Milione’, p. 162.


166 Bacon, *Opus tertium*, ed. Little, p. 70. OM, II, p. 376; also ibid., p. 388, where it is claimed that the Christians and Muslims rapidly vanquished the idolators, who then abandoned their religion.


171 The phrases used respectively by Jagchid, ‘Why the Mongolian khans’, p. 110 (repr. in his *Essays*, p. 84), and by Larry W. Moses, *The Political Role of Mongol Buddhism*, IUUAS 133 (Bloomington, IN, 1977), p. 60.


173 Moses, p. 67. Cf. also Young, ‘*Deus unus*’, p. 122.


178 WR, xix, 7, p. 96 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 133).
183 Geoffrey Parrinder, Jesus in the Qur’an (London, 1965). Hamilton, ‘Knowing the enemy’, p. 378. Alternatively, the Muslims’ capitulation may have been a tactic designed to throw into relief the more inclusive and accommodating nature of their religion and so to outflank the Christians. Cf. Kedar, ‘Multilateral disputation’, p. 176.
185 WR, vii, 2, and xxxv, 6–8, pp. 44, 266, 268 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 94, 242–4). The cases mentioned seem always to centre around sorceresses. See Boyle, ‘Kirakos of Ganjak’, p. 208, n.34; for more detail than is given here, Jackson, ‘Mongols and the faith of the conquered’.
186 Young, ‘Deus unus’, p. 118.
195 WR, xxxiv, 7, p. 262 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 239).
Hostility suspended


200 ‘Chronica XXIV Generalium’, p. 531; also in SF, I, p. 510. Ryan, ‘Conversion or the Crown’, p. 33, assumes that the khan concerned is Yesium Temür’s brother and predecessor, Changshi (d. c.1337). Tanase, “Jusqu’aux limites du monde”, p. 506, is surely incorrect in describing Yesium Temür as a Muslim.


204 Marco Polo, tr. Moule and Pelliot, I, pp. 201–2 (tr. Ricci, p. 111; tr. Latham, p. 90): a section found only in Ramusio’s text.
EPILOGUE
East and West

In the course of the last few chapters, reference has been made to all the accounts, written by Western Christians on the basis of their travels in the Mongol world between the 1240s and the early fifteenth century, that have come down to us: those of Carpini (1247), Simon of Saint-Quentin (via Vincent of Beauvais, 1253), Rubruck (1255), Marco Polo (1298), Jordan (1328), Odoric (1330), Marignolli (c.1353), John of Sultāniyya (1404) and Clavijo (1404). We have also noticed the expatriate Armenian prince Hayton of Gorigos, who travelled in the opposite direction, to Western Europe, and whose *Flor des estoires* (1307) contained a description of the East, composed for a Latin Christian readership. This circumstance, even more than his status as a member of a church that was in union with Rome – an ‘honorary Latin’, as it were – and a Premonstratensian canon, requires him to be ranked together with the Western writers just listed.

What was known of Europe in the Mongol world is harder to tease out from comparatively meagre source material. Regrettably, apart from Hayton, only one other easterner visited Europe and left a written account, namely Rabban Șawma, the Nestorian monk who served as ambassador for the Ilkhan Arghun in 1287–8. The Persian original of his narrative is now lost, and we have only the abridged Syriac translation that was incorporated in the biography of the Patriarch Mar Yahballaha III. This work would have been available only within a very restricted circle. The geopolitical survey in Rashīd al-Dīn’s ‘History of the Franks’ (1305/6) – gleaned, perhaps, from Dominican friars or from Ghazan’s Pisan agent Isolo – contains numerous interesting details. Rashīd al-Dīn is aware, for instance, of the election of the ‘King of the Romans’ by a college of seven, of the character of the regime of
the Teutonic Knights in Prussia, of the current occupation of (part of) Poland by the Bohemian King and of the use of mappae mundi (presumably portolans) by Italian mariners; though he also believed, wrongly, that the Neapolitan King’s recent destruction of the Muslim colony at Lucera (which he attributes, also in error, to the German King Adolf of Nassau) was a reprisal for the fall of Acre and the demolition of churches in the Ilkhanate. His historical section, on the other hand, amounts to little more than a chronological list of popes and emperors, with exiguous detail on their reigns and derived ultimately from the chronicle of Martin of Troppau (d. 1278).1

That the Mongols’ Chinese subjects held the peoples of the far west in relatively high esteem is clear from a saying attributed to them in a number of sources, namely that they themselves saw with two eyes, and the Fulang with one, while everybody else was blind. This adage clearly enjoyed a wide currency, since it is repeated by Hayton, by Clavijo and even by the Muslim writers Zakariyāʾ al-Qazwīnī and Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-ʿUmarī; but the fact that it is first encountered in a twelfth-century source suggests that it originally applied not to the Franks but perhaps to the Byzantines.2 More information may lie hidden in the largely untranslated Chinese material from the Yuan era. Minimal data about the West, obtained through an obscure embassy (quite unknown from European sources) in the period 1314–20, was deemed intriguing enough to be incorporated in a Chinese work dating from the middle of the century.3 The maps produced in China in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, which may themselves have been partly based on details supplied by Muslim cartographers, provide some information, notably Li Zemin’s map of c.1330. This includes approximately a hundred European place-names, as well as about thirty-five for Africa: it is now lost, but the data it contained are reproduced in various later maps, notably the Korean world-map of c.1402.4 Although this map is superior to anything produced in Europe prior to the end of the fifteenth century, the limited quantity of Far Eastern material in general that relates to the West contrasts sharply with the volume of European writing on Asia during the Mongol era. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall try to assess the impact of that writing on Western opinion.

Before we do so, however, it will be as well to note that Latin Christians had other means of gaining an impression of the Mongols and their world than simply through travel accounts. During the fourteenth century, ‘Tartars’ became a more common sight within Western Europe, whether as members of Ilkhanid embassies or as slaves purchased through the markets of the Crimea.5 It is noteworthy that Genoese, Venetians and other Italians occasionally often adopted Mongol names for their newborn children: Alaone (Hülegü), Argone (Arghun), Cassano (Ghazan) and so on6 – though all these names, significantly, were borrowed from the friendly Ilkhans. This was just one symptom of the wider ‘vogue of the East’, as it has been termed, that went back several decades prior to the rise of the Mongols.7
‘Tartar’ faces and ‘Tartar’ clothing – in forms more realistic than the fanciful portrayals by Matthew Paris in the 1240s–50s – were also making an appearance in Western art. In a Nativity scene shown in St Catherine’s monastery on Mount Sinai and dating from soon after 1260, one of the three Magi is depicted as a Mongol, and it has been suggested that he may represent Kitbuqa (his two colleagues, correspondingly, Het’um I and Bohe-mond VI). Lorenzetti’s *Martyrdom of the Franciscans*, one of the frescoes in the friary of S. Francesco in Siena, possibly borrowed its Tartar faces from slaves in Tuscany, and its depiction of Tartar apparel may well have been inspired by a Mongol embassy as much as by the accounts of merchants or missionaries. Mongol-type costume also appears in Giovanni del Biondo’s *Martyrdom of St. Sebastian* (*c*.1370). The mediators were in many cases the Franciscans, whose missionary activity, as we have seen, took them as far as China and who frequently acted as patrons of Italian artists.

Westerners were growing increasingly familiar, too, with the products of the Mongol world, like the luxury textiles (panni tartarici: see p. 256) that figure in the inventory of Marco Polo’s goods. Some examples of such wares ended up in the tombs of Latin princes: Chinese silks were found in the graves of the Emperor Charles IV (d. 1378) and of Cangrande della Scala (d. 1329), tyrant of Verona, and Duke Rudolf IV of Austria (d. 1365) was shrouded in Tartar cloth of gold inscribed with the name of the Ilkhan Abū Sa’īd. Further examples are known to have existed in the papal treasury. Motifs from Chinese textiles found their way into Western European monumental decoration; pseudo-Arabic and Mongol ’phags-pa’ script began to appear on silk draperies manufactured in the West from 1285. The Mongols even found a niche in English pageantry in 1331 when, on the eve of a tournament, Edward III and his barons rode through the streets of London clad as Tatars. These phenomena represent the cultural counterpart of the growing economic interconnectedness across Eurasia that we noticed in Chapter 10.

**Genuine and bogus travellers**

Whereas Carpini and Rubruck had travelled only as far as present-day Mongolia, their successors who visited the qaghan’s court after 1260 were obliged to go much further, to China. The earliest were the Polos, who stayed in China longer than any other medieval Western travellers known to us, for sixteen years or so (1275–91). Of those Latin visitors who have left behind a written account, moreover, only the Polos entered China by the overland route through Central Asia, and Marco claims subsequently to have undertaken a mission on Qubilai’s behalf that took him four months’ journey to the west. He accordingly furnishes information about the easternmost stages of the Silk Route that is lacking in other Western accounts: the desert of Lop, the towns of Ganzhou, Suzhou and so on. Polo seems to
have been based in the north, ‘Catai’ or ‘Cathay’ (named after the Kitan/
Khitai); he was less familiar with the wealthier and more populous southern
half of the country, known in European accounts as ‘Manzi’ or ‘Mangi’
(Chinese manzi, ‘southern barbarians’). The book gives an account of only
three of the nine provinces (‘kingdoms’) of Manzi, namely Yangzhou, Quin-
sai (Hangzhou) and Fuzhou on the grounds that Marco passed through
them; for the other six, he was reliant on hearsay.¹⁹ It should be remembered
that at the time of the Polos’ arrival, parts of Manzi still held out for the
Song, who were not eliminated until 1279. Subsequent visitors from medi-
eval Europe – notably Montecorvino, Odoric, Jordan and Marignolli – were
therefore able to reach the Yuan dominions by sea more easily, but for this
reason they tend to describe only a number of coastal cities in the south of
the country, together with the qaghan’s capital, Khanbaligh.

We should notice that Latin travellers gained access not merely to territo-
ries under Mongol rule but also to those which maintained commercial and
diplomatic relations with the Yuan court and sometimes paid the qaghan
tribute – the coastal regions of peninsular India, for instance, and south-east
Asia. Both missionaries and merchants from Europe, travelling by way of
Hurmuz in the Persian Gulf, were to be found in India from the final dec-
ade of the thirteenth century.²⁰ But the world of the Indian Ocean also lay
athwart the sea route to southern China (Manzi), which was preferred when
inter-Mongol warfare rendered the overland journey hazardous. The vagar-
ies of the monsoon usually dictated a long delay in the subcontinent even for
those proceeding further east. Thus on his way to the qaghan’s dominions
in c.1292–3, Montecorvino spent thirteen months in ‘India and the Church
of St Thomas’ (probably in Ma’bar, as the Coromandel coast was called),
while over fifty years later, Marignolli was halted in Malabar (modern Ker-
ala) for thirteen months.²¹ These experiences gave Western travellers more
than a nodding acquaintance with the ‘real’ India, rather than with the fan-
tasy realm offered up by the writers of Antiquity. Marco Polo stayed so long
in India that nobody was in a better position to describe its customs and its
trade accurately – or so his book assures us.²² Although the term ‘India’, as
used here, embraces a much vaster area, extending as far as (and including)
present-day Indonesia and even Japan, it is clear that Marco did visit the
subcontinent and on perhaps more than one occasion.

One of the difficulties attaching to the works of Polo and Odoric is that
both of them, so to speak, dictated their accounts. Polo’s book, it will be
recalled, began life in a Genoese prison, as a text drafted by a fellow captive,
the professional romance-writer Rustichello of Pisa. In its original form,
Odoric’s work owed its composition to a fellow Franciscan, William of
Solagna, to whom he dictated it in his final months. In neither case can we
be sure how much of the material we have represents the original narrator
and how much should be ascribed to the person who actually transmit-
ted it. Rustichello was clearly responsible for the literary form of the Polo
book, in which the first person plural, bewilderingly, does duty sometimes for all three Polos and at others for Marco and Rustichello himself as if he had been the Venetian’s travelling-companion.\textsuperscript{23} Did he restrict the content faithfully to what Polo told him, or did he embellish it with details of his own?\textsuperscript{24} Odoric’s book was composed when he was ill: did William of Solagna ‘improve’ upon what Odoric narrated?

A further, related problem is that in a preprint culture, it was not unknown for either the original author or copyists to add or delete material later. In the second decade of the fourteenth century, the Dominican Francesco Pipino, translating the Polo text into Latin, made significant alterations in structure and tone. In addition, there are grounds for believing that at some point before 1307, Polo himself produced an amended version of his book, which included details omitted in the Rustichello text. From this revised draft, presumably, are descended both the Latin text found in the fifteenth-century Z manuscript in Toledo Cathedral Library and certain material which the Venetian official Gian Battista Ramusio (d. 1557) extracted from an old Venetian manuscript of the Polo book and which in some degree overlaps with that in Z.\textsuperscript{25} So too in 1340, fewer than ten years after Odoric’s death, the Solagna version of his experiences was reworked by another Franciscan, Henry of Glatz, and further revised versions were produced later in the century. In this fashion, texts took on a life of their own, as different redactions evolved and were disseminated. The question ‘What is the “authentic”, “original” text?’ may (as in the case of Polo’s book) be impossible to answer; in the present context – the reception of the different texts and their contribution to knowledge of the East – it may be largely irrelevant.

Some of those who did not visit Asia nevertheless produced travel accounts or geographical surveys which purported to be based on their own experiences and which were regarded as genuine by their contemporaries and even until relatively recent times. One example of an author whose travels certainly took him no further than the nearest library is the anonymous Castilian Franciscan who soon after 1350 wrote the \textit{Libro del conocimiento de todos los reynos y tierras} (‘Book of Knowledge of All the Kingdoms and Countries’): although presented as his itinerary, it amounts in fact to little more than a bald catalogue of often unidentifiable place-names. Another such bogus traveller is the mysterious writer who calls himself Sir John Mandeville, author of a much more skilful compilation, dating from c.1356, that drew on the account of an authentic voyager, Odoric, and the works of Hayton and Vincent of Beauvais, as well as on the ‘Letter of Prester John’ and the lore of Classical Antiquity.\textsuperscript{26} As regards geographical content rather than authorship, accounts such as these were not necessarily designed to hoodwink their readers and might do a good job of representing what was known on the basis of real journeys (even recent ones).\textsuperscript{27} They need to be taken into consideration if we are to determine what impression more or less educated Western Europeans had of the wider world by 1400.
This is not to say that ‘ways of thinking’ can be defined in uniform, monolithic terms, that there was general agreement on what elicited wonder, or indeed that scepticism was unknown; rather, that it is possible, by focusing on those works that appear to have been most popular, to delineate a corpus of information (and sometimes misinformation) that was available.

It should be noted that we are not necessarily dealing exclusively with the literate. At this date, texts were very often designed to be read aloud to an audience.28 That Rustichello’s version of the Polo book was so intended emerges, perhaps, from the prologue: ‘Take this book and cause it to be read’.29 Rustichello’s opening is also aggressively unclerical, addressed as it is to ‘[e]mperors, kings, dukes, marquesses, counts, knights and burgesses’. Pope and prelates are alike ignored; the choice of French itself indicates the desire to reach a secular, courtly milieu.30 The author of Mandeville’s ‘travels’ may well have been a cleric, but his work was cast, like Polo’s, as that of a layman. Together the two books signal the arrival of a new genre of travel literature – written from a lay perspective for a lay readership.31

The best known literary sources: Polo, Hayton and Odoric/‘Mandeville’

The fourteenth century, then, witnessed an explosion – relatively speaking – in travel literature about Asia; it might appear that by the end of that century the frontiers of Western knowledge had been advanced hundreds of miles to the east. But the influence exerted by these various Latin Christian writers varied considerably. All too often modern scholars have assumed that new knowledge was absorbed by the West simply because a European observer committed his experiences to writing.32 Although the letters of a friar such as Montecorvino possibly enjoyed a wider circulation within his Order, this was not necessarily so in the case of more substantial documents. We have seen how Rubruck’s report to Louis IX languished in comparative obscurity and that only scattered passages were used by Bacon. Marignolli inserted his description of the East in a Bohemian chronicle he was compiling at the behest of the Emperor Charles IV in the years 1355–8, and there it remained buried for over four centuries. Like Jordan’s brief reminiscences, it has survived in only one manuscript – though it may nevertheless have been read by Columbus.33

By contrast, to judge from the number of surviving manuscripts, three of the works we have noticed – those of Marco Polo, Hayton and Odoric – were widely disseminated. It is noteworthy that none of these authors, ironically, was typical of the genre in which he might have been placed. Hayton was not a European, as were most of the authors of crusading treatises, but an expatriate Armenian, albeit one who had joined a Latin religious order. The account of the Franciscan Odoric betrays hardly any evidence of attempts to spread the Gospel. And although Marco Polo undoubtedly
owed his lengthy employment in the qaghan’s service to the entrepreneurial initiative of his father and uncle, the book associated with his name bears little imprint of a trading mentality.

Polo’s book was translated into several vernacular languages, though Pipino’s Latin rendering, made in the second decade of the fourteenth century and extant in sixty manuscripts (not counting translations of Pipino’s text into various vernaculars), was the most widely read. Hayton’s treatise was available from the outset both in the original French version by Nicolas Faucon and in a Latin translation which Faucon produced in the same year (1307). It has survived in over fifty fourteenth- or fifteenth-century copies (seventeen of the original French text, twenty-eight of Faucon’s Latin translation, and at least five representing retranslation from Latin into French, four of them in the version of Jean Le Long dated 1351). As recast by Pipino, the Polo text soon inspired sufficient confidence among the friars for writers belonging to the Mendicant Orders to cite it for the recent history of the East. Within half a century of their composition, both Polo’s and Hayton’s books were quoted by the Florentine chronicler Giovanni Villani. Legends became attached to Hayton himself, notably in Tuscany. His *Flor* was almost the only source utilized by Marino Sanudo for those sections of his *Secreta fidelium crucis* (1321) that dealt with the history of Lesser Armenia and of the Tartars; it was also plundered by other authors, notably Paulinus Minorita and Pietro Vesconte in the 1320s, for their geographical surveys.

Odoric’s fame naturally spread rapidly among the Franciscans, one of whom, John of Winterthur, described his *Relatio* in c.1350 as ‘highly comforting and enjoyable’, but his sanctity ensured that miracles were reported from his tomb at Udine in Friuli within a few years of his death, and this may have guaranteed a wider circulation of his work. More than one hundred manuscripts have come down to us from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries – the great majority in Latin, the rest mostly in Italian or French but a few in German. It was clearly popular reading, though less so than Polo. The accessibility of Odoric’s experiences was greatly enhanced, however, when they became the principal source for Mandeville’s description of Asia – the material coinciding to such an extent that Odoric was sometimes taken to be Mandeville’s travelling-companion or to have lifted his own account from Mandeville’s seemingly fuller work. Mandeville’s account is represented today by 234 fourteenth- or fifteenth-century manuscripts, as opposed to only 130 or so of Polo’s book.

Rustichello and Polo, between them, produced the broadest geographical description of Asia available to date (or for some considerable time to come), with part of East Africa thrown in – even though Polo had never been there. Pride of place goes, perhaps, to the qaghan’s dominions and to Qubilai himself, his court, his harem, his great feasts, his hunting expeditions. The book also contains a good deal of information on certain Chinese cities, especially
the major ports: Quinsai (Hangzhou), Zaitun (Quanzhou), Fuzhou and so on. Although no attempt is made to conceal the fact that devastation had accompanied the Mongol conquests elsewhere, the overall impression the book gives of China is one of unrivalled prosperity. Polo describes the huge Chinese ships, or junks, in which trade with India and other countries was carried on. He himself sailed from China to southern India at least twice, and he describes a number of the towns there, too, along the south-western littoral, Malabar, and on the Coromandel coast (Ma’bar). He lists the products of the territories he is talking about, including fine porcelain from China, pepper and spices from India and the islands of south-east Asia. When it comes to religious differences, it cannot be said that he is especially profound: the inhabitants of this or that region are either Christians or ‘idolators’ or Muslims (termed, in a somewhat cavalier fashion, ‘worshippers of Mahomet’), but in the section on China he does briefly distinguish between Buddhists and the other prominent religious group, the Daoists.

Hayton’s survey of the geography of Asia – apart from a fairly terse account of India – was largely confined to the lands under Mongol rule. He began with Cathay (even though he had never set foot there), describing it as ‘the noblest and wealthiest of all the kingdoms in the world’. The book introduced Western readers properly to the idea that there now existed a number of rival Mongol states (a fact previously adumbrated, as far as I know, only by Bacon and Polo), naming the principal regions of each and even making some attempt to define their boundaries. By comparison with the other written accounts available, it was especially informative about conditions in Central Asia, the territories of the Chaghadayid khanate. In view of his purpose – to bring about cooperation between the Ilkhangs and the West (pp. 124–5) – Hayton may have been especially responsible for popularizing the image of friendly Mongols, although the wide publicity given to Ghazan’s recovery of the Holy Land in 1300 (pp. 210–11) must also have played a significant role.

Unlike Polo’s book, Odoric’s is more an itinerary than a geography; it is laced with personal experiences. He visited the cities of Canton, Zaitun, Fuzhou, Quinsai and Yangzhou in Manzi and the Great Khan’s court at Khanbaligh. The details about China reinforce (and occasionally echo) Polo’s, though seemingly independent of the earlier work. Odoric may have halted in Sumatra and Java and furnishes us with a fuller description of those islands than Polo had done. On the other hand, his account of the regions that lay on his return route is hazy by comparison and markedly inferior to Polo’s material. He was the last author to locate the kingdom of Prester John (presumably the Önggüt kingdom, with its centre at ‘Tenduc’) in the Far East (p. 351). The vague description of Tibet is tacked on at the end almost as an afterthought, though Odoric may actually have seen the fortified monastery of Sa-skya. Yet his work is characterized by personal anecdotes that imbue it with greater vividness than is to be found in Polo’s book.
In sum, a perusal of Polo, Hayton and Odoric would have imprinted on the mind a vision of Asia defined by certain characteristics. These authors provided the West with its first introduction to China – or, rather, to the two distinct regions of the country, Cathay and Manzi. They spoke of the wealth of China, with its paper currency backed up by vast reserves of gold; the huge, densely populated cities of Manzi, bursting with merchandise, and its broad, navigable rivers teeming with traffic; the formidable power of the Mongol qaghan, and the orderly and efficient administration over which he presided. Polo’s claim that there is no kingdom on earth worth half as much as Manzi, frequently reinforced by descriptions of this or that great city, is expressed somewhat more succinctly by Hayton. Polo and Odoric agree that Quinsai is the noblest and richest city in the world. For every shipload of pepper that reaches Alexandria, a hundred are unloaded at Zaitun. In addition a great deal of material was now made available about southern and south-east Asia. The Western reader learned of the existence of states like Ma’bar, ruled by five brothers; Malabar, rich in pepper; the island of Ceylon; Champa (corresponding roughly to the southern part of present-day Vietnam), whose king, says Polo, has 326 children, though according to Odoric he has fathered a mere 250; Java (Polo’s ‘Greater Java’, the empire of Majapahit); and the petty kingdoms of Sumatra (Polo’s ‘Java the Lesser’).

The vast number of islands in the eastern seas clearly made a marked impression: 7,448 in the China Sea and 12,700 in the Indian Ocean, according to Polo, while Odoric spoke of 5,000 in the area of Manzi and another 24,000 within the limits of India, and for Hayton the islands off the coast of Cathay were simply beyond enumeration. On certain of these islands, cannibalism was practised; on some, the inhabitants went naked or almost naked. There was one island, in particular, on which Polo (and Polo alone) waxed eloquent. Lying allegedly 1,500 miles to the east of China, it was called ‘Cipingu’ (Chinese Jibenguo, ‘the kingdom of Japan’). Gold and pearls were in abundant supply there, and the walls and roofs of the ruler’s palace were rumoured to be covered with gold. The palace is a fiction presumably circulating in China (Odoric heard a very similar tale about a golden palace but ascribed it to the ruler of Java instead). Yet the importation of pearls and small quantities of low-price gold from Japan to China is confirmed by contemporary Chinese sources. As we shall see, the chief attributes of Cipingu in Polo’s account would be of prime importance in prompting both Columbus and Cabot to embark on their first journeys across the Atlantic.

The authors’ perspectives

To any notion of an expansion in the West’s horizons a number of qualifications must be made. The first has to do with the mental cargo that Western travellers carried. There has, I think, been some misunderstanding here. It has become fashionable to represent European observers as reporting what
they saw in their own mind’s eye as well as, or sometimes instead of, what confronted them, so that they looked for and hence found the fabulous elements that were the stock-in-trade of medieval Christian geography and ethnology. The distinguished French medievalist, Jacques Le Goff, has proposed that the Indian Ocean, for instance, represented for Latin Christians an ‘oneiric horizon’ – the frontiers of a world that was dreamed about, a world of fabulous riches (contrasting with the relative poverty and economic backwardness of Western Europe), of anti-Nature (fabulous beasts and races, quite unlike the tedious normality of the West), of liberation from the shackles of civilization (as expressed in cannibalism, nudity and sexual licence; one might add, in the case of the king of Champa, unbridled conjugalit).60

Whatever the virtues of this analysis, the pattern it evokes is incomplete. The Asia that confronted these visitors is simply too passive; no room is made for the perspectives of the people they met and spoke with.61 The reports of Latin travellers did not just grow out of a projection of their own mental baggage. Their mental universe shows through, naturally, but it interacted with the information they acquired on the spot, in the form of other peoples’ ‘folk knowledge’. They often took on board, unconsciously no doubt, the mental frontiers of others, which played a crucial role in defining the regions Europeans did not penetrate. Some of the stories the Westerners heard evidently belonged to a common fund of tales that circulated in the Indian Ocean basin: the account of St Thomas’s death which placed it in Maʿbar; or the association of the Biblical and Qur’anic Adam with a mountain in Ceylon (‘Adam’s Peak’), which allegedly contained his giant footprint and which originally was linked with the Buddha;62 the magnificent ruby in the king of Ceylon’s possession, which the qaghan coveted but had never been able to persuade him to sell (one version of the Polo account claims that Marco, accompanying an embassy from Qubilai, actually saw the stone, but Odoric’s account transposes the story of the ruby to ‘Nicoveran’, the Nicobar Islands).63 Certain of these tales had been circulating for centuries and can without difficulty be married up with material found in Chinese sources: the Ceylon ruby, for instance, which had attracted the attention of Cosmas Indicopleustes in the sixth century, is referred to by the Chinese official Zhao Rugua in 1225, just a few decades before Polo’s travels.64

In some cases the local sources of information were often Muslims. When Polo speaks of ‘Ferlec’ (a kingdom in Sumatra), where he briefly stopped off during one of his trips on Qubilai’s behalf, he unconsciously identifies his informants by saying that the people of the coastal towns have embraced Islam and are civilized; not so those in the interior (‘they live like brute beasts’).65 When Odoric notices the cannibals of the Kingdom of Lamori (north-west Sumatra), whom he never met, he has surely borrowed his categories from the Muslim traders he did encounter. Other stories are known
both to have circulated in China and to have been transmitted by Muslim sailors to Arab and Persian geographers back in the tenth century: tales of the islands inhabited separately by men and women; or the ‘ruc’ or rukh, a gigantic bird capable of dropping elephants from a great height.\textsuperscript{66} In describing a custom in Tibet, whereby people make goblets out of the skulls of their deceased fathers, Odoric transmits a folk-tale that had been current back in the eighth century (though applied to a people of eastern Asia) and that Rubruck had also heard recounted of Tibet eighty years before.\textsuperscript{67} It follows from all this that the new frontiers of knowledge are not to be seen in linear terms. We might think of the world that these men discovered as a series of oases in a still imperfectly charted wilderness. Or, to put it another way, the vantage-point is still often the sea-coast; the overwhelming bulk of the land-mass and the majority of the islands (especially the more remote ones) were alike known (if at all) only through hearsay.

**The reception**

The second qualification relates to the purpose with which these works were read.\textsuperscript{68} On this question a number of circumstances can throw some light: the additions made by copyists or translators, the other writings with which the texts were bound and the marginal comments by owners and readers (though all too often anonymous and not datable with any marked precision). Pipino, for instance, turned the Polo text into a handbook for missionaries. The emendations in his Latin translation were evidently designed to impart a spiritual and moral gloss where Rustichello’s version had been dangerously non-committal or had even registered approval. Thus the Tibetans’ practice of lending their wives to passing foreign merchants (‘thither’, observed Rustichello slyly, ‘young bachelors will do well to go’) becomes for Pipino ‘an absurd and deeply abominable custom arising from the blindness of idolatry’.\textsuperscript{69} Conversely, a reworking of Odoric’s ‘Relatio’ made in southern Germany in the latter half of the fourteenth century totally suppresses the missionary theme, to which William of Solagna had given some prominence, and accentuates the marvellous instead.\textsuperscript{70}

The fact that the books of Polo and Odoric, as far as we can tell, are most often found bound together with the stuff of chivalric legend or works of an improving nature suggests that, for the first hundred years of their existence, they were read primarily for entertainment or edification: to dispel boredom, to feed a sense of wonder at the diversity of Creation, to amass knowledge of pagan customs with a view to future evangelization. Only in the second half of the fifteenth century did readers approach them in order to learn about the true layout of the land-mass and the oceans.\textsuperscript{71} Hayton’s *Flor des estoires* perhaps followed a different trajectory. Designed originally as a crusade treatise, it was on occasions bound together with other matters of relevance to crusading that dated from the early years of
the fourteenth century: the geopolitical survey of Eastern Europe by an anonymous Dominican, to which we have already referred (p. 172), and the Memoria Terrae Sanctae. No fewer than five codices combining these three works have survived from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This might lend support to the idea that they were first put together as early as 1308, when the French prince Charles of Valois (brother of Philip IV) planned a crusade against Byzantium, of which the anonymous Dominican, at least, was an enthusiastic advocate.72

Yet the distinctions are not as clear-cut as this. A copy of Polo’s book was presented to Charles of Valois’s ambassador when he visited Venice in 1307 in connection with the previously mentioned anti-Byzantine crusade.73 And both Polo (particularly Pipino’s Latin version) and Odoric are sometimes found bound together with Hayton in late medieval manuscripts that reflect unmistakeable crusading preoccupations.74 Underlying this, to a large extent, was the loss of the Holy Land, generating a new urgency in the extension of strategic horizons beyond the Near East and into the Indian Ocean.75 The linkage between Polo and Odoric on the one hand and crusading concerns on the other persisted into the latter part of the century. A notable example is the assemblage of texts produced for Juan Fernández de Heredia (d. 1396), the Master of the Knights Hospitallers at Rhodes and a keen patron of historical writing.76 At this time an interest in the East is to be found in the very westernmost reaches of Catholic Europe, the Iberian peninsula. As we saw, it was in the late fourteenth century that a Castilian Franciscan composed the Libro del conocimiento. But Aragonese interest was more pronounced still. Between 1372 and 1374, King Pedro IV purchased no fewer than three copies of Polo’s book. Roughly simultaneously, it is known to have been translated into Catalan, the language of part of Pedro’s dominions, and this version underlay the ‘Catalan Atlas’ of c.1380, containing, as we shall see, the earliest maps of the Far East to reflect a detailed knowledge of Polo’s material. The codex produced for Heredia, a friend and one-time subject of King Pedro, represented an Aragonese translation, done in part, at least, at the Aragonese court. Not only did it comprise Polo’s book and Hayton’s Flor des estoires (possibly translated from the Catalan), but the Polo text itself included a few supplementary passages borrowed from Odoric, so that the manuscript represents a relatively full compendium of what was by now becoming common knowledge about the East.77 Pedro’s son, the future King Juan I, exhibited a keen interest in fresh accounts of ‘Tartaria’ and the East, both before and after his succession to the throne.78 An Aragonese translation of Mandeville’s book (based on a copy of the work presented to Juan by Charles V of France in 1380) may have appeared not long after the Heredia codex.79

The fact that knowledge of these works was so widespread does not, of course, mean that all the detail they contained was necessarily accepted. The authors themselves clearly felt a need to guard against incredulity in
A new world discovered?

advance. Generally speaking, primacy in these matters was ostensibly given
to personal experience. Marignolli was concerned to report what he had
seen himself, even if the outcome was frequently to confirm the veracity of
tradition. Marco Polo’s book guaranteed that what he himself had wit-
nessed would be distinguished from hearsay (though this laudable principle
is not always observed). For Polo, the wealth of Manzi was on such a
stupendous scale that nobody could credit it who had not seen it. In one
version, he hesitated to give the number of boats that plied the Qara Mören
( Yellow River) for fear of being branded a liar. Odoric, for his part, denied
any desire to write about what was incredible unless witnessed. How nec-
essary these disclaimers actually were is not clear. Professor Larner argues
persuasively that, during the first few decades, when Latin merchants were
free to travel within the Mongol realms, they provided corroboration of
the written accounts. It was after these contacts with Central Asia and the
Far East dried up in the latter half of the fourteenth century that scepti-
cism began to be expressed more frequently and not until Niccolò Conti
reported back from his journeys in the Indian Ocean in the 1440s that Polo’s
truthfulness was again validated. Nevertheless, Polo allegedly encountered
disbelief in his lifetime – even, in one story, on his deathbed, when he was
urged to excise from the book what was untrue and retorted that he had not
described one half of what he had seen.

This is not to claim that what prompted incredulity in fourteenth-century
Europe was necessarily what would do so today. As we shall see (pp. 348–9),
the fabulous races still commanded a loyal following. That said, it is impor-
tant to distinguish ‘natural’ marvels from the miraculous, a distinction that
was just beginning to be drawn at the onset of the thirteenth century. The
term ‘marvels’ was coming to embrace whatever within Nature inspired
amazement and admiration, as opposed to that which lay outside it and
often provoked scepticism. With the occasional exception (like the ‘ruc’),
such ‘natural’ marvels were the kind that Polo purveyed; to a lesser extent,
this is also true of Odoric. Breathless claims about this or that great city or
the size of an Eastern king’s harem belong in a different class from traditional
mirabilia. The reader is invited to share in the wonder conjured by superla-
tives rather than by the anthropologically or zoologically preposterous.

We are possibly approaching the reasons why Polo, in particular, was
not believed. Not merely was he prepared to leave a void where no descrip-
tion of a region lay readily to hand rather than to fill it with the fantastic,
but he seems further to take a positive pleasure (insofar as we can detect
a personality at all behind Rustichello’s deathless epic prose) in demolish-
ing misconceptions that were prevalent back home. The salamander, for
example, an animal that reputedly was capable of withstanding fire, was
in fact not a beast but a mineral (asbestos). The corpses sold in India as
dead pygmies were really those of dried monkeys. The unicorn is recogniz-
able for the first time here as the rhinoceros: contrary to Western European
tradition, says Marco, this is not at all the sort of creature that lets itself be ensnared by virgins. Such iconoclastic disregard for cherished elements of traditional wisdom was objectionable enough; added to it was the manner in which Polo depicted the qaghan’s empire. The stumbling-block here was not that the Western reader was predisposed to reject the notion of a highly organized and sophisticated polity in the East – witness the longevity of the Prester John legend. Rather, it was that Polo depicted such a polity as presided over by those from whom the West had grown accustomed to expect only coarse-grained barbarism; the artists who illustrated the more luxurious manuscripts of the Polo book, such as BN fr. 2810, bear witness to this expectation by falling back on the older image, in defiance of the text. As has been pointed out, the discovery of the ‘simpler’ society in the Canary Islands in the 1340s proved significantly easier to assimilate.

**Conflicts, contradictions and authority**

The third thing that circumscribed Western perceptions of Asia has to do with discrepancies between new information and that found in traditional authorities. Medieval Latin travellers themselves sometimes sought to correct what they viewed as misinformation by contemporaries who had trodden the same path not long before. Jordan, assuring his readers that the Indian rhinoceros is not the unicorn (which he located instead in ‘the Third India’, i.e. Africa), may be consciously challenging Polo. Marignolli, in turn, was almost certainly taking issue with Odoric in stating that the pepper in Malabar did not grow in forests and that its production was in the hands of the Christians there rather than of the Muslims; on the other hand, his denial that it was roasted cannot be aimed at Odoric, since Jordan had earlier attacked the same ‘lie’.

More importantly, however, the new information frequently clashed with that derived from venerable sources. Polo, of course, was not the only traveller who became aware of a conflict between his own experiences and traditional knowledge; he simply enjoyed a higher profile. By making a choice, Rubruck had impugned one of the highest authorities of all. It was untrue, he found, that the Caspian was a gulf linked to the Ocean, as Isidore had asserted; rather, it was entirely landlocked. Yet such emphatic assertions were unusual. More often those who wrote about geography hedged their bets. The Castilian Franciscan who composed the *Libro del conocimiento*, for instance, transmits the well known fact that the Three Magi were buried in Cologne, but he then mentions the monument to them in the Chinese city of ‘Solin’ (which had been pointed out to him, he tells us, during his visit to the city), without committing himself to either location.

The overall impact of the works of Polo, Hayton and Odoric was consequently patchy. Certain geographical treatises or encyclopedias and a minority of maps reflect – in some measure – the journeys made and the
new territories opened up to Europeans. But other contemporary prose works parade none of this new knowledge whatsoever. Writers sometimes exhibit a bewilderingly ‘compartmentalized’ approach to learning. Vincent of Beauvais enriched the historical section of his encyclopedia with detail on the Mongols borrowed from Carpini and Simon of Saint-Quentin; the geographical section, by contrast, makes no reference to the information furnished by these travellers and simply falls back on the writings of Antiquity. So too the geography inserted by Ranulf Higden in his *Polychronicon* (before 1350) is highly traditional; it makes no mention of the Mongols, in contrast with the historical part of his book.98 And the material on the Far East purveyed by Polo took an especially long time to be incorporated into the work of the cartographers. Even the ‘Catalan Atlas’ of c.1380 – containing, as we noticed, the earliest maps to demonstrate a familiarity with Polo’s book – is selective: it incorporates China, but no attempt is made to depict Cipingu. Thereafter we have to wait until the latter half of the fifteenth century before several maps, produced in relatively rapid succession and independently of one another, again bear the imprint of Polo’s findings and – in the case of Fra Mauro (c.1459) – include the first Western representation of Japan.99 It was incumbent on cartographers to tread more cautiously than the authors of prose accounts; it was easier to play it safe and merely reproduce the geographical data inherited from Antiquity, or – at best – simply to graft the new material onto the existing corpus of sources that were deemed authoritative for the history and geography of the world.100

The problem of deference to authority is already illustrated by the example of Roger Bacon, writing back in c.1267 – no mere plodding compilator but a scholar blest with an enquiring mind. Very commendably, Bacon insisted that he would give priority to those who wrote from personal experience rather than on the basis purely of report (*ex rumore*). Thus he used the writings of those who had travelled in Asia, such as Rubruck and others who had visited the Tartars; he knew of Carpini’s *Ystoria Mongalorum*, though it is not certain whether he had read it completely.101 And yet Bacon adds that he will rely also on the late eighth-century author known as Aethicus Ister – whose *Cosmographia* is a pastiche of nonsense and who was never east of Austria in his life – as if its account of ‘Scythia’ were likewise based on genuine travel experiences and equal in value to Rubruck’s report.102 In c.1400, the Florentine Domenico Silvestri was expressing an attitude rather akin to the policy Bacon had in practice followed, when he declared that he would include in his work on geography only what was supported by the authority of Antiquity, told by *viva voce* witnesses, or based on probable conjecture.103 As these examples demonstrate, it was not enough to look for an empirical understanding in the works that one consulted; it was also necessary to know just where such an empirical understanding was truly to be found. Bad sources could so easily look like good ones.
It is sometimes said that the fifteenth-century Renaissance exacerbated the problem – that the rise of Humanism accentuated the reverence with which ancient writers were viewed and made scholars less likely to question or challenge them. This view, however, must be qualified. Classical sources themselves provided conflicting information: what eventually prompted a reassessment and enhanced the priority of personal observation was the rediscovery of Ptolemy’s *Geographia* (translated into Latin in 1406/10) and of Strabo’s *Geographia* a little later (the Latin translation dates from the mid-fifteenth century). The unearthing of these works led to the recognition that some of their material clashed with the geographical data inherited from other traditional sources.

By way of illustration we may turn to the fabulous races. On this point, one or two of our travellers were sceptical. Rubruck voiced doubts regarding the existence of the monsters of which Solinus and Isidore had written and which nobody he asked claimed to have seen. Montecorvino felt bound to mention that he had found no monsters in southern India. Marignolli went so far as to reject the notion of whole races who were deformed, proposing that it had arisen because the occasional individual ‘monster’ lurked in one locality or another, just as in Europe. And some of these peoples, he suggested, were completely fictitious: the Sciopods, for example, with the enormous foot they used for shading themselves, surely originated with the Indian practice of carrying a large parasol.

Yet these were seemingly isolated voices. There was an internal rationality to the accounts of monsters, which reminds us that in the medieval context the distinction between ‘factual’ geography or ‘rational’ reporting, on the one hand, and the genre of marvels, on the other, can be misleading and anachronistic. Was not the authenticity of the marvels supported by a host of trustworthy writers in the ancient world? It was, moreover, licit for Christians – even obligatory – to stand in wonder before God’s Creation and not just a duty confined to the devout, either. It may be that the success of ‘Mandeville’ lay partly in his readiness to satisfy a profound need by peopling Odoric’s Indian islands with the whole gamut of monstrous races.

Locating the Cynocephali north of ‘Tartaria’, the author of the *Libro del conocimiento* claimed to have met one of this race in Ürgench; though for some reason he dispatched the headless people, whose faces were on their chests, to the northern reaches of Norway and denied having sighted them. Even genuine travellers felt compelled to mention the monstrous nations, while relegating them to the fringes of the world they described. Thus John of Sultāniyya, who passed to the south of the Caucasus (‘Caspian’) range in 1404, could cite rumours that its inhabitants included not only the peoples Gog and Magog, imprisoned by Alexander, but also the Monacli, who fed on human flesh, and a race who were half-canine, half-human. His contemporary, Clavijo, whose mission to Temür took him as far as Samarqand, retails an account of the Amazons, in the assurance
that they lived eleven days’ march beyond that city. Nor did the fact that Polo’s book nowhere actually mentions the mythical monstrous races prevent some of those who copied the manuscripts of his work from including illustrations of them. In some respects, therefore, and for many Western readers, the world went on much as before.

Within a relatively short time, moreover, all this new-found knowledge of Asia, such as it was, acquired a static, fossilized character, as the fourteenth century witnessed a progressive drying-up of journeys between Europe and eastern Asia, the reasons for which we have already noticed (pp. 271–3, 300–1). There is no indication that anyone in Europe – with the possible exception of John of Sulṭāniyya – ever learned that the Mongol rulers had been expelled from China and replaced by the native Ming dynasty in 1368. Having been made aware, therefore, of an impressive and powerful civilization in Cathay, Western Christians continued to imagine the Great Khan presiding over it long after he had in fact withdrawn into the steppes of Mongolia.

**Christians and pagans: a shifting balance in a larger world?**

It has been suggested that, with the publicity given to the findings of Western travellers in Mongol Asia, the world appeared much larger. This impression, at any rate, would have been conveyed by the duration of journeys – three or three-and-a-half years – between China and the Near East given (though inaccurately) in Marco Polo’s book. And one consequence was that the territory in Christian hands accordingly came to seem a significantly smaller proportion of the earth’s surface. Material to support this proposition can be gleaned from a variety of writers, beginning with the dejected comment of Roger Bacon in c.1267: ‘There are few Christians. The whole breadth of the world is peopled by unbelievers, and there is no one to show them the truth’. One circumstance that influenced his judgement, no doubt, was the discovery of Buddhism, a faith hitherto completely unknown to the West. Carpini, as we saw (p. 102), had heard of Buddhists while at the qaghan’s encampment but had mistaken them for Christians. It fell to Rubruck to identify such figures not merely as ‘idolators’ but as the representatives of an organized religion: he described their dress, the layout of their temples and the beliefs of different sects (although he wrongly concluded that the Mongols represented a monotheistic tradition within Buddhism). In China – outside the cities where Nestorianism was represented, that is – and beyond, only Buddhists (‘idolators’), were allegedly to be found. It was, of course, Marco Polo who first brought Buddhism to the attention of a Western readership; although his material on Buddhism was rather more superficial, he did (unlike Rubruck) devote some space to the life of the Buddha.
The vast extent of the Mongol realms helped to reinforce the impression that Christians were a small minority. We find Robert Grosseteste expressing such a view as early as 1250, when visiting the papal Curia. According to Ramón Lull, the dominions of the qaghan, the Ilkhan and the khan of the Golden Horde were, in the aggregate, at least twice as large as those of the Christians and Muslims combined. References to an apparently shrinking Christian world population could be multiplied, and statements of this sort voiced after 1300, at least, must reflect in part an awareness of the successes achieved by Muslim arms (as in Syria and Palestine). Yet we need to approach such opinions with caution. Pessimism about the relative strength of Christians in the world was no new phenomenon. As early as the twelfth century, William of Malmesbury, in his account of the sermon that launched the First Crusade in 1095, makes Pope Urban II point to the fact that believers inhabited only a small fraction of the Earth’s surface, though, of course, it should be borne in mind that William wrote before Latin Christians became aware of the existence of the far-flung Nestorian communities and that crusading successes, acts of union with separated churches and the spread of reports about Prester John all gave rise to more sanguine opinions.

What had also changed in the intervening century and a half was the attitude towards Christians of other churches. It was no longer just a matter of the great number of pagans: the high proportion of schismatic Christians had also proved daunting. Rubruck had observed that Nestorians were established in fifteen Chinese cities. Although he seems to have enjoyed a good working relationship with at least one Nestorian cleric, his strictures on the Nestorians in general clearly influenced Bacon’s judgement: they were ‘bad Christians’. Two generations later, Marino Sanudo estimated that ‘Christians’ (a term which for him excluded schismatics) held only a tenth of the world, and the author of the *Directorium ad passagium faciendum*, in what was perhaps an indirect allusion to Sanudo’s verdict, was more pessimistic still: ‘As for us, the true Christians, we number – let alone a tenth – not even a twentieth’. Such sentiments were being expressed in the early fifteenth century: at the Council of Constance in 1417 it was noted that of the twelve regions of the world converted by the Apostles, eleven were now heretical.

In this context, it is worth noting the eclipse of the Asiatic Prester John. From being the mighty (and only incidentally heterodox) ally he had appeared to Otto of Freising, he had undergone a steady decline in status, until both Polo and Montecorvino identified him with a relatively minor prince, a former ruler of the Turkish Önggüt tribe, north-east of the great bend in the Yellow River. The handling of the Prester John theme by different travellers reflects, in some measure, the immediate conditions or the wider political circumstances in which they operated. Thus Rubruck, frequently ill at ease in Nestorian circles, was content to dismiss the entire
story as the product of Nestorian exaggeration, and whereas previous writers had assumed that Chinggis Khan had killed the Christian Prester John, Polo transmitted a striking mutation of the legend. Flushed with the (doubtless overstated) patronage of a benevolent Mongol qaghan, he said nothing of Prester John’s Christianity and made Christian astrologers in Chinggis Khan’s entourage predict his rival’s downfall. Around the same time Joinville, recalling – or perhaps refining – the testimony of Louis IX’s returning envoys in 1251, would recount Prester John’s overthrow in terms that virtually identified Chinggis Khan’s cause with justice and Christian truth. In any case, the arrival of an embassy from the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia (c. 1306) dealt a new and fortuitous twist to the long career of Prester John. Jordan of Séverac, who soon afterwards, in 1323, located him in Africa, was the first of many authors to do so; Odoric, conversely, was the last to associate him with Asia. The Nestorians of the East no longer even had a useful king to offer.

It is true that some were still ready to count schismatics unequivocally within the ranks of the faithful and that this bred a more positive outlook on the world. Burchard of Mount Sion, on pilgrimage in 1283, demonstrates a comparatively open attitude towards other sects and clearly derived comfort from an overwhelming preponderance of Eastern Christians in the territories ‘beyond the sea, as far as India and Ethiopia’, despite their unwarlike character. In 1255, Rubruck, noticing that the (Greek) Christians in Seljük Anatolia outnumbered by ten to one the Muslims who ruled over them, seemed to be adding this fact in support of a crusade. The Rustichello version of Polo’s book regularly mentions Eastern Christians without pronouncing on their orthodoxy, and Mandeville (often in contrast with his sources) not only abstains from adverse comment but uses the virtues of heterodox Christians as a vehicle for criticizing the Latins. But not all those who copied and embellished the Polo account displayed such eirenic attitudes. The majority of other texts were likely to dismiss Nestorians and other non-Latin Christians out of hand. For Odoric, they are ‘schismatics and heretics’ or ‘the very worst heretics’; in Jordan’s eyes, similarly, the ‘Thomas Christians’ and the Nestorians of the Caucasus region are not Christians, although the Georgians qualify. Some fourteenth-century writers went further, with the assertion that the Nestorians had fallen away from Christianity altogether. Dismissive judgements of this kind did not, even so, signal the end of illusions about high-ranking conversions in Asia: Clavijo in 1404 transmitted a false report that the new Ming Emperor (Yongle) had become a Christian.

**Prospect: the discovery of Asia in America**

A new world, then, had been opened up to Latin Christians by the Mongol conquests. And as a result of the discovery of Cathay, Java and Sumatra and
perhaps a vague consciousness also of the existence of Cipingu, it became clear that the Eurasian land-mass extended a considerable distance further to the east. Given the canonical statement in II Esdras, 6:42, that the land occupied six-sevenths of the earth, and that only one-seventh lay under water, this would be of prime importance. Roger Bacon was just one of several theorists grossly to underestimate the circumference of the globe and hence the distance between Spain and the Far East for anyone traveling westward across the Atlantic, and Bacon, through the medium of Pierre d’Ailly’s *Imago Mundi* (c.1410), would have a profound impact on Columbus’s determination to make the journey to Cipingu in 1492. The flurry of Spanish activity surrounding the Polo book and other texts in the late fourteenth century, which we noticed earlier, was perhaps unusual and short-lived, but it is important as evidence for a rise in interest in the East within this – one might think, perhaps, the most unlikely – part of Latin Europe. A hundred years later, these texts took on a new significance when Europeans first conceived of reaching Asia by a westerly route. In his endeavour to reach Cipingu, Columbus was surely indebted to geographical notions that had been popularized by Polo. Yet it is by no means certain that at the time of his first voyage he had read the book, of which he is known to have acquired a copy only in 1497/8. This was sent to him from England by the Bristol merchant John Day. Day was familiar with the recent expedition of the Venetian citizen John Cabot, whose own acquaintance with Marco Polo’s information about Cipingu had inspired him to cross the Atlantic under the patronage of the English king.

The great majority of the annotations (*postille*) that are to be found on the Pipino text Columbus owned (now in the Biblioteca Colombiana in Seville) cannot be dated – even where the hand can be reliably identified as the Admiral’s own; those few that can were made no earlier than the third voyage. On the other hand, it is worth noting that Heredia’s composite manuscript (including, as we saw, an Aragonese version of Polo’s book) had been acquired by Columbus’s patron, Queen Isabella of Castile (d. 1504). Columbus may therefore have had access to a text at an early date. But this is purely conjectural. On balance, it seems safer to conclude that by his second voyage in 1493, he had imbibed only an outline familiarity with the world the Venetian had described (and for that matter, given the evidence, the same might be said of Cabot five years later). Even during his subsequent attempts, Columbus was possibly guided more by a general awareness of what Polo and others had said. After his arrival in the Caribbean and the onset of doubts about the proximity of Cipingu, the presence of so many islands – surely that very plethora of islands referred to but never visited by Polo and by Odoric and Mandeville – must have helped to bolster his conviction that he was not far from the mainland of Cathay. On the other hand, the dark skins of the islands’ inhabitants – so difficult to reconcile with the received
image of the Cathayans – would have been explicable only for someone who had read Polo or Odoric on the aboriginal inhabitants of the southern Chinese province of Fuzhou.145

The journeys of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that were both stimulated and facilitated by the rise of the Mongol world-empire did not, perhaps, have as profound and widespread an impact on contemporaries as did those of their successors from the last years of the fifteenth century onward. Yet in the longer term, their consequences were no less striking. Three authors, at least, were undoubtedly responsible for a pronounced growth in the availability of knowledge about the world beyond Islam after 1300, and through their agency ‘Cathay’ and its neighbours became part of an idée fixe within the West, which in turn prompted the voyages of discovery made by Columbus and others. How many persons read Marco Polo’s book (in one form or another) during the two hundred years following his return to Italy, we have no sure way of knowing; how many more came to put their trust in Mandeville, it is impossible to surmise. Nor can we be certain how familiar Columbus was with the contents of either book prior to his departure in 1492 or even after his fourth and final voyage. What can be said with confidence is that in the broadest sense, thirteenth- and fourteenth-century travellers (both real and imaginary), and Polo especially, exerted a decisive influence on the actions of their late fifteenth-century successors.

Notes


5 Reichert, Begegnungen, p. 239.

6 Schmieder, Europa, p. 160.


10 Finlay, Pilgrim Art, p. 155.


12 Charles IV: Arnold, Princely Gifts, p. 121 and n.43 at p. 185. Cangrande: Finlay, Pilgrim Art, p. 156: it is by no means certain, however, that Cangrande’s name is derived from the title of the Great Khan, as there stated.


14 Finlay, Pilgrim Art, p. 155.


21 Montecorvino, ‘Epistolea II’, §1, p. 345 (tr. in Moule, Christians in China, p. 171, and Dawson, Mongol Mission, p. 224). Marignolli, p. 530 = ‘Kronika Jana z Marignoly’, p. 496 (tr. Yule, Cathay, III, p. 217); slightly later he gives one year and four months.


25 See Larner, Marco Polo, pp. 46–58, 185; Gadrat-Ouerfelli, pp. 64–86, on Pipino’s Latin version, and 96–100 on the ‘Z’ text. The arguments of Barbara Wehr, ‘À propos de la génèse du “Devisement dou Monde” de Marco Polo’, in Maria Selig, Barbara Frank and Jörg Hartmann, eds., Le passage à l’écrit des langues romanes (Tübingen, 1993), pp. 299–326, that Pipino’s version represents the original Polo text and that Rustichello’s is a subsequent reworking, have attracted little support.

26 For these two accounts, see Guéret-Laferté, pp. 88–107. There is no consensus as to the identity or even the nationality of ‘Manevelle’: see J.R.S. Phillips,


28 M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066–1307, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1993), esp. pp. 266–70. For the change that occurred in the significance of literatus (from ‘one versed in letters’ to ‘one who is [minimally] literate’), see ibid., chap. 7.

29 MP, I, p. 117, si prenez cest livre et le faites lire, closely followed by chascuns . . . qui ce livre orra ou lira (tr. Ricci, p. 1; tr. Latham, p. 1). Larner, Marco Polo, pp. 51–2, takes this as anachronistic and largely rhetorical; but cf. Rubiés, Travel and Ethnology, pp. 77–8.

30 See Goodman, p. 85.

31 Rubiés, Travel and Ethnology, pp. 77–83.


35 See the list in RHCD, II, pp. lxxxv–ccxiii.


37 Giovanni Villani, Nuova cronica, vi, 29, and ix, 35, ed. Porta, I, p. 256, and II, pp. 56–7, on each occasion citing both authors.


40 Schmieder, Europa, p. 300.

41 John of Winterthur, Cronica, p. 231: opusculum valde solaciosum et delectabile. See also John of Viktring, II, p. 113.


45 Calculation based on the most up-to-date list, given by Deluz, Le Livre, pp. 370–82; see also the list in her introduction to the edition, pp. 38–58. For Polo, see Reichert, Begegnungen, p. 172; and for comparisons of the two works, Malcolm Letts, Sir John Mandeville: The Man and His Book (London, 1949), p. 129, and Bennett, Rediscovery, p. 219. Cf. Larner, Marco Polo, p. 106, for still higher figures.

46 See, e.g., MP, II, p. 2 (tr. Ricci, p. 54; tr. Latham, p. 43), for the ruined condition in which they have left the city of Balkh.

47 For a convenient survey of Polo’s information on India, see Franz Übleis, ‘Marco Polo in Südasien (1293/94)’, AK 60 (1978), pp. 268–304.


50 For the growth of the idea that the Mongols’ attitude had changed and that they were now more ‘civilized’, see Schmieder, Europa, pp. 9 (citing Jacopo d’Acqui), 132, 255.


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59 K. Enoki, ‘Marco Polo and Japan’, in Oriente Poliano, pp. 23–44.
61 See Critchley, pp. 91–2; and Rubiés, Travel and Ethnology, p. xvi.
64 Friedrich Hirth and W. W. Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Entitled Chu-fan chï (St. Petersburg, 1911), p. 73; for Cosmas, see the editors’ note at p. 74.
66 Larner, Marco Polo, pp. 81–2 and n.35 at p. 204; Critchley, pp. 91–2. For the islands of men and of women in Islamic geography, see Miquel, La géographie humaine, II, pp. 487, 493–5; for the rukh, ibid., p. 91.
71 See Reichert, Begegnungen, pp. 173–96. For examples of mss. containing both Pipino’s text and Odoric, see Larner, Marco Polo, pp. 112, 114.

74 Larner, *Marco Polo*, p. 112.


79 Pilar Liria Montañes, ed., “Libro de la maravillas del mundo” de Juan de Mandevilla (Zaragoza, 1979): for the date, see the editor’s introduction, pp. 20–1.


84 Marco Polo, tr. Moule and Pelliot, II (‘Z text’), p. 41 (cf. tr., I, p. 309, n.4).


93 Hyde, ‘Real and imaginary journeys’, pp. 139–40.

94 Jordan, §36, ed. Gadrat, p. 249 (tr. Yule, *Wonders*, p. 18); for the unicorn in Africa, see ibid., §109, ed. Gadrat, p. 259 (tr. Yule, pp. 42–3), where Jordan accepts the report, which Polo had dismissed, that this creature can be captured only by virgins.


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97 Libro del conosçimiento de todos los rregnos et tierras et señorios que son por el mundo, ed. (from the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek ms. hisp. 150) María Jésus Lacarra et al. (Zaragoza, 1999), p. 157; tr. Clements Markham, The Book of the Knowledge of All the Kingdoms, Lands and Lordships of the World, HS 29 (London, 1912), pp. 5–6.

98 Reichert, Begegnungen, p. 229.


100 Reichert, Begegnungen, pp. 234–6.

101 OM, I, pp. 304–5, 354, on those who have not written from their own experience. For Carpini, ibid., I, p. 371, and II, p. 368; at I, p. 322, Bacon refers to those who had visited the Mongols, such as Rubruck et alii, and at I, p. 356, he speaks of libr[i] de moribus Tartarorum, of which Rubruck’s is apparently just one.


103 Cited by Larner, Marco Polo, p. 137.


109 Cynocephali: Libro del conosçimiento, p. 175: et llaman synfalos (sentence wrongly punctuated; cf. text in SF, p. 572, and Markham trans., p. 48); for the headless race, see p. 159 (tr. Markham, p. 11).

110 John of Sultâniyya, Libellus, pp. 108–9; for Gog and Magog, see also ibid., p. 113, and Moranvillé, ‘Mémoire’, p. 449.

111 Clavijo, p. 212 (Le Strange trans., pp. 293–4, has ‘fifteen’).


114 Larner, Marco Polo, p. 91.

115 OM, III, p. 122, cited by Southern, Western Views of Islam, p. 57. See also Opus tertium, ed. Little, p. 62.


120 Lull, Disputatio Christiani et Hamar Saracenii, cited in Reichert, Begegnungen, p. 226 and n.167.

121 For some early fifteenth-century examples, see Hay, Europe, pp. 74–81 passim.

124 OM, I, pp. 373, 400; also Bacon, *Opus tertium*, ed. Little, p. 62.
126 Hay, *Europe*, p. 77; cf. also Petrarch’s dismissive comment about once-Christian Asia, cited ibid., p. 60.
128 WR, xvii, 2, p. 82 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 122); and see OM, I, p. 367.
137 Clavijo, p. 211 (tr. Le Strange, p. 292).
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142 Nitti, *Juan Fernández de Heredia’s Aragonese Version*, p. xvi.

143 Gadrat-Ouerfelli, pp. 330–5: her discussion of the evidence in the journals of the four voyages.


145 Odoric, xxii, 2, pp. 461–2 (tr. Yule, *Cathay*, II, pp. 187–8). Cf. MP, V, pp. 126–7 (tr. Ricci, p. 257; tr. Latham, p. 203), where colour is not mentioned (apart from blue war-paint) but where we are clearly dealing with a cultural group quite distinct from the Chinese; the relevant details are lacking in the Tuscan or French–Italian texts.
CONCLUSION

This book has explored the contacts between Catholic Christendom and the Mongols over a period of almost two centuries, ranging as they did from hostile incursions, through more or less amicable diplomatic exchanges and talk of coordinated military campaigns, to far-flung trading ventures and strenuous but stillborn efforts at Christianization. At the same time, the story is largely one of shifting images. When the Mongols first attacked Latin Europe, they were barbarian harbingers of the Last Things, fulfilling scriptural prophecy or, more probably, the predictions of the seventh-century writer Pseudo-Methodius; such conclusions may have been encouraged by the similar rumours that circulated about them in Orthodox Rus’, by reports from the Islamic world and by what was to be gleaned of the invaders’ own origin-myths. A century and a half later, they had been integrated within a more holistic world-view; their image had softened. Western Europeans had become more familiar with ‘Tartars’ and with the products of the Tartar world, and they imagined the Great Khan in Cathay presiding over a realm characterized by enviable order and untold prosperity. At the very end of the fifteenth century, one or two more enterprising souls – Columbus and Cabot – were prepared to take enormous risks with the aim of reaching his dominions by sea.

In the mid-thirteenth century, the rapidly growing Mongol world-empire and the expansionist Christian West were undoubtedly on a collision course. A series of campaigns (1237–42) devastated the eastern marches of Latin Christendom and destroyed the outcrops of recent Catholic evangelism in Cumania. Whether the Mongols could have advanced as far as the Atlantic coast must remain a matter for speculation. In 1241, they penetrated only to the borders of Germany and Bohemia, perhaps because their principal objective on that occasion was to chastise the Hungarian king. There is no
doubt that they envisaged further conquests; this was the mission entrusted to them by Heaven. Nor is it self-evident, given the qaghan’s capacity to muster formidable resources over a vast area, that the Mongols lacked the strength to inflict a severe reverse upon Hungary’s western neighbours; the idea that internal divisions rendered the West an easier target for Mongol attacks would remain alive well into the following century.

Innocent IV’s attempts to remonstrate with the Mongols, through the embassies of 1245–7, achieved little other than the accumulation of valuable information about the newcomers. The Mongols understood diplomatic overtures from independent rulers only as a prelude to acceptance of the qaghan’s authority: had this book been written from the vantage-point of (regrettably non-existent) Mongol sources, it would have recorded the submission of the Great Pope in the Year of the Horse. Papal efforts, too, to erect a _cordon sanitaire_ of schismatic and pagan client princes in Eastern Europe under the umbrella of union with Rome and to secure concessions from nervous Muslim rulers in Syria and Egypt came to nothing.

That the grim new power which had arisen on the borders of the Latin world did not follow up the assault of 1241–2 was due to conditions within the Mongol empire. The Mongol invasion of Poland in 1259 was probably meant to herald the next forward thrust into Europe, and similarly Hülegü’s campaign of 1260 – had it not been aborted – could have brought about the elimination of the Latin states in Syria and Palestine as independent entities. As in 1241–2, the reaction of the papacy – the one element in Catholic Europe capable of coordinating the resistance of Western princes – proved inadequate; the Curia again had too many pressing concerns just in terms of crusade projects, amid which the Mongols simply had to take their place. It was fortunate for the West that the disintegration of the unitary Mongol empire in 1260–1 put an end to any plans the invaders may have harboured. Henceforward, such Mongol offensives as occurred on Latin Christendom’s eastern frontiers were no longer mounted with the support of the centre but were the exclusive responsibility of the successor-states – the Golden Horde in the Pontic and Caspian steppes and the Ilkhanate in the Near East, each at least as embroiled in conflict with the other as with its non-Mongol enemies.

The Golden Horde continued to menace Latin Christendom after 1260. Fear of further Mongol incursions surfaces at frequent intervals in our sources. But apart from a few major attacks – notably the devastation of Hungary in 1285 and of Poland in 1287 – Mongol military operations were confined to raids. More indirectly, the protectorates established by the Golden Horde over non-Latin states – the schismatic Rus’, Bulgarians and Byzantines, and pagan Lithuania – had the effect of fortifying these polities against Latin pressure. The Mongols may have reacted particularly sharply to Western encroachments on ‘Ruthenia’, where the line of princes died out in 1340 and Polish intervention sparked a series of conflicts that
lasted into the 1350s. At various points the rulers of the ‘front-line’ Catholic states – Hungary and Poland – themselves reached an accommodation with the enemy in order to fend off an attack. When they did prove ready to stand against the Mongols, on the other hand, they found themselves relatively isolated. The papacy responded more readily to Polish appeals for help than to those of the Hungarians, but recruitment for the crusade among the nobility and knights of Germany and other regions further west seems to have been remarkably unimpressive.

After c.1360, the collapse of the Golden Horde into civil war greatly reduced the Mongols’ striking power, and, despite Toqtamish’s achievement in restoring the Horde, the two campaigns by the Central Asian conqueror Temür (Tamerlane) in the Pontic steppe inflicted irretrievable damage upon the khanate. Ironically, since Temür – who ruled in the name of Chinggisid puppet khans – had aspired to recreate the Chinggisid empire, these upheavals enabled neighbouring states, particularly Christian Hungary and pagan Lithuania, to encroach upon the Horde’s lands and those of its satellites, whether Wallachia and Moldavia or the Rus’ principalities, and to extend their own spheres of influence towards the Black Sea. By the time of the battle of Tannenberg (1410) the khans’ forces, by contrast, were reduced to being just one among a number of evenly-matched elements vying for territory and tribute.

Relations between the Latin West and the Ilkhans developed along different lines. In the Near East, the Mongols’ principal antagonists were the Muslim Mamlūks of Egypt and Syria, who from 1262 were in friendly contact with the rival Mongol power on the Volga, and Hülegü and his successors turned to Christian European states as potential allies. Despite numerous diplomatic exchanges down into the early fourteenth century, no military collaboration materialized. By the late thirteenth century, the logistics of a major crusade to the eastern Mediterranean were too complex, and Western public opinion was rather too wary. The apparent friendliness of the Ilkhans has served both to mask Mongol aims and to distort the nature of the choice confronting the Franks of Syria and Palestine in 1260, when Hülegü’s forces had first reached the Mediterranean. It used to be thought that by failing to cooperate with the Mongols against the Mamlūks, who would eventually eliminate the Latin presence in 1291, the Franks of the kingdom of Jerusalem sealed its death-warrant. In 1260, however, there had been no question of collaboration between allies on equal terms; the Mongols accepted only abject submission. Nor should the assiduity with which the Ilkhans pursued their courtship of the West after 1262 blind us to their ultimate aims. Ilkhanid overtures belonged squarely in a tradition that is in evidence as early as 1221: that of enlisting the neutrality, or even the aid, of more distant powers as a purely temporary measure, in order to secure the overthrow of an antagonist closer at hand.

By the time Temür subjugated most of Persia in the late fourteenth century, the Ilkhans had long passed from the scene. But Temür appeared to
offer the same potential as an ally as had the Ilkhanate. He not only devastated Mamlūk Syria in 1400–1; he also dealt a crushing blow to the rising Ottoman Turks at Ankara in 1402. His campaigns in the Near East, though mounted at least partly on behalf of Islam, secured a reprieve for Orthodox Christian states like Byzantium and Serbia. Despite the reservations of many observers, he was courted by the envoys of Western European monarchs as well as by those of the Byzantine government, and his envoy, Archbishop John of Sultāniyya, promoted his claims as a worthy ally to several Western powers. Yet for all this diplomatic activity, what Temür offered essentially fell short of what had been offered by the Ilkhans. Insofar as we can discern his aims at all clearly, he merely sought to capitalize on Latin Christian good will in order to foster trade.

The fresh opportunities provided by the advent of the Mongols lay not in military cooperation but in commerce and the mission field. The Latin traders who visited the Mongol world from the mid-thirteenth century profited from a ‘proto-globalization’ created by the union of much of Asia under a single regime (and, after c.1261, by the transition to a handful of major states). The ports of Laias in Lesser Armenia, Kaffa and Trebizond on the Black Sea, Tana on the Sea of Azov and the Persian city of Tabrīz had become the gateway to a vast world to which Western merchants had previously had no access and of whose very existence they had been unaware; it included not merely territories, like China, which owed obedience to the Mongols, but also both northern and peninsular India, which did not. Even if the Pax Mongolica ceased to be a reality following the fragmentation of the empire in 1260–1, it was still much easier to travel in Asia than in the pre-Chinggisid era. The Mongol khans took an active interest in commerce within their dominions and beyond their borders, and Latin Christians could now deal directly with Central Asian or Far Eastern merchants instead of through Muslim intermediaries. That said, the profits which accrued to Western traders from protracted ventures to ‘Cathay’ are a matter for debate, and such ventures, in any case, may well have flourished for only a few decades in the early fourteenth century. The real success-story of Western commercial expansionism, in fact, was not so much the penetration of eastern Asia as the opening-up of the more localized trade of the Black Sea region, which became an Italian and largely a Genoese preserve right down until the Ottoman conquest of Kaffa in 1475.

The eclipse of Muslim sovereignty throughout a considerable part of western and central Asia relieved Christian proselytism of the impediments it had hitherto encountered. Attempts by members of the newly-founded Mendicant Orders to convert the Mongols to Latin Christianity began within twelve years of the invasion of Eastern Europe and continued for over a century. The friars’ achievements, however, were limited. In China they made the greatest headway among schismatic Christians, such as the Alans in Khanbaligh, but only a few Mongol grandees were apparently won
over, and the subject Han population remained virtually untouched. The Mongols’ own approach to religious matters, like that of earlier steppe peoples, was even-handed and syncretistic. Their rulers patronized the ‘religious’ within every confessional group, with the aim of benefiting from their prayers and from any thaumaturgical techniques they might have for influencing Nature – a stance which itself gave rise to misapprehensions about the possibilities of conversion. Western Europeans were further unaware, it seems, that Mongol attitudes towards the transcendent and the sacramental diverged sharply from their own. The comparatively rigorous and uncompromising position taken by the friars, lastly, prevented them from competing with their more flexible Buddhist and Muslim rivals; it may also have earned the resentment of their Nestorian confrères.

The unsuccessful attempts to launch Western–Ilkhanid collaboration, the short-lived operations of Latin merchants in the Far East and – in particular – the relatively fruitless labours of the friars left, nevertheless, a more enduring legacy. Directly or indirectly, they gave rise to written accounts which circulated in Western Europe and thus introduced the Mongol territories and neighbouring lands to a Latin readership. The most widely circulated among such accounts were the book put together by Marco Polo and Rustichello, Hayton’s crusade treatise and the account of the East dictated by the Franciscan Odoric of Pordenone. It was thanks above all to these three works, along with the book of the armchair traveller ‘Sir John Mandeville’ (drawing heavily on Odoric), that the wealth of Cathay and of neighbouring regions acquired a near-proverbial familiarity which long outlasted the European presence in the Mongol dominions.

It was not until after the end of the period covered by this book that the newly available material on Asia became entrenched. More often than not, it had to contend or coexist with older cosmological ideas derived from Scripture and from the works of late Antiquity; some of Polo’s revelations, especially, proved hard to swallow, precisely because his brand of ‘marvels’ did not constitute the diet that Western taste demanded and to which it had grown accustomed. Nevertheless, in however dim and distorted a form, during the last years of the fifteenth century, Polo would act as the principal stimulus to those who sought a westerly route to the qaghan’s dominions. At whatever stage they read his book – and whether or not, indeed, they ever read it, as opposed to imbibing a general familiarity with its statements about Cathay and Cipingu – the voyages of Columbus and of Cabot were in the tradition not of contemporary Portuguese ventures into the African Atlantic but of their Genoese and Venetian precursors (not to mention the papal envoys) who had made the daunting journey across Asia by land in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
APPENDIX I

Glossary

basqaq (Turkish) ‘Resident’ appointed to supervise a subject ruler and muster resources on the Mongols’ behalf; referred to by Arabic/Persian authors as shiłna
il or el (Turkish) Literally ‘peace’; also ‘submission’
jizya (Arabic) The poll-tax levied by Islamic governments on the ‘Peoples of the Book’ (e.g. Christians and Jews)
noyan (Mongolian) Military commander; the Muslim equivalent is amir
ongghon (Mongolian; plural ongghod) Felt image of an ancestor
ortogh (Mongolian) Merchant acting in partnership with a Mongol sovereign or prince
qaghan (Turkish) Steppe emperor; ‘Great Khan’ of the Mongols
qumis (Mongolian; from Turkish qımız) Fermented mare’s milk, a beverage highly prized among the steppe peoples
quriltai Assembly of princes, princesses and commanders, called to choose a qaghan or to deliberate on other important matters such as forthcoming campaigns
shılına (Arabic) See basqaq
toyin (Mongolian; from Chinese daoren, ‘man of the path’) Buddhist priest or lama
tümėn (Turkish) A Mongol military unit, notionally comprising 10,000 men
ulus (Mongolian) Complex of herds, grazing-grounds and peoples granted to a Mongol prince; used especially of the larger territorial units held by Chinggis Khan’s sons and their descendants
yasa (Turkish; Mongolian jasa/jasagh) Regulation issued by a Mongol ruler
APPENDIX II
Genealogical tables and lists of rulers

I The Mongol qaghans and their kinsmen in Central Asia

Persons mentioned in the text (qaghans in capitals)

![Genealogical tree](image-url)
Genealogical tables and lists of rulers

II Khans of the Golden Horde

Jochi

Orda          Batu       Berke      Shingequer   Bo’al   Toqa Temür
              d. 1255/6   (1257–67)             

Sartaq       Toqoqan               Tutar
(1255/6–1256/7)     

Ulaghchi     Tartu        Mengü     Töde        Mengü
(1256/7)   (1267–80)    (1281–7)   d. 1299/1300

Töle Buqa    Tʊqто’a     Toghrulcha  Cheke
(1287–90)   (1291–1312)  

Özbeg
(1312–42)  

Jânibeg
(1342–57)

Berdībeg
(1357–9)

Khans of the Blue Horde

Orus  Toqtamish  Temūr  Shādībeg

Jalāl al-Dīn
Appendix II

III Ilkhans of Persia

Hülegü d. 1265

Abaqa (1265–82)

Ejei

Mengü Temür

Tegüder (Ahmad) (1282–4)

Taraghai

Argun (1284–91)

Gaikhatu (1291–5)

Ghazan (1295–1304)

Öljeitü (Muhammad Khudābanda) (1304–16)

Abū Sa’id (1316–35)

IV Popes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pope</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honorius III</td>
<td>1216–27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregory IX</td>
<td>1227–41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celestine IV</td>
<td>1241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent IV</td>
<td>1243–54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander IV</td>
<td>1254–61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban IV</td>
<td>1261–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clement IV</td>
<td>1265–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregory X</td>
<td>1271–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent V</td>
<td>1276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adrian V</td>
<td>1276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John XXI</td>
<td>1276–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas III</td>
<td>1277–80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin IV</td>
<td>1281–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honorius IV</td>
<td>1285–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas IV</td>
<td>1288–92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celestine V</td>
<td>1294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boniface VIII</td>
<td>1294–1303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benedict XI</td>
<td>1303–4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clement V (at Avignon from 1309)</td>
<td>1305–14</td>
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<tr>
<td>John XXII</td>
<td>1316–34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benedict XII</td>
<td>1334–42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clement VI</td>
<td>1342–52</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1352–62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban V</td>
<td>1362–70</td>
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<td>Gregory XI (returns to Rome 1377)</td>
<td>1371–8</td>
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### V Kings of Hungary

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<tr>
<td>Béla IV</td>
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<td>István V</td>
<td>1270–2</td>
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<tr>
<td>László IV ‘the Cuman’</td>
<td>1272–90</td>
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<tr>
<td>András III</td>
<td>1290–1301</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carobert (Charles Robert of Anjou)</td>
<td>1301–42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lájos (Louis) I</td>
<td>1342–82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria</td>
<td>1382–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigismund of Luxemburg</td>
<td>1387–1437</td>
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### VI(a) Polish dukes at Cracow

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duke</th>
<th>Reign</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boleslaw V ‘the Chaste’</td>
<td>1241–79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leszek ‘the Black’</td>
<td>1279–88</td>
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### VI(b) Kings of Poland

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<tr>
<td>Władysław I Łokietek (‘the Short’)</td>
<td>1320–33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casimir III</td>
<td>1333–70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louis I (of Hungary)</td>
<td>1370–82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jadwiga (Hedwig)</td>
<td>1382–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Władysław II (Jogailo of Lithuania)</td>
<td>1386–1434</td>
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### VII Kings of Bohemia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>King</th>
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<tr>
<td>Václav I</td>
<td>1230–53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ottokar II</td>
<td>1253–78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Václav II</td>
<td>1278–1305</td>
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<tr>
<td>Václav III</td>
<td>1305–6</td>
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<tr>
<td>John (of Luxemburg)</td>
<td>1310–46</td>
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<td><strong>IUB</strong> 187 (Julian, <em>Epistula</em>; letters of 1241; prophetic discussion between Aristotle and Alexander)</td>
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