

Russian Participation
in Baltic Sea Region-Building:
A Case Study of Kaliningrad

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Paul Holtom and Fabrizio Tassinari (eds.)

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Abbreviations

BSSSC	Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Co-operation
BSR	Baltic Sea region
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States
DPPR	Deputy Plenipotentiary Presidential Representative (Russia)
EU	European Union
FEZ	Free Economic Zone
LSSR	Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
MSWiA	Ministry of Interior Affairs (Poland)
MSZ	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Poland)
PHARE	Poland and Hungary: Action for the Restructuring of the Economy
RF	Russian Federation
PPR	Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative (Russia)
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance (Poland)
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Preface

This working paper is the result of the BaltSeaNet workshop “Russia’s integration into Regional Structures”, organised by the Centre for European and Transition Studies at the University of Latvia. The workshop was held 11–14 October 2001 in Riga, Latvia. All of the following papers were presented in earlier versions at the workshop.

The workshop explored the question of Russian co-operation with the European Union (EU) and its participation in the more restricted geo-political environment of the Baltic Sea region (BSR). The future possibilities of Russian integration into European structures are at present complex and fuzzy, one could say very much like the current forms of co-operation. However, the BSR represents one of the most pronounced interfaces where this complex dynamic takes place. The four contributions that compose this were presented and discussed during the Riga workshop, and each one deals with different aspects of Russian ‘participation’ in the BSR from the ‘big picture’ to cross-border co-operation and city twinning.

Fabrizio Tassinari opens this working paper with an overview of some of the key themes and questions that arise from Russian participation in BSR projects. He considers Russian perceptions of Europe, and the West European values that are enshrined in BSR-building, before exploring some of the problems that the Russian Federation faces if it wishes to participate in this process: from relations with the Baltic States to the implications of internal centre-periphery relations.

Paul Holtom then considers the idea that Kaliningrad could serve as a ‘pilot region for enhanced co-operation between Russia and the EU in the Twenty-first Century’, paying particular attention to events in and around the *oblast*’ (Russian administrative region) in 2001. The role that Kaliningrad is to play in Russian-EU relations is considered from the Kaliningrad, Moscow and Brussels perspectives, and attention is also given to the developments in relations between Kaliningrad and Moscow.

Agnieszka Hreczuk's contribution explores Polish-Russian relations, with particular emphasis on the Kaliningrad issue. She notes how Poland's 'western-orientated' foreign policy – membership of the EU and NATO – has brought the issue of Polish-Russian relations to the fore in Polish foreign policy considerations. Various areas of Polish-Russian co-operation are considered in this paper.

Henry Andreasen draws upon fieldwork in Poland's North-eastern *województwa* (Polish administrative counties) to provide an account of cross-border co-operation between these units and Kaliningrad. He considers the impact of Polish internal administrative reforms on this co-operation, and various 'grassroots' initiatives. He also offers an insight into the difficulties of conducting research at this level.

A note on the use of Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad will be used throughout this working paper to refer to the *Kaliningradskaia oblast'*. References to the city of Kaliningrad will explicitly state 'Kaliningrad city'.

Paul Holtom, Fabrizio Tassinari,
Birmingham Copenhagen

January 2002

FABRIZIO TASSINARI

Russian Self-identity and the Baltic Sea Region:
Trajectories of Regional Integration¹

This paper outlines the Russian standpoint on Baltic Sea region-building and investigates the reasoning behind the Russian position by peeling away each of the concentric circles that form it, starting with the outermost layer/circle. In this way, a comprehensive approach to the most exacting challenges that Russia has to confront will be produced, particularly with respect to the heterogeneous political environment that characterises the Baltic Sea region (BSR).

The general focus will be on Russian perceptions of Europe, with Europe perceived as an established system of values, rather than as an institutional framework. A cultural dialectic is taking place and, in the case of Russia's relations with Europe, results in a crucial dividing line for relations between Russia and the West. Considerations of the Russian discourse on Europe in this paper are intended to serve as the basis for a broader understanding of Russian attitudes and relations to Europe. An examination of the BSR as a potential meeting place for Russia and Europe will also take into consideration the progressive construction of this region. The reality here is presented as a dichotomic internal struggle in which low-levels of consensus and little commitment on the issue of BSR-building appears to exploit the advantages and the uncertainties of a relatively safe and de-securitised environment. The study will then focus on the more delimited ground of Russia's relations with its neighbouring countries in the BSR, with particular attention given to its relations with the Baltic States and the effect that these relations could have on Russian participation in BSR-building. In the final section of this paper, the consequences of *oblastnichestvo* (Russian regionalism)²,

¹ I would like to thank Henry Andreasen, Indira Dupuis, Jyrki Hakapää, Paul Holtom, Uffe Jakobsen, Toms Rostoks, and Alexander Sergounin for their helpful comments.

² A brief history of *oblastnichestvo*, or Russian regionalism, can be found in Shlapentokh 1998, 50–52.

and its potential impact on the regionalisation of the BSR will be considered. This process could have repercussions not only for internal dynamics within the Russian Federation, but could also have implications for developments in neighbouring countries and the BSR as a whole, as Paul Holtom discusses in the following paper.

It is therefore necessary to stress that Europe, the Baltic States and the regional processes in the BSR are at the heart of this investigation. These entities have different magnitudes and operate at different levels. The aim of this paper is therefore to locate the core of the Russian identity crisis and to investigate its impact on the BSR as a summation of repercussions that take place at wider and minor levels. In other words, the purpose is to provide a pattern as it appears from the kaleidoscopic Russian reality, discerning real and apparent matters, leading to an analysis of BSR-building vis-à-vis its impact on internal national dynamics.

The Russian Federation and the West European Values of BSR-Building

It is first necessary to adopt an appropriate conceptual and theoretical framework in order to investigate the role played by the Russian Federation in BSR-building. Generally speaking, the debate concerning Russia is accustomed to adapt pre-given markers to define the Russian geopolitical phenomenon while, as Neumann rightly argues, these cultural markers are never pre-given but may vary (qtd. in Browning 2001, 2–3).

This fundamental misunderstanding affects and conditions also the regional construction in the BSR. The tendency to consider Russia as an “equal partner” (Browning 2001, 27) is an expression of good intentions. But in fact it conceals, forgets, or ignores the reality that the West European identity cannot simply be confronted with the Russian identity and assume that the two are automatically compatible. As a result, as will be exposed below, even the most good-natured attempts to put the two actors on an equal basis will end up by externalising Russia.

The success of BSR-building must inevitably pass through Russia, with the expressed aim of creating equal conditions and consideration of the Russian Federation “as a potential partner, and not an object”

(Joenniemi 2000, 21). The basic presupposition is the need to constitute a *dialogue* as opposed to *negotiation* (Browning 2001, 6). The former is a situation where there are two actors with different viewpoints but the same target. The latter represents the establishment of relations between two isolated, at times even contrasting units, a sort of “we–them relationship” (Fierke 1999, 27).

With respect to BSR-building, one should consider ‘soft’ security issues as presenting the safest basis upon which dialogic relations between the two parts can proceed. Consequently, *de-securitisation*, namely the exclusion of ‘hard’ security issues and the removal of territorial concerns³, constitutes a necessary condition for such relations. This setting paves the way for a re-conceptualised and, to some extent, de-constructed environment in which the Russian approach to BSR-building is based on dialogue or, as Øyvind Jaeger has persuasively argued, on “*social interaction* besides representations of sovereignty” (emphasis added) (Jaeger 1997, 7).

At present, Russian participation in existing European structures is hard to envisage. The rhetoric of Europe’s “concentric circles” (Buzan 1990, 206–210), which originate in Brussels and become weaker as they move outwards, would condemn Russia to perpetuate its *status* at the periphery.⁴ Conversely, region building springing from the Baltic Sea and Northern Europe represents the greatest opportunity for Russia to become an actor on a terrain that does not carry the label of being peripheral. On the contrary, such a terrain presents an opportunity for the Russian Federation to prove that it is a credible and reliable partner, willing and able to participate in an integration project (Wæver 1997, 59–93). As Viatcheslav Morozov argues “the unique situation in the Baltic region can provide Russia and Europe with an opportunity to overcome the legacy of the Cold War (...) to the benefit of both sides”

³ The progressive shelving of the border issues between Estonia and Russia and between Latvia and Russia, beside other reasons (including proper ‘hard’ security issues), might be seen as an example of the tendency to move the debate up to a higher de-securitised confrontation (cf. below).

⁴ See Paul Holtom below for the impact of ‘peripherality’ on the Russian *oblast’* of Kaliningrad.

(Morozov 2001, 3). As a confirmation of this, the former Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin, in 1998 eloquently declared:

The Baltic Sea region has considerably increased the chances of producing to the rest of Europe a unique 21st century-oriented development model based on the logic of good neighbourhood. We view the co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region as an important single element of the process of building a new, democratic and stable Europe without division lines.

(qtd. in Baltinfo 1998, 4)

Yet, the reality on the ground makes such a pattern of co-operation unrealistic, at least in the short-to-medium term. Different forms of co-operation might pave the way for promising BSR-building processes, but only if Russia will passively accept West European values (incarnated in the EU). Arguably, the use of the Kalmar Union or the Hanseatic League by policy-makers and academics as a means of legitimising current BSR-building projects with mythical ‘western’ predecessors, which are identified as providing Europe with Baltic and Northern values, reinforces the idea that BSR-building is a West European project.⁵

If region-building in the Baltic is a West European project, and all European values have been copyrighted by the EU, then Brussels has the “moral obligation” (Browning 2001, 54) to assist with the transformation of the Russian Federation into a fully participating member. The EU also has the responsibility of monitoring the transition towards the construction of a State of a “European type” (Browning 2001, 22). The Russian Federation will have to adhere to values that it does not fully acknowledge. Europe is offering a chance for a return to ‘normality’ after, as the former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev puts it, “five long centuries of absolutism – from Ivan the Terrible to the Soviet 1970s – had tamed the Russian masses into the habits of submission” (Kozyrev 1992, 3). These are the conditions for dialogue; they are not negotiable. It implicitly imposes a situation akin to ‘blackmail’ and requires that relations between Russia and the West do not revert to the confrontation and negotiation of the past. Russia has to adhere to European values in order to be allowed to play an active role in the Baltic Sea game.

⁵ See Browning 2001, 9–11.

Russian Foreign Policy Discourses and Schools: Westernisers, Eurasianists and Derzhavniki

The well-known dichotomy between *Westernisers* and *Eurasianists* characterises the Russian foreign policy debate. The actual dialectics go to the very core of Russian disorientation and need to be mentioned here. The *Westernisers* tend to recognise the West as a natural partner. For proponents of this school of thought, former enemies now represent a 'civilised model' and while partnership is not seen as the only option, it is perceived to be the best option available. The former Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev (October 1990 to January 1996), was thought to incarnate this view. He stressed that "Moscow's main guideline is to join the club of recognised democratic States with market economies, on a basis of equality" and asked assistance "to set on our feet and become a normal member of the European Community"(qtd. in MacFarlane 1993, 9).

Eurasianists, on the contrary, rightly described elsewhere as representing part of a "nationalist backlash" (Browning 2001, 27) in the Russian Federation, stress the uniqueness of Russian civilisation as a 'third way' between East and West. Both 'Reformists' and 'Slavophiles', the two sub-groups of this school, tend to neglect relations with Europe (albeit it is considered necessary to keep good neighbourly relations). The national interest relates to issues in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), or as the former Russian Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, Evgenii Primakov has stated, the 'post-Soviet' space. A strong central authority is crucial for paving the way to a renewed *unique* Russian role as a bridge between Europe and Asia.⁶

In addition to these two schools of thought, however, a third current has emerged, confirming the existence of a wide and contrasting spectrum of possibilities in the Russian political arena. The *derzhavniki* (so-called 'proponents of Great Power status') represent what could be termed 'autarchic paternalism', based on a strong central authority which recognises the need for retrenchment and turns the Russian

⁶ Some use the term 'Slavophile' to refer to the Eurasianist current. See for instance Neumann 1996, 28–39.

Federation into a regional power “guided by the principle of self-limitation and self-sufficiency” (Sergounin 1998, 60).

These three trends identify Europe, and its structures, as a regional environment. It is noteworthy that the boundaries between the three trends have become more blurred since the mid-nineties and seem to have coalesced into a more generalised ‘realist’ foreign policy.⁷ Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, formally belonging to the conservative faction of the Westernisers, was heavily influenced by the two other trends. For example, in 1993, he ranked Europe fifth in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ list of priorities, behind the CIS, arms control and international security, economic reforms, and the United States (in Sergounin 1998, 17). A natural and obvious follow-up to this approach has been the enforcement of a Russian version of the “Monroe doctrine” (Litera 1995, 45–52) towards the Russian ‘Near Abroad’, defining bordering countries, most importantly for this paper the Baltic States, as strategic interests.

Hence, the question of which trend will prevail remains unanswered and seems to permit these different interpretations. It might be that the Russian Federation is truly willing to co-operate with European structures and in particular within the BSR – perhaps as part of the re-shaping of the former global superpower (Soviet Union) into a regional power that fears isolation. On the other hand, Russia might intend to re-define its position as an independent actor in the regional environment. While supporters of both tendencies can be found in the Russian foreign policy debate, neither model should be read as being necessarily negative. In particular, the hypothesis that we might re-define Russia as a place that is differentiated from the rest of the European continent might be beneficial to relations between Russia and the West and, to a certain extent, beneficial to the regional project in the Baltic Sea. Arguably, from the Western side, relations based on negotiation, viewing Russia as ‘other’, could be more manageable. Indeed, a more ‘traditional’ confrontational relationship between Europe and Russia would side-step the problems of integration, co-ordination and co-operation that the so far uncertain dialogic approach would require.

⁷ I thank Alexander Sergounin for drawing my attention to this point.

The Russian Federation and the Post-Modern Project in the BSR

BSR-building is a post-modern project in which, as Morozov argues, “borders are blurred, the identities shifting and uncertain and the hierarchy of actors is ill established” (Morozov 2001, 4). This setting represents the most favourable ground on which the Russian identity crisis presented above can be played out, limiting the loss of international credit, if not that of domestic stability. The Russian Federation should be able to endure the possible enlargement of the West European ‘booming banana’, which will be mirrored by a ‘blue banana’ that touches the Baltic shores, as a result of the expansion of the Western ‘concentric circles’. Yet, the “Baltic banana” (Joenniemi and Wæver 1992, 8) as conceived by local policy-makers and academics would not be bound to Brussels and would consider Moscow as a natural and irreplaceable – rather than inevitable – partner. If it is true that regionalisation around the rim is a reality that is able to stand on its own feet, then it is also true that without Russia the project is lame.

Arguably, regional development around the rim does not progress when Russian interests are threatened. Thus, a major shift will take place only when Moscow will be able to perceive the advantages that a ‘multiple’ project might lead to. Conceiving the BSR as a post-modern construction does not appeal to Russian perceptions. *Multiplicity* (Morozov 2001, 32) is the only tool that might bring about concrete progress. In fact, the consolidation of institutional co-operation offers the unique opportunity to enhance co-ordination in several sectors in which Russia is already actively involved through its North-western *oblasti* (Russian administrative regions) as will be discussed below. However, Moscow maintains a somewhat modernist *utilitarian* view on the matter, which is embodied in the constant attempt, more or less explicitly, to preserve national interests (Morozov 2001, 32). Russian utilitarianism does not create effective conditions to exploit multiplicity. On the contrary, it symbolises the relativity and, to a certain extent, the fallacy of the post-modern spirit that nourishes the BSR project. It is necessary, as Dmitrii Trenin has pointed out, “to gradually ease mutual fears and anxieties, rooted in historical experience” (qtd. in Morozov 2001, 33), but it is also undeniable that this is “still largely to be realised” (Morozov 2001, 33). Evidently, the BSR project

is recognised and appreciated among Russian foreign policy elites within the framework of a Cold-War zero-sum game – in which, if one side loses, the other inevitably has to win. One of the main reasons that current co-operation encompasses mostly low-key issues is because geopolitics and national interests will demolish the potential to propel co-operation to higher levels.

Thus, region-building remains still open and constantly under construction. It is a framework that encourages forms of co-operation that spawn from within and below certain structures. But, up to a certain point, further progress – especially in institution-building – is strongly dependent on Moscow's attitude. On paper, the BSR is a *de-securitised* environment. But in practice, Russia's neighbours cannot hide their fear of the potential threat posed by the Russian military and economic shadow. Moreover, regionalism around the rim does not have strict institutional criteria, a fact that somehow favours the strengthening, or perhaps the re-establishment, of national hierarchies among the actors involved.

Arguably, the apparent affirmation of the *Derzhavnik*i School in the internal Russian foreign policy debate confirms this trend, and such open regional patterns turn out to be convenient in many respects to the *derzhavnik*i. Indeed, besides the consolidation of a centralist, authoritarian and partly autarchic model, the Russian Federation would be able to take advantage of the openness of Baltic regionalism to re-impose hegemony towards its 'Near Abroad', as is discussed below. Moreover, the as yet provisional state of institution-building around the rim might allow Moscow to put conditions on the depth of regional integration and the extent of Russian participation.

Therefore a dilemma presents itself as to whether external uncertainty, which is not bound to institutional frameworks, will prevail and, on the other hand, whether there will be a protagonist fully involved in the project. There is no *acquis communautaire* that entraps the Russian Federation with certain requirements in order to access BSR institutions, and therefore access through the BSR does not entail such serious commitment. Any unwanted developments in Western organisations that might directly or indirectly damage the Russian

Federation can affect the progress of regionalisation around the rim. It would not be hard to foresee the effects on BSR-building if the next round of NATO enlargement will include one, if not all, of the Baltic States. Former Russian Foreign Minister Primakov stressed that “NATO enlargement is a big mistake, possibly the biggest since the end of the Second World War” (qtd. in Sergounin 1998, 36). This paper does not address ‘hard’/military security matters, but such a statement has implications in other spheres also, as Paul Holtom also argues in the next paper with relation to the *Kaliningradskaya oblast’*. It exemplifies the fact that the Russian Federation can affect BSR-building if it perceives its strategic, territorial or economic interests to be threatened.

Russian foreign policy elites are fully aware of the indirect importance that BSR-building has, and will have, for other institutional frameworks; namely the EU and, to a certain extent, NATO. Therefore, if dependency on the West European system of values mentioned above is a precondition of integration, the Russian Federation will respond by exploiting its ‘stand-by’ position with respect to Baltic Sea regionalisation. Russia could insist on certain conditions being met before its crucial participation is guaranteed, and would therefore present a method of safeguarding Russian interests, and also a way of counterbalancing Western ‘blackmail’. As will be explained below, this is particularly relevant in relation to the Baltic States.

Just as the BSR project needs the Russian Federation, the opposite is also undoubtedly true: that Russia, and particularly the North-western *oblasti*, need the Baltic Sea. The maintenance, or more realistically the significant presence, of economic and strategic interests in the area, which this paper does not intend to single out, are the most outspoken concerns. Fear of isolation will emerge, and will become particularly acute after the Baltic States have acceded to the EU and NATO.

Yet, the reasoning underlying the acceleration or deceleration of BSR-building cannot be limited to Russian fears of economic collapse or military threat perceptions. Russian security and economic interests will need to be taken into account if BSR-building is to be accomplished. The BSR is not an area devoid of Russian geopolitical concerns and pretensions, as the case of relations with the Baltic States

shows. Problematic relations with the Baltic States appear to be one of the most pressing areas of concern for the Russian Federation in the BSR, and the resolution of these issues could serve as a spur for deeper Russian integration in the Baltic Sea region.

Russian Relations with the Baltic States:
Brake or Accelerator on BSR-Building

Prior to considering Russian limits and ambitions with respect to the complex reality of the 'Near Abroad' and its consequences for the BSR-building, some wider considerations on the Russian approach towards neighbouring countries will be presented. This is necessary for a more comprehensive assessment of this multifaceted framework and to delimit and clarify more explicitly the position hereinafter developed.

Arguably, the magnetism that attracts bordering countries to Russia can be justified by revisiting a version of the Waltzian systemic polarity approach (Mouritzen 1998, 4–7). In a global dynamics where uni-polarity has emerged, it is given that “power and incentives wane with distance from states’ home base” (Mouritzen 1998, 4). With respect to the BSR, therefore, the Russian Federation is the unavoidable magnet when considering any neighbour’s policy vis-à-vis alliances. Thus, the Baltic Sea’s salient environment can still be reconstituted within bi-polar dynamics, one in which Russia should be considered influential and, to a certain extent, predominant, especially as far as economic-security-related issues are concerned.⁸

Moreover, another concomitant dynamic takes place. Having acknowledged the validity of the approach presented above, the ‘Sea’ environment has to be considered unsettled, since the choice between regarding the Sea as a conflict- or peace-zone is still uncertain. The result of this uncertainty is that the identity of Russia’s neighbours operates in a ‘grey zone’⁹ in which their orientation is, necessarily, directed towards Moscow, quite simply because, for decades, Russia

⁸ I thank Paul Holtom for drawing my attention to this point.

⁹ I thank Toms Rostoks for commenting on this point.

has represented their natural landmark. This does not imply any obligatory choice, but intends to soften and justify the effects of the above-mentioned systemic polarity approach, including a variant that is undoubtedly present, but that cannot be properly measured. The two phenomena, 'systemic polarity' and the 'grey zone' – are not in conflict, in fact they take advantage of each other. The 'grey zone' serves as recognition of an existing bi-polarity, due to the uncertainties that would be absent in the case of strong unilateral polarity. Similarly, bi-polarity represents the terrain that determines the 'grey zone', in which one pole (Russia) is geopolitically closer although declining, while the other (Europe) is distant but far more constant.

Evidently, reshaping hegemony into partnership means for Russia first and foremost to "bridge a gap" (Jonson 1997, 112). It consists of relations with those neighbours, which can easily be identified in the Baltic States, and which belong to a pattern of relationships that are not to be reconstituted or reappraised. What is hard to identify are the means Russia will utilise to fill this gap. In real terms, Moscow will be confronted with two options. The one option is for Russia to abandon its former hegemonic projects vis-à-vis the Baltic States and to initiate realistic and practical co-operation, one that recognises the importance and legitimacy of the Baltic States in the new geopolitical environment of the BSR. The second option is that, anachronistically, Russia behaves obstinately, continues to view these countries as its historical sphere of interest and implements a 'great power' policy, one that no longer corresponds to contemporary conditions. These are the two options available to fill the gap, as Lena Jonson arguably puts it "by adapting to reality or by forcing reality to adapt" (Jonson 1997, 112).

Solving this dilemma is made more problematic by the continuing dominance of Neo-imperial thinking in Russian foreign policy discourse. Hence, co-operation with its neighbours is limited by terms set down in Russian internal debates. This limits co-operation by judging such endeavours on 'Realist' and 'Neo-imperial' assessments of Russian national interests. When such co-operation is considered to conflict with these interests then the co-operation is replaced by mutual suspicion. This, as will be stressed below, contributes to tip the scales in favour of the approach defined above of "forcing reality to adapt".

If one takes a closer look at developments on the ground from the last decade, a rather clear line can be drawn. Time and again, the Russian Federation appears to have adopted a series of *ad hoc* positions (Jonson 1997, 123–124) that inevitably result in a disorienting incoherence, which provokes, among its neighbours, the sensation of an apparent continuing imperialism. As was mentioned above, the attitude adopted during Kozyrev's term as Foreign Minister was inspired by a more explicit belief in the possibilities of recovering leadership on the continent, if not at a global level, in a not-too-distant future. With regard to the 'Near Abroad', therefore, the new doctrine preached the need to "deny outsiders (...) a strategic position on the [Baltic] territories" (Jonson 1997, 114), before full control could be resumed. The zero-sum game is, once more, a rather eloquent way of illustrating the Russian perception of the world in this phase, and the way it affected the Baltic States. Hence, the impression is that Russia was more oriented to force reality, rather than to adapt to it. But this new kind of hegemony has certain advantages for Russia compared to the hegemonic control of the Soviet era. Today Russia can try to assert hegemony without the kinds of obligations that characterised Soviet hegemony. As Sergei Karaganov puts it: "leadership instead of administrative control, economic dominance instead of political responsibility" (qtd. in Jonson 1997, 119).

Evgenii Primakov was a more realistic Foreign Minister (January 1996–September 1998) when analysing Russia's geopolitical environment and, opposing the powerful Kozyrevian intellectual circles, resigned himself to 'shift' the Russian attitude towards the 'adaptation to reality' paradigm and thus to initiate a phase of more pronounced *détente*. Nevertheless, the current Putin-Ivanov team, while holding more moderate positions than their predecessors, has not renounced the *revanchist* tendencies exhibited in earlier periods towards the 'Near Abroad'. The most obvious example of continuing friction between the Baltic States and the Russian Federation surrounds the vexed issue of the treatment of the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic States. Kozyrev's rhetoric leant towards statements such as "apartheid" and "ethnic cleansing" (Jonson 1997, 127). On this issue, Primakov threatened, in January 1997, to implement economic sanctions (Jonson 1997, 128). The current Russian Foreign

Minister, Igor' Ivanov, on the occasion of a recent press conference connected to the up-coming Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) Russian presidency, used harsh language when referring to Estonia.¹⁰

Collating these three positions, which cover a ten-year period, one can observe the emergence of a common pattern. In trying to decode the Russian approach towards the Baltic States, the impression is that, despite remarkable differences in the shifting top personnel of the Moscow administration, certain features have remained constant. Russia can adapt to reality but must preserve at any price its influence over its perceived zones of interest.

The borderline between considering this approach as conservative nationalism or as potentially dangerous but *ad hoc* policies is rather subtle. In fact, the risk that demagogic tendencies might predominate – rather than quite justifiable and lawful claims – is realistic. Moscow's mayor Yurii Luzkhov's anti-Latvian campaign greatly increased his popularity in Russia when he compared "Riga's policies to Pol Pot's rule in Cambodia". But the Russian Foreign Ministry then tried to reassure the Latvian foreign ministry in the following way "Do not take these things at heart, it's pre-election time with us!" (Morozov 2001, 8–17). These inconsistencies are merely illustrative. What needs to be emphasised is that any prospects of progressive co-operation with the Baltic States that go beyond single sector-by-sector policy issues are far more distant than the abandonment of this confrontational approach.

However, Moscow's grievances with Estonia and Latvia, which are based on their adoption of laws that give citizenship only to descendants of citizens from the pre-Soviet period – the so-called '1940' option, which Latvia amended in April 1998 – do have reasonable grounds. The real or presumed violation of minority rights does represent a serious issue that has to be settled. Russian protests to international authorities have to be taken seriously. Alexander Pikayev,

¹⁰ "The current Estonian Authorities under various pretexts have for several years now been refusing registration to the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Of course this is nothing but an infringement of religious rights." (Ivanov 2001, 1).

defending the Russian perspective, argues that “Moscow has never used force (...) in order to solve [the] minority problem” (Pikayev 1997, 144), and that “democracy in Russia represents a main source for modern Baltic independence” (Pikayev, 1997, 137). Estonia and Latvia were supposed to, but never did, implement the ‘zero option’, as Lithuania did, with regard to citizenship options for their Russian-speaking minorities. Instead, they have, in Pikayev’s view, always insisted, or at least claimed, that in fifty years of occupation their territories were ‘russified’. Pikayev states that they argue that the Soviet Union hampered their economic growth, and continues to represent a threat to their statehood (Pikayev 1997, 133–157).

These voices cannot be ignored and have been briefly mentioned here to capture the flavour of this complex issue. The impression and the suspicion is, however, that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1993–1994, the Russian-speaking minority issue is one of the few threats, or weapons, left in Moscow’s hands for interfering in the affairs and aspirations of the Baltic States. Arguably, as local academics point out, “Russia in real terms does not care about Russian speakers (...). Rather, they are using them as a *stick* in their foreign policy strategy” (Ozolins 1998, 136). The Russians “try to use Russian populations in the Baltic countries as more or less *Trojan horses*” (Miniotaite 1998, 191) (emphases added). Russia can no longer prevent the course of events, she cannot restrain Baltic negotiations with the EU, which on paper are considered by Moscow as “a natural process” (Alexandrova 1998, 90). Nor can Russia forbid NATO enlargement. Thus, rather than ‘adapt to reality’, Russia attempts to divert it rather than force it, concealing some minor ambitions – influence on the Baltic States – under legitimate requests – the protection of her sizeable minorities. As Paul Holtom points out in his paper on Kaliningrad, these are not the only Russian-speakers in the BSR that are considered to represent a ‘Russian Trojan Horse’ in EU and NATO enlargement to the Baltic States.

Thus, the continued Russian rhetoric of perceiving the Baltic States as “historical nonsense” (Morozov 2001, 25) induces elites to identify them in terms of “a problem of Russian politics” (Alexandrova 1998, 90), rather than an international issue. Therefore, the good intentions of some Russian intellectual circles that claim, as Andrei

Fedorov persuasively states, that “the period of political stagnation in our relationship with Baltics is now finally over” (Fedorov 1998, 83), do not represent the majority. On the contrary, they are categorically dismissed, even in the internal debate. For instance, the view that the inclusion of the Baltic States in the EU enlargement process is a Russian “strategic goal” (Fedorov 1998, 87), is considered the result of widespread Russian “Euro-ignorance” (Alexandrova 1998, 94), rather than Russia ‘letting go’ and abandoning imperial pretences. This view pretends to re-appraise such enlargement in terms of its impact on Russia and on the European architecture. The heritage of the Cold War *status quo* has to be located within this geopolitical framework, and will have a considerable impact on the future of the BSR.

Russia has the invaluable potential to use the Baltic States as a bridge towards a new policy, but only if current disputes are settled. This bridge represents the necessary condition for a definitive step towards full integration into the BSR, towards a normalisation of relations with the North-western Russian *oblasti*, and towards a substantial stabilisation of current sectoral agreements. However, the dominant view in Moscow continues to identify the Baltic States as a ‘security belt’, a bulwark against the West, a bulwark that has to be “deferential to Moscow” (Alexandrova 1998, 90). As a result of this, by refusing to shelve pending issues, or at least to give to them a decisive impulse forward, the stasis remains and weighs heavily on the development of the regional construction.

The Oblastnichestvo of the Russian Federation: Consequences for the BSR and its Structures

The Russian Federation’s post-Soviet geopolitical inheritance sits uncomfortably with its pre-eminence in the BSR in its Tsarist and Soviet past, as Alexander Sergounin argues:

Russia lost approximately two thirds of the former Soviet Baltic coastline. The total length of the outer boundary of the country’s territorial waters is now just over 200 km (...) what Russia possesses now in the Baltic Sea area is only slightly more that it did in the time of Ivan the Terrible. In fact, Russia feels itself pushed back several centuries.

(Sergounin 1998, 71)

This produces dramatic consequences and limitations, for instance, on Russian overseas trade developments and military influence in the BSR. Moreover there are several logistical problems for Russia. The two Russian seaports in the BSR, Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, are the only overcrowded Russian ‘windows’ on Europe. Kaliningrad’s peculiar geographical location and questions relating to practical linkage with the Russian mainland, plus the prospect of becoming a pene-exclave in the enlarged EU represents a complex and unique case in the European and international debate.¹¹

Yet, this should not prevent us from stressing the undeniable *centrifugal* force which affects the peripheries of the Russian Federation and which poses a threat of further obstacles to regional construction. As Sergounin has argued:

The normal and healthy process of delegating authority to local governments leads to a strengthened influence of regional political elites on the national level. This process, however, was not simple in Russia. Moscow could not prevent the local elites from developing autonomous foreign policy.

(Sergounin 1998, 53)

Amidst the euphoria of the first post-Soviet years, the *Kaliningradskaya* and *Leningradskaya oblasti* exploited the spur to co-operation around the BSR rim, reinforced by the dawning influence of the CBSS, to conduct foreign relations suited to *oblast’* demands and interests. It has to be noted, however, that the 1996 elections for governors in *Kaliningradskaya* and *Leningradskaya oblasti* changed the participatory tendencies that had been characteristic of the early 1990s (Sergounin 1998, 53–54). Nevertheless, the destabilising effects of the apparently uncontrollable peripheries on the central authorities remain a cause for concern.

In fact, the Russian Federation’s constitution itself blurs the issue of responsibility for foreign relations. It establishes a confused pattern whereby “the regional elites use the lack of clarity in the federal law to carve out their own policies and thus become more independent from Moscow” (Sergounin 1999, 4). For example, co-operation between the

¹¹ See the other contributions on the matter in this Working Paper.

Leningradskaya oblast' and Denmark developed entirely of its own accord, and could almost be classed as a state-to-state relationship. Thus, the metaphor of two territories within the same dimension and population, which was just supposed to establish a more intensive link within the wider framework of Russian-Danish relations, resulted in real agreements in several crucial sectors such as environment, housing, taxation, justice. Eventually, Moscow's veto interfered negatively on the Danish-St. Petersburg negotiations on the Leningrad Military District (Heurlin 1997, 3). This confirms once more that, on the one hand, hard security matters in relation to the BSR do not simply represent a sector of federal jurisdiction that needs to be preserved. Hard security issues are but a – crumbling – bulwark used, and perhaps abused, by the Russian federal authorities to save some chance of maintaining or recovering a predominant position. On the other hand, this example confirms the main argument of this section of the analysis: namely the difficulty of disciplining regional units. *Oblast'* leaders and institutions enjoy popular support, are legitimised by democratic mandate, and are often heavily sponsored by lobbyist structures, both at the central and at *oblast'* level – the gas-oil and import-export merchants are probably the most competitive interest groups in the North-western Russian *oblasti* (Sergounin 1998, 50).

Having briefly delineated the whole analysis, it is now important to observe more closely the considerable consequences that Russian *oblastnichestvo* dynamics have on BSR-building and institutions, and vice versa. In fact, the actual integration of Russia's North-western *oblasti* appears to be the most favourable terrain for the CBSS strategy of intervention vis-à-vis Russia: a sector by sector, and perhaps short-sighted, approach involving the North-western *oblasti*. Indeed, local co-operation with Russian *oblasti* is seen by the CBSS as positive, stressing that:

The Council underlined the particular importance of support for improved cross-border and sub-regional co-operation for the further development of the BSR. This is specifically valid with regard to cross-border contacts and economic development in the Russian *oblasti* of Kaliningrad, Pskov, Leningrad, Novgorod, and the city of St. Petersburg.

(CBSS 2001, 2)

The above-mentioned consequences that this approach might have on the progressive enfeeblement of the Russian federal structure appear here to be underestimated.

Apparently, the Council is more concerned with the full amalgamation of the individual *oblasti* in the regional context rather than implementing integration strategies for the Russian Federation as a whole. While stressing the crucial participation of Moscow in the BSR project, the CBSS encourages local structures and, to some extent, contributes to the enfeeblement of the Federal institutions. Thus, the Council's strategy towards the Russian Federation tends, on the one hand, to support co-operation with the *oblasti*, and an involuntary favouring of centrifugal tendencies. On the other hand, the strategy retains a confrontational approach towards the Russian centre. In other words, recalling the terminology presented above, the CBSS tends to *dialogise* with the Russian peripheries – the North-western *oblasti* – and to *negotiate* with the core.

Thus, Russian *oblastnichestvo* is becoming a defining component in wider BSR dynamics, particularly in relations between the Russian Federation and BSR institutions. Generally speaking, relations between the Russian Federation and the CBSS appear to be characterised on both sides by clear outspoken commitments and more subtle targets. Formally, as Morozov underlines, quoting Russian diplomatic statements:

The Council of the Baltic Sea States (...) has a very positive image in Russia: according to the Russian diplomats the CBSS countries [*including* the Baltic States] “Have managed to create (...) in the Baltic space an atmosphere of good neighbourhood, mutual understanding, stable and secure co-existence”.

(Morozov 2001, 32)

Moreover, as the current Foreign Minister Ivanov stated during the CBSS Ministerial session in June 2001, Russia “will be leading matters to ensuring that the CBSS builds up its authority not only as the co-ordinator, but also as the initiator of co-operation in the Baltic” (Ivanov 2001, 1). Yet, as was explained above, Russia simultaneously takes advantage of this *de-securitised* environment to maintain a relatively mild influence on its neighbours and keep a closer eye on European affairs, or

in other words “to grasp the post-modern reality of the Baltic region [and] reshape the dominant discourse accordingly” (Morozov 2001, 5).

At the same time, “the Council’s main focus was on overcoming the division of the continent and bringing greatest stability to Northern Europe” (Zöpel 2000, 1). Within this framework, the Russian Federation is considered a fundamental component. But the aim appears to be only the emancipation of the Russian North-west’s *oblasti*. The Russian presidency of the CBSS, which started in July 2001, was accompanied by great expectations, not only with respect to the auspicious progress of BSR development over the following twelve months. With the tenth anniversary celebrations of the foundation of the organisation, it is entering a decisive phase. This phase is also expected to be crucial in relation to the Russian position, which on paper is willing to “give a good impetus” (Ivanov 2001, 1) to the regionalisation process in the area.

However, current Russian policies regarding Russian *oblasti* do offer several opportunities, not only to the Russian Federation but also to BSR-building. *Oblastnichestvo* might become an extremely precious source of dynamism and flexibility for BSR-building. New initiatives in the different *oblasti* can serve as models for the others to imitate. This might lead, as was argued above, towards a progressive disintegration of the Federal structures or, conversely, to “make the democratic reforms irreversible” (Sergounin 1999, 8). In other words, it might result in a *centripetal* rather than a *centrifugal* process, whereby initiatives taken by Russian *oblasti* can encourage the other units towards a virtuous circle, rather than a vicious circle, leading to fundamental administrative changes or to remarkable institutional adjustments in Moscow. As a result, the increasing activism of Kaliningrad, Karelia or St. Petersburg in negotiating agreements with countries around the rim might eventually attract the core’s attention. Indeed, offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have already been established in these *oblasti*, and, as Paul Holtom explains below, 2001 has been a very busy year for one North-western *oblast’* in particular, regarding centre-periphery relations.

Moreover, the interest of neighbouring actors alleviates some of the burdens of the North-western *oblasti* and ensures the smooth development and constant implementation of co-operation. As Agnieszka

Hreczuk and Henry Andreasen demonstrate below, Polish aspirations for EU and NATO membership have played a significant role in its improving relationship with Kaliningrad, and the Russian Federation as a whole. Thus, a co-operative approach to Russia's North-western *oblasti* might have results that are beneficial to Moscow in relation to strictly state-to-state concerns.

Finally, *oblastnichestvo* is probably the most valuable tool in avoiding the fear of marginalisation that was mentioned above, the fear of unconditional Russian surrender to the conditions for West European co-operation that have been described above. Thus, the health of Russia's North-western *oblasti* is one of the Russian Federation's most effective weapons in its dialogue, or negotiations, with Europe.

By Way of a Conclusion

The case of Russia's policy towards the BSR bears witness to a paradox. While, to some extent, the Russian State is undergoing enormous problems with internal developments, this does not necessarily corrode the weight of Russian influence abroad. The Russian Federation has not abandoned its role in the BSR, rather on the contrary, it continues to attempt to impose conditionality upon its relations with its Baltic neighbours.

The impression, therefore, is that the Russian Federation takes advantage of such confusion and exploits its identity crisis to disorientate counterparts, while it hopes for a change in the external political environment that would offer new possibilities for its hegemonic intervention in BSR affairs. Meanwhile, it carefully plays a game in which negotiation and dialogue are intertwined, and where the stagnation and uncertainty of its internal reforms serve as a pretext for disguising its potential and aspirations for greater influence in the BSR, and perhaps control of certain states in particular. The above-noted continuities in relations with the Baltic States would suggest that the Russian Federation is not entirely content with its Soviet inheritance.

Developments in the Russian Federation, without a doubt, affect BSR developments. At present, the only realistic prediction is that the

Russian Federation will continue its integration into the BSR in low-key sectors that do not impair its internal evolution, or involution. Therefore one could state that the Russian Federation has a conception of BSR-building that is in contrast with the post-modern inspiration that animates West European participation in the project. The basic changes required for Russian integration into Western/European structures, and in particular the BSR project, should lie in the progressive dismantling of state-to-state confrontations and the adoption of a softer approach on border disputes. This fundamental contrast carries a risk: that the BSR project will be pigeonholed or, at least, endangered. Disparities in economic, social or political development could be tackled, especially by appealing to the prospect of a BSR *Gemeinschaft*. But if the goals differ they cannot be subject to mediation. Thus, the key to taking an active part in the BSR project, as a leading actor rather than as a second lead, is that “Russia has to *secede* from itself” (Morozov 2001, 26) in terms of mentality and self-perception. This is also the only opportunity left to avoid the estrangement of the Russian Federation from the BSR project. The Russian search for “firm foundations” (Morozov 2001, 24), together with its obstinacy in preserving its national/neo-imperial interests, will not be able to justify Moscow’s delay on the BSR project indefinitely.

The Russian Federation’s aggressive approach towards neighbouring countries appears to be an attempt to “distract public opinion from the nation’s serious problems” (Perry 2000, 59). Russian acceptance of the dynamics of BSR-building will be heavily dependent upon Russian policies vis-à-vis the Baltic States. The political credibility of Russia among its prospective partners in the BSR will mostly depend on how this complex issue develops. Currently, formal statements of good intent by Russian policy-makers attempt to dissipate years of mutual suspicion that often resulted in direct accusations and threats. Moscow’s interests vis-à-vis the Baltic States have always been well known and are still undeniably present. Sacrificing these interests in the cause of regional co-operation appears to be both an exacting and a crucial step towards the construction of a new BSR.

Despite the centralising approach proposed by the new presidential administration in Moscow, the impression is that Russian participation

in the BSR project can take place at a local and sub-regional level. Regional institutions, especially the CBSS, encourage, and take advantage of the inexorable deterioration of core-periphery relations in the Russian Federation in order to preserve the pace of BSR development. The CBSS and other BSR institutions are only interested in working with actors that are truly willing to play an active role in the BSR, and seem to disregard the consequences of this strategy on Russian domestic affairs. After all, the main beneficiaries of the BSR project are the Russian North-western *oblasti*, if they commit themselves directly to counterbalancing the indecision of the Russian core towards the BSR project. In fact, BSR institutions and individual states appear to exploit the flexibility of the process of negotiation which does not entail state-to-state relations but which rather favours the dynamism of local elites who are well aware of the advantages of region-building. This has a major consequence, as BSR-building tends to be based more on the riparian sub-regions than on the individual states involved. This has the further advantage of empowering sub-state units in this trans-national context and the disadvantage of favouring *centrifugal* tendencies within the individual states. The latter is particularly visible in the framing of the Russian Federation's internal policy.

Hopes for a new impetus towards a genuine BSR feeling in the Russian Federation can only appeal to strong institutional reforms and perhaps a radical change in the Muscovite nomenclature and its mentality. This should pave the way for a more convincing involvement in BSR affairs. Sergounin argued in 1998 that, "as Russia progresses with its reforms, the need for a more constructive and coherent policy in the area could emerge" (Sergounin 1998, 71). However, the pattern delineated by President Vladimir Putin – who has attracted to the Kremlin a lot of St Petersburg's former *apparatchiki*, the Russian North-western oligarchy and bureaucratic elite (D'Avanzo 2001, 12–13) – leaves unanswered many of issues posed above. Some of these issues are considered in the following paper with regards to Kaliningrad as a pilot region.

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PAUL HOLTOM

Kaliningrad in 2001: From Periphery to Pilot Region¹

This paper follows on from the final section of Fabrizio Tassinari's paper by exploring the case of the Russian North-western *oblast'* (Russian administrative region) of Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad has slowly begun to dominate not only Russian foreign policy concerns in the Baltic Sea region (BSR), but has also been cited as a 'testing ground' for Russian-EU relations in general. This paper discusses some of the reasons behind Kaliningrad's promotion to centre stage in Russian-EU relations, concentrating mainly on events that have taken place in 2001. To this end, the development, by Kaliningrad's elites, of a concept that envisages 'Kaliningrad as a pilot region for enhanced co-operation between Russia and the EU in the Twenty-first Century' will form a backdrop to this paper.

The paper is roughly split into four parts:

- A brief exploration of some of the arguments that have been presented by Kaliningrad's political, economic and academic elites, for turning Kaliningrad into a 'pilot region';
- An account for the change in the Russian federal centre's actions and attitudes towards Kaliningrad;
- A few brief comments on the European Union's (EU) response to this initiative;
- Some problems and considerations concerning the concept of 'Kaliningrad as a pilot region for enhanced co-operation between the Russian Federation and the European Union'.

Kaliningrad as a Pilot Region: Kaliningrad's Wishes

On the 22 March 2001 the Kaliningrad governor and administration presented their set of proposals for the future development of Kaliningrad at a special hearing of the Russian government. The

¹ I would like to thank Philip Hanson, Tatsuhiko Kasai, John Round and the participants of the *BaltSeaNet* workshop in Riga, in particular the other contributors to this working paper, for their helpful comments.

preparations for this hearing dominated Kaliningrad's media from the beginning of January 2001, as various seminars, conferences, and meetings were held in Kaliningrad to finalise the development proposals. A special hearing of the *Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma* (the Kaliningrad region's parliament), held on 16 February 2001, called upon the Russian government to "speed up the signing of a special agreement on Kaliningrad with the EU", which should include "concrete preparations for a joint action plan for Russia and the EU, aimed at the development of the *Kaliningradskaya oblast'* as a pilot Russian region for large scale and intensive co-operation" (Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma 2001). Further, the hearing also recommended that the Russian government should "demonstrate [its] readiness and ability (...) to bear responsibility for the fate of the *Kaliningradskaya oblast'* and become a reliable partner with the EU" (Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma 2001).

Despite these calls for special agreements with the EU, and more 'responsible' and 'stable' policies from the Kremlin towards Kaliningrad, one could argue that the 'pilot region project' is just an attempt to keep the privileges of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) legislation, which took legal effect in 1996.² Certainly many of the proposals prepared by Kaliningrad's administration for the Russian government hearings on the development of Kaliningrad do not appear to differ significantly from earlier pieces of legislation on the *oblast's* development. This could cause some problems for the current pilot region proposals as the Russian Ministry for Economic Development and Trade is supposedly keen to remove many of the 'privileges' contained

² The Free Economic Zone (FEZ) 'Yantar' was adopted in a resolution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic's (RSFSR) Council of Ministers in September 1991. This resolution entered into effect in December 1992. The FEZ was abolished in July 1993, re-enacted in December 1993, and then finally abrogated in March 1994. After extensive lobbying it was, more or less, restored as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in 1995, taking legal effect in 1996. The main aspects of the SEZ legislation can be found in *Ob osoboi ekonomicheskoi zone v Kaliningradskoi oblasti. Novii sbornik normativnykh aktov*. Kaliningrad, 1998. Assessments of Kaliningrad's SEZ can be found in Dewar 2000a; Dewar 2000b; Hanson *et al* 2000; Ivchenko and Samoilova 1999; Kargopolov *et al* 2001; Khlopetskii and Federov 2000; Samson 2000.

in the Russian SEZ legislation.³ This is perhaps why the Russian Minister for Economic Development and Trade, German Gref', during a visit to the region in March 2001, spoke cautiously about Kaliningrad's development plans by stating that, while Kaliningrad will be a "priority *oblast*", the exact formula will only be elaborated after "careful analysis" (Pirogova 2001, 1–2; Surinova 2001, 2). This position is also in line with the arguments of Natalia Smorodinskaya, who also argues that SEZ regimes in Russia have not led to economic success stories, but have rather played an important role in corruption and the development of the 'grey economy' in these zones (Smorodinskaya 2001).

In defence of the SEZ, the authors of *The Kaliningrad Puzzle* point to the fact that between June 1992 and January 1996 ten significant interventions from the Federal authorities changed the Free Economic Zone (FEZ) legislation to such a degree that an effective FEZ or SEZ could not exist in Kaliningrad (Joenniemi *et al* 2000b, 15). Despite these drawbacks and its many faults, local researchers have claimed that the SEZ in Kaliningrad has played a positive role in developing several economic sectors. They point out that the number of joint-owned and foreign enterprises in the *oblast*' total more than a thousand, or 7 % of all such enterprises in the Russian Federation.⁴ The best known example

³ Thanks to Tatsuhiko Kasai, Russian Division of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for explaining that if Russia wants to become a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), then it is highly probable that the Kaliningrad SEZ will have to be closed, as China for one would oppose SEZ's in Russia, as they have had problems with the WTO on this issue themselves. This could also explain German Gref's sceptical position on the SEZ in Kaliningrad, as the Russian Ministry for Economic Development and Trade is currently negotiating Russian membership of the WTO.

⁴ These figures are taken from Fedorov and Korneevets (1999, 47). According to Ivan Samson (2000, 87) the total number of firms with foreign investments registered in the region numbered 1284, while Artur Kuznetsov, representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kaliningrad, claims that there are almost 1,500 'joint-owned' companies in the *oblast* (Kuznetsov 2001, 104). The problem with these figures is that, on the one hand, there are questions concerning the level of involvement in these firms by foreign investors, going as far as to ask whether they actually continue to function. This has led some commentators to question whether the figure is really so high. Yet, on the other hand, according to Ričardas Slepėvičius, Acting Consul of the Consulate General of the Republic of Lithuania

of foreign co-operation with Kaliningrad enterprises is perhaps the 'Avtotor' – BMW production plant in Kaliningrad.⁵ And as Henry Andreasen explains below, the SEZ has been highlighted by residents of the neighbouring Polish regions as a 'positive' reason for co-operating with Kaliningrad.

One of the main reasons that Kaliningrad's political, business and academic elites argue that Kaliningrad, whether as an SEZ or a pilot region, deserves 'special privileges' is due to the fact that it is in a 'unique geographical position'. Pertti Joenniemi (1998, 226–60) has argued that Kaliningrad is in a "double periphery" – that is, the *oblast'* is separated from the Russian mainland, and also excluded from the EU's economic space because it is a Russian *oblast'*. This view was endorsed by the *Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma* hearings on the pilot region project (Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma 2001).

The acknowledgement, or realisation, that the EU will enlarge, leaving Kaliningrad as a Russian island in an enlarged EU is a new addition to the previous locally devised development strategies for Kaliningrad. Two of the contributors to the 'pilot region' proposals for Kaliningrad have argued that the latest development plan is "a cardinal measure for overcoming drawbacks and for utilising the advantages of [Kaliningrad's] geopolitical location" (Khlopetskii and Fedorov 2000, 706). The project envisages that Kaliningrad would become not only a 'gateway' between Russia and the EU – an idea that has featured in studies by west European scholars since the mid-1990s, and has noticeably been picked up by Kaliningrad's political elites in the past few years⁶ – but also as a 'testing ground' for Russian-EU co-operation. For

in Kaliningrad, a lot of Lithuanian investments are made using local Russian partners, without declaring Lithuanian investments to the regional authorities. For a more detailed consideration of Polish co-operation see the following papers by Agnieszka Hreczuk and Henry Andreasen.

⁵ For more information about this project see "Avtotor ..." 29 May 2001, 66–7.

⁶ For an elaboration of the gateway concept see Cohen 1994. West European academic works that consider the potential of Kaliningrad as a gateway include Hanson *et al* 2000; Samson 2000; Wellmann 1996. In addition, this idea was put forward in interviews conducted by the author in Kaliningrad in June-July 2000, and January-June 2001 with Gerge Dykhanov, Vladimir Kouzine, Sergei Kozlov,

example, amongst its many recommendations, the *Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma* hearings foresaw Kaliningrad as:

- A testing ground for the introduction of EU standards into the Russian Federation;
- An opportunity to combine funds from TACIS, PHARE and the Russian Federation to evaluate the impact of EU enlargement to Lithuania and Poland on Kaliningrad;
- Deepening cross-border co-operation, and utilising the ‘Northern Dimension’ Framework (Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma 2001).

Russian Support for a Pilot Region in Russian-EU Relations

The concept ‘Kaliningrad as a pilot region for co-operation between Russia and the EU’, and the calls for a ‘special agreement’ between Russia and the EU on Kaliningrad, have arguably been developed from one phrase in the Russian government’s *Medium-term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union for the Years 2000–2010*. The then Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, presented this document at the EU-Russia Helsinki summit, which was held in October 1999. The article from which the ‘pilot region’ phrase has been developed suggests that:

Given the special geographic and economic situation of the *Kaliningradskaya oblast’* (...) [it may be necessary to conclude], if appropriate, a special agreement with the EU, for safeguarding the interests of the *Kaliningradskaya oblast’* as an entity of the Russian Federation, within the process of EU expansion, to transform the region into Russia’s pilot region within the framework of Euro–Russian cooperation in the 21st century.

(“Strategiya razvitiya otnosheniya...” 1999, 26)*

Phrases such as ‘test case’ and ‘litmus test’ have been used with increasing frequency since this date when referring to Kaliningrad, but we have not yet been given a clear picture of what this will actually entail.

Yurii Matochkin, Leonid Mikhlin, Sergei Naumkin, Aleksandr Songal and Vladimir Yozhikov. For a critique of the application of this idea to Kaliningrad see Dewar 2000b.

* Translation by the author. All Russian quotes are translated by the author.

For example, Russian Foreign Minister, Igor' Ivanov stated in an interview with *Kaliningradskaya pravda*, published on the 7 March 2001:

If you are considering whether Kaliningrad can become a laboratory for preparing a new form of co-operation [between Russia and the EU] – then we [The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] say 'yes'. (...) We are prepared to support all forms of co-operation, which are directed towards solving actual problems, which face the *Kaliningradskaya oblast'*. But I want again to underline, actual and not 'invented', as these, unfortunately, frequently arise.

(Ivanov 2001, 1)

In addition to the governmental hearings on Kaliningrad's development (22 March 2001), when the Kaliningrad administration's 'pilot region' project was presented to the Russian government, there have been numerous meetings, seminars, visits and preparations conducted by a wide range of Russian ministries (cf. Below). All of this makes one thing clear, Kaliningrad has moved up the Russian government's agenda in 2001. So, one must ask, what has happened since Lyndelle Fairlie wrote in a research paper on *The EU's Northern Dimension and Kaliningrad*, published in July 1999, that "Kaliningrad is still a low priority for Moscow simply because other Russian regions are perceived as having worse problems" (Fairlie 1999, 13)?

Under Russian President Vladimir Putin, relations with the EU, in rhetoric at least, appear to form one of the main cornerstones of current Russian foreign policy. For example, President Putin has been recorded as stating:

Much work needs to be done in Europe, traditionally one of the most important areas for us. Complex and dynamic processes are underway in Europe. (...) Therefore, the significance of our relations with the European Union is surely growing. (...) We must seek to dramatically improve the effectiveness of co-operation and its quality.

(Putin 2001, 11–12)⁷

⁷ Taken from Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech at a meeting with senior officials from the diplomatic service of the Russian Foreign Ministry, 26 January 2001: "Vstrecha prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ..." 2001, 11–12.

This is certainly in keeping with the idea that President Putin has identified the EU as Russia's "single most important partner" (Kassianova 2001, 834)⁸. Further, it can be noted that calls for an increase in cooperation between Russia and the EU are now beginning to place a great deal more emphasis on the Kaliningrad issue than during Boris Yel'tsin's tenure as Russian President. Here the reasons behind the elevation of Kaliningrad to centre-stage in Russian relations with the EU will be the main focus.

There is an argument that the current Russian position on Kaliningrad in Russian-EU relations is no more than a 'Russian Trojan horse' in the EU (Traynor 2001). That is, the Russian government is raising concerns about the impact of EU enlargement to Latvia, Lithuania and Poland on Kaliningrad, as a means of gaining influence over the EU enlargement process in the former Soviet sphere of influence (Black 2001). This idea is certainly one that has support within certain circles in Moscow, and Russia at large, and was voiced several times in 2001 as an option for Russian influence in the Baltic Sea region (BSR). It has even been suggested that from such a position, Russia could bargain with the EU for more influence in the former Soviet space, and possibly block EU and NATO membership for the Baltic States altogether⁹.

Certainly the issues that are being raised by President Putin, and members of the Russian government, are all directly connected with possible 'negative' or 'problematic' aspects of the impact of EU enlargement on Kaliningrad and mirror the main concerns of many of the

⁸ The idea that the leadership of the Russian Federation consider the EU as an important strategic partner is also discussed in Baranovsky 2000; Ivanov 2000; Kuznetsov 2001.

⁹ Some Russian politicians continue to voice such neo-imperial positions, as Fabrizio Tassinari has noted above regarding Russian relations with the Baltic States. For example, Viktor Alksnis, a Russian State *Duma* (parliament) deputy, suggested that not only should Kaliningrad be used to stop the EU and NATO moving east, but that Russia should exercise its 'rights' to the Klaipeda region of Lithuania (Alksnis 2001, 4). While these politicians cannot claim to represent the Kremlin, or the foreign-policy making community, they have played a significant role in setting the tone of current Russian foreign policy (Holtom 2002; Medvedev 1999).

inhabitants of the *oblast'*. For example, the Russian Transport Minister Sergei Frank was recently quoted as stating that Russia was concerned with anything that might disturb “the normal life of residents of Kaliningrad” after Lithuania enters the EU. The main areas of concern that he highlighted were “the introduction of visas, energy resources, cargo transit through Lithuania to Kaliningrad” (“Russia concerned over Kaliningrad ...” 2001).

Without a shadow of doubt the ‘Schengen visa issue’ was the most hotly discussed topic in Kaliningrad’s local media regarding the impact of EU enlargement on life in Kaliningrad. And according to research conducted by a deputy in the *Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma*, Solomon Ginzburg, this is the main concern for the majority of Kaliningrad’s population regarding EU enlargement (Biryukova 2001, 1–3; Ginzburg 2001). In February 2001, Kaliningrad’s media ran several stories on this issue. This included the suggestions of the chair of the *Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma*, Vladimir Nikitin, who called for special consultations between Lithuania, Poland and Russia as a means of enabling Kaliningraders to continue enjoying the special ‘visa-free’ regime that they have with their neighbours, possibly leading to a “Baltic Schengen”.¹⁰ While this suggestion does not appear to have been accepted by the EU Commission, there have been developments in tri-lateral parliamentary relations between Lithuania, Poland and Russia (“A. Paulaskas prizyvaem ...” 2001, 2). However, one must ask, if the Russian Presidency and government are concerned, then apart from the rhetoric, what concrete measures have been undertaken by the Russian government to improve Kaliningrad’s situation? Do they support the idea of Kaliningrad as a pilot region, or even an *oblast'* that can be used for ‘enhanced co-operation’?

¹⁰ “Deputy – za ‘Baltiiskii shengen’.” 2001, 1; “Deputy za ‘Baltiiskii shengen’.” 2001, 4. For a more in-depth considerations of the impact of Schengen-related problems see Fairlie 2001; Gromadzski and Wilk 2001; Joenniemi *et al* 2000a. For Stephen Dewar “Schengen is not the only problem concerning visas”, as ‘foreigners’ require a Belarusian transit visa to allow them to “sleep on a Russian train as it passes through Belarus” on the way from Moscow to Kaliningrad (Dewar 2001, 99). Further, he draws attention to Belarus’ “unique approach to economic development” where a transit visa in 2000 can cost \$30 but in 2001 costs \$68! (Dewar 2001, 99).

Kaliningrad's Governor and Relations with Moscow

One name could perhaps be given as an excuse for the lack of concrete 'pilot project' preparations between October 1999 and the November 2000 elections for Kaliningrad's governor – Leonid Gorbenko. Gorbenko was the governor of Kaliningrad from 1996–2000, and would certainly not have been seen as a suitable candidate for representing a pilot region for co-operation between Russia and the EU. In a country, which is renowned for having more than its fair share of 'robber-barons', Gorbenko has earned a considerable reputation. *The New York Times* ("In a Russian Region Apart..." 2000) crowned him 'Russia's corruption king' and he has also been the subject of two *Itoji* features on his 'activities' in the space of less than one year, which is some achievement.¹¹ During his tenure as Kaliningrad's governor Gorbenko called for the region to embark on a path towards "regional autarky" (Zarembko 1999, 15). In practice, this meant that his administration did not have to concern itself with forging good contacts with neighbouring countries, or the Russian Federal authorities (Dewar 2000a; Hanson *et al* 2000).

In the November 2000 elections for Kaliningrad's regional governor Gorbenko was defeated by the Commander of the Russian Baltic Fleet, Admiral Vladimir Yegorov.¹² This transfer in power in the *oblast'* has had an enormous impact on the Kaliningrad administration's relations with neighbouring countries, and also with Moscow. It has been argued that one of the main reasons that local hopes were placed in Vladimir Yegorov was that it was assumed that he had the President's ear, and would be able to get Moscow to notice Kaliningrad's plight (Baikov 2001).

This view was arguably reinforced by Yegorov's perceived role in restoring Kaliningrad's SEZ privileges in the face of customs changes

¹¹ *Itoji* is a national Russian news and investigative journalism programme.

¹² The chairman of the *Kaliningradskaya oblast'* electoral commission reported that Vladimir Yegorov polled 193,657 votes (or 56.34 per cent) in the second round of the election, while Leonid Gorbenko, gained 116,286 votes (or 33.83 per cent). About 8.47 per cent of people, or 29,101 voters, were against all candidates. See "Russian fleet commander..." 2000.

that were introduced at the end of 2000/beginning of 2001. According to Kaliningrad's business and political elites, these changes would have wiped out most of the few privileges that remain in the SEZ legislation. This was the view of the Kaliningrad administration's representative in the Russian Federation Council, and former Speaker of the *Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma*, Valerii Ustyugov. In an interview that he gave with *Kaliningradskaya pravda*, he stated that the decision of the Russian Trade Committee to collect VAT from goods imported to SEZs, or on goods partly produced there, as "disastrous for the area", and signalling the death of the SEZ in Kaliningrad.¹³ Eventually, these changes were withheld from Kaliningrad, with many claiming that this was due to Yegorov's meeting with the President in Moscow on 30 January.¹⁴ Further proof of improved relations between the Kaliningrad administration and the Russian Federal authorities rests on examples such as the inclusion of two deputy vice-governors, Vladimir Pirogov and Mikhail Tsikel', in a working group responsible for studying the impact of EU enlargement on Russia.¹⁵

Not only was it expected that Yegorov could represent the *oblast's* interests in Moscow, and make them listen, but he was also trusted, in a limited and approved manner, with aspects of the *oblast's* 'foreign policy'. On the 15 February 2001 he played host to the EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten and Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, as they were returning from meetings in Moscow (Aryutova 2001a, 2; Aryutova 2001b, 3; Aryutova 2001c, 3; Kucheryabenko 2001, 3; Nisnevich 2001b, 2; and Ostakhov 2001, 2). On the 31 March 2001 the Lithuanian President Adamkus also made a detour to Kaliningrad on his return from meetings in Moscow with Russian

¹³ Reported in "Russia's western-most Region..." 2001. See also Ryabushev 2001, 2.

¹⁴ "Russian western economic ..." 2001. The view that Yegorov had the President's ear on this occasion was supported in an interview, conducted by the author with the *Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma's* representative to the Russian Federation Council, Nikolai Tulaev.

¹⁵ The occasion cited took place between 28 February to 1 March 2001. Details of this and other examples can be found in Sazonov 2001a, 2; "Pravitel'stvo izuchaet ..." 2001, 1.

President Vladimir Putin¹⁶. In fact, one journalist informed the author that in the first six months of his tenure, Yegorov had received official guests from every EU member state, bar two (Men' 2001). Furthermore, Yegorov has also represented the region on a visit to Polish neighbouring regions (18–20 April 2001), which expanded to include a visit to Warsaw and a meeting with Polish President Aleksandr Kwaśniewski ("S sosedyami..." 2001, 1; Sazonov 2001c, 1; Sazonov 2001d, 1). He even gave a speech to the 'Northern Dimension' conference in Luxembourg, 9 April 2001 ("V Lyuksemburge govoryat ..." 2001, 1–2).

But contrary to this image, developments in the summer of 2001 could cast some doubt over earlier assessments of Yegorov's support and position in Moscow. Vladimir Yegorov's election to the post of Kaliningrad governor was supposedly welcomed in the Kremlin, as it strengthened the so-called 'vertical of power' between the Federal centre and Kaliningrad (Main 2001, 21), and further, it could have been deemed a 'success' when reviewing President Putin's centre-region reforms of 2000 (Menkiszak 2001; Nicholson 2001). However, the outcome of the Russian Security Council's meeting of 26 July 2001 further complicates this picture. As a result of this meeting, Andrei Stepanov was appointed as the only Deputy Plenipotentiary Presidential Representative (DPPR) for the North-western Federal *okrug* (district). Viktor Cherkesov, the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative (PPR) for the North-western Federal *okrug*, told journalists that the deputy PPR would be "in charge of co-ordinating the activities of the federal bodies directly in the *Kaliningradskaya oblast'* and (...) enable the Federal centre to have a greater influence over the situation in the *Kaliningradskaya oblast'*".¹⁷ This appears to rule out the suggestion, which was floated on the eve of the Security Council meeting, that Kaliningrad would become the Eighth Federal *okrug* (Aryutova 2001e, 2) – a view that both Sergej Ivanov and Viktor Cherkesov had

¹⁶ "Poezdka V. Adamkusa ..." 2001, 2; "Vizit V. Adamkus ..." 2001, 6. For the full transcript of the Russian and Lithuanian presidential speeches see "Rossiya-Litva" 2001, 58–62.

¹⁷ "Russia: Regional presidential envoy ..." 2001. Andrei Stepanov was introduced to the Kaliningrad administration by Viktor Cherkesov on 26 September 2001, see "Presidential envoy to ..." 2001.

dismissed earlier in the year (“No special rule ...” 2001). While Yegorov has been quoted as approving of this move and arguing that it is no different to the old Presidential representative that the *oblast’* used to have (Yegorov 2001b, 2), he has also been quoted as suggesting that ‘dual rule’ in Kaliningrad would lead to “chaos and disintegration” (“Kaliningrad Conflict ...” 2001.) If Yegorov has good links to the centre, and was thought reliable enough to represent the *oblast’*, then why is Kaliningrad the only Russian *oblast’* to have a deputy PPR?

This appointment, and other moves, appear to suggest that the *oblast’s* future development could follow plans laid out by the former Head of the Russian Federation Council, Vladimir Shumeiko (1994–96), who suggested that Kaliningrad should become a ‘liberal economic experiment’, but under the close watch of Moscow.¹⁸ Indeed, the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov at the Russian government’s meeting of 22 March 2001 used a similar phrase, when he stated that Kaliningrad would become “an example of the application of market methods in the economy” (“Kaliningrad Region to be Model...” 2001).

Further, it would appear that German Gref’s “careful analysis” has been completed as the Russian cabinet meeting of 4 October 2001 accepted the ‘pilot region’ development concept, as part of the 2-stage development plans for the region – 2002 to 2005 for “overcoming the crisis”, 2005 to 2010 to “radically improve the situation in the region.” The projected cost of this project is 95 bn Russian roubles, with only 20 % of the funding coming from the Russian Federal budget (Kornysheva 2001).¹⁹ Targeted areas of investment and development include those highlighted by the TACIS projects, including transport, infrastructure, energy, telecommunications, tourism, and ecology (Samson 2000). It is still unclear whether Gref’ and Smorodinskaya will succeed in dismantling the SEZ regime as part of the changes advocated by the Federal

¹⁸ The advantages and disadvantages of Shumeiko’s plans can be found in Abramov 2000, 37–8.

¹⁹ Full details of the Russian government-approved development plan for Kaliningrad can be found at “Model’ razvitiya Kaliningradskoi oblasti do 2010 goda.” Taken from the Kaliningrad Administration’s web-site at: <<http://gov.kaliningrad.ru/omodel2010.php3>>.

authorities. But the results of the recent Russian Audit Chamber's study of Kaliningrad's SEZ for 1996–2000 led Sergei Stepashin, head of the Russian Audit Chamber, to state that the zone “may be free only in terms of corruption and money-grabbing” (“Russian Audit Chamber...” 2001). While this will do no harm to the claims of Gref' and Smorodin-skaya, Vladimir Yegorov and his administration could argue that this investigation only covered the period of Gorbenko's governorship.

To conclude this section, it is worth highlighting that the pilot region project would not have been discussed at such length, at the *oblast'* or national levels, without a change in the Kaliningrad administration. Whatever Yegorov's fate in the near future, his election to the post of Kaliningrad governor played a significant role in moving the Kaliningrad issue onto the Russian national, and foreign policy, agenda. But there is another factor/actor in the equation that has contributed to the Kaliningrad's rise in Russia-EU relations.

EU Enlargement and Kaliningrad

Certainly the promotion of the 'Kaliningrad issue' by the Russian side in Russian-EU meetings in 2000–2001 has played a key role in manoeuvring Kaliningrad onto the EU's enlargement agenda. Despite this, the EU also appears to have its own concerns about enlargement to the east – the fear that the EU would create a 'new dividing line' in Europe, between EU applicants and non-applicants. The Swedish presidency of the EU – January to June 2001 – was a stroke of good fortune for Kaliningrad and Russia, as Sweden had chosen not only to promote 'Enlargement' as one of the 'Three E's' of its presidency, along with 'Employment' and 'Environment', but the issue of Kaliningrad was also placed high on the Swedish Presidency's agenda.²⁰ As one Swedish web-site proclaimed, Kaliningrad was 'in focus' at the beginning of 2001 (Ballad web-site, 2001).

During their visit to Kaliningrad in February 2001, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, and the EU Commissioner for External

²⁰ For more information on the aims and results of the Swedish presidency of the EU in the first half of 2001, see the final report at: <<http://www.eu2001.se/main/>>.

Relations, Chris Patten, emphasised that EU enlargement was not aimed against Kaliningrad and Russia. Swedish Foreign Minister Lindh took the opportunity to endorse the idea that Kaliningrad could serve as a 'pilot region', stating that it could become a 'test case' for the EU to show that enlargement will not lead to a worsening of economic and social problems in Kaliningrad, but will actually be beneficial (Nisnevich 2001b, A2). It was not explained how this would be achieved, and despite a large number of sceptics in Kaliningrad regarding the benefits of EU enlargement on the *oblast*', it did create a considerable level of optimism, especially among young people and also in certain sections of Kaliningrad's media. There was certainly a feeling in many quarters that the EU would be foolish to leave Kaliningrad as a 'black hole'.²¹

Apart from visiting the *oblast*', the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, appears to be particularly interested in the Kaliningrad issue. For example, he stressed the 'strategic' importance of Kaliningrad for EU enlargement, EU-Russian relations and the 'Northern Dimension' initiative in the foreword for *The EU and Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad and the Impact of EU enlargement* (Baxendale *et al* 2000). However, his views were a little more impolite in an article that appeared in the British newspaper *The Guardian* on 7 April 2001, under the headline "Russia's hell-hole enclave" (Patten 2001). One of the main reasons for Patten's, and the EU's, interest in Kaliningrad is quite clearly stated in the following passage:

Kaliningrad has problems. Organised crime, drugs, and a polluted environment. And we [the EU] want to help solve these problems. *This is not an altruistic act: such threats will spread beyond the borders of Kaliningrad* [Italics added].
(in Osthakov 2001, 2)²²

²¹ This optimism was expressed in several interviews conducted by the author with students from Kaliningrad State University and the Kaliningrad filial of Moscow International University. It was also expressed in the Kaliningrad newspaper *Kaskad* in the first six months of 2001. On one occasion this newspaper even featured a line which ran: "Brussels solves our [Kaliningrad's] problems quicker than Moscow" (Aryutova 2001d, 8).

²² This statement is taken from a translation of an article that originally appeared in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, but was reprinted in Russian in Ostakhov 2001. The original publication date was not given.

Therefore, one can see that the EU is willing to help Kaliningrad with some of its problems, but only in areas which concern the EU's member-states – i.e. soft security threats such as organised crime, migration, smuggling, and environmental pollution. In this regard Kaliningrad has been cited as a problem because it is perceived not only as a haven for 'soft security threats', but perhaps more worryingly as a 'gateway' for these 'threats'. This is quite clearly demonstrated by the priorities of the EU Commission's communiqué on Kaliningrad, which was published on 17 January 2001 (European Commission 2001). Although mainly constructed in response to the concerns listed in the Russian non-paper on 'possible solutions to the specific problems of the *Kaliningradskaya oblast*' in connection with EU enlargement' it is still clear to see the EU's priorities and fears regarding its future eastern border.

However, while establishing border regimes to keep the 'soft security threats out', the EU enlargement process is also supposed to bring Europe together, not to draw new dividing lines. And this is one of the main paradoxes that faces EU policy-makers, how to guard against 'soft security threats' and increase border security procedures, without 'othering' those who are not EU-applicants.²³ The attempts to overcome this predicament through cross-border co-operation schemes, however, demonstrate the problem of trying, even on a relatively small-scale, co-operation between EU members, applicants, and non-applicants. The idea that a new dividing line already exists in Europe has already been put forward by Peter Wennersten (1999). He has argued that the PHARE-TACIS borders already represent a new dividing line in the Baltic Sea region, and therefore also in Europe.

One solution to this predicament 'slipped out' in February 2001, when Yegorov suggested that Kaliningrad should be made eligible for PHARE funds, like its neighbouring regions in Lithuania and Poland. However, this demonstrates a misunderstanding of the rules of eligibility for EU funding, rather than an attempt for the region to become a member of the EU (Nisnevich 2001b). Nevertheless, one should recall that there was a suggestion for a 'special agreement' to be concluded

²³ Fabrizio Tassinari has also discussed the question of 'othering' above regarding BSR-building and Russia.

between the EU and Russia in the Russian government's *Mid-term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union for the Years 2000–2010* (“Strategiya razvitiya otnosheniya...” 1999, 26). What could this ‘special agreement’ amount to? The possibility of granting Kaliningrad, as a Russian *oblast’*, EU associate member status before the rest of the Russian Federation has been raised by two Kaliningraders, Vladimir Kouzine and Sergei Naumkin (Kouzine and Naumkin 2001, 6–9). In this article they ask whether such a proposal should be a ‘myth or reality’. Could Kaliningrad become a ‘pilot region’ for eventual Russian membership of the EU? The proposals put forward by the *Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma* to combine TACIS, PHARE and Russian resources could signal an opportunity to break the so-called ‘paper curtain’. As Henry Andreasen states below, the idea of joint Kaliningrad-Polish project proposals for TACIS and PHARE funds is already being discussed.

A Special Russian *Oblast’*?

Suggestions for ‘enhanced co-operation’ and ‘special arrangements’ for Kaliningrad are interpreted in a variety of different ways within Russian political circles. This is arguably due to the lack of clarity concerning the actual implications of making Kaliningrad a ‘pilot region’ or the subject of a ‘special agreement’ between Russia and the EU. For many in Russia’s political elites at the federal and *oblast’* levels, some of these suggestions sound like “the path to regional separatism”. For example, the governor of Chelyabinsk, Petr Sumin is quoted as stating that:

Special membership for the [Kaliningrad] oblast of the [European] Union – this is the path to separatism. Today Kaliningrad is taking such steps, tomorrow, for example, Bashkortastan. Where do we go next?

(Sazonov 2001b, 2)

The fear of regional separatism is a crucial weapon in the armoury of Russia’s regional leaders and the above statement shows how this fear can be used by one regional leader in an attempt to halt ‘privileging’ another Russian *oblast’*. It is usually used by the leaders of Russian *oblasti* as a threat for attracting the Federal centre’s attention with the hope of gaining more Federal subsidies, and this is certainly the case for Kaliningrad’s political and economic elites. They claim that Kaliningrad’s youth

visit ‘the west’ more than the Russian mainland, compare their living standards with their EU-applicant neighbours, and are increasingly looking for reasons why their neighbours’ living standards have rocketed, while theirs have stagnated (Sazonov 2001b, 2). For example, in an interview with the Russian language Latvian newspaper, *Chas*, Kaliningrad governor, Vladimir Yegorov, stated that:

If in the near future the Federal centre will not establish a [distinct and constructive] programme or a conception for the development of Kaliningrad, we will see an outburst of separatism based on [the following economic logic] – “everyone around us lives better than we do, therefore, we must separate from Russia...”

(Yegorov 2001, 2)

It could be read, therefore, that the EU’s enlargement is being used in Kaliningrad’s relations with the Russian Federal centre to scare the centre into more financing and attention. This certainly makes the Kaliningrad case different to other prospective Russian-EU border regions.

Lyndelle Fairlie (1999, 13) has stated that the EU officials that she interviewed seemed happy to conduct relations with the Russian Federation solely with Moscow. She suggested that this appealed to the EU as relations with applicants and non-applicants alike are conducted solely with state capitals. Further, this would mean that the EU would not offend Moscow by becoming embroiled in problems related to Russian centre-*oblast*’ relations. However, the above statements would appear to suggest, that whether the EU likes it or not, it is involved in Kaliningrad’s relations with the Russian Federal centre.

What we have, arguably, is a catch-22 situation regarding Kaliningrad as an ‘*oblast*’ between Russia and the EU’. The EU cannot, even if it had the desire or legal mandate to do so, construct and implement a development plan for Kaliningrad, for fear of fuelling the above-mentioned separatist scares and/or concerns about offending Moscow. But the Russian government cannot be expected to provide Kaliningrad with a development strategy without taking the real impact of EU enlargement into account – but how can it do this when, despite the EU communiqué, it is usually just told that ‘EU enlargement brings good’. How is it possible to break this?

The Pilot Region as a Framework

One of the dangers of elevating Kaliningrad's problems to the level of 'high international politics' is that we have statements, like those given by Swedish Foreign Minister Lindh, about Kaliningrad serving as a 'pilot region' for the benefits that the EU will bring to non-applicants. From the Russian side, there is the position of the First Deputy Russian Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Avdeev, who suggests that Kaliningrad will stand as a test case for how Russia will conduct relations with the EU in the future ("Russia for Closer..." 2001). The problem here is encapsulated by Andrew Dolan's (2000) phrase: 'The clash of expectations'. Are the stakes becoming too high? 2001, for a variety of reasons, was undoubtedly Kaliningrad's year, but for how long can it be the main focus of attention in Russian-EU relations? By focusing on Kaliningrad as the 'main test', do we ignore other Russian *oblasti*? The danger here is that rather than Kaliningrad becoming a model for the rest of Russia, if it is given a 'perceived' privileged position this could become a source of jealousy, as the above quote from Petr Sumin, the governor of Chelyabinsk region, has been interpreted. Further, what is to stop the pilot project from meeting the same fate that the SEZ regimes met with during the 1990s?

Whatever the answer to these questions, the 'high politics' approach will not necessarily solve another problem associated with elevating Kaliningrad to centre stage: the feeling of 'uniqueness' or 'special exclave identity syndrome', as briefly alluded to by Honore Catudal (1979) in his study of *The Exclave Problem in Western Europe*. In a paper that the author gave earlier this year in Kaliningrad, it was argued that dangers comparable to the situation of the Free City of Danzig could arise from giving Kaliningrad 'special treatment' (Holtom 2001). If people living in detached regions²⁴ feel like they are

²⁴ Although Kaliningrad has often been called an exclave or an enclave, there is a problem in using such terms. For Robinson: "an exclave is a part of the territory of one country entirely surrounded by the territory of another country" (Robinson 1959, 283). Kaliningrad is not entirely surrounded by one country, as it has access to the sea. Further, it is bordered by two countries, and separated from the rest of Russia by two independent states. The term 'detached region' will be employed

special when no extraordinary efforts are made for them, then what happens when you elevate them to centre-stage? The case of Danzig highlights the problem that you could encounter when the local population, and the national population, do not want to have a region with a special status. There is definitely a sizeable section of the population in Kaliningrad, and Russia as a whole, who also do not want to see Kaliningrad as a special Russian *oblast'* between Russia and the EU, in any form (Oldberg 2000). The table below shows the results of research conducted by the Kaliningrad Sociological Centre between the 7–10 May 2001:

Which status would best serve the interests of the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad *oblast'*?

An independent Republic in the RF	8 %
Remain an <i>oblast'</i> , but with similar rights to Russian Republics	9 %
An <i>oblast'</i> in the RF, but with a special status, guaranteed by the constitution of the RF	35 %
More economic rights, but no change in the <i>oblast's</i> political status	26 %
Stay the same as now	9 %
Unable to answer	13 %

Source: "Kto na svete ..." 2001, 1.

While the results of this poll would appear to suggest that there is a sizeable percentage of the population in Kaliningrad in favour of 'privileging' Kaliningrad in the Russian Federation, this is not a referendum on the 'pilot region' proposals. The 'warning from Danzig' should be kept in mind when 'great powers' devise 'solutions' for the geographical oddities that arise as a result of imperial collapse.

If we change the focus of this paper, from the high political arena of Russian-EU relations, to a different level, then it can be argued that co-operation is already being carried out between Kaliningrad, Russia and the detached region's neighbours Lithuania and Poland.

here because: "the best solution is to abstain from conceptualisations such as enclave and exclave altogether and to revert to more general terms such as 'region', in order not to add to the problematique by the use of the concepts applied" (Joenniemi 1998, 265).

A cursory glance at the 'Kaliningrad link' on the web-site of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would reveal the extent, depth and breadth of Lithuanian-Russian discussions on Kaliningrad, and also Lithuanian-Kaliningrad relations.²⁵ Agnieszka Hreczuk and Henry Andreasen argue below that transnational co-operation involving Kaliningrad, Poland and neighbouring Polish counties and cities is not only possible, but that it can also be successful. However, giving Kaliningrad a 'special status' could cause further problems for sub-regional integration projects that are planned in the future. As one interviewee from the International and Inter-regional Relations Department of a Polish *województwo* (county) explained to the author:

It is difficult enough to get Kaliningrad, and other Russian *oblasti*, involved in sub-regional projects because they are not large scale and do not bring a great deal of financial support for the Russian *oblast'*. But now, after all the visitors to Kaliningrad, it will be impossible to get them to agree to any regional co-operation unless we can provide an ambassador or EU commissioner!

(Szakiel 2001)

Conclusion: What does the 'Pilot Region' Concept Offer?


It is possible to argue that the 'pilot region' project for Kaliningrad could be read as a test for relations between Moscow and its detached region. Can the Russian Federation implement a development plan for Kaliningrad that is not continually sabotaged? To what extent will Kaliningraders be involved in the development of the *oblast'*? And can Kaliningrad be used as a 'model *oblast'*' for relations with the EU, and a 'test bed' for meeting EU standards, or even just increase its own role in the BSR? All of these possibilities were suggested and discussed at the *Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma* special hearings on the development of the 'pilot region' concept for Kaliningrad (*Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma* 2001).

Arguably, the 'pilot region' concept also presents the EU with a test. Whether intended or not, EU enlargement has an impact on social,

²⁵ 'Lithuanian's co-operation with Russia's Kaliningrad region.' Taken from the homepage of the Lithuanian MFA: <<http://www.urm.lt/political/kaling.htm>>.

economic and political conditions in Kaliningrad. While the EU is currently facing pressures to reform its internal management in the face of enlargement, political demands on its external relations are also becoming more pronounced. Can the EU meet the foreign policy challenges of enlargement in Eastern Europe? The Kaliningrad issue certainly provides an interesting case for further academic research.

However, it is possible to argue that the 'pilot region' concept could be read as Russian participation in the EU's 'Northern Dimension'. If it can be interpreted in this way, then it should be read as a framework under which sub-regional and bi-lateral co-operation projects can be carried out, including in the sphere of civil society, as suggested by Birckenbach and Wellmann (2001), and Gromadzki and Wilk (2001). The project would require greater transparency, but would also keep attention focused on 'low politics' where 'real' rather than the 'imaginary' problems can be successfully dealt with and solved. Along with questions concerning funding, this could, of course, make the project susceptible to the same accusations that can be levelled at the 'Northern Dimension'. Would the 'pilot region' concept just become nothing more than the Emperor's New Clothes?



Administrative Divisions of Russia

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AGNIESZKA HRECZUK

Polish-Russian Relations and Kaliningrad

Kaliningrad should play an important role in Polish relations with the Russian Federation, as it is the only Russian *oblast'* (Russian administrative region) that borders Poland today. However, relations with the Russian Federation did not appear to be one of Poland's main foreign policy priorities in the period 1989–99, as Poland strove for membership of the EU and NATO. Yet, in a rather strange twist of fate, Polish relations with Russia, and therefore with Kaliningrad, have become more important as Poland has edged nearer to full EU membership, while they have inexplicably improved since Poland gained full membership of NATO.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the state of relations between Poland and the Russian Federation on the issue of Kaliningrad. Paul Holtom has argued above that the Kaliningrad issue has become a 'priority' area for the Russian Federation's relations with the EU and EU applicants, and this paper notes the changes in Polish foreign policy towards the Russian Federation on the Kaliningrad issue. It will explore the various areas of co-operation between the two states on this issue, and highlight possible areas for further development.

The paper will begin by briefly considering the place of relations with the Russian Federation in Polish foreign policy since 1991. This section will conclude by highlighting the increasingly cordial relations between Poland and the Russian Federation, noting the promotion of the Kaliningrad issue as a key area for co-operation. The next section of this paper deals with the history of Polish-Kaliningrad relations, before moving on to consider the establishment of 'good neighbourly relations' and areas of co-operation between Poland and Kaliningrad. The paper will conclude with a few comments on the future of the Polish-Russian relations in this sphere.

Polish-Russian Relations since 1991

Polish-Russian relations have a difficult history. Even before the partitions of 1772, 1793 and 1795, when Poland was carved up among the Austrian, Prussian and Russian Empires, Polish relations with the Russian Tsarist Empire had been strained. However, things did not improve with the 'restoration' of Polish statehood after the First World War. The Polish-Soviet war (1919–21) did little to improve relations between Poland and the Tsarist Empire's 'successor', the Soviet Union. And despite 'liberating' Poland at the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union's collusion with Nazi Germany in the 1939 'partition' of Poland, the events surrounding the executions of Polish officers in Katyn in 1940, and the deportations during the Second World War and in the immediate post-war period, were not the best foundations on which to build Polish-Soviet friendship. Ironically, an article written in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947 points to the establishment of Kaliningrad as another reason behind problems in Polish-Soviet relations (Kulski 1947; remark by Paul Holtom). The whole East Prussian region was supposed to have been given to Poland to ensure that the 'Polish corridor' problem did not reoccur. By 1945, Stalin and the Soviet government had decided to take the northern part of East Prussia, including Königsberg, as compensation for the Soviet Union.

The three priorities of Polish foreign policy in the 1990s were membership of NATO, membership of the European Union (EU) and good relations with Poland's seven neighbouring countries (Skubiszewski *et al* 1994). Partially as a reaction to almost 50 years in the Soviet sphere of influence, Polish foreign policy took a turn to the west. While 'good neighbourly relations' was an important element of Polish foreign policy, and co-operation in the Baltic Sea region (BSR) and among the Visegrad countries was seen as worthwhile, they could be perceived more as a means rather than an end in themselves. That is, EU and NATO membership, or 'Returning to Europe', were the principal aims of Polish foreign policy in the post-1989 period.

Polish attempts to join NATO were often perceived in Moscow as a hostile act, threatening the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and rejected (Kukułka 1998). For Poland, NATO membership

was undoubtedly seen as a means of protecting its own territorial integrity. Polish history had the above-cited lessons on the ‘expansionist designs’ of Russia, and with the Baltic Fleet naval base in neighbouring Kaliningrad, ‘hard’ security fears were an element in the Polish desire for NATO membership. While Polish-Russian relations remained correct throughout the 1990s, the issue of NATO membership was certainly a ‘cooling’ factor, although by no means the only one.¹ Paradoxically, the full Polish membership in NATO, which took place in March 1999, appears to have contributed to improving bilateral relations (Jakimowicz 2000). It could be argued that NATO membership has satisfied Polish hard security concerns regarding the Russian, and Kaliningrad, threat, while the Russian Federation’s own concerns have moved on. However, Poland’s other main ‘western-orientated’ foreign policy aim – joining the EU – has also played a key role in Polish eastern foreign policy.

It was only towards the end of the 1990s that perceptions and actions towards the Russian Federation and Kaliningrad began to change in Polish foreign policy. This change, to a large extent, can be attributed to Poland’s drive towards membership of the EU. As the EU has become more concerned with its future eastern border, a large section of which will be Poland’s eastern border, attention has begun to focus more on relations with the Russian Federation at the EU-Russia level, but also on relations between the Russian Federation and EU applicants. Therefore, the EU has played a role in promoting a neglected sphere of Polish foreign policy, relations with the Russian Federation. It has arguably given Polish diplomacy an important opportunity to prove that it can assist in developing successful areas of co-operation between the EU and the Russian Federation. This includes giving Poland the possibility to present its own initiatives to the EU Commission

¹ Other problems in Polish-Russian relations in this period mainly stemmed from the unresolved issues from the Second World War, for example: the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 1939; The Katyń massacres of 1940; Soviet actions during the Warsaw Uprising; and the deportation of large sections of the Polish population starting in 1940 and in the immediate post-war period. Another problem, more in tune with East-West relations in the Cold War period, was the expulsion of several Russian diplomats from the Russian Federation’s embassy in Warsaw on spying charges, in 1999. See also: Janusauskas 2001.

on EU-Russia relations, and an opportunity to show that it can have a positive influence as a future member of the EU. This idea has been reflected in the official goals of the Polish foreign policy:

Poland's policy towards Russia will be conformable with tasks defined in the EU's Common Strategy towards Russia, particularly as the candidate countries have been invited to participate in the implementation of it.

(Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001b)*

As a direct result of this, relations with the Russian Federation, and Polish activities and co-operation in the BSR, have become more prominent in Polish foreign policy. In 2001, for the first time since 1989, BSR co-operation has been assessed as one of Poland's main foreign policy priorities. Previously, BSR co-operation had been placed below relations with the Visegrad countries, and even relations with the Benelux countries, in Poland's list of foreign priority areas.² However this change in foreign policy enables Poland to co-operate in a number of different EU co-operation projects in the BSR, including the EU's Northern Dimension, and signals a more balanced Polish foreign policy (Exposé of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 2001). This has led to a situation where the "economic, social and consequently political stability in the east Baltic Sea Region, and in north-western Russia, is undoubtedly in Poland's interests" (Mazur-Barańska 2000).

Of course, as the only border that Poland shares with the Russian Federation is with Kaliningrad, relations with this Russian *oblast'* have become one of the main foci in Polish-Russian relations. For example, the Stefan Batory Foundation, a well-established Polish NGO, recently published a report on the Kaliningrad issue, and areas that deserve considerable attention in the light of Polish EU membership (Gromadzki and Wilk 2001). Its recommendations make very interesting reading, and demonstrate that the debate on Kaliningrad in Poland is moving on from hard security issues towards areas of co-operation relating to soft security issues. The economic aspects of the relationship with Kaliningrad have become very heavily underlined, both by

* Translation from Polish by autor.

² See Henry Andreasen below for more comments on Polish policies towards the BSR.

politicians and business entrepreneurs. As Polish President Alexander Kwaśniewski has stated:

The time of Kaliningrad as Russia's most important military base has passed. Serious politicians should open the area for investors and tourism. Kaliningrad can become a Russian bridge to the EU.

(Kwaśniewski, Spiegel 2001)

A similar 'European' approach was reflected in the new *Outline of Poland's Foreign Policy towards Russia* (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000), where co-operation with Kaliningrad was mentioned as "a significant component of transregional and transborder co-operation with Russia, especially in the context of the European enlargement". However, before this paper discusses the current state of Polish-Kaliningrad relations, a brief historical overview will be presented.

The History of Polish-Kaliningrad Relations

The Bases for Historical Claims on Kaliningrad

The area that is currently called Kaliningrad is a territory that has had a complicated history. It has played a role in the cultural and historical development of four different nations/states: Germany, Lithuania, Poland and Russia. Kaliningrad covers one third of the territory that was formerly known as East Prussia, and also the birthplace of the Prussian state, Königsberg, now Kaliningrad city. Since the foundation of Königsberg in 1255, the area for centuries had very close cultural and historical ties to Germany. Its history was also intertwined with that of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Polish-speakers even have their own name for the area (*Królewiec*); for Lithuanian-speakers, the region is known as 'Lithuania Minor' (*Mažoji Lietuva*), and it is stressed that it was originally inhabited by the *Prusai*, an ancient tribe related to the Lithuanians. Furthermore, the area houses the birthplace of literature in the Lithuanian language, as the author of the first Lithuanian epic, Kristionas Donelaitis, lived and wrote in this area (Janusauskas 2001).

However, the area is perhaps better known for its role in contemporary history. It was on the pretext of the impact that the so-called 'Polish corridor' was having on East Prussia that Adolf Hitler

launched the German attack on Poland at the beginning of September 1939. And it is for this reason also that the idea of Polish territory serving as an ‘ex-territorial corridor’ between Kaliningrad and the rest of the Russian Federation is unpalatable.³ At the Tehran (28 November to 1 December 1943) and Yalta (4–11 February 1945) conferences the decision was taken to deprive Germany of East Prussia. The original plan was that this area should have been incorporated into Poland, as compensation for the eastern territories transferred to the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet leader’s desire for the inclusion of the Königsberg area (the northern part of East Prussia) into the Soviet Union changed this. At the Potsdam conference (17 June–2 August 1945) the British and American sides formally accepted the Soviet Union’s claim on this area, pending a final peace conference.⁴

This complicated history led to the airing of some controversial claims and ideas in the early 1990s, when questions about the ‘ownership’ of the *oblast’*, and its international status, were raised by individuals and groups from Germany, Lithuania and Poland. For example, during his 1993 presidential election campaign, the former Lithuanian ambassador to the United States of America, Stasys Lozoraitis, called for Kaliningrad to be incorporated into Lithuania.⁵ Vytautas Landsbergis, speaker of the *Seimas* (Lithuanian parliament)

³ *Editor’s note*: For a Russian account of the plan to connect Kaliningrad to the rest of the Russian Federation by rail through Belarus and Poland see Chardoev, Gennadii: “Normal’nye geroi vseгда vezut v ob’ezd.” In: *Izvestiya*, 28 Oct. 1994, A2.

⁴ In Teheran, Churchill’s suggestion that Poland’s borders should be drawn “between the so-called ‘Curzon line’ and the Oder, with the inclusion of East Prussia and the province of Oppeln” was accepted (Materski). However, this was not a binding decision and during this conference the Soviet Union presented a postulate to divide East Prussia between the Soviet Union and Poland, with the Königsberg area being incorporated into the Soviet Union. This postulate was included in the 9th Chapter of the *Final Resolution of the Potsdam Conference*. *Editor’s note*. For a discussion of the ‘birth’ of the *Kaliningradskaya oblast’*, see Sharp, Tony: “The Russian Annexation of the Königsberg Area 1941–5.” In: *Survey* 23 (1977–78:4), 156–62. For a consideration of the legal bases for claims on East Prussia, see Whomersley, C. A.: “The International Legal Status of Gdansk, Klaipeda and the Former East Prussia.” In: *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 42 (Oct. 1993:4), 919–28.

⁵ *Editor’s note*: See also: “Diplomat Suggested Lithuania Should Take Control of Kaliningrad.” In: *The Baltic Independent*, 6–12 Mar. 1992, A2.

supported the idea of Kaliningrad becoming the fourth Baltic Republic (Janusauskas 2001). In Germany Marion Gräfin Dönhof, former editor of *Die Zeit* and a former resident of East Prussia, was a proponent of the idea of making the *oblast* an international condominium. In Poland other ideas have been discussed, including a Polish-Lithuanian condominium, and the partition of Kaliningrad between Poland and Lithuania. There was also support for the creation of a 'fourth Baltic State' ("Królewiec" 1992). Although claims and ideas, such as those noted above, have recently rescinded, and were never openly stated as state policy, Janusz Reiter, a former Polish ambassador to Germany, declared that German actions towards Kaliningrad were still greeted with apprehension in Moscow and Warsaw (Reiter 2001a).

Polish-Kaliningrad Relations in the Soviet Period (1956–91)

The first direct contacts between officials from the *Kaliningradskaia Oblast* of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and the People's Republic of Poland were established in 1956, when the first reciprocal visits of delegations from the Olsztyn *województwo* (county) and Kaliningrad took place. These limited and formal relations were maintained over the next 35 years.

From 1975 Kaliningrad had three partner *województwa* in Poland, although this expansion of contacts was only due to administrative reforms in Poland, whereby Kaliningrad gained a new neighbouring *województwo* as a direct result of an overall increase in the number of Polish *województwa*. Of course, any form of contact was strictly determined and limited by the Soviet and Polish central governments, which led to some unusual decisions. For example, Kaliningrad was not permitted to co-operate with the Suwałki *województwo*, which directly bordered Kaliningrad at the time, because Kaliningrad was only allowed to co-operate with regions of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (LSSR) in this geographical area (Rozhikov-Yuriewskii 1997).

It should be noted, however, that even these limited and relatively weak ties with the People's Republic of Poland have been cited as playing a positive foundation role for the development of further co-operation between Polish *województwa* and Kaliningrad in the

1990's. For example, Yurii Rozkhov-Yurievskii, a former representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry in Kaliningrad, has assessed co-operation in the years 1956–1990, as important for the *oblast'* (Rozkhov-Yurievskii 1997).

The first adjustments to the new 'geopolitical' situation after 1989 were introduced by the *Declaration of Friendship and Neighbourly Cooperation between the RSFSR and the Republic of Poland*, which was signed on 16 October 1990, during the visit of Polish Foreign Minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, to Moscow. The first significant agreement to form the basis for the development of contacts between Kaliningrad and Polish north-eastern *województwa* was the *Intentional Record on Cooperation between the Kaliningrad oblast, Olsztyn województwo and Blekinge lan*. This agreement was signed by the representative of Kaliningrad Y. Malininkin, the voivod of Elbląg Z. Olszewski and the deputy governor of Blekinge (Sweden) S. Inge-marsson, in June 1990. This document stressed co-operation in the field of transportation, and contained plans for projects aimed at reconstructing the Kaliningrad-Elbląg motorway, and the establishment of a regular ferry connection between Karlskrona-Gdynia-Kaliningrad.

*Polish-Kaliningrad Relations after 1991
and the Establishment of 'Good Neighbourly Relations'*

Poland's policy towards Kaliningrad is just one element of Polish foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. The legal bases for co-operation between Poland and the Russian Federation rests on the agreements, signed by the president of the Polish Republic, Lech Wałęsa, and the president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, in Moscow 22 May 1992.⁶ Some elements of these agreements are directly concerned with co-operation between Poland and Kaliningrad:

⁶ Actually just the first of them was signed as part of a package by Polish President Wałęsa and Russian President Yeltsin in Moscow. *Umowa* was signed by Yegor Gaidar and Hanna Suchocka, *Porozumienie* by deputy-prime ministers Skubiszewski and Shochin, but the projects of these documents were prepared together with the package of the agreements signed in Moscow.

- Treaty on Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations between the Republic of Poland and the Russian Federation (*Traktat*);
- Agreement between the Governments of Poland and Russia on Trans-Border Co-operation (*Umowa*, Warsaw 2 October 1992);
- Agreement between Poland's north-eastern counties and the Kaliningrad region on Co-operation (*Porozumienie*).⁷

The first of the above-mentioned documents, the *Traktat*, regulates the relations between the two states on the intergovernmental level, but also touches upon issues related to co-operation between their particular administrative units, with the special emphasis on Kaliningrad. In article number ten of this agreement, support for co-operation between sub-regions, territorial and administrative units, and towns of both countries is a clear aim. One paragraph of this article (10.2) stresses a direct tightening of contacts between the Polish north-eastern *województwa* and Kaliningrad.

The *Agreement between the Governments of Poland and Russia on Trans-Border Co-operation (Umowa)* emphasises in the preamble the need for special relations between the north-eastern areas of Poland, Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg:

[The governments of Poland and Russia] have decided to support co-operation and contribute in this way to the further economic and social development of both states, in particular in the north-eastern and coastal areas of the Republic of Poland, the region of St. Petersburg, and the *Kaliningradskaya oblast'*.

(*Umowa*, preamble)

The agreement on the co-operation between the north-eastern Województwa of Poland and the *Kaliningradskaya oblast'* (*Porozumienie*) was also signed in Moscow but was not implemented until after the ratification of the Treaty on Trade and Economic Co-operation between Poland and Russia on the 13 February 1995 (Kukułka 1998). It was the first one entirely devoted to the issue of co-operation between the bordering areas of Poland and Russia. The preamble stresses the need to have mutual relations to solve common problems

⁷ The Polish words *umowa* and *porozumienie* have been translated into 'agreement', as the English language does not distinguish between these two Polish words.

of a social, economic and ecological nature. *Porozumienie* is of broader interest for this working paper, and Fabrizio Tassinari's topic in particular, as the authors stressed that this agreement should be read as an "expression of interest in the constant development and co-operation in the Baltic Sea region".

In *Porozumienie*, several spheres of co-operation are mentioned: economy (including transport, trade, and agriculture), ecology, science and technology. Some unusual practical areas were also highlighted, such as collaboration between insurance companies, the establishment of information centres for the economy, culture, science and technology, joint-stock banks, and other business-related spheres. In contrast to the more general agreement on co-operation *Umowa*, specific plans are outlined, as opposed to simply stating general aims. One plan, which is only stressed in this treaty and demonstrates its local character, was the idea for close co-operation in the agricultural sphere, with cross-border farm co-operation.

To implement these agreements a Polish-Russian 'round table' was established, which was first chaired by the Polish deputy-prime minister, H. Goryszewski, and the Russian deputy-prime minister A. Shochin. In 1994 this forum was transformed into the permanent 'Council for Co-operation between the *Kaliningradskaya oblast*' and the north-eastern *Województwa* of Poland', with the expressed aim of co-ordinating activities between these units. Its chairmen are the governor of Kaliningrad and the under-secretary of state in the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Council also includes representatives of both (Polish and Russian) governments and business communities from Kaliningrad and Poland. There were five meetings of the Council between 1994–2001: Svetlogorsk (1994), Gołdap (1995), Kaliningrad (1996), Gdańsk (1999), and Kaliningrad (2001). At the last meeting in Kaliningrad in 2001, the Council decided that it would subsequently meet twice a year.

Despite the tradition of the co-operation between the north-eastern Polish *województwa* and Kaliningrad, and the initial enthusiasm on both sides of the border, neither side has fully utilised the opportunities enshrined in these agreements. For most of the past ten years the thick net of bilateral ties has existed only on paper. However, that said,

Poland was the first country to establish a Consulate General in Kaliningrad (in 1992), and, as will be discussed below, there are a number of areas where co-operation has been undertaken and continues to yield positive results.

Furthermore, in concurrence with Paul Holtom's paper, the Polish government and Foreign Ministry is beginning to explore the various possibilities for deepening co-operation and ties with the Russian Federation and Kaliningrad. Poland is now also an active participant, not only in bilateral co-operation projects with the Russian Federation, but also tri-lateral projects with Lithuania, and multilateral co-operation within EU and CBSS mechanisms, including the 'Northern Dimension'.⁸

While Paul Holtom has described some of the expectations that preceded, and followed, the election of Vladimir Yegorov to the Kaliningrad governorship, he did not directly mention the expectations and hopes that were being expressed in Poland. Vladimir Yegorov is perceived by many to be a friend of Poland, with an understanding and knowledge of Polish culture and history. Therefore it was expected that he would support and further enhance Polish-Kaliningrad co-operation. However, as Fabrizio Tassinari and Paul Holtom have pointed out above, Russian *oblasti* are not always free to decide their own development strategies and interests. The most important decisions concerning cross-border co-operation can still only be taken with the expressed support of Moscow. Therefore, bilateral relations between Kaliningrad and the north-eastern *województwa* of Poland appear to be considerably dependent on the state-to-state relationship.

⁸ Some of the bi- and trilateral initiatives of Poland, Lithuania and the Russian Federation are also treated as common CBSS contributions to the 'Northern Dimension' of the EU, for example the training of public administration staff. Kaliningrad issues are also touched upon during meetings of the *Council of Cooperation between the Governments of Poland and Lithuania* and the *bilateral Commission of the Foreign Policy and Security*. In February 2001, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed a will to participate in meetings of these bodies to discuss the future of Kaliningrad (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001a).

An assessment of this relationship in 2000 to 2001 would suggest that the prospects for cross-border co-operation are rosy. There have been several Polish delegations and working visits to Moscow by the Polish Foreign Minister Bartoszewski and President Kwaśniewski, and Russian delegations to Warsaw headed by Russian Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov and the head of the Russian Security Council, Sergei Ivanov. Furthermore, for the first time in history, a governor of Kaliningrad has officially been received by the Polish president (April 2001). In January 2002, the Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Poland, the first time that the Russian head of state has visited Poland since 1993. On this occasion, President Putin was accompanied by the governor of Kaliningrad Vladimir Yegorov, another indicator of the important role that the Kaliningrad issue plays in Polish-Russian relations.

It is hoped that this intensification of contacts can help to solve some problems that continue to burden Polish-Russian relations. One of the most important problems in this relationship concerns navigation in the Wiślana Bay's straits ("Protokół rozbieżności" 2002, A4). The division of the bay makes it impossible for vessels to gain free access to the Polish harbours. The only connection that the bay enjoys with the open sea is through the straits. While the protocol (*protokół*) from 16 August 1945 (still in force) provides only Polish merchant ships with the right to free access through the strait (ships belonging to other countries are not permitted to enter the bay), in fact this decision was never obeyed. In concern for the security of the military base in Baltijsk, the USSR, and later Russia, used to close or limit the freedom of the flow. This situation has been found by the Polish authorities as burdening the development of the Polish coastal towns and regions. There were not enough connections between them and therefore the favourable condition could not have been fully used (Jakimowicz 2000). Since 1990 the situation has changed a little for the better, as there are now regular passenger connections between Polish and *Kaliningradskaya oblast's* towns (Elbląg-Kaliningrad, Elbląg-Krynica Morska, Ełbląg-Ostróda, Krynica Morska-Kaliningrad, Frombork-Krynica Morska), and freight is carried between the harbours within the Bay, and through the strait also to Denmark, Finland and Gdańsk and Szczecin. In 1997 up to 641,000 tons of goods

were brought to Elbląg, the biggest Polish harbour in the Bay (Homepage of Zalew Wiślany). In 2001, during the meeting of the Polish-Russian Council of Cooperation of the north-eastern counties of Poland and the *Kaliningradskaya oblast'*, both parties agreed that this problem needs to be solved in the near future. Russia decided to allow ships of third parties to enter the Wisłana Bay, in return for Polish construction of a new cross-border point in Mamonovo and continuing the reconstruction of the so-called 'Berlinka' (a motorway Berlin-Kaliningrad).

The issue of the bay is expected to be touched upon also during the visit of president Putin to Warsaw in January 2002.

Areas of Co-operation

Cross-Border Co-operation

For the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, border infrastructure and 'soft' security issues remain the main areas of co-operation. The Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs' *Programme on Running the State Border in the Years 2000–2002* highlights the modernisation of the cross-border points between Poland and Russia as a priority area. At the last meeting of the 'Council' both parties agreed on the need to start building new cross-border points at Grzechotki-Mamonowo II, Michałkovo-Zeleznodroznii and Perły-Krylowo.

However, there are still several problems regarding transport links between Kaliningrad and Poland. For example, the motorway Elbląg-Kaliningrad, part of the old motorway that connected Berlin and Königsberg and expected to form one of the spokes of the *Via Hanseatica*, still needs a great deal of investment.

Combating organised crime has also been identified as a target area for Polish-Russian co-operation. Thus, a new agreement on co-operation between the police headquarters of the north-eastern *województwo* in Olsztyn and the militia of Kaliningrad has been agreed upon (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001b).

Military Co-operation

An interesting, and unexpected, sphere of bilateral co-operation between Poland and Kaliningrad covers military co-operation. It is perhaps not as active as other spheres of Polish-Russian co-operation, but 10 of Poland's 15 joint activities planned for the years 2000 to 2010 are to be conducted in co-operation with the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet. The co-operation mainly consists of visits, but also includes, and aspires to include:

- A permanent political-military dialogue on security;
- Regular contacts between the headquarters of the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet in Kaliningrad and the Pomorski Military District, Poland;
- Co-operation with the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet on exercises with other fleets in the Baltic Sea region.

Economic Co-operation, Trade and Investment

The leading sphere of co-operation between Poland and Kaliningrad remains the economy. Poland is one of the most important economic partners for the *oblast'*, but both sides of the border could benefit from economic co-operation as Henry Andreasen argues below. There are at least two reasons for this: firstly, the border areas of Poland and Russia in the South-eastern corner of the Baltic Sea are geographically and economically peripheral on the national level; and secondly, there were some traditional economic ties within the old borders of East Prussia that were destroyed by the division of the territory between Poland and the Soviet Union. Reactivating these ties could help boost the economies on both sides of the border.

In 2000, Poland's turnover with Kaliningrad amounted to 294 million USD, which made Poland Kaliningrad's number one economic partner. Turnover has increased five-fold since 1994, when it amounted to 54 million USD.⁹ For Kaliningrad, turnover with Poland accounts for about 22 % of Kaliningrad's overall turnover. Exports to Poland constitute 34 %

⁹ In the first 6 months of 2001 the bilateral trade amounted 130 mln. US dol. (export: 60, import: 64).

of all of Kaliningrad's exports, giving Poland first place. It ranks only second, behind Germany, on the percentage of imports with 16%, which places it above Lithuania (see Appendix, tables 1–3).

In July 2001 there were 439 Polish companies registered in Kaliningrad, accounting for about 16.7% of all companies in Kaliningrad with foreign capital. However, as the Polish companies investing in Kaliningrad are usually of small and medium size, the level of investment amounted only to about five million USD, placing Poland fourth among foreign investors, with a share of 7.8%. Nine percent of all Polish-Russian joint-venture companies are located in Kaliningrad, with an estimated total value of 48 million USD.

The Polish state's support to those interested in economic involvement in Kaliningrad is confirmed by the fact that the Ministry of Economy sponsors 'economic events of special significance for Poland' in Kaliningrad. This is only one of 10 areas selected by the Polish Ministry of Economy for special attention. Polish enterprises are given financial assistance to take part in these events, but the most active state institution involved in promoting mutual trade and investment between Poland and Kaliningrad remains the Polish Consulate General in Kaliningrad.

The latest achievement in bilateral economic co-operation was a Business Forum for Russian and Polish entrepreneurs, held in Kaliningrad on 4 January 2002. The Polish Deputy Prime Minister, Marek Pol, not only participated in this event but also proclaimed: "We intend to do our best to assure effective economic contacts between Russia and Poland, first and foremost through the Kaliningrad Region that we have a common border with" ("Business Forum" 2002). A similar attitude has also lately been expressed by President Putin himself when he suggested that further economic co-operation would be a good base for Polish-Russian relations ("Putin: nie wolno..." 2002).

As noted above, the north-eastern of *województwa* of Poland and Kaliningrad do not play a very significant role in Polish-Russian economic relations in general. However, as Henry Andreasen discusses below, this does not mean that the north-eastern *województwa* and Kaliningrad cannot gain from low-level economic co-operation. Further,

local level trade chambers appear to be more successful than higher-level government initiatives. For example, since 1992 Elbląg has had a trade delegation in Kaliningrad, as do Olsztyn and Białystok.¹⁰ However, a special Polish-Kaliningrad chamber of commerce, established as a result of a governmental initiative, became defunct, as it was not perceived to be actively functioning.

The Visa Issue

As Paul Holtom has mentioned above, the incorporation of Schengen regulations into Polish law will mean that current cross-border arrangements have to be changed. As citizens of a non-EU country, the residents of Kaliningrad will have to hold valid Schengen visas if they wish to visit Poland. The current arrangement allows Kaliningraders to visit Poland, and Poles to visit Kaliningrad, if they hold so-called 'tourist vouchers'. This mechanism is based on a 1979 agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union, and will have to change if Poland wishes to become a full member of the EU. However, as Gromadzki and Wilk's (2001) report demonstrates, there are several options available to both Poland and the EU to deal with this problem. Two of the possible methods are given here:

1. *Travel without a Schengen visa*: The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in favour of continuing current arrangements, or at least applying a mechanism akin to that implemented by Lithuania, whereby residents of Kaliningrad can stay on Lithuanian territory for 30 days. It should be noted that this arrangement is only valid for residents of Kaliningrad, as Russian citizens resident in other parts of the Russian Federation require a visa to enter Lithuania, unless there are extenuating circumstances;
2. *Quick and cheap Schengen visas*: Another suggestion, almost a gesture of goodwill, would be to introduce free-of-charge visas for the residents of Kaliningrad. Such a policy would require the establishment of General Consulates of EU member states in Kaliningrad. Currently, apart from the General Consulates of Lithuania and Poland, there are plans for Latvian and 'Scandinavian'

¹⁰ More about the co-operation between the county and the *Kaliningrad oblast* see in Henry Andreasen (above).

(Swedish) consulates in Kaliningrad. These representations are necessary for implementing this policy option.

The original date for the introduction of visas for Kaliningrad residents, autumn 2001, has already passed without any changes to the established regime. However, a new visa regime could be implemented as early as the second half of 2002 or even 2003. The latest statement from President Kwaśniewski, published shortly before the visit of President Putin to Poland, may indicate that there is a will to answer positively to suggestions from Russia for maintaining the favourable conditions for Kaliningrad's inhabitants. President Kwaśniewski said that Poland is prepared to give Kaliningrad a 'special status' after Poland has joined the EU, as "Reducing the Kaliningrad Region to the role of a kind of aircraft carrier would be impractical, as its encirclement is friendly" ("Kwaśniewski offers Kaliningrad..." 2002).

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to examine the development of Polish-Russian relations, with particular emphasis on the Kaliningrad issue. Over the past ten years, the new reality in Europe has also affected relations between Poland and the Russian Federation. As a result of Poland embarking on a distinctly 'Western' foreign policy course (membership of the EU and NATO), relations with the Russian Federation have become more important. However, one must ask for how long relations with the Russian Federation will remain high on the Polish foreign policy agenda. The fact that the new Polish government has confirmed that it wishes to continue, and perhaps enhance, the dialogue with the Russian Federation, with considerable attention also being paid to co-operation with Kaliningrad, is a sign that this trend is likely to continue in the near future (Miller 2001). The latest event, in particular the visit of President Putin to Poland in January 2002, indicates that this co-operation may even be intensified. The economy and pragmatism, as bases for further Russian-Polish co-operation, were stressed by both presidents.

It could be argued that the promotion of relations with the Russian Federation in Polish foreign policy are a direct result of external

factors, such as the EU's interest in achieving closer relations with the Russian Federation. The enlargement of the EU, and the exclusion of the Russian Federation from its structures, would lead to a new 'curtain' being drawn in Europe at the eastern border of Poland and the Baltic States. At present, neither side desires this situation, and as the following paper by Henry Andreasen will demonstrate, the result of such a division could harm some useful attempts to include Kaliningrad, and therefore the Russian Federation, into sub-regional integration projects in the BSR and Europe.

Appendix

1. Dynamics of the trade turnover of the *Kaliningrad oblast'* with Poland

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Trade turnover	191,798	305,9	291,965	209,539	294,902
% previous year		ca. 152	95,4	71,8	140,7
Export	78,326	101,56	99,622	95,219	154,244
% previous year		129,7	98,1	95,6	160
Import	113,427	204,34	192,343	114,32	140,657
% previous year		ca. 180	94,1	59,4	123

2. Structure of Kaliningrad's export to Poland, January–March 2001

Code TNWZD		Poland
01–24	Foodstuff	463,4
27	Products of the energy complex	28901,5
28–35, 37–40	Products of the petrochemical complex	919,8
41–43	Raw leather, fur and products	52,0
44, 47, 48	Wood and products, inc. printing production	1576,4
61–64	Clothes and footwear	518,2
72–81	Ferrous and non-ferrous metal and products	1654,0
84–90	Engineering products	679,7

3. Structure of Kaliningrad's import from Poland, January–March 2001

Code TNWZD		Poland
01–24	Foodstuff	10820,4
27	Products of the energy complex	30,1
28–35, 37–40	Products of the petrochemical complex	3598,0
41–43	Raw leather, fur and products	17,7
44, 47, 48	Wood and products, inc. printing production	1957,5
61–64	Clothes and footwear	501,9
72–81	Ferrous and non-ferrous metal and products	1359,0
84–90	Engineering products	2068,1

4. Foreign investment in Kaliningrad (in thous. USD)

	Volume of accumulated foreign investment (state on 01. 01. 2001)	% of general volume of accumulated investment (state on 01. 01. 2001)	Growth in 1999	Growth in 2000	Growth in % as compared to 1999
			Total	%	Total
Total	62275	100	18266,3	100	19142,6
Of which Poland:	4933,3	7,8	1382,5	7,6	3889,9

Source: Data received from the representative of the *Kaliningradskaya oblast'* in Poland, Yurii Annenkov, on the 24 October 2001.

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HENRY ANDREASEN

Poland, Local Co-operation and Kaliningrad¹

A Polish researcher in Olsztyn informed the author that a presentation on co-operation between Poland and Kaliningrad at the local level would be very simple and short as “there is no co-operation. It is all empty words!” (Anon, OBN Interview 2001). The main aim of this paper is to evaluate whether this researcher is correct in his rather pessimistic evaluation. In order to achieve this aim the internationalisation of Polish local actors, Polish decentralisation and the new local political structures, the legal basis for relations between Poland and Russia at the local level and examples of Polish-Russian co-operation on the local level will be considered. The examples in this presentation are based on sources gathered from the county administrations of Pomorskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie, and the city administrations of Elbląg, Gdańsk, Gdynia and Olsztyn, in September and October 2001.²

New International Polish Actors

As Agnieszka Hreczuk explained above, some of Poland’s neighbours and areas appear to be more important than others. Despite having a Baltic Sea coastline of over 500 kilometres, Poland’s Baltic Sea

¹ Two clarifications: *województwo* is often translated as voivodship, region, province or county. In this paper the author has chosen ‘county’ as the author deems it more appropriate from an international perspective, for example comparable to the Danish *amt*. By the same token, *powiat* is also often translated into English as county or district. The latter is preferred in this paper.

² I began my research at BaltSeaNet in summer 2001. My topic is the internationalisation of Polish local governments. The purpose is to throw light on the international activities of Polish local governments by analysing selected international relations departments. The central question of this project is ‘what kind of strategy and working methods each individual department has chosen for international contacts and co-operation?’ In order to better understand Polish conditions, Polish local governments and Polish civil servants, two pilot projects were embarked upon. The first pilot project explored the Polish branch of the Euro-Region ‘Baltic’ and the second pilot project formed the basis of this presentation.

neighbours have been treated as second-rate and, according to Jerzy Zaleski, Poland has no distinct policies towards the Baltic Sea region (Zaleski 2000, 32). For Zbigniew Rykiel, the northern part of Poland has been peripheral since the communist period, and to some extent has continued to remain so (Rykiel 1998, 134).

One would assume that this situation will change in the near future as the recent Polish decentralisation processes will empower local actors, enabling them to define and act according to their own priorities. A further boost to the elevation of Polish counties as 'limited international actors' should flow from the financial and moral support that the EU offers to decentralisation processes throughout member and applicant states of the EU. Indeed, it has been argued that the administrative reform of local self-governments in Poland was not only due to economic matters, but was necessary for adapting to EU standards (Gorzelać and Jallowiecki 2000, 14). However, according to a recent survey of the leadership of Polish county self-governments, sub-regional integration within the EU is not strongly supported. For example, in response to the question "how should Europe look in the future?" 189 respondents wanted to keep the nation-state as the main international unit in a Europe of Nations. Only 46 respondents wanted a Europe of the Regions.³ This would help to explain why only two of the 16 Polish counties (Podlaskie County and Lubelskie County) had established their own representations in Brussels by the end of 2001 (Łuszczuk 2000, 13; M. G. 2001, 17).

Here the author feels it would be beneficial to give a short comparative perspective using the Danish counties and their relationship with the EU as an example of the impact of EU membership and regional policies. The Danish counties are smaller in size than the Polish counties, but they are more powerful if one compares the financial resources and the legislative powers of the local self-governments.⁴

³ This survey took place in the winter of 1999–2000. 855 people were sent questionnaires, 269 people responded (Śliwka 2001, 19 and 23).

⁴ According to an OECD report Danish local and county authorities manage resources that account for around 32 % of the total value of Danish production whereas local government expenses in countries such as Norway and the UK are 10–15 % (Danish Ministry of the Interior 1999, 27). For a short description of the Danish local governments see Danish Ministry of the Interior 1999.

Since the 1990s, the Danish counties (and municipalities) have acknowledged that Brussels is a parallel centre to Copenhagen for regional political and economic development. Danish EU membership has had a significant impact upon the functions of Danish local self-governments. With EU membership came more international co-operation projects, and a refocusing of local agendas towards the promotion of local businesses, employment, the environment, infrastructure, education and health onto the international stage (Anderesen 2001, 3). Today all 14 Danish counties – and a few municipalities – have representatives in Brussels. Will the Polish counties follow this example?

One key aspect of the new Polish local self-government reforms, introduced in 1999, was the expectation that every Polish county government would develop a set of guidelines and priorities for its regional development and foreign co-operation strategies in order to promote, attract and enrich every Polish county (Gorzelać and Jałowicki 2000, 14). Polish studies on regional and local policy, which were carried out by the central authorities, concluded that the development policies of the county authorities are often closely linked to the international contacts of these counties. Grzegorz Gorzelać and Bohdan Jałowicki link the economic development of the counties with their future plans for international co-operation. However, while they argue that the goals of the counties are often too vague (Gorzelać and Jałowicki 2001, 58), their main conclusion is that:

County and provincial self-government (...) have not been given adequate legislative powers or independent budgetary means. As a result the fundamental aim of the reform – the decentralisation of the state – has only been partially achieved. The reform has not limited the power of the central government in a significant way (...) The reform can be regarded as 'step in the right direction', but the current scope of the reform falls far short of all the changes which need to be made.

(Gorzelać and Jałowicki 2000, 18)

It was expected that this greater autonomy would enable the Polish counties to become more active players on the international scene, especially regarding cross-border co-operation (Toczyski 1998, 51–54), and also in relations with the EU (M. G. 2001, 17). The *sejmik województwa* (county parliament) now has to develop a set of guidelines

for foreign co-operation for itself. These guidelines should include the geographic priorities, foreign partners, and organisations and associations to which the county was either a member or applicant. The *zarząd województwa* (board of the county government) is now responsible for carrying out the resolutions of the *sejmik województwa*, preparing and executing projects regarding the strategic development of the county and organising co-operation with associations and local-government structures in other countries (*Ustawa województwa* 2001, 16). It is, however, the *marszałek* (speaker) of the *sejmik województwa*, who seems to be the most important person regarding local foreign relations, as they are in charge of the day-to-day affairs and represent the county in foreign contacts (*Ustawa województwa* 2001, 17). Yet, one should note that while all *sejmiki województwa* are empowered to sign twinning contracts or join foreign associations, the consent of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ) is still required before such agreements can be considered binding (*Ustawa województwa* 2001, 25).

Local Polish Administrative Structures After 1999

Before considering examples of co-operation between Poland and Kaliningrad, a short overview of the legal basis for these relations will be given (see next section). This overview will only address the post-1989 territorial organisation of Poland. Here two years are important: firstly 1990, the year that local government was introduced at the municipal level; and secondly 1999, when local self-government was introduced at the intermediate level.

Today the local Polish administrative structure consists of three vertical levels and three horizontal units. At the lowest level, there are roughly 2,500 *gminy* (municipalities). Between the *gminy* and the highest level, the 16 *województwa* (counties), there are about 350 *powiaty* (districts). At the highest level of the local administrative structure there are 16 directly elected *sejmiki województw* (county parliaments), each presided over by a *marszałek województwa* (speaker). At the same time and parallel to the county government authorities there is an *urząd wojewódzki* (central government county level administration) headed by a *wojewoda* (governor), who is nominated by the Prime Minister. The *wojewoda* is responsible for

supervising and controlling the *sejmik województwa* (*Ustawa województwa* 2001, 25–26). However, these divisions have led to confusion and criticism.

A deputy mayor from a city in Warmińsko-Mazurskie County told the author that the separation of responsibilities between the *sejmik województwa* and the *wojewoda* at the county level is necessary.⁵ His statement is supported by legislation that decrees that the *sejmik województwa* formulates the foreign policy of the county and the *marszałek* informs the *wojewoda* and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on new international agreements and contacts (*Ustawa województwa* 2001, 25–26). However, later in the same interview, the above-cited deputy mayor complained that in practise the division creates duality in many roles, doubles the amount of paperwork and creates a lot of frustration.⁶ For example, when the Kaliningrad governor, Vladimir Yegorov, visited Warmińsko-Mazurskie County in September 2001 to sign an agreement on co-operation between Kaliningrad and the Polish county, he had to sign separate agreements with the *sejmik województwa* and the *wojewoda*.

Bartłomiej Sochański, the mayor of Szczecin, is also sceptical of the division of responsibilities, regarding international issues, between the *sejmik województwa* and the *wojewoda*, and also including the *powiaty* and *gminy*. He asks the important question: can international co-operation be conducted with such a multitude of voices from one region (Sochański 1998, 18)? Marian Kallas has struggled to find any explicit references in the Polish constitution concerning the regulation of the international relations of the *sejmik województwa* (Kallas 2000, 72). Further confusion can arise as the name of the international relations' department – like many other departments – of the *sejmik województwa* and the *urząd wojewódzki* are often very similar.

In theory, the main function of the *wojewoda* is to act as the crucial link between the central and the local authorities. Roman Sowiński

⁵ Anon. Interview with a deputy mayor of a Polish city in Warmińsko-Mazurskie 2001.

⁶ *Ibid.*

states that the *wojewoda* is responsible for national foreign policy at the local level, and merely supervises the *sejmik województwa's* international relations. Yet, the *wojewoda* prepares the necessary documents for the county's international agreements and also signs these agreements with foreign units. As the government's representative, the *wojewoda* is in constant contact with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Polish Ministry of Interior Affairs (MSWiA) and other relevant ministries regarding international contacts and co-operation (Sowiński 1998, 124). However, as the *wojewoda* is appointed by the government, national political choices have an important impact upon local politics. For example, when the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Labour Union (UP) formed a government, as a result of the Polish parliamentary (*Sejm*) elections that were held on the 23 September 2001, one of their first acts was to replace the standing *wojewoda* in each of the 16 counties (Sybi 2001, 6–7).

The Bases for Local Level Polish-Russian Co-operation

Agreements on co-operation between Russia and Poland exist at four levels: the central government level, the county level, the municipality level and the non-governmental level. This paper will consider examples of co-operation at the county level (between Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Kaliningrad) and at the municipality level (the cities of Olsztyn and Kaliningrad, and the cities of Gdynia and Kaliningrad).⁷

Researchers interested in the development of relations between Poland and Russia/Kaliningrad are in a relatively poor position, as there are very few Polish documents available. For example, documents from the working groups in the Polish Ministry of Interior Affairs would be invaluable to researchers engaged in this field, as they would reveal subtle insights on the nature of co-operation between Poland and Russia. Unfortunately, these documents are not currently available and researchers are confined to work from a few short articles

⁷ See Agnieszka Hreczuk (above) for a more in-depth discussion on Polish-Russian relations at the central government level.

written by government specialists, dealing with Polish affairs relating to Kaliningrad.⁸

As Agnieszka Hreczuk has described above, since the end of the Soviet Union Poland and Russia have met to discuss issues regarding the only Russian *oblast* that shares a border with Poland, Kaliningrad, several times. The first meeting between the special proxies of the Polish and Russian governments concerning Kaliningrad took place in July 1994. This meeting took was a result of the so-called 'round table' proceedings, where representatives of Polish and Russian national and local governments discussed cross-border problems. The 'round table' proceedings produced eleven working groups covering areas of mutual interest such as transportation, protection of the environment, the bay of the Baltiisk straits, economic co-operation, culture and the ability to view Polish TV in Kaliningrad (Olszewski 2000, 4).⁹


Intergovernmental meetings on co-operation between Polish counties and Kaliningrad have become regular events. One recent example of these meetings is the Polish-Russian commission regarding trade and economic co-operation, which met for the fifth time in Warsaw in April 2001. The topics considered at this meeting included expanding co-operation in the fields of trade, energy, industry, military, agriculture, fishery, investments, transportation, and financial affairs (*Protokół ds. Handlu* 2001, 1–2).

Another area where there appears to be interest on both sides is in connection with cross-border co-operation. In July 2001, the fifth Polish-Russian meeting on cross-border co-operation between Polish counties

⁸ A few notable Polish perspectives on Polish relations with Russia and Kaliningrad include Cichocki *et al* 2001; Maciejewski 2001; Zajęczkowski 2000. The chapters on relations between Poland and Russia in the annual periodicals of Polish foreign policy published by MSZ (*Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej*) very rarely deal with Kaliningrad. The Centre of Scientific Research (OBN) in Olsztyn monitors the papers of Russia and Kaliningrad, producing translations from Russian into Polish for their periodical *Obwód Kaliningradzki*.

⁹ Zdzisław Olszewski is the current head of the Polish secretariat of Euro-Region 'Baltic'. The paper is Olszewski's personal record of the period up to 1996. It is stored in his computer at the Polish secretariat of Euro-Region 'Baltic' in Elbląg.

and Kaliningrad was held in Kaliningrad city. The issues on the agenda included development and co-operation in the fields of infrastructure, transportation, maritime, agriculture, labour, trade and EU funding. It was at this meeting that the decision was taken to meet every six months (*Protokół ds. Regionów*, 1–3). It could therefore be argued that a positive atmosphere exists between Poland and Russia at the state level on the issue of Kaliningrad. But what is happening at the Polish county level?



Map by Martin Bo Nørregaard

The County Level – Warmińsko-Mazurskie

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ) has stressed that Poland is interested in developing further co-operation with Russia on Kaliningrad. One example of this is the belief that it is possible to conduct Polish foreign relations with Kaliningrad at the local

level, in activities connected with youth exchanges, artistic events, tourism, broader co-operation between local governments and a greater use of the Euro-Region 'Baltic' (MSZ 2001, 2–4).¹⁰ In this context the counties of Pomorskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie are important, as they have both entered into agreements with Kaliningrad. In this section, the level of co-operation between Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Kaliningrad will be explored.

The border between Poland and Kaliningrad is 232 km long, and the county of Warmińsko-Mazurskie (1.5 million inhabitants) is the only Polish county to share a land border with the Russian Federation.¹¹ As Agnieszka Hreczuk has stated above, before 1990 contacts between the Polish local governments and Kaliningrad were very limited and were usually only entered into in connection with meetings between regional administrators, Communist party leaders or for sports events (Olszewski 2000, 1). The first local-level agreement to be signed between Kaliningrad and a Polish North-eastern county after the events of 1989, was concluded with Elbląskie County in January 1991 (Olszewski 2000, 3). The latest *porozumienie* (agreement) between Kaliningrad and the county of Warmińsko-Mazurskie was accepted by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and signed on the 19 September 2001 (*Porozumienie między Wojewodą* 2001; *Porozumienie o Współpracy* 2001). As was mentioned above, it was necessary for two agreements to be signed, one by the *sejmik województwa* and one by the *wojewoda*.

Comparing the two agreements one may say that the overall objectives are identical: co-operation with the aim of creating conditions favourable for further economic development. In the agreement of the *wojewoda* with Kaliningrad the need for the creation of better conditions for economic co-operation and infrastructure is stressed. The agreement of the *sejmik województwa* is more general. Support for economic development is only one of many topics highlighted for co-operation. Other topics

¹⁰ See Andreasen 2002 for an assessment of the Polish section of Euro-Region 'Baltic'.

¹¹ Before the new administrative divisions of Poland, which occurred in 1999, Kaliningrad bordered four Polish counties: Elbląskie, Olsztyńskie, Suwalskie, and Gdańskie (sea border).

cited include: expanding co-operation in the fields of tourism, transportation, town planning, assistance programmes for rural areas, health services, protection of the environment, science and education, sport, culture and local governments. The Warmińsko-Mazurskie County local parliament and Kaliningrad have already agreed to share information regarding their dealings with the EU, and they have even considered the possibility of co-ordinating their applications for EU projects funds in the future (*Porozumienie o Współpracy* 2001, 3).

However, there are considerable differences between the two Polish documents concerning the period of time that the agreements will operate for, and also on how to evaluate further co-operation. The Warmińsko-Mazurskie *województwo* and the Kaliningrad governor meet once a year, and if problems occur before the agreed date for the next scheduled meeting, then special consultation can be arranged before the annual meeting is due to be held. The agreement will continue to be in force until one of the partners decides to end the co-operation. The agreement between the *sejmik województwa* of Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Kaliningrad is more definite. The agreement is valid for five years and special consultations can be established regarding problem areas. There are direct contacts between local governments and organisations, and a working group has been established in order to monitor the realisation of the agreement (*Porozumienie między Wojewodą* 2001, 2–3; *Porozumienie o Współpracy* 2001, 2–3).

An Example of Successful Co-operation – Olsztyn City

Are the intentions of the county agreement(s) also visible in local government co-operation with cities in Kaliningrad? The city of Olsztyn (170,000 inhabitants) represents a good example of co-operation at the city and municipality level. Olsztyn city is important because it is the nearest Polish county capital to Kaliningrad.¹²

¹² Kaliningrad is not mentioned directly in the SWOT analysis in the latest published strategy plan of Olsztyn city. On the other hand, involvement in Euro-Region 'Baltic' is seen as a means of developing international business co-operation and preventing the threat from Kaliningrad of so-called "cheap foreign labour from East". See Zarząd Miasta Olsztyna 1998, 24 and 26.

The co-operation between Olsztyn city and Kaliningrad city (424,000 inhabitants) is based on a partnership agreement of December 1993. This agreement was replaced by a 'twinning' agreement two years ago. The city of Olsztyn was involved in more than 30 registered projects, events and contacts with Kaliningrad city in the period January 2000 to March 2001, with co-operation taking place in the following areas: local government, business and tourism, culture, science, civil society, police and border police, helping people find relatives lost during the Second World War, and the local media (Górecki 2001a, 1–4).

According to Lech Górecki, the proxy of Olsztyn city towards Kaliningrad, his pamphlet on mutual co-operation between Olsztyn city and Kaliningrad is the only written information that he possesses regarding co-operation with Kaliningrad. He told the author that there is, however, far more activity than is recorded on paper. He stressed that most co-operation and discussions take place by telephone, with calls for help and requests for business contacts not being registered (Górecki 2001b). According to Górecki's internal pamphlet Olsztyn city assesses its relations with Kaliningrad city as good (Górecki 2001a, 3), and the city administration believes that Kaliningrad, as a whole, is regarded as a good partner for the following reasons:

- The high level of foreign investments in Kaliningrad;
- The demilitarisation of Kaliningrad;¹³
- The Euro-Region 'Baltic';
- The growth of NGOs;
- The increasing interest in Kaliningrad from the CIS countries and the EU.

Of importance for this research is the fact that, according to Górecki's pamphlet, several of Olsztyn city's leading politicians perceive Kaliningrad city to be an important future partner. On the other hand, the pamphlet enumerates several factors, which have been cited as having a negative impact on relations:

¹³ Poland remains concerned about the Russian military potential in Kaliningrad. Russian statements confirming that there are no nuclear weapons or radioactive waste in Baltiisk, which is the harbour of the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet, do not assuage Polish fears (Bobiński 2001, 24–25).

- The large financial deficit of Kaliningrad city;
- Competition from Kaliningrad's other Polish twinning cities (Gdańsk, Gdynia, Elbląg, Toruń, Białystok, Zabrze, Łódź);
- Problems regarding border crossings;
- Large-scale corruption and bureaucratisation in the Kaliningrad city administration;
- Problems with the special economic zone in Kaliningrad;¹⁴
- Lack of an official Polish policy regarding co-operation with Russia (Górecki 2001a, 4).

According to Górecki's pamphlet Olsztyn city would like to see more cross-border co-operation with Kaliningrad city in the future. An important area for increasing contacts between the two cities is thought to be through the business communities, with contacts between small and medium sized companies highlighted as a priority area. Kaliningrad is seen as presenting business opportunities not only for Olsztyn city, but also for the entire county. Olsztyn city has therefore proposed the establishment of a Polish House in Kaliningrad city, which would promote companies from the North-eastern regions of Poland. This step is deemed necessary as the Polish Consulate General in Kaliningrad is perceived as neglecting the promotion of small and medium sized companies.¹⁵ Another promising sign in relations with Kaliningrad for Olsztyn is the fact that the representative of Kaliningrad in Poland moved from Gdańsk city to Olsztyn city in April 2001 (Górecki 2001a, 4; Departament Integracji Europejskiej 2001, 4).

The examples of contacts between Kaliningrad and the county of Warmińsko-Mazurskie, and also those that exist between Olsztyn city and Kaliningrad city, are limited. However, they do show that co-operation involving Polish and Russian local governments at the

¹⁴ See Paul Holtom above for more details on the problems of Kaliningrad's SEZ.

¹⁵ The author was unsuccessful in his attempt to find data on local trade between local business partners in Poland and Kaliningrad. For example, Olsztyn city does not register trade and economic co-operation that takes place between Olsztyn and Kaliningrad. And according to the Polish office of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Suwałki, to their knowledge, not one of their members has a business partner in Kaliningrad (e-mail correspondence in September 2001). The commercial department of the Polish General Consulate in Kaliningrad has not replied to the author's requests.

county and city levels does exist. Unfortunately, the author concedes that it is not possible to estimate the full extent of the co-operation from his data. In the neighbouring county of Pomorskie, documents from Gdynia city were made available for the author to assess another 'successful' case of co-operation at local level.

An Example of Successful Co-operation – Gdynia City

Leading politicians and civil servants of Pomorskie County (2.2 million inhabitants) regard Kaliningrad as one of its main areas of interest (Departament Współpracy Międzynarodowej 2000b, 4). Gdynia city co-operates with Kaliningrad city in the following areas: economic development, administrative support, environment, energy, health care, social services, education and NGOs relations (Departament Współpracy Międzynarodowej 2000a, 1–6).

According to a survey compiled by the International and Inter-regional Affairs Department of the office of the Pomorskie County government, Gdynia city is more active than Gdańsk city regarding co-operation with Kaliningrad, if one judges this competition on registered 'co-operation' projects and events (Departament Współpracy Międzynarodowej 2000a). Gdańsk city signed agreements with Kaliningrad city in 1993 on cultural and economical co-operation, but there has been little registered co-operation since then. A notable exception is the financial assistance given by Kaliningrad city (3,000 USD) to Gdańsk city in the summer 2001 after serious flooding (Graż 2001, 3).¹⁶ However, the rest of this section will consider some of the most positive and successful examples of co-operation between Gdynia city and Kaliningrad city.

Co-operation between Gdynia city (255,000 inhabitants) and Kaliningrad city began in 1994, developing into a twinning agreement in 1997. Co-operation is divided into two spheres: 'formalised co-operation', including, for example, co-operation in the Euro-Region 'Baltic'; and 'institutional co-operation', including, for example, working contacts

¹⁶ For a comparison of the activities of the cities of Gdańsk and Gdynia with Kaliningrad city, see the annual works published by the international departments of the two Polish cities (Urząd Miasta Gdyni 2001, 29–30; Zarząd Miasta Gdańska 2000, 83).

between local governments regarding fishing (Departament Współpracy Międzynarodowej 2000). The twinning agreement stresses that co-operation through direct contacts between public administration, organisations and businesses in the areas of production, trade, culture, education and protection of the environment is very important (Urząd Miasta Gdyni 2001, 29). It is also worth mentioning that Gdynia city gave almost 26,076 EUROS worth of humanitarian aid – food, clothes, cleaning articles, and toys – to Kaliningrad city during the Russian crisis in the winter of 1998, and donated anti-tuberculosis medicines to Kindergarten no. 124 in Kaliningrad city in December 1997 (Urząd Miasta Gdyni 2001, 29; *Actions of European Solidarity* 2001).

One of the most recent co-operation projects in which the cities of Gdynia and Kaliningrad participated was the three-day seminar 'United Against Drugs', which was organised in the framework of the Euro-Region 'Baltic'. The seminar's participants included civil servants, police officers, social workers and NGOs from Gdynia (Poland), Karlskrona (Sweden), Klaipeda (Lithuania) and Kaliningrad (Russia). It was organised by the Gdynia City Council, and received 4,393.69 EUROS from the EU. This co-operation project was so highly evaluated by the Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Co-operation (BSSSC) organisation, a non-governmental organisation concerned with the interests of regional and county authorities in the Baltic Sea region, that the project was selected as one of the best examples of cross-border co-operation at the BSSSC Conference in Riga, which was held between 25–27 October 2001 (BSSSC 2001, 24).

The project was undertaken in response to a rapidly increasing number of drug users in the partner cities. The problem is particularly acute in the city of Kaliningrad, with 2,300 registered drug users, although actual numbers are estimated to be around 20–30,000. In comparison, Karlskrona has 700 registered drug users, Klaipeda 500 registered drug users, and in Gdynia there are about 400 drug users. By organising the seminar with its partners in the framework of the Euro-Region 'Baltic', Gdynia city's aims were to enable an exchange of information and experiences on a common problem. They also hoped to point out that it is a cross-border problem, which can only be solved by international co-operation. The result is that working groups have been set up for further exchanges of information (*Sprawozdanie końcowe*, 2001)

Closing Remarks

To conclude, the author would once more like to draw attention to the fact that a complete analysis of co-operation between Kaliningrad and North-eastern Polish counties cannot be drawn while a great deal of information is unavailable. It would have been very interesting to study documents concerning economic co-operation, infrastructure projects and political units' activities in order to answer whether the Polish local authorities, and other administrative units, find Kaliningrad an attractive partner for co-operation. The author found this to be a task hampered by a lack of transparency and openness at the county level, and no central office to archive documents and information.

It would also have been very interesting to study 'co-operation' in the so-called 'Grey economy', as this is an area within which a considerable amount of co-operation is understood to take place (Fairlie 1999, 9). However, the author acknowledges that further methodological problems would arise from such an endeavour. Another interesting research agenda would have been to trace the development, or lack of development, in co-operation between Polish border regions and Kaliningrad during the Communist period.

To return to the initial research question, is there co-operation between Polish counties and Kaliningrad? It would appear that the opening comments of the Polish researcher would be justified if county agreements alone were to be the basis for such an assessment. They are full of good intentions, but contain no concrete plans or examples. On the other hand, the agreements and activities at the local levels and between the cities of Olsztyn and Gdynia with Kaliningrad city, appear to be relatively successful in creating an environment for closer co-operation. However, future co-operation between Polish Northern regions and Kaliningrad depends on a vast array of relationships ranging from Moscow-Kaliningrad relations, to Polish centre-region relations and the ongoing EU enlargement process¹⁷.

¹⁷ See Paul Holtom above.

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German, Polish and Russian Words and Terms

<i>Derzhavniki</i>	A Russian word that roughly translates as 'proponents of Great Power status'
<i>Duma</i>	Parliament (Russian)
<i>Gemeinschaft</i>	community, 'a sense of community' (Ferdinand Tönnies, German)
<i>Gminy</i>	Municipalities (Polish)
<i>Kaliningradskaya oblast'</i>	The Kaliningrad administrative region
<i>Kaliningradskaya oblastnaya Duma</i>	The Kaliningrad administrative region's parliament
<i>Leningradskaya oblast'</i>	The Leningrad administrative region
<i>Marszałek</i>	Parliamentary 'speaker' (Polish)
<i>Marszałek województwa</i>	Speaker of the county parliament and head of à <i>Urząd Marszałkowski</i>
<i>Oblast'</i>	Administrative region (Russian)
<i>Oblasti</i>	Administrative regions (Russian)
<i>Oblastnichestvo</i>	Russian regionalism
<i>Okrug</i>	Federal District (Russian)
<i>Ostpolitik</i>	'eastern-orientated foreign policy' (German)
<i>Pełnomocnicy</i>	'Special proxies' (Polish)
<i>Porozumienie</i>	Agreement (Polish)
<i>Powiaty</i>	Districts (Polish)
<i>Sejm</i>	Parliament (Polish)
<i>Sejmik województwa</i>	County parliament (Polish)
<i>Traktat</i>	Treaty (Polish)
<i>Umowa</i>	Agreement (Polish)
<i>Urząd Wojewódzki</i>	Central government county level administration office (Polish)
<i>Urząd Marszałkowski</i>	Office of the county self-government (Polish)
<i>Wojewoda</i>	Governor, also known as voivod (Polish)
<i>Województwo</i>	County, also known as voivodship, region, or province (Polish)
<i>Województwa</i>	Counties (Polish)
<i>Zarząd województwa</i>	Board of Polish county self-government

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