Livonia, Rus’ and the Baltic Crusades in the Thirteenth Century

Anti Selart
Livonia, Rus’ and the Baltic Crusades in the Thirteenth Century
Cover illustration: The 12th-century enkolpion with an image of Virgin Mary was found in Viltina cemetery on the Saaremaa Island, western Estonia. The findings of this type enkolpions concentrate in the region of Kiev, the westernmost exemplar is known from the Gotland Island in the middle of the Baltic Sea. Archaeological collection of the Institute of History, Tallinn University (AI 3884: 2956).

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Preface

This monograph is a revised English translation of the German book *Livland und die Rus’ im 13. Jahrhundert*, published in Cologne by Böhlau in 2007 as volume 21 of the series “Quellen und Studien zur baltischen Geschichte” issued by the Baltische Historische Kommission (Göttingen, Germany). Apart from the slight amendments and updating of the text, the bibliography has also been updated and ‘anglicized’ to some extent. A few minor parts were abridged to avoid unnecessary repetition and details of local interest tangential to the main narrative. Any flaws and mistakes identified and located by reviewers have been corrected. The adaptation of the monograph was supported by Estonian Research Council grant no. PUT 107.

The Baltic region is a multilingual area in which several languages have been used throughout history. Accordingly, there are parallel traditions of place-name usage. Since the medieval and early modern language of administration and correspondence was predominantly German in this region, or more specifically Middle Low German in the Middle Ages, and a major part of the relevant historiography is written in German, preference has generally been given to German place names in this book. English place names have been used where there is an established equivalent. The toponyms of local languages can be found in the index and in the multilingual place-name concordance (p. 318). The transliteration of Russian names and places follows the Library of Congress standard, except where the established English equivalents differ.

I would like to thank the Baltische Historische Kommission and its president Professor Matthias Thumser, and the Böhlau publishing house for the kind permission to publish the book in English. I would also like to thank Professor Florin Curta, who accepted the monograph in his series “East Central and Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages, 450–1450”, and Dr Fiona Robb, who carefully carried out the translation work. Marcella Mulder of Brill was responsible for all the organisational and technical aspects of publication. Dr Tõnno Jonuks helped to find the cover illustration, commented on it, and provided the photograph. Kristel Roog drew the maps, and last but not least, Madis Maasing produced the index. I’m extremely grateful to everyone who has supported, collaborated, and provided encouragement throughout the course of this work.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Akten und Rezesse der livländischen Ständetage</td>
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<tr>
<td>AV</td>
<td>Analecta Vaticana</td>
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<td>BD</td>
<td>Bullarium Danicum</td>
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<td>BGP</td>
<td>Die Berichte der Generalprokuratoren des Deutschen Ordens</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLDR</td>
<td>Библиотека литературы Древней Руси</td>
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<td>DD</td>
<td>Diplomatarium Danicum</td>
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<td>DPR</td>
<td>Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMU</td>
<td>Finlands medeltidsurkunder</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVNP</td>
<td>Грамоты Великого Новгорода и Пскова</td>
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<td>HCL</td>
<td>Heinrichs Livländische Chronik</td>
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<td>HRM</td>
<td>Акты исторические, относящиеся к России</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUB</td>
<td>Hansisches Urkundenbuch</td>
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<td>LGU</td>
<td>Livländische Güterurkunden</td>
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<td>LR</td>
<td>Livländische Reimchronik</td>
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<td>LUB</td>
<td>Liv-, Esth- und Curländisches Urkundenbuch</td>
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<tr>
<td>LUR</td>
<td>Liv-, est- und kurländische Urkundenregesten</td>
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<tr>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>Senās Latvijas vēstures avoti</td>
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<tr>
<td>LVIŽ</td>
<td>Latvijas Vēstures Institūta Žurnals</td>
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<td>LübUB</td>
<td>Urkundenbuch der Stadt Lübeck</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGH</td>
<td>Monumenta Germaniae Historica</td>
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<td>MGH SS</td>
<td>Monumenta Germaniae Historica, scriptores</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Valentin L. Ianin, Новгородские акты</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>Новгородский исторический сборник</td>
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<td>Новгородская первая летопись</td>
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<td>NL4</td>
<td>Новгородская четвертая летопись</td>
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<tr>
<td>OM</td>
<td>Ordines militares. Colloquia torunensia historica</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSP</td>
<td>Oxford Slavonic Papers</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUS</td>
<td>Odense University Studies in History and Social Sciences 1970–2002; University of Southern Denmark Studies in History and Social Sciences 2002–</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PG</td>
<td>Полоцкие грамоты</td>
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<td>PL</td>
<td>Псковские летописи</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSRL</td>
<td>Полное собрание русских летописей</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUB</td>
<td>Preußisches Urkundenbuch</td>
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<tr>
<td>REA</td>
<td>Registrum Ecclesiae Aboensis</td>
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<td>RLU</td>
<td>Russisch-livländische Urkunden</td>
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<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Svenskt diplomatarium</td>
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<tr>
<td>SL1</td>
<td>Софийская первая летопись</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>Scriptores rerum Prussicarum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Sverges traktater</td>
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Introduction

Relations between the northern crusaders, the peoples of the Baltic, and the population of Rus’ in the 13th century have impinged to a greater or lesser extent on the history of all the nationalities now living in the Baltic region. Consequently, this period is crucial for determining the way in which these groups and the modern states now occupying this space view their history. On an even larger scale, the subject is also linked to the formation of both Catholic Europe and the Orthodox world as well as the relationship between them. The Baltic is an area that has been disputed by various political powers across the centuries, and this tension is reflected in the historiography, both in terms of volume and approach. The amount of literature devoted to the region, either as its main subject or just tangentially, and the variety of points of view and interpretation are vast. Authors in this field have tended to be swayed more by their own personal political and ideological prejudices than by the actual source material or professional standards of scholarship. This is regardless of whether the subject of their research is the establishment of the German colony in Livonia, the end of the Estonians’ and Letts’ age-old freedoms, the defence of Russia, or simply an episode in the history of the crusades. This tendency had been established by the 15th and 16th centuries at the very latest, when Russia and its immediate western neighbours each portrayed themselves as the victim of the other’s unjust aggression. This perspective found expression in the 15th- and 16th-century chronicles from Livonia and elsewhere in eastern European on the one hand, and the Russian chronicles (летописи) on the other, all of which gave accounts not only of contemporary events but those from the more distant past as well. These works, most notably the 16th-century Russian Nikon Chronicle (Никоновская летопись) and the chronicle of the Reval pastor Balthasar Russow (d. 1600), in turn served as the basis for the first scholarly investigations in the 18th and 19th centuries, resulting in the creation of certain historiographical traditions some of which have continued

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to this very day. A distinctly unforgiving tone skewed the writings of many scholars from the outset, who often saw themselves as the descendants of one of the medieval powers from this region.

From the end of the 12th century onwards various Catholic powers organized military expeditions and crusades against the pagans in the Baltic. This had the consequence of bringing the conquerors of these lands into conflict with Rus’ and its various principalities. This development raises a whole series of questions. Was this confrontation merely a by-product of the war against the pagans or did the crusaders harbour secret plans from the beginning of gaining control of Russian territories as well, or perhaps even the whole of Rus’? Who were these crusades initiated by: popes and emperors, or local powers? Were they a Scandinavian, Livonian or German enterprise? The different ways in which these questions have been answered have determined the different points of departure adopted by historians, ranging from detailed and carefully researched studies on specific questions, eschewing generalization, to free adaptations of the historical facts to preconceived schema. One of the most influential interpretations was the dictum of Drang nach Osten (‘push to the East’), condemning what was seen as the German tradition of eastward expansion. This notion originated in Polish and Russian journalism in the second half of the 19th century, but was then adopted by German authors, who transformed it into a positive development as a crucial stage in German cultural dominance of the area.2 The political struggles and conflicts of the 20th century gave renewed impetus to the East-West dichotomy, one of whose consequences was the enthusiastic reception given to the idea of heroic resistance against Western aggressors in the Russian tradition and those derived from it. The saintly Russian grand prince Aleksandr Nevskii (d. 1263) and the Livonian master of the Teutonic Order Wolter von Plettenberg (d. 1535) in particular served as symbolic figures used by many writers to project their contemporary ideas of the enemy onto Livonian-Russian relations in the past.3

Above all in the past few decades the so-called pluralist use of the term ‘crusades’ has started to prevail as a result of the increasing influence of Anglo-American historiography in general and its impact on the history of the Baltic

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region in the 13th century in particular. According to this approach, the term ‘crusade’ refers not just to the crusades in the Holy Land but to all wars based on the same ideology as the crusades.\(^4\) Thanks to this line of research it has become possible to move away from the narrowly defined national scholarly traditions.

A closer look at these different historiographical tendencies (which cannot, of course, be completely separated from one another) must first examine what is known as the ‘patriotic’ Russian school of thought.\(^5\) Here the past is examined from the perspective of a strong Russian centralized power and its aim of territorial expansion. A key component is veneration of Prince Aleksandr Iaroslavich, better known as Aleksandr Nevskii,\(^6\) while the Catholic or ‘German’ camp is portrayed as the aggressor. In both the ecclesiastical Orthodox and secular strands of this tradition it was claimed that the pope and the Catholic church as a whole, depicted as a powerful, cruel and ruthless institution motivated purely by self-interest, were behind the eastward aggression. The wars to propagate Catholicism in the area now comprising modern Estonia, Latvia, and Finland, bearing in mind that these countries were ruled by Rus’ in the 12th century, must have been aimed from the beginning against Rus’ and the Orthodox church since the pagan peoples of the Baltic region were too weak to be the real target of the aggressors. Even just temporary agreements between individual Russian territories and the Catholics are seen as ill-fated and fraught


\(^5\) This terminology is used in Igor N. Danilevskii, *Русские земли глазами современников и потомков (XI–XIV вв.). Курс лекций* (Moscow, 2000).

with danger or even treacherous. Such a view of history has been propounded by modern scholars such as George Vernadsky (1887–1973), Vladimir Pashuto (1918–83), and Igor Shaskolskii (1918–95), as well as by Patriarch Aleksii of Moscow (1929–2008),7 to name only a few.8 The hypothesis of Western aggression allows authors to explain everything that happened with a view to supporting the desired conclusion. For example, the Russian archaeologist Elena Rybina, the author of a series of notable works on the economic history of Novgorod, explained the changing pattern in the importation of western European goods to Novgorod as identified based on the archaeological evidence as follows: if a particular commodity turns up in the archaeological finds less frequently in the 13th century than previously, this can be attributed to Western aggression in the Baltic; however, if it turns up more frequently, then this means that merchants refused to be affected by the aggressive policies of Western rulers.9

A fascinating aspect of this now virtually abandoned school of thought is how it was perfected to the level of absolute absurdity in the period from about 1940 to the end of the 1960s in the works not of Russian authors, but historians from the countries conquered by or dependent upon the Soviet Union. Its most extreme form can be found in the East German-based Austrian historian Eduard Winter (1896–1982). One of his works includes such chapter headings as ‘The Papacy’s General Attack on Rus’ (Der Generalangriff des Papsttums auf die Rus’) or ‘Rus’ in a Pincer Attack between East and West (Die Rus’ im konzentrischen Angriff von Ost und West). The tract in question describes the plans of the popes, together with another force called ‘feudalism’ but not defined in greater detail, to conquer Rus’. It was in pursuit of this objective, according to Winter, that the popes aimed to establish a papal state in the Baltic and thereby surround Rus’ with aggressive Catholic territories in that region, just as they allegedly tried to do in the Balkans and Poland. The popes were supposedly working in close alliance with the Mongols, whose invasions made it impossible for the Russians to drive the Germans from Livonia. Pagan Lithuania was, so the argument goes, later used as a tool by the popes against Rus’.10

7 Aleksii II (Ridiger), Православие в Эстонии (Moscow, 1999), pp. 6–67.
8 See the bibliography in Natalia A. Kazakova, “Внешняя политика Новгорода в русской и советской историографии,” in NIS 1 (11) (1982), 146–64.
standard of scholarship of such works published in the Soviet Union around the middle of the 20th century led Hans-Heinrich Nolte to sum-up pithily: “A subject without research”.11

Closely linked to the theme of aggression against Rus’ is an approach, which has a number of variants, that sees the wars conducted in the Livonian-Russian borderlands in the 13th century not as local conflicts, but a clash between East and West, finally resulting in the estrangement of the Catholic and Orthodox worlds, as well as representing the origin of a clear and insurmountable antagonism.12 Accordingly, Grand Prince Aleksandr Nevskii had made the right choice for Russia’s future in the 1240s and 1250s by deciding to collaborate with the Mongols, thus allowing the emergence of a confrontation with the Catholic world which guaranteed Russia’s unique cultural and ethnic identity.13 Relations between the Livonian states and Novgorod, Pskov and Polotsk, and particularly between Galicia-Volhynia and Poland, were occasionally also seen as the expression of a universal opposition between the Holy Roman Emperor and the pope, in which Rus’ allegedly played the role of the Staufen dynasty’s ally and counterpoise to the papacy.14

The very opposite view to that of the ‘patriotic’ Russian school of thought is found in the historiographical tradition on the Russian threat to the Christian colonies in Livonia and Finland along with the resistance to that threat. The analysis of events is often appropriated here to argue for the purported ‘Germanness’ of these cultures. In addition, the tradition of legal scholarship within this strand overestimated the formal juridical aspects present in the medieval sources by regarding 13th-century papal bulls and princely correspondence as equivalent to modern legislation. According to this perspective, the areas recently converted to Christianity were then faced, in defence of Western culture, with repelling the ‘savage attack’ from the East; or, to put it more diplomatically, the influence of the Orthodox religion was feared in Livonia and the hope was that Catholicism could be spread east of Lake Peipus. This approach had certain similarities to the pan-Russian school of thought in its presentation of the facts and even in the hypotheses based on them, but differed in the emotional tone of the narrative, value judgements, and, of course, by providing a different answer to the question of who was the aggressor. A crucial role was attributed to the Roman curia in these versions too. As well as encompassing the Baltic German tradition, particular mention should be made of the contribution of the Finnish and Finnish-Swedish historians Jalmari Jaakkola (1885–1964), and Gustav Adolf Donner (1902–40) to this interpretation. Jaakkola argued that there had been a permanent ‘eastern crisis’ in the relations between Rus’ and the West from the end of the 1230s until 1270.15 In Estonia Hendrik Sepp (1888–1943), writing in the period between the two world wars, claimed it had been a tragedy that the expansion led by the Roman curia had not been capable of saving the Finnish peoples east of the Baltic from Russian rule and the consequent Russification that this entailed in the modern era.16

A series of rather more marginal historical approaches were developed roughly along the lines of these overarching schema. The Estonian folklorist Oskar Loorits (1900–61), who had a distinctly hostile attitude towards the West and the Germanic peoples, contrasted what he called the German mission by sword with a peaceful Orthodox mission, which, according to him, was distinguished by its great spiritual force, and also considered the Christianization of

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15 See the overview provided by Jukka Korpela, “‘The Russian Threat Against Finland’ in the Western Sources Before the Peace of Noteborg (1323),” Scandinavian Journal of History 22 (1997), 161–62.
Livonia to be part of the conflict between Rome and Constantinople.\textsuperscript{17} In addition, in a more restricted context, a succession of authors have portrayed the hero of their particular study, whether Bishop Albert of Riga,\textsuperscript{18} the papal legate William of Modena,\textsuperscript{19} Bishop Thomas of Finland\textsuperscript{20} or the Order of the Sword Brothers,\textsuperscript{21} as the instigator and master of events.

This picture of aggression, animosity, and conflict has begun to break down in the historical studies published since the 1980s. One of the pioneers of this development was the German historian of Baltic-German origin Manfred Hellmann (1912–1992).\textsuperscript{22} It is above all Norbert Angermann and his pupils who have made a notable contribution in this direction.\textsuperscript{23} In Russia, recent discussion has focused mainly on the significance of the Battle of the Ice at Lake Peipus (1242). This was triggered to a large extent by the publication, in 1989, of the Russian translation of the book by John Fennell (1918–92) on Rus’ in the 13th century.\textsuperscript{24} Despite the fact that many scholars have not been able to come

\textsuperscript{21} Benninghoven, \textit{Orden}.
to terms with the deheroization of their heroes, historians on both sides of the imaginary medieval frontier have since generally come to take the view that neither the history of Livonia nor that of Novgorod, Pskov or Polotsk can be treated in isolation from its surrounding region and that the internal cohesiveness of these places during this period should not be overestimated.

Almost all the sources for the history of Livonia and Rus’ in the 13th century have been published. It is perhaps inevitable that the quality of the older publications does not generally meet modern standards, but most editions can still be used as long as the research subject lies outside the philological or diplomatic field. A large volume of the documents published by earlier historians has subsequently been reedited, usually with much greater precision in those cases where it was possible to use the original documents and not just early printed editions.

The majority of the charters and letters relating to Livonia were published as part of the series Liv-, Est- und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch started by Friedrich Georg von Bunge (1802–97) in 1853; the material for the 12th to 14th centuries is contained in the first four volumes and the sixth volume. The central place in medieval Livonia’s chronicle writing is held by the Chronicle of Henry of Livonia, written in Latin. Henry of Livonia, the priest thought to be the author of the chronicle, is likely to have come from the area of Magdeburg to Livonia c. 1205. He personally took part in a number of military and mission-

25 See for example the discussion in Древний Псков. Исследования средневекового города, ed. Vasilii D. Beletskii (St Petersburg, 1994), pp. 136–49.
ary expeditions, but his principal occupation was as priest to the Lettgallians in Papendorf, almost 100 km north-east of Riga in what is now modern Latvia. There is still no consensus about why Henry began to write the chronicle c. 1224, completing it in 1227. Its tone at least is distinctly apologetic insofar as it justifies the privileges and merits of the Rigan church as against those of Denmark and other rivals. Although it is based to a large extent on Henry’s own memory of events, the author must certainly also have used charters and other records. Indeed, the chronicle stands out for its precise chronology, generally accepted as reliable, which is based largely on the calculation of Bishop Albert’s years in office. Its oldest surviving manuscript, which was the main source used by Leonid Arbusow Jr (1882–1951) in his reconstruction of the original text, dates from the turn of the 13th and 14th centuries.

The other Livonian chronicle from the 13th century, the older Livonian Rhymed Chronicle written in Middle High German, narrates the history of Livonia up to about 1290 in 12,017 lines. This chronicle emanates from the milieu of the Teutonic Order; it was written by a Teutonic Knight based in Livonia during the last quarter of the 13th century and thus reflects late 13th-century attitudes. Its narrative revolves around the battles with the pagans and the exaltation of military virtue. It was traditionally classified as an example of what is known as a *Tischbuch*, which was read out at the communal meals of the brothers. Recent research suggests, however, that its original purpose might have been to help the Order recruit external troops for crusades, an interpretation which would in turn explain the important role ascribed in the narrative to crusaders who did not belong to the Order. Apart from

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its author’s recollections and the Order’s oral tradition, some of the factual information provided in the chronicle is also based on written sources. It has been suggested based on the fact that the bishops of Dorpat are mentioned in some episodes that the chronicler also drew on the hypothetical ‘Dorpat Annals’. But the Order’s own activity is also described in these sections of the narrative — relating to the military campaigns of 1240 and 1268 — making such an explanation unnecessary, while on the other hand it has not been proven that the ‘Dorpat Annals’ ever existed.

A considerably more complex problem is posed by the tradition of Old Russian narrative sources and their research history. In some cases, the Old Russian chronicles (летописи) are annals continually kept up to date or containing short intervals. These chronicles were sometimes corrected or added to, either when the manuscripts were transcribed or a particular entry was deleted or corrected. In most cases, however, the variants of the летописи that have come down to us are reworked and consolidated versions of several chronicle traditions. The most important Old Russian source for Livonian history in the 13th century is the older recension of the so-called First Novgorod Chronicle. This chronicle is practically contemporary to the events it describes. The first part of the surviving manuscript, with entries up to 1234, was recorded in the second half of the of the 13th century, while the following part dates to c. 1330, with entries up to then and some later additions. The gaps in the manu-

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33 On the research history, see Aleksei A. Gippius, “К характеристike новгородского владычного летописания XII–XIV вв.,” in Великий Новгород в истории средневековой Европы. К 70-летию Валентина Л. Янина, ed. Aleksei A. Gippius et al. (Moscow, 1999), pp. 352–54.
script for the years 1272–99 have been filled in by the younger recension of the chronicle from the 15th century, which transmits the same text as the older one except for a few minor differences. Other 15th-century chronicles also contain the information found in the same tradition with slight changes and additions based on another, no longer known source.\(^{34}\) The main original source of the chronicles was provided by the annals continued by scribes of the archbishop of Novgorod.\(^{35}\) The original text for the years 1226–74 relevant to this study was apparently written by the sacristan Timofei, who famously referred to himself in the chronicle.\(^{36}\) Whereas the style of the Russian chronicles of the 13th century is generally extremely concise—containing only brief reports about events deemed important—Timofei used a series of literary models as the basis for his descriptions. It has been argued that his writing style, which is adorned with a plethora of moralistic epithets, also bears some relation to the conventions used in hagiographic texts.\(^{37}\)

The chronicles of Pskov are extant in manuscripts from the 15th to 18th centuries, but contain only scattered local references dating back to the mid-13th century. Earlier events have been described at a later date based on other sources such as the Novgorod chronicles and hagiographic accounts. A continuous narrative does not begin until 1323, when its main subject is the military clashes with Livonia.\(^{38}\)

A special place in the Russian sources is assumed by two Old Russian vitae, those of Prince Aleksandr Iaroslavich\(^ {39}\) and Prince Dovmont,\(^ {40}\) both of which refer to Livonian history in the 13th century. Aleksandr Iaroslavich’s *vita* was

\(^{34}\) E.g. *Новгородская четвертая летопись*, ed. Fedor I. Pokrovskii et al. (Moscow, 2000) (PSRL 4/1); *Софийская первая летопись старшего извода*, ed. Boris M. Kloss (Moscow, 2000) (PSRL 6/1).


\(^{36}\) NL1, p. 70.


\(^{38}\) For an historiographical overview, see Aleksei V. Valerov, *Новгород и Псков. Очерки политической истории Северо-Западной Руси XI–XIV веков* (St Petersburg, 2004), pp. 62–88.


\(^{40}\) PL 1, pp. 1–5; PL 2, pp. 16–18, 83–87.
originally compiled soon after his death in 1263, either in the 1280s\textsuperscript{41} or perhaps even as early as the 1260s.\textsuperscript{42} Given that the narrative is closely related to the literary tradition of south-western Rus', the composition of the text has been linked to the immediate circle of Metropolitan Kirill (d. 1281), who was originally from Galicia-Volhynia and spent long periods in Vladimir, in northeastern Rus', in the 1260s and 1270s. The text of the \textit{vita} known to us today is also likely to contain traces of the Novgorod tradition.\textsuperscript{43} Aleksandr Iaroslavich's \textit{vita} was already known in Pskov at the end of the 13th century, attaining some popularity there, and was used as a model in the writing of a similar regional \textit{vita}, that of Prince Dovmont of Pskov in the second quarter of the 14th century.\textsuperscript{44}

The focus of this study is the 13th century. In this case it is a 'long' 13th century, however, since the period under consideration stretches from the 1180s to the 1320s and the portrayal of Rus' in the Livonian sources is examined up to the middle of the 14th century. The book's structure is determined by the course of historical events, on the one hand, providing it with its chronological layout, while an analysis of the different historiographical traditions also provides certain points of intersection. Most of the historical scholarship in this field takes the view, as discussed above, that there was a divide and ideological antagonism between the Eastern and Western worlds, regardless of whether this is seen as the prerequisite for, or result of, events in the 13th century. This study sets out to examine whether such antagonism did in fact exist, by what mechanisms it arose, and how—to the extent that it did exist—it manifested itself and was used at the time. The work follows the sequence of recorded events while also comparing the source texts, allowing not just the event itself but also the intention of the relevant source to be analysed.

From the end of the 12th century onwards the centres of political power in the various Scandinavian and north German territories gradually began to bring the area known by consensus as 'Livonia' in the historiography under their sovereignty. This entailed simultaneously both contact and conflict with

\textsuperscript{41} Begunov, \textit{Памятник}, pp. 57–61. See also Lur’e, \textit{Россия}, pp. 105–08.


Rus’, which itself sought control over some of these lands. Livonia was considered by the Catholics as a land settled by ‘pagan tribes’; Rus’, while Christian, was regarded as a schismatic nation. The campaigns against the pagans were seen as crusades in West European culture and society. The question is whether this crusade ideology was also extended to the military clashes with Rus’, and if so, in what cases. A further issue is how the neighbouring Russian rulers actually responded to the crusades in the Baltic lands.

What powers in Catholic Europe might have been interested in a conflict with Rus’ and what means did they have of manipulating this conflict? Can the political situation be described as an opposition between different religious confessions or, to put it another way, was politics determined by a conflict between different confessions? Before discussing the possibility of a crusade against Rus’ in Livonia, however, it must first be shown that the conditions necessary for a military conflict between Catholic Europe and Rus’ were present. In the 12th and 13th centuries the criteria for a crusade were designed and formulated within a complex system of rules and practices. From the perspective of Livonian history, it must be asked whether it was possible to adapt these legal criteria, ceremonies, and language to the wars against Rus’ and whether there is any evidence of this in the sources.

This study thus has certain points of contact with the study of images and the way in which foreign lands and peoples are imagined and the ‘Other’ is constructed. However, it should be noted that an investigation solely of the ‘image’ of an adjoining region runs the risk of confining itself to generalizations with little concrete substance and which tend to express the historian’s idealized vision rather than the situation as it was in the past. The sources, which are primarily of a political nature, indeed provide no more than fragmentary glimpses of the image held of the neighbouring region. Moreover, it must be remembered that these fragments were recorded in the context of specific disputes: they often do not provide evidence of widely held views, but rather express isolated polemical attitudes. Consequently, when scholars attempt to understand the reasons for what they see as an outsider’s supposedly distorted idea of their country during some period in history, in this case in the Middle Ages, there is always the risk of self-projection in which the scholars see themselves as the victims of an unfair image. The aim of examining the expressions found in the sources in the context of contemporary political relationships is to make it possible to be more precise when looking at descriptions of, or references to, neighbouring peoples. This is because the sources drawn upon to investigate the image of the other are at the same time, and indeed primarily, sources on contemporary politics. It must also be taken into account that the ‘crusading literature’ that originated in north-eastern Europe in the 12th and
13th centuries used language and interpretive frameworks already available from the traditions of Latin written culture. ‘A new world’ was thus put ‘into old words’, also with the aim of making it intelligible to readers in ‘Old Europe’.

The ethnonyms used in this work, such as ‘Estonians’, ‘Germans’, ‘Russians’ etc., do not designate the modern nations, but ethnic and political groups, just as they do in the sources, and for that reason they are inevitably just as vague and generalizing. Indeed, the same applies to the term ‘pagans’, which in some contemporary sources refers to a political rather than a religious community (see p. 72). Choosing the terms to describe the different political interest groups is not without its complications. ‘Livonia’ as used here refers not to the area of settlement of the Livs, but to the whole of Livonia, which generally coincided from the 14th to 16th centuries with the territories of the modern republics of Estonia and Latvia. As regards the 13th century, however, it was only during the process of the different conquests and alliances that the territory of medieval Livonia eventually came to be defined. Consequently, for this earlier period ‘Livonia’ refers to that part of the future medieval territory of Livonia which had already been conquered or brought under control by the Catholic powers, with the result that the geographical area covered by the term shifts over the chronological period covered in this work and comes to designate a larger territory at the end than at the beginning.

Livonia at the end of the 12th century initially meant no more than the area in which Bishop Meinhard was active. The success of the crusaders, the bishop’s vassals, and the Sword Brothers who set out from the city of Riga, just founded in 1201, led to the defeat of the Livs by 1207 and of the principality of Kokenhusen shortly afterwards. The Order entered into an alliance in 1208 with the Lettgallians of Tolowa, while in 1209 the prince of Gerzike was obliged to become a vassal of the bishop of Riga. The conquest of the south-east of the country began in 1208 and was completed by 1216. The Rigans were suddenly pushed back by the Estonians, but then went on to complete the subjection of mainland Estonia, following a major uprising by the Estonians in 1224, along with the Danes, who were involved in military operations in Estonia continually from 1219 onwards. Ösel was defeated in 1227, although several rebellions took place there later. Driven by the threat of famine, the Curonians surrendered to the papal vice-legate Baldwin in 1230–31. The Livonian army was

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defeated at the Battle of Saule in 1236 by the Lithuanians and the Semgallians. As a consequence, in the 1240s it was necessary to defeat the Curonians again and sometime later the Selonians and the Semgallians were also conquered. The crusaders suffered a further defeat at the Battle of Durben in 1260, but the Curonians and Semgallians were finally conquered by 1290. These, very roughly, were the main phases in the military conquest of Livonia by the crusaders.

In the 13th and 14th centuries Livonia consisted of a conglomerate of independent powers. These were the Rigan church and its bishops and, later on, archbishops, other Livonian bishoprics, the Danish king and his representatives in northern Estonia, the Order of the Sword Brothers (until 1237), the Teutonic Order and, in the early part of this period, indigenous rulers too. These protagonists were later joined by the Livonian trading towns, which originated in the 13th century. It was therefore the exception rather than the rule for the different Livonian forces to work together. On the other hand, a number of Russian and Livonian powers did have common interests and would occasionally form alliances in pursuit of these. The question must even be raised as to what extent Livonia and Rus’ actually represented distinct societies and cultures during the early 13th century, confronting each other as internally cohesive entities.46

The entity known as Rus’ essentially comprised the lands ruled by the members of the Riurikid dynasty. This house of Scandinavian origin established its rule in the vast area along the rivers from the Baltic to the Black Sea during the 9th and 10th centuries. The head of the princely family resided in Kiev, where Prince Vladimir Sviatoslavich (d. 1015) adopted Christianity from Byzantium in 988. Even though the Riurikid princes still ruled Rus’, the realm gathered around this dynasty had long ceased to form a political unity in the 13th century. The grand princes of Kiev had forfeited their central position and had been replaced by new regional centres and dynasties by the 12th century. Although all these dynasties descended from the house of Riurik, they fought among themselves

for dominance. The areas controlled by these centres were themselves sometimes split up into smaller, more or less dependent principalities governed by the younger members of the princely line. Rulership in the Russian principalities was generally based on two models: either governing power was handed down, according to age, from the elder brother to the younger or from father to son (Suzdal), or the local town had the main role, appointing the prince, whose power was limited (Novgorod).

The social structure and the ways in which decisions were reached internally in many of the Russian principalities during the High Middle Ages remains largely hypothetical, however. The number of written sources is often very limited or indeed lacking in the case of several territories. Apart from the princes themselves, the aristocracy (boyars) played an important role and also controlled the towns. Towns with communal government or institutions were unknown in Russia; merchants and craftsmen generally remained dependent on the nobility even when they were personally free. Even where the "Veche", the meeting of free town inhabitants, played the decisive role in Novgorod and elsewhere, these towns still cannot be considered communes in the Western European sense since they did not include a legal definition of the citizenry or communal legislation.

As Kiev lost its former importance, Chernigov und Volhynia came to prominence in western Rus’. The princes of Volhynia were the rivals of the other Russian princely houses, as well as of the Polish and Hungarian rulers. They succeeded in subjugating another western principality, Galicia, c. 1200. However, due to internal conflicts and external claimants to the princely throne, the power of the Volhynian house became consolidated only by the middle of the 13th century, by which time it was in a position to play the role of mightiest Russian principality in the west. Chernigov for its part was the main centre east of the Dniepr. Despite its fragmentation into smaller semi-independent principalities in the 12th century, the princes of Chernigov managed effectively to control the area and participate in dynastic struggles in Russia until the Mongol conquest.

The region from which the rivers Dniepr, Volga, and Daugava originate was in turn the location of the principality of Smolensk. The independence of its princely line was established by the middle of the 12th century, when Smolensk became one of the main economic and cultural centres of Rus’. During its heyday from the 1160s to the 1230s Smolensk and its princes were able to influence actively the political developments in Rus’ and partly to control the smaller neighbouring principalities.

By far the most powerful rulers in northern Rus’ in the 12th and 13th centuries, however, were the grand princes of Vladimir, of the Rostov-Suzdal dynasty.
This area began to emerge as one of the core territories of Rus’ at this time. At first Suzdal and then from the 1150s onwards, Vladimir, were the residences of princes, developing into prominent towns of commerce and crafts. Vsevolod Iur’evich ‘Big Nest’ (‘Bolshoe Gnezdo’, 1177–1212) became the permanent holder of the title of grand prince of Vladimir. As a territory that had been recently colonized, the area lacked a well-established nobility with the result that princely power had fewer limitations than elsewhere in Rus’.

By contrast, Novgorod in the north-west had a different social and political structure. Novgorod was already a large town in the Viking Age, collecting tribute—mainly furs—from the extensive forests in the north and north-east. The town community was dominated by aristocratic landowners (boyars), but could express its political will in the Veche which elected the leaders of the town community, the posadnik and tysiatskii. In the 12th and 13th centuries the posadnik was elected from among boyars for an unspecified time period, and acted as mayor of the city. Commoners were represented by the tysiatskii who originally commanded the militia, but was now mainly involved in the organisation of trade, as well as in commercial adjudication and taxation. From the 1150s onwards the archbishop of Novgorod ceased to be appointed by the metropolitan of Kiev but was elected from the local clergy. The archbishop was not only the leader of the church but also the highest political representative of the community. The community invited the prince to lead the army and administer justice. However, if there was a conflict between the community and the prince, the former could expel the latter. This accounts for the sometimes extremely frequent changes of prince in the town.

To the west of Novgorod was the small territory of Pskov, which still managed to play a key role in Livonia’s history. It consisted of a rather narrow land strip along the eastern coast of Narva River and Lake Peipus, and the Velikaya River basin in the south. Water bodies and poorly settled areas formed a division between Pskov and the Livonian lands. However, it was the main, more than 300 kilometers long frontier of medieval Livonia against Rus’ where several border conflicts occurred, especially during the 14th–15th centuries. The governmental system of Pskov was similar to that of Novgorod.

To the west of Smolensk between the Daugava and the Dniepr rivers lay the region of Polotsk-Vitebsk. Polotsk emerged as a centre of Scandinavian chieftains where in the late 10th century a branch of the Riurikid family secured its rule. After its cultural and economival heyday in the second half of the 11th century, Polotsk split into smaller principalities by the end of the 12th century. A significant role among them played Vitebsk (see p. 78). The principalities of Ryazan and Pereiaslav bordered on the steppes in the south-east. Despite the fact that in this work the term Rus’ is used to refer to the entire eastern Slavonic
world from Halych to Vladimir and from Novgorod to Ryazan, far from con-
stituting a political unity, this area was extremely heterogeneous in political,
ethnic, and even religious terms throughout this period.

From 1236 to 1242 Rus’ was conquered by the Mongols, apart from Novgorod,
Pskov, Smolensk, and Polotsk. Novgorod and Smolensk were forced to pay the
Mongols tribute sometime later but only for a short time and as the very conse-
quence of the policies of the Russian princes. During the 1250s a relationship of
interdependency between the Russian princes and their Mongol rulers devel-
oped in which particular importance was assumed by the rivalry between the
Russian princes to secure the title of grand prince of Vladimir and to obtain the
accompanying patent from the Khan, the iarlyk. The princes of north-eastern
Rus’ (Suzdal and Pereiaslav, and later Moscow) and Tver (principality detached
from Pereiaslav in the 1240s) competed for this honour. In western Rus’ the
influence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania spread quickly from the second half
of the 13th century. The pagan dynasty of Lithuania began to control politically
a conglomerate of Rus’ lands which simultaneously preserved some degree of
autonomy and often also the local rule of its traditional Riurikid princely fam-
ily. Thus various branches of the Russian ruling house, various princes, and
various centres of power fought in defence of their own interests. The histo-
riographical tradition that regards the formation of a central power stretch-
ing across this area as a strength and an objective pursued by the historical
development of Rus’ did not emerge until much later on. Although the region
belonged together by virtue of historical tradition, ecclesiastical organization,
literary language, and culture, almost exactly the same can be said of Catholic
Europe and it did not develop into a single unitary state. Even the dialects of
Old Russian reveal quite major differences, much greater than the written
variants.47

Rus’, Livonia, and Catholic Europe were thus anything but unified entities in
the 13th century. This aspect has far too often been neglected in historical stud-
ies to date. The aim of this work, in contrast, is to investigate these questions,
above all based on the relationships between local and regional powers. It was
these specific relationships that ultimately shaped the relations between Latin
Europe as a whole and Rus’ as a whole, and between Catholicism and Russian
Orthodoxy, not vice versa. It thus transpires that the decisive roles were played
not by the popes, emperors, or other individuals at the top of the hierarchy in
faraway countries, but by the people taking decisions locally and able to take
account of local requirements and conditions. This is not to say that Livonia

47 See Andrej A. Zalizniak, Древненовгородский диалект (Moscow, 1995) (Язык.
Семиотика. Культура), pp. 3–5.
and its closest neighbours in Rus’ can be dealt with completely in isolation from wider European developments. During certain periods Livonian politics was linked to a greater or lesser extent with the areas to the north and south of it, with western Rus’, Poland, and Prussia, not to mention influenced by relations between the Finnish and Swedish regions and Novgorod. At least this should be assumed as a starting point. In investigating these actual links and those taken for granted in the historiography, and parallel developments, this work will also have to touch upon, without going into detail, specific issues in the history of south-western Rus’ and Karelia, particularly as they relate to the period from the 1230s to the 1250s. It is nevertheless hoped that these occasional and unavoidable digressions will not detract from the main thrust of the narrative: the relations between the different powers on the ground.
CHAPTER 1

The Religious Frontier in Eastern Europe in the Twelfth Century

1.1 The Schism and the Russian Church

Two different Christian confessions faced one another in the conflicts that took place in and over Livonia in the 13th century: the Roman Catholic church of the crusaders, vassals, merchants, and ecclesiastics who had come from the West, and the Russian Orthodox church. According to the conventional view, the division between the Latin and Greek churches was the result of the mutual excommunication each imposed on the other’s hierarchy in 1054. It is precisely in this acrimonious context, it is argued, that the history of the Baltic region in the 12th and 13th centuries must be seen. The flagship date of 1054 is one of those, however, that did not actually acquire its symbolic significance as a historical turning point until much later, namely in the 19th century. The doctrinal and liturgical differences between the Eastern and Western churches together with the accusations of heresy on both sides were already present earlier on in the Middle Ages. Yet these differences were not in any case what caused the split: the reasons behind the schism and how it became entrenched were mainly political in nature. Nor was there any indication in the mid-11th century that the rift would be lasting. The church of Rome never gave up its aim of bringing the Greeks under papal authority. While the crusades served to intensify contact between the different Christian communities, the ensuing political conflict was dressed in religious tones. As far as the deterioration in the relations between the Eastern and the Western churches is concerned, the turning point is seen as the Second Crusade (1147–54), which ended to the West’s disadvantage. Perhaps it became more difficult to consider one another as fellow Christians just at the moment when Byzantium made peace with the Seljuks, who had, after all, defeated the crusaders, and just when the Catholic king Roger II of Sicily (1105–54) fought alongside Muslim Egypt against Byzantium. Any chance of reconciliation was thwarted once and for all when Constantinople was conquered in 1204 during the Fourth Crusade. This was when the difference in faith undoubtedly became the symbol of political conflict. Even though most of the Greek clergy continued in their positions after the foundation of the Latin Empire, they did not accept the election of a Latin patriarch of Constantinople, Thomas Morosini (elected 1204), after the
death of the previous patriarch John Kamateros in 1206. The bishops who fled to Nicaea elected the Orthodox patriarch Michael Autoreianos (1208–14) in 1208, who was also recognized by the Russian church. Rome’s attempts to overcome the split and bring the Greek ‘schismatics’ under its authority continued unabated: the curia in any case considered that the Greek church was already subject to the Roman obedience as a result of the events of 1204.1 According to Georgij Avvakumov, what was at issue in the 12th and 13th centuries was an ambivalence on the part of Catholic theologians even to recognize the Eastern church as a Christian one combined with “Rome’s political practice of ‘tolerant non-recognition’”.2

The relations between Rome and Constantinople and/or Nicaea were in turn reflected in the relations between the Latin church and the regional Orthodox churches. Political causes can be identified even in the conclusion and collapse of ecclesiastical unions with some of these churches. The relevant treaties were not even agreed with the spiritual, but with the secular rulers. Thus in 1204 Innocent III sent a royal crown to the Bulgarian ruler Kaloyan (1197–1207) and Honorius III sent one to the Serbian ruler Stefan Nemanjić (d. 1228) instead of discussing the union with the relevant church hierarchies. Both of these ecclesiastical ‘unions’ fell apart extremely quickly, however; in the case of the Serbs, almost immediately.3

Just as in the history of the Byzantine mother church, there is no consensus in the history of the Russian Orthodox church about when the schism began to take effect and become an important factor in those areas of eastern Europe where the different faiths came into contact. It has been argued the Latin faithful were considered schismatics by Rus’ as early as the 11th and 12th centuries.4 Yet there are counter-examples suggesting the opposite. There are episodes in Old Russian literature in which the Russians (i.e. the Orthodox) and the Latins form a common front against the pagans.5 The author of the original text of the

Old Russian Hypatian Chronicle, who came from western Rus', clearly regarded the German emperor and those of his men who fell in the Third Crusade as holy martyrs who had fought in the name of the Lord, for their corpses were taken from their graves by an angel on the third day. On the other hand, the very same chronicle for the same period relates how the armies of Catholic Hungary, described as the opponents of Christian nations, desecrated the Orthodox churches of Galicia. Attitudes depended very much on individual circumstances: there were no rigid ideological positions.

When the Kievan prince Vladimir Sviatoslavich (d. 1015) adopted Christianity from Byzantium in 988, by no means the entire region under his dominion was baptized. The Christianization of Rus' took several centuries and was still far from complete in the 13th century. A number of pagan tribes also inhabited the lands ruled by Russian princes. Pagan shrines existed side by side with Christian churches even as late as the 13th century, not only in the non-Slavonic periphery, but also in many purely Russian areas. Not until after the Mongol invasions was the word крестьяне introduced, meaning 'people of Christ', to describe the Russian villagers. To grasp the schism and its doctrinal causes and fundamentals ordinary people would need a reasonable knowledge of Christianity and a basic level of education. But, with the exception of the clergy, this could hardly be expected of a population at Europe's periphery, where there were still few Christian institutions, and given such slow and haphazard internal Christianization. It follows therefore that any anti-Roman polemical literature produced by the Russian church was not of local origin. Such literature borrows from Byzantine models and was propagated in Rus' by the Kievan metropolitans of Greek origin and by the clergy in their entourage. In the 13th century this type of literature virtually disappeared from the Old Russian tradition altogether, coinciding as it did with the continuing decline.

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7 Ипатьевская летопись, p. 665.

in ecclesiastical relations between Byzantium and Rus'. The attempts of the Greek ecclesiastical hierarchy to incite ill-feeling towards the Catholics in Rus' as well clearly did not find a receptive audience in the 11th and 12th centuries. The sources drawn upon in the historiography to illustrate an attitude of intolerance can also occasionally be interpreted in a different way. Moreover, it must be questioned to what extent the medieval legal codes often cited as evidence of hostility actually reflect everyday life in the first place. For example, the extended version of the Old Russian ‘Church Statute of Iaroslav’ (Устав князя Ярослава о церковных судах) from the turn of the 12th and 13th centuries forbids, under threat of punishment, eating and drinking with non-Christians and those of other faiths or with foreigners. Such decrees originated in early Christian literature. It is not clear whether the Russian clerics who worked on their redaction understood those of other faiths and non-Christians to include other Christians as well or just Muslims and pagans. Feodosii (d. 1074), one of the founders of the Kiev Pechersk Lavra (Monastery of the Caves), described
the horrible deeds of Latin believers in his epistle to Prince Iziaslav Iaroslavich (d. 1078). They

do not hold the right beliefs and do not live purely: they eat with cats and
dogs, drink their own piss, eat turtles and wild horses and donkeys and
anything that has been strangled, and carrion and bear flesh and beavers
and beaver tail in Lent.

Yet even this epistle, although hardly likely to have had a significant influ-
ence on contemporaries, was motivated by political concerns, namely Prince
Iziaslav’s use, in 1069, of Polish forces to help defeat his opponents in Kiev.\(^{13}\) Moreover, writings hostile to Catholicism focused less on doctrinal differences
than differences in custom.

The proposition that the reality of the religious frontier should not be exag-
gerated is also supported by the fact that the Russian church celebrated saints
and feast days either not recognized by Byzantium or even initially viewed with
hostility. An example of this was the Feast of the Translation of the Relics of
St Nicholas on 9 May. This reliquary was brought from Myra (modern Demre,
Turkey), which had been plundered by the Seljuks, to Bari in southern Italy in
1087. Since, as far as the Greeks were concerned, this meant that the relics had
been stolen, there is no way in which the Russian church could possibly have
adopted this feast day from Byzantium.\(^{14}\)

If it can be argued that it took centuries for the schism to become part of
the general consciousness even in the countries of the Mediterranean, this
must surely apply even more so as regards its impact on religious differences
and their perception in north-eastern Europe. Northern Europe as a whole was
still a politically and culturally integrated area in the 11th century, regardless
of religious denomination. Nor did the contacts established through dynastic
relations and trade break down after the mid-11th century when the schism
occurred. Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that there was even
a mission from Byzantium and Rus’ to Sweden, specifically Uppland, in the

\(^{13}\) Igor P. Eremin, “Литературное наследие Феодосия Печерского,” in Труды Отдела
dревне-русской литературы Института литературы АН СССР 5 (1947), 159–62,
quoted from p. 170–71. The letter’s date and authorship are far from settled; it has also been
suggested that its author is actually a 12th-century monk known as Feodosii the Greek. See
Viktor Aleksandrov, “То же и с латины: Запрет браков с католиками у православных
славян в средние века,” Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 47 (2002),
102–03. Feodosii’s anti-Catholic accusations belong within the Greek tradition. Iziaslav’s
mother was Swedish and his wife of Polish descent.

\(^{14}\) Shchapov, Государство, p. 172.
11th century. The archaeological finds of artefacts with Byzantine influences would seem to point not so much to a mission from Byzantium to Sweden, however, than to the high regard in which Byzantium was held in Scandinavian society and the symbolic value of objects from its material culture. In other words, people who otherwise observed Catholic rituals saw nothing contradictory in using objects from the cultural sphere of the Eastern church.

The Varangians and their successors for their part transmitted what might be loosely termed ‘Catholic’ influence to Rus’, above all in the nearby Novgorod area. There was still a certain ‘common denominator’ between Scandinavian and Old Russian ecclesiastical culture in the 12th century. Its most striking example was the cult of a Catholic saint in Novgorod, that of the Norwegian king Olaf the Holy (d. 1030). Many of the miracles worked by the saint took place in Rus’ according to his vita. It is noteworthy that most of these miraculous deeds affected Novgorod’s native population. A spiritual text written in Rus’ sometime in the middle of the 12th century mentions a whole series of martyrs and saints from the Roman Catholic world, mostly Scandinavians such as Magnus Erlendsson (d. 1115), Knud the Holy and his brother Benedict (d. 1086), Alban (3rd century), Olaf, and Botulf (d. 680). Scandinavia’s...
influence (and its rivalry) may also be discerned in the fact that from 1148 at
the latest some Orthodox bishops of Novgorod occasionally used the title of
archbishop, unusual in Rus', and which even became obligatory for the leaders
of the Novgorod church from the second third of the 13th century.\footnote{20}

In the middle of the 12th century Bishop Nifont of Novgorod (1131–56), along
with other Orthodox ecclesiastics, replied to a number of questions posed by
the Novgorod deacon Kirik. These answers reflect religious practices and throw
light on everyday life in the Novgorod church at the time. In response to the
question about what ought to be done when someone baptized in the Latin
faith wanted to come “to us” (к намь) comes the reply that one should treat
the ‘church changer’ in the same way as a neophyte: he must be rubbed with
ointment, but rebaptism was not required.\footnote{21} There had been cases in Novgorod
in which parents had taken their children to a “priest from Scandinavia”
(к варяжкомоу попоу). This was punished by a six-week penance usually in
the form of a fast.\footnote{22}

The supposed displeasure felt by Novgorodians towards Catholicism is
recounted by the Russian archaeologist and historian Elena Rybina, citing the
legend of the construction of a Catholic church in Novgorod. The city’s posad-
nik, Dobrynia, was miraculously punished when he gave the Latins permission
to build their own church (ponama)—despite opposition from the bishop and
the people—and, to make room for the site, even had the Orthodox Church
of John the Baptist moved elsewhere: a gust of wind threw him from his boat,
causing him to drown in the river Volkhov. The story is full of rhetoric against
the Latins and their culture. Yet even if part of the pro-Moscow text from

\footnote{Историко-филологические очерки (Moscow, 2002) (Studia philologica), pp. 115–31.
A different view is put forward by Herman Kølln, “Zur Allerheiligenlitanei im altrus-
sischen Dreifaltigkeitsgebet,” Scando-Slavica 42 (1996), 77–89.

\footnote{20} Шchapov, Государство, pp. 62–69. The view held by some scholars that the title of arch-
bishop was introduced in Novgorod in 1165 is erroneous.

\footnote{21} Памятники древне-русского канонического права, part 1 (памятники XI–XV в.), 2nd ed. (St Petersburg, 1908) (Русская историческая библиотека 6), pp. 26–27, para. 10. See
also Podskalsky, Christentum, pp. 187–91. In the 13th century the Greeks were accused by
the Latins of not recognizing Latin baptism and forcing converts to be baptized again. See
(Paderborn-Munich-Vienna-Zürich, 2000), pp. 235–36, para. 4 (Fourth Lateran Council
of 1215); Anna-Dorothee von den Brincken, Die ‘Nationes christianorum orientalium’ im
Verständnis der lateinischen Historiographie von der Mitte des 12. bis in die zweite Häfte des

\footnote{22} Памятники древне-русского канонического права, p. 60, para. 16.
around the end of the 15th century might reflect events from the 12th century, the difficulties in dating alone make this an unreliable source: the posadnik Dobrynia died in 1117, but the Scandinavian Church of St Olaf in Novgorod is supposed to have been built much earlier, before the 12th century, while the foundation of the German trading enclave in Novgorod has been dated much later to 1192.23

Many historians have therefore drawn attention to the intense rivalry between the Catholic and Orthodox churches in the 12th century, which is also said to manifest itself in political developments or even the language found in the sources.24 However, the material available does not allow us to draw this conclusion with absolute certainty.25 While there is indeed much to suggest that the once integrated Scandinavian and Russian world was breaking up at the end of the 12th century, there is no reason to see such disintegration as tantamount to the erection of cultural or political barriers. On the contrary, the absence of a clear distinction between the Catholic and the Orthodox worlds would be a more accurate description of the Baltic region at the end of the 12th century. Some ecclesiastical texts might have been antagonistic, but their effect on society, on everyday behaviour and attitudes, and on the political course of events was evidently extremely slight.26

23 Rybina, Торговля, pp. 168–73 and 331–37; Anna L. Choroschkiewitsch, “Nowgorodisch-
warägische Beziehungen der ersten Hälfte des 11. Jahrhunderts nach Angaben von rus-


1.2 Relations between the Russian Principalities and their Western Neighbours

The key players in the Baltic crusades came principally from northern Germany and Scandinavia and probably knew little of Rus’. They would likely have formed their own idea of it as they made their way along the eastern Baltic coast. Rus’ was generally seen as a distant, strange, unknown, and unruly land in contemporary German literature.\(^{27}\) *Ruthenia* was a common term used for Rus’ in European geography,\(^{28}\) although the word could equally stand for the entire eastern Baltic coast or a much larger area. When the English chronicler Matthew Paris (d. 1259) told of the death of King Valdemar II of Denmark (1241), he added that the king had conquered *Frisia et Ruscia*, where he had founded six or seven bishoprics.\(^{29}\) The name of the island of Rügen must have also caused confusion. At the time it was under Danish sovereignty and the terms *Russia* and *Rugia* were used interchangeably for both territories.\(^{30}\)


\(^{29}\) Matthaei Parisiensis, *monachi sancti Albani, Chronicà majora*, ed. Henry R. Luard, vols. 1–7 (London, 1872–1883) (Rerum Britannicarum mediii aevi scriptores or Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages [57/1–7]), here vol. 5, p. 193; cf. vol. 4, pp. 92–93, 109. For Matthew, the regions of *Frisia*, *Sithia*, and *Gothia* lay somewhere in eastern Europe. He relates that the Mongol threat meant that no one from *Gothia* and *Frisia* appeared in Yarmouth in 1238 to buy herring (*Matthaei Chronica*, vol. 3, p. 488). Cf. Vernadsky, *Mongols*, pp. 53–54, who identified these lands with Novgorod. ‘Frisians’ in Matthew could also be a general description for the merchants trading eastern goods in the north; cf. for example *HCL* XIV, 3, p. 74. Valdemar’s power also extended to Frisia. Six or seven fits in rather well the number of Livonian bishoprics.

Europe, particularly Rus', played an important role in Old Norse literature.\textsuperscript{31} The issue of religious differences seems to have been completely secondary in these texts. For example, the 12th-century chronicle of Magdeburg in its account of the crusade against the Wends in 1147 relates that, in addition to Polish fighters, the Russians—"although less Catholic, still Christian men"—had also taken up arms against the pagan Old Prussians.\textsuperscript{32}

The Holstein-based chronicler Helmold of Bosau (d. after 1177) speculated that it had been the Greeks who had converted the Russians to Christianity based on the fact that Rus' was not far from Greece.\textsuperscript{33} Chroniclers also believed that the western European and Russian nobility had common ancestors.\textsuperscript{34} When in 1193 King Philip II Augustus of France (1180–1223) married Ingeborg (d. c. 1237), the daughter of King Valdemar I of Denmark (d. 1182), only to demand a divorce after a few months, the marriage was defended by William (d. 1203), the French abbot of the Danish monastery of Æbelholt. One of his arguments was that Ingeborg’s mother, also the mother of King Knud VI (d. 1202), was of extremely high birth: she was the daughter of a Russian prince and her brothers continued to govern in Rus'.\textsuperscript{35} There are instances of Russian princes mentioned as guests at European courts.\textsuperscript{36} Where central Europe is concerned, it is more likely that they came from Galicia or Kiev. Art historians

\textsuperscript{32} Annales Magdeburgenses, ed. Georg Pertz, in MGH SS, vol. 16 (Hanover, 1859), p. 188: "licet minus catholici tamen christiani nominis karakterem habentes". See also Aleksandr V. Nazarenko, "Западноевропейские источники," in Древняя Русь в свете зарубежных источников, ed. Elena A. Melnikova (Moscow, 1999), p. 390.
\textsuperscript{33} Helmold of Bosau, Slawenchronik, ed. Heinz Stoob (Darmstadt, 1963) (Ausgewählte Quellen zur Deutschen Geschichte des Mittelalters. Freiherr-von-Stein-Gedächtnisausgabe 19), 1.1, pp. 34, 36.
have, moreover, detected a western European influence on Galician art dating from before the Mongol invasions, but also on the art of Vladimir and Suzdal. These were transmitted via Polish, Hungarian, German, and Lombard master builders working in Russian dominions. The Laurentian Chronicle, when praising the local Bishop Ivan, even noted under the year 1194 that a church in Suzdal had been rebuilt exclusively using home-grown labour, without “German” help. There was thus considerable contact in both directions during this period.

The relationship of north-western Rus’ with its northern Catholic neighbours was also portrayed in contradictory terms in the Russian sources. These neighbours included the “nemcy” (немцы). This term did not refer just to ethnic Germans; in Old Russian literature the word can refer to any people of the Roman faith in central and western Europe, although mostly to the Germanic peoples. In the Novgorod Chronicle the term not only refers to the populations of Livonia and Germany in the 13th and 14th centuries, for example, but also to the Swedes in particular. It is unclear to what extent this was a pejorative expression. The Danish historian John Lind has argued that the replacement of the earlier term for Scandinavians, “variagi” (варяги), by немцы should be seen as an expression of religious hostility. It is true that the Varangians are mentioned by name for the last time in the First Novgorod Chronicle at the


beginning of the 13th century; but the “Germans” are mentioned in connection with military clashes in Livonia and then for the first time in Novgorod in 1232 as grain merchants. The word немцы is used to designate the Swedes from the end of the 13th century. In relation to events outside of Novgorod’s immediate vicinity, use is also made of the term “Latin” (латиняне). On the other hand, it has also been argued that the terminology of the Novgorod Chronicle was, overall, far from derogatory towards Germans and Western nations during the early 13th century. According to the American scholar Thomas Noonan (1938–2001), the word ‘Christian’ in the Russian sources is a synonym for ‘Russian’, the latter being used in contrast to foreigners. As far as animosity towards Catholics is concerned, however, his evidence is not entirely convincing. The material actually draws an opposition between Christian Russians and pagans (e.g. Lithuanians and Mongols) or even describes the “spilling of Christian blood” among the Russians themselves.

Scholars have repeatedly drawn attention to Novgorod’s buoyant cultural relations with the West at the end of the 12th century, which allegedly became weaker later on or were broken off following the propagation of anti-Rus’
crusading ideology in the Baltic region.\footnote{Duczko, “Byzantine Presence,” p. 297; Dietrich Wörn, “Die politischen und kulturellen Beziehungen Rußlands zum Westen im ausgehenden 12. und beginnenden 13. Jahrhundert und ihre Bedeutung für die Kulturentwicklung des vormongolischen Rußlands,” in \textit{Slavistische Studien zum IX. internationalen Slavistenkongress in Kiew 1983}, ed. Reinhold Olesch (Cologne-Vienna, 1983) (Slavistische Forschungen 40), pp. 647–48.} When dating this rift it is assumed that the events of the first half of the 13th century represented a crucial turning point in the emergence of a hostile relationship. This would first have to be demonstrated, however, given that the sources could just as well be interpreted in the opposite sense. For example, in the account of the conquest of Constantinople by the crusaders, which the Novgorod Chronicle enters under the year 1204, the pope is actually portrayed more as a positive figure, who together with the “German emperor” tried to prevent the pillaging of the city and its holy sites. To blame were the Greeks themselves, who could not agree with one another, and the crusaders’ avaricious military leaders.\footnote{NL1, pp. 46–49. The incorporation of the narrative in the Novgorod Chronicle may have been at the initiative Archbishop Antonii of Novgorod (1210–19, 1225–28), who himself visited Constantinople c. 1200. On the textual history, see Gippius, “К характеристике,” pp. 358–359; cf. Timberlake, “Older and Younger Recensions,” pp. 22–27; Svetlana I. Luchickaia, “Четвертый крестовый поход глазами русского современника,” in \textit{Византийский временник} 65 (2006), 107–25. Antonii wrote a description of Constantinople’s sacred sites, the younger version of which refers to the conquest of the city by the Latins. It has not been established when these references were incorporated into the text since the extant manuscripts date from a later period (16th–18th centuries). The author warns Christians of the importance of unity. See \textit{Книга Паломника. Сказание мест Святых во Цареграде Антония архиепископа Новгородского в 1200 году}, ed. Khrysanf M. Loparev (St Petersburg; 1899) (Православный Палестинский Сборник, 17/3 (51)), pp. 1, 13–15.} Indeed, it is precisely in the Polish tradition that Rus’ is seen as

The main region from which information about Rus’ reached the heart of Europe was not northern Europe, but Galicia and Volhynia. The principal conduits of knowledge of and attitudes towards Rus’ were Poland and Hungary. These adjacent regions formed a common culture in the Middle Ages in political terms.\footnote{Gotthold Rhode, \textit{Die Ostgrenze Polens. Politische Entwicklung, kulturelle Bedeutung und geistige Auswirkung}, vol. 1 (Cologne-Graz, 1955) (Ostmitteleuropa in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart 2), pp. 91, 132–65; Nazarenko, “Русско-немецкие связи”; Martha Font, “Hungaro-Kievan Political Ties and Cultural Relations during the 12th Century,” \textit{Specimina nova dissertationum ex instituto historico universitatis Quinquesecclesiensis}, vol. 12 (1996, 1998), 139–49; Mártá Font, “On the Frontiers of West and East: The Hungarian Kingdom and the Galician Principality between the 11th and 13th Centuries,” \textit{Annual of Medieval Studies at CEU} 6 (2000), 171–80.}
the heterodox enemy. The most important source in this context is the verse epistle sent by Bishop Matthew of Krakow (1143–66) to Bernard of Clairvaux (d. 1153). In the letter he calls the Russians false believers. They were not Catholics but only pretended to honour Christ, and their church had nothing in common with the Latin or the Greek churches nor did it share their sacrament. He is obviously referring here to the Slavonic church service. The epistle also urges the famous abbot to visit Ruthenia, Poland, and Bohemia. It may be the case that the Polish prelate did indeed regard Rus’ as a different, insincere country, but it is also possible to detect a political motive. The letter’s co-author is referred to as comes Petrus, in other words the palatine Piotr Włostowicz (d. c. 1151), who was married to a Russian princess. When he briefly fell into disgrace in 1145, he spent some time in Russian exile. At the same time (1142–43 and 1145), the Polish prince Władysław II (d. 1159) was fighting against his half-brother with support from the army of Grand Prince Vsevolod Olgovich of Kiev (d. 1146). This Russian alliance was cause of widespread dissatisfaction among the Polish clergy and led the archbishop of Gniezno to excommunicate Władysław II in 1146. The latter was defeated and banished, one of the accusations against him being his alliance with the schismatics against the Latins. The letter from Bishop Matthew and Piotr Włostowicz, who were both opposed to Władysław, must therefore be seen in the context of these events in Poland.

The chronicler and bishop of Krakow, Wincenty Kadłubek (d. 1223), described the Polish military campaign of Prince Vladimir Iaroslavich (d. 1199), who had come to power in Galicia in 1187–88, as a succession of profanities, beginning with the rape of virgins and ending with the murder of clerics performing mass at the altar. He was thus offering the reader a standard selection of impious deeds committed by the enemy. Prince Vladimir, however, was

49 Ипатьевская летопись, p. 319.
51 Wincentego zwanego Kadłubkiem Kronika Polska, ed. Marian Plezia (Krakow, 1994) (Pomniki dziejowe Polski, 2nd Series, 11), IV.15, pp. 159–60. Cf. for example Arnoldi abbatis
actually acting in concert with the Hungarian king. Wincenty expressed particularly strong reservations about Prince Roman Mstislavich, who ascended to the Galician throne in 1199 with the help of Leszek the White (d. 1227), prince of Sandomierz and Krakow. Although he was initially described “as the constant helper and quasi carer” of Polish princes, relations deteriorated and in the account of Roman’s death in his 1205 campaign against the Polish princes, Wincenty remarks with irony that this was a belated thanks. In his universal chronicle the Cistercian Alberic de Trois-Fontaines (d. after 1252), in the province of Champagne, in addition described Roman—indeed following a Polish view—sicut falsus christianus: his death had been Saxony’s good fortune, for he had been planning to advance with his army that far.

Just as in Poland, where clerical writers incorporated religious arguments into the political conflict despite the shared ‘political space’ with western Rus’, one comes across two traditions in the Russian sources: the judgmental literary tradition and the everyday one, in which religious differences are not prominent. The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle mentions that Elisabeth of Hungary (1207–31) “dedicated much time to serving God after the death of her husband and was considered a saint”. This patron of the Teutonic Order was canonized in 1235 and her mention in the Russian chronicle shows that the idea that a Catholic could be holy was still not questioned in Galicia in the mid-13th century. News of Elisabeth’s deeds reached western Rus’ precisely

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53 Albrici Chronica, pp. 885, 921. It has been debated whether Roman was allied with the pretenders to the imperial throne and the pope. One of the arguments cited in support are the references to a large donation by Roman to a monastery in Erfurt. See Nazarenko, Русско-немецкие связи, p. 269. Cf. Aleksandr V. Maiorov, “Поход Романа Мстиславича 1205 года: в Саксонию или в Польшу?,” in Вопросы истории 2008, 11, pp. 36–48.

54 Andrei V. Kuzmin, “Образ Польши и поляков в древнерусских источниках (до начала XIV века),” in Kirillin, Древняя Русь и Запад, pp. 88–91.

55 Ипатьевская летопись, p. 723. Elisabeth’s death and canonization are mentioned in a number of Polish sources.
Religious Frontier in Eastern Europe in the Twelfth Century

because she was a native Hungarian and therefore had close dynastic relations with both Polish and west Russian princes.

Another means linking Rus’ with Catholic Europe was through marriage. The branches of the Russian Riurikid ruling house were closely intertwined through dynastic marriage with ruling European families, particularly Poland and Scandinavia, in the 11th and 12th centuries. This was despite the injunction pronounced by the Greek metropolitans of Kiev against matrimonial ties between the different faiths and especially against giving daughters in marriage to husbands of the Latin faith. Such ties were not confined solely to the princely caste but in the borderlands could also be found at other social levels. They were most frequent in the frontier region between Poland and Rus’. At least fifteen marriages between the Riurikid and Piast dynasties are recorded in the period from 1140 to 1305; the rulers of Galicia, Volhynia, and Masovia had particularly close ties. The western Riurikids were also related to Hungary.

A rough estimate calculates that Russian princes married into the dynasties of Catholic Europe five times more often than they did with Byzantine rulers and four times more often than with the ruling families of the nomadic steppe peoples. Duke Swantepolk of Pomerania (d. 1266) was given the sister of Prince Daniil Romanovich in marriage, while Daniil's brother Vasilko married

56 These regulations are based on Greek precedents. See Aleksandrov, "То же и с латины", 101–13.
57 See Fennell, History, pp. 97–101; Nazarenko, Древняя Русь, pp. 559–84; Paszkiewicz, Origin, pp. 101–02. For genealogical tables, see Nicolas de Baumgarten, Généalogies et mariages occidentaux des Rurikides Russes du Xe au XIIIe siècle (Rome; 1927) (Orientalia christiana 9/1 no. 35); Julius Forssman, Die Beziehungen altrussischer Fürstengeschlechter zu Westeuropa. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Ost- und Nordeuropas im Mittelalter (Bern, 1970).
58 Rhode, Ostgrenze, pp. 136–37.
59 Wörn, “Die politischen und kulturellen Beziehungen,” p. 637. The following Polish princes were married to Russian princesses: Bolesław 111 the Wrymouth (d. 1138); Bolesław IV the Curly (d. 1173); Mieszko 111 the Old (d. 1202); Casimir the Just (d. 1194); the son of King Andrew II of Hungary (d. 1235), Andrew (d. 1234), married the daughter of Mstislav Mstislavich the Bold (d. 1228); in 1207 Leszek the White of Krakow and Sandomierz (d. 1227) married the daughter of Ingvar Iaroslavich of Lutsk (d. after 1212); Conrad of Masovia (d. 1247) married c. 1209 the daughter of Sviatoslav Igorevich of Novgorod-Siverskyi (d. c. 1211); Bolesław I of Sandomierz (d. 1248) married c. 1243 the daughter of Aleksandr Vsevolodovich of Belz (d. after 1234); in 1248 Siemowit I of Masovia (d. 1262) married the daughter of Daniil Romanovich of Galicia (d. c. 1264); in 1265 Leszek the Black of Kujawy (d. 1288) married the daughter of the ban of Mačva, Rostislav Mikhailovich (d. 1264). Piast princesses were married to Iaroslav Sviatopolkovich of Volhynia (d. 1123), Volodar Glebovich of Minsk (12th century), Grand Prince Mstislav of Kiev (d. 1170), Vsevolod Sviatoslavich of Chernigov (d. c. 1215), and Iurii Lvovich of Galicia (d. c. 1308).
the daughter of Prince Leszek the White of Krakow and Sandomierz. The wife of Daniil’s son Lev was the daughter of King Béla IV; Daniil’s son Roman was married for a time to the Austrian duchess Gertrude (d. 1288); and Daniil gave his daughter to Duke Siemowit of Masovia (d. 1262) in marriage. Great value was placed on the ruler’s political status when contracting marriage, not surprisingly given that dynastic marriage was, after all, a purely political act. In the 13th and 14th centuries marriages along similar lines were also contracted between the rulers of the pagan Lithuanians and both their Catholic and Orthodox neighbours precisely because these dynastic ties proved to be politically expedient.

Another region that stands out for its dense network of dynastic relations is that formed by northern Rus’ and Scandinavia. In contrast to south-western Rus’, however, the contacts here declined in importance during this period. The apparent cause of this was not the incipient hostility between the faiths but rather the increasingly intense cultural and economic interconnections between northern and central Europe which gradually overshadowed the ties with Rus’. The son of Grand Prince Vladimir Monomakh (d. 1125), Mstislav (Harald, d. 1132), was given the daughter of King Inge of Sweden (d. c. 1100) in marriage, while the daughters born of this marriage were in turn sent to Scandinavia to be married: Malmfred (d. after 1137) became the wife of King Sigurd of Norway (d. 1130) and, when he died, she married King Erik Emune of Denmark (d. 1137); Ingeborg was given in marriage to Erik Emune’s half-brother, Duke Knud Lavard (d. 1131). Their son became King Valdemar I the Great of Denmark, who, according to the Knýtlinga saga (written in the second half of the 13th century), was born in Rus’ and spent his early childhood in Novgorod. He was given his name in honour of his grandfather Vladimir.60 In 1154 Valdemar I himself married the Russian princess Sophia (d. 1198), the daughter of Prince Volodar Glebovich of Minsk.61 Sophia’s mother, the daughter of Duke Bolesław III of Poland, was married three times: first with the murderer of Duke Knud Lavard, Magnus Nielsen (d. 1134), then with Volodar—this marriage was subsequently nullified—and lastly with King Sverker I of Sweden (d. 1155). Such close dynastic relationships, which dated back to the Viking

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Age, broke down in the middle of the 12th century. As is known, the relationship between Valdemar I and Sophia was the last Russian and Scandinavian royal marriage, and its origins lay much more in internal Danish politics than anything else.\textsuperscript{62}

Merchants from Catholic countries also visited Rus’. In the story \textit{Der guote Gêrhart} by Rudolf von Ems from the first half of the 13th century foreign voyages to Rus’, Livonia, Prussia, Damascus, and Nineveh are mentioned as exotic and successful trade journeys.\textsuperscript{63} An important trade route was from Kiev, either via towns in Hungary and Austria, or Krakow and Prague, to Germany, especially Regensburg, one of the most important centres of overland trade with Russian territories. In Kiev there may have been several Latin churches with trading enclaves.\textsuperscript{64}

The trade naturally involved travel by merchants. The often marshy terrain and long distances between settlements made the waterways important. The Viking-Age route ‘from the Varangians to the Greeks’ connected the Baltic Sea, where the island of Gotland was the centre of the transportation and trade networks, with both inland Russian territories and the Black and Caspian Seas along the major rivers of the Neva, Volkhov, Lovat, Daugava, and Dniepr.

In the north the main goods exported by Rus’ were furs (primarily squirrel) and wax. Western imports consisted of cloth, salt, wine, luxury goods, and silver. Local exports from the areas of Estonia and Latvia might also include iron extracted from bog ore and possibly grain too. Changes in the system of trade in this period are indicated by the fact that the number of hoards from the second half of the 12th century is relatively small in this region but starts to grow in the last decades of the century, indicating direct commercial links with Gotland and Westphalia by that time. The active party in this trade, i.e. the person actually travelling, was probably the Western merchant.

Scandinavian-Russian relations in the Baltic during the Viking Age and subsequently\textsuperscript{65} were inherited by the emerging Hanseatic centres of trade thanks to trade with Gotland. As a result of the recent foundation of Lübeck by


\textsuperscript{64} Nazarenko, “Западноевропейские источники,” pp. 378–84; Nazarenko, “Русско-немецкие связи,” p. 274.

\textsuperscript{65} Tatjana N. Jackson, “Novgorod the Great in Baltic Trade before 1300,” \textit{Acta Borealia} 25 (2008), 83–92.
Duke Henry the Lion (d. 1195) in 1159, German merchants obtained the first and for a long time only harbour along the Baltic Sea. According to the chronicle of Helmold of Bosau, when Henry the Lion founded the city he sent ambassadors to the neighbouring towns and countries, including Rus', promising to grant them freedom of trade. He granted the Gotlanders the privilege of free trade with Lübeck in 1161. Trade with the Russians is mentioned in the virtually contemporary privilege, fragments of which have survived in later documents, granted by Henry the Lion to the city of Lübeck. The first treaty between German merchants and Novgorod is also likely to have been concluded under Henry. It has been suggested that the earliest extant treaty between Novgorod and the “Germans, Goths [Gotlanders] and the entire Latin people”, dating from 1191/92, was the natural development of this previous treaty of Henry the Lion and the hypothetical treaty from the early 11th century between the prince of Novgorod and his Varangian entourage. The treaty of 1191/92 was preceded by a conflict between the merchants of Gotland and Novgorod. The Russians responded to the repression of the Novgorodians on Gotland by imposing the first known trade embargo in the Baltic region, prohibiting their merchants from travelling to Gotland. At the same time, the ‘Varangians’ were expelled from the country. The embargo later became a customary means of applying pressure in relations between the Hanseatic League and Novgorod.

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66 Helmold [of Bosau], Slawenchronik, 1.86, p. 304.
68 GVNP, no. 28; NA, p. 81, no. 1. The treaty guarantees mutual freedom of trade and sets out the criminal code applicable to foreigners.
Not only Scandinavia and Lübeck traded with the Russians in the Baltic region. As early as 1165 the archbishop of Cologne, Rainald (d. 1167), granted the town of Medebach in Westphalia—home to a succession of Livonian crusaders—a privilege referring to the trade in Datia uel Rucia. Indeed, Westphalia was the main region, apart from Saxony, whose towns developed increasingly close commercial ties with Russian territories from the 12th century. The region could be reached by ship via the Baltic Sea, connecting it with Novgorod, Pskov, Polotsk, and Smolensk. Scandinavian and German merchants visited trading enclaves or so-called merchants’ churches in some of these towns. These included the ‘churches of the Varangians’ previously mentioned. Archaeological evidence indicates that St Olaf’s Church in the Gotlanders’ enclave in Novgorod had been built mostly by the beginning of the 12th century at the latest; it is already mentioned in the second half of the 11th century in runic inscriptions in Uppland. It may have been founded in the second third of the 11th century when Scandinavian warriors were continuously in the service of the prince of Novgorod. The trading enclave presumably developed out of the church’s location.

At the end of the 12th century, apparently immediately after the treaty of 1192 had been agreed, a second Catholic church together with its trading enclave was built in Novgorod, St Peter’s Church patronised by German merchants. Yet a third foreign church in Novgorod is named in the 1260s. The Gotlanders had sold it and it no longer appears in later sources. Apart

71 DD 1/2, no. 166.
72 The concept of the merchants’ church developed by Paul Johansen is not entirely uncontroversial, however.
73 Elena A. Melnikova, Скандинавские рунические надписи. Новые находки и интерпретации. Тексты, перевод, комментарий (Moscow, 2001) (Древнейшие источники по истории Восточной Европы), pp. 338–39, 485, no. 7.29. The reading is entirely speculative.
from the merchants, there were priests at both of these churches. In Smolensk the Latin Church of St Mary’s, whose ostensible remains have been studied by archaeologists, and the German trading enclave are mentioned in the sources for the first time in 1229. The German trading community had lost the right of ownership to the church by the end of the 14th century for reasons that are obscure. German merchants later built enclaves in Vitebsk and Polotsk as well.\footnote{Leopold K. Goetz, \textit{Deutsch-Russische Handelsgeschichte des Mittelalters} (Lübeck, 1922) (Hansische Geschichtsquellen N.F. 5), pp. 507–08; Rennkamp, \textit{Studien}, pp. 244–45; Nikolai N. Voronin and Pavel A. Rappoport, \textit{Зодчество Смоленска XI–XIII вв.} (Leningrad, 1979), pp. 140–50.}

Commercial relations were certainly not confined just to the Russian regions close to the Baltic. Livonia and Scandinavia took part in trade in the 13th century with areas as far east as Suzdal.\footnote{Paul Johansen, “Novgorod und die Hanse,” in \textit{Städtewesen und Bürgertum als geschichtliche Kräfte. Gedächtnisschrift für Fritz Rörig}, ed. Ahasver von Brandt and Wilhelm Koppe (Lübeck, 1953), p. 133; Limonov, \textit{Владимиро-Суздальская Русь}, pp. 189–91. See also Nazarenko, \textit{Древняя Русь}, p. 616.}

One of the preconditions for the exchange of goods is personal contact, which in turn serves to reinforce that trade. Later on in the period young merchants from the Hanseatic cities spent time living in Rus’ to learn the language.\footnote{Johansen, “Novgorod,” pp. 138–39; Anti Selart, “Тайна купцов, забота дипломатов: русский язык в средневековой Ливонии,” in \textit{Лотмановский сборник} 4 (2014), 48–60.}

Some German and Scandinavian merchants probably moved their permanent residence to one of the Russian towns,\footnote{Valentin Kiparsky, “Wer hat den Handelsvertrag zwischen Smolensk und Riga vom J. 1229 aufgesetzt?” \textit{Neuphilologische Mitteilungen} 61 (1960), 247.} without the difference in religious confession thereby proving an obstacle.


\footnote{Another Latin church is mentioned in Ladoga in 1268. See Denis G. Khrustalev, “O системе готовских дворов в Новгородской земле в XI–XIII вв.,” in Denis G. Khrustalev, \textit{Северные крестоносцы. Русь в борьбе за сферы влияния в Восточной Прибалтике XII–XIII вв.}, vol. 2 (St Petersburg, 2009), pp. 298–304.}
returning from Gotland and Denmark can be found in the Novgorod Chronicle for the year 1130.\textsuperscript{82} Novgorod merchants were arrested or had their goods confiscated in Denmark in 1134.\textsuperscript{83} In 1157, when the Danish heir to the throne, Svend Grathe (d. 1157), conquered Schleswig, he also took possession of the Russian ships and goods docked in the harbour.\textsuperscript{84} In 1204 King Valdemar II of Denmark confirmed Lübeck’s privileges, among which was the privilege of 1188 from Emperor Frederick I granting “the Russians, Goths, Normans, and other eastern peoples” the freedom to visit Lübeck.\textsuperscript{85} In the 1220s Russians and Livs are mentioned among the other eastern nations in Lübeck with the right to trade in the city without paying customs.\textsuperscript{86} In the second half of the 12th century Russian merchants trading in the Baltic built several churches in Novgorod.\textsuperscript{87} It can be concluded from the extensive building work there that the third quarter of the 12th century was a thriving period for Novgorod’s foreign trade. It has been argued that one of the causes of this growth was these legal regulations on trade in the Baltic.\textsuperscript{88} The Russians also had ‘merchants’ churches’ abroad, two presumed to be on Gotland (Novgorod and Polotsk or Smolensk churches?) and one in Sigtuna.\textsuperscript{89}
During the course of the 13th century the independent voyages made by Russians westwards from Gotland became less frequent or even stopped altogether. This decline is also reflected in the treaties with Novgorod agreed during the second half of the 13th century in which, in contrast to earlier periods, only the journeys of Russian merchants as far as Gotland are mentioned. The reasons for this change must be attributed to a structural shift in Baltic trade. In the first place, the cog type of ship had a greater holding capacity than the Novgorod ships thanks to its broad hull and was also more seaworthy. Moreover, the harbour towns that had emerged in Livonia in the meantime were ideal for reloading goods onto smaller ships, carts, and sledges, which could then be transported inland by river or via land routes. The decrease in active Russian trade did not result in a worse balance of trade, however. The changing pattern in transportation simultaneously gave Livonian towns the opportunity to thrive economically and to become stronger politically.90

1.3 The Crusades and the Schismatics

An extremely influential historiographical tradition sees Livonia’s military clashes with Novgorod and Pskov as part of the crusading ‘movement’.91 This movement’s ultimate aim throughout the 13th century was supposedly to convert Russian territory to the Catholic faith or bring it under the control of the Roman obedience, and thereby achieve the union of the churches. Countless historians have considered it legitimate to regard all military operations along Livonia’s borders against the Russians and Lithuanians as crusade or a series of ongoing crusades lasting into the 16th century; in other words, as a war against

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Latin Europe’s neighbours. But what does the term ‘crusade’ mean in the first place? It did not originate in the Middle Ages. The extension of a term traditionally used in historical-writing to describe the military campaigns in the Mediterranean region from the 11th to the 13th centuries to the eastern Baltic is in fact a relatively recent development in historiography, as is the more in-depth research into the late crusades of the 13th to 16th centuries.

The term ‘crusade’ can be defined for the 13th century with reference to various criteria. A central characteristic was its authorization by the pope, who granted approval for the preaching of a crusade in a particular area and promised indulgences to those taking part. At the same time, different crusades could be ranked according to their greater or lesser status. The most prestigious were always those to the Holy Land. These set the standard by which crusades against other enemies were measured. Thus the Baltic Crusades were compared from the beginning to those to the Holy Land. Formulas for proclaiming a crusade came to include treating a war as equivalent to a crusade in terms of the indulgence and papal protection it entailed or making a crusade to some other destination equivalent to a crusade to Jerusalem as well as obtaining papal approval to replace a crusading vow for the Holy Land with one for elsewhere.

There is nevertheless no clear legal definition of a crusade (or a historical tradition for how to define one). It is equally impossible to draw up a list of military campaigns that were crusades and a list of those that were not. Not all papal calls to crusade were successful (e.g. the preaching of the crusade against the Mongols from 1241 to 1249), and hence some crusades (e.g. the wars of King Valdemar I of Denmark against the Wends in the 1160s) were not formally endorsed by the curia, even though they were compatible with crusading ideology. What was decisive, therefore, even more so than formal papal approval, was that the actual crusaders saw themselves as such and were regarded as crusaders in their native lands. The crusade was not a phenomenon that originated in frontier areas and the peripheries of western Europe; rather, its roots lay in the societies of Europe’s core regions. Moreover,

92 For a summary, see Jonathan Riley-Smith, What were the Crusades?, 4th ed. (Basingstoke, 2009); Tyerman, Invention, pp. 1–7.
93 LUB 1, no. 14; HCL III.2, p. 12; XIX.7, p. 132.
94 For example, DD 1/5, no. 61.
95 On the crusades from the canon law perspective, see James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader (Madison, 1969).
the crusades were neither based on a monolithic, unchanging ideology nor were they a self-contained movement. They amalgamated holy warfare with a number of spiritual rituals that preceded and accompanied the crusades. The leading role in the conduct and justification of crusades on Europe's periphery was assumed by the local secular and spiritual rulers. The crusade as an institution existed in these areas merely as an expression of political and ecclesiastical aims and ideas, such as rulers' ambitions, attempts at church reform, and the desire for salvation. These ideas had elements in common with the Holy War but the latter was not indispensable to them.

Crusades were carried out to free and protect Christians. Originally Christians were to be freed from Muslim bondage in Palestine, the Iberian peninsula, and North Africa. At the same time, however, Christians were also to be protected from pagans, who could pose a danger to them in the form of military incursions and raids for plunder. Even just their proximity could be accepted as threatening. Regardless of who might actually undertake hostile manoeuvres during a given season, however, warfare against the pagans was conceived as a defensive war in itself. Precisely such a conception is drawn upon when the crusades on the Daugava River started at the end of the 12th century. According to the Chronicle of Henry of Livonia, the initial aim was to force the Livs to retain the Christianity to which they had voluntarily converted and then to protect the Church from pagan incursions. It was in this way that crusading ideology or terminology continually extended its scope during the 13th century. The call to crusade (negotium crucis) extended to all lands that recognized papal authority. The cross was preached against all enemies, whether unbelievers (Muslims and pagans), schismatics (Greeks), heretics (Albigensians), rebels (Stedingers) or the pope's political rivals, who were regarded as destroying the unity of the Church.

The far-reaching ambitions entailed by crusading endeavours inevitably led to conflicts. This generally unfolded on the European fringes according to the following pattern. In response to a ruler's request, the pope issued approval to preach a crusade for the planned undertaking. This in turn could lead to

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97 Ernst-Dieter Hehl, "Was ist eigentlich ein Kreuzzug?" Historische Zeitschrift 259 (1994), 336, including an extensive bibliography.
99 HCL 1.12, p. 7; II.3, p. 9; VI.4, p. 18; VII.1, p. 19; IX.8, pp. 29–30; XI.6, pp. 53–54 as examples.
competing crusades, not to mention the rivalry between the preachers them-
selves. In the second half of the 13th century this often translated into disagree-
ments between the Dominicans and Franciscans on the one hand, who were
the main propagators of the calls to crusade, and between them and the tradi-
tional monastic orders. There were also crusading preachers whose activities
had not been authorized by the pope.101

Since therefore in the 12th century the idea took shape that the various wars
against the pagans were part of one and the same war against Christianity’s
enemies, regardless of where they took place, the clashes with east European
pagans became equivalent to crusades. Although the crusades east of the Elbe
in 1147 did not at first achieve the hoped success, the Elbe Slavs were eventu-
ally subjugated during the subsequent decades through a combination of war
and dynastic politics. The conflicts of the Poles, Swedes, and Germans with the
 pagan tribes of the Prussians, Livs, Lettgallians, Curonians, Finns, and Karelians
developed into crusades from the 12th and 13th centuries. Forced conversion to
Christianity also served the purpose of self-defence. It secured the borders—
even though this also meant shifting these towards new enemies—and pro-
tected the newly christened population from apostasy.102

In this context, the notion appears entirely plausible that crusades were
undertaken on Baltic soil not just against the pagans but also against the
schismatics—in other words, the Russians of Novgorod, Pskov, and Polotsk.
The papal diplomat and canonist Henry of Segusio (d. 1271) claimed that a war
against schismatics or rebels could even be more justified than one against the
 Saracens since a key prerequisite for the latter was the unity of the Church.

101 Christoph T. Maier, *Preaching the Crusades. Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the
Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1994) (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought
4th Series 28); Tyerman, *Invention*, pp. 41–49; Maureen Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy. The
Chief Instruments of Papal Crusading Policy and Crusade to the Holy Land from the
Final Loss of Jerusalem to the Fall of Acre 1244–1291* (Leiden, 1975) (Studies in the History of
Christian Thought 11), pp. 14–22. On unauthorized preaching of the crusade in the Baltic, see
Maier, *Preaching*, pp. 51–52; Anti Selart, “Die Bettelmönche im Ostseeraum zur Zeit
des Erzbischofs Albert Suerbeer von Riga (Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts),” *Zeitschrift für
Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 56 (2007), 492–94.

102 Albert Bauer, “Der Livlandkreuzzug,” in *Baltische Kirchengeschichte. Beiträge zur
Geschichte der Missionierung und der Reformation der evangelisch-lutherischen
Landeskirchen und des Volkskirchentums in den baltischen Landen*, ed. Reinhard Wittram
(Göttingen, 1956), pp. 29–30; Berhard Stasiweski, “Missionsbestrebungen im Ostseeraum
Furthermore, one could not force a pagan to adopt Christianity, but one could very well use force to bring an apostate onto the right path. The historian and crusade preacher Jacques de Vitry (d. 1240) stressed in a sermon for the military orders that their task was to use the secular sword to defend the Church of Jesus Christ, above all in war against non-Christians, i.e. the Saracens of Syria and the Moors of Spain, the pagans of Prussia, Livonia and Cumania, and also, when ordered by the authorities, against heretics and the Greek schismatics. In this way, arguments derived from the wars against the pagans were turned against other Christians, who were accused of preventing the fight against the Saracens or joining in alliance with them. This argument was used against Byzantium from the beginning of the 12th century at the latest, albeit initially in the language of secular rulers: the Greeks had prevented the war against the unbelievers in the Holy Land. It was further extended by the idea, in the wake of the failure of the Second Crusade, that it was necessary to wage war...
against Byzantium as a prelude to war against the Muslims.\textsuperscript{106} When the Fourth Crusade resulted in the conquest of Constantinople in 1204 instead of warfare against the Saracens, Innocent III gave his retrospective approval.\textsuperscript{107}

After the conquest of Constantinople the idea of the schismatic as enemy became firmly entrenched in crusading thought. Given the Latin Empire’s need for protection from its Orthodox neighbours (the Empire of Nicaea and Despotate of Epirus), Gregory IX, Innocent IV, and Urban IV announced crusading indulgences in its support and against the schismatic Greeks.\textsuperscript{108} The Greeks especially were deemed schismatic, while the other Orthodox religions were considered of only marginal importance by the Roman curia.\textsuperscript{109} The Russian regions bordering on Hungary, Poland, and Livonia were viewed as peripheral, not in the same league as the Greek and Bulgarian opponents of the Latin Emperor. Hungary’s church and nobility in the 1230s saw their schismatic opponents much more in Bosnia than in Rus’.\textsuperscript{110} Moreover, relations between the Latins and the Greeks cannot be automatically transferred to those between the Livonians and the Russians. The geographical distance alone was too great. Livonia shared a border with pagan lands, in the form of Lithuania, right up to the 14th century. The latter always presented a greater military threat than the principalities of Rus’ and thus had a greater presence in the relevant crusading accounts.

1.4 The Mission from Denmark and Bremen to the Eastern Baltic Coast

Scandinavia’s conversion to Christianity began around 1000 and continued for sometime after. The central role was played by the archbishopric of Hamburg-Bremen and the missionary tradition founded by its first archbishop, St Ansgar (d. 865). The Scandinavian churches became autonomous during the 12th century: Lund had become an independent archbishopric by 1104 at the latest,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{109} Purcell, \textit{Papal Crusading Policy}, pp. 16–17.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Maier, \textit{Preaching}, pp. 58–59.
\end{itemize}
Chapter 1

Trondheim in 1153 and Uppsala in 1164. Precedence was assumed by the archbishopric of Lund, whose archbishop also bore the title of primate of Sweden. The interests of the metropolitan of Lund clashed with those of Bremen over a wide area along the southern Baltic coast in Mecklenburg, Pomerania, and Rügen.

Denmark was regarded as one of the centres for propagating crusading ideology in the Baltic from the middle of the 12th century. The wars waged by the Danish kings and the archbishops of Lund against the neighbouring pagan peoples could be considered a continuation of the earlier Viking raids except that they evolved in a legal sense into crusades. While the pagan Slavs did pose a real threat to the coastal areas and to Denmark’s sailors, fighting against them also offered the opportunity of fulfilling one’s warlike Christian duty in a way that was much less costly and involved a less arduous journey than a crusade to the Holy Land. Valdemar I and his son Knud portrayed themselves as leaders of crusades on their coins and royal seals. From 1159 to 1185 King Valdemar I and Absalon, the bishop of Roskilde (1158–91) and also archbishop of Lund (1178–1201), embarked on 22 campaigns along the southern Baltic coast. The area saw the foundation of a succession of monasteries under the auspices of the archbishops of Lund, zealous patrons of the Cistercians. In 1168 the pagan shrine of Arkona on Rügen was conquered. From this point onwards the sea routes along the eastern Baltic coast became safer for the Danes, although the struggle for dominance in northern Germany and Pomerania continued. The

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political struggle was also manifested in the competition between the metropolitans of Lund, Hamburg, Magdeburg, Bamberg, and Gniezno for the newly Christianized areas and the submission of their population.\textsuperscript{113}

Danish interests extended along the eastern Baltic coast as well. By means of the so-called first crusade, occasionally referred to as legendary, under King Erik the Holy (d. c. 1160) in the 1150s, the Swedish sovereigns began their conquest of Finland. However, it is not known whether this campaign was already considered a crusade before the end of the 13th century.\textsuperscript{114} Sweden's capacity to embark on campaigns against the pagans remained slight, however, because of the frequent succession struggles.\textsuperscript{115} The Danes, on the other hand, repeatedly penetrated Finnish territory, with victory in 1191 under King Knud and perhaps also in 1202 under Archbishop Anders Sunesen (d. 1228) and his brothers.\textsuperscript{116}

These Finnish offensives have been seen as a precursor of the conflict with schismatic Rus'. This is nevertheless hard to verify because it is not possible to measure the extent of Novgorod's influence in Finnish territory at the end of the 12th and beginning of the 13th centuries and therefore to what extent they would have involved a confrontation with that principality. What is clear is that the sources for this period do not mention military clashes between Rus' and Sweden or Denmark in terms that could be seen as an indication of a religious conflict. In May 1164 the Swedes did indeed undertake a failed offensive against Ladoga,\textsuperscript{117} but there is no reason to relate this campaign to the Christianization of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{113} Jürgen Petersohn, \textit{Der südliche Ostseeraum im kirchlich-politischen Kräftespiel des Reichs, Polens und Dänemarks vom 10. bis 13. Jahrhundert. Mission—Kirchenorganisation—Kultpolitik} (Cologne-Vienna, 1979) (Ostmitteleuropa in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart 17); for an overview, also Lotter, “Crusading Idea”.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Tarvel, “Dänische Ostseepolitik,” p. 53.
\item \textsuperscript{117} NL1, pp. 31, 218–19.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
of Finland. Evidence of a crusade in Finnish territory has been identified in the letter of Alexander III dated 1171/72 to Archbishop Stephen of Uppsala (d. c. 1185) and the jarl Guttorm. The letter says that the Phinni had promised to convert to Christianity in view of the threat from certain enemy troops, but had reneged on this promise once the armies had withdrawn. This reference to enemy troops, however, does not allow us to draw any conclusions about possible military endeavours against Rus'. It is true that the 16th-century chronicle of Bishop Paulus Juusten of Viborg and Åbo (d. 1575) relates that Åbo was razed to the ground by the Russians in 1198. However, even if this information, in a work written at a time of extremely volatile relations between Sweden and Russia, turned out to be correct, it would still only refer merely to a single campaign.

Denmark’s interest in the territories of Estonia and Latvia appears even more evident than its engagement in Finland. Although the traditions about the success of the missionary work by Denmark in this period and the establishment of the diocese of Curonia in 1161 are not considered reliable, the existence of Fulco, ‘bishop of the Estonians’, is confirmed by a number of contemporary sources from the 1160s and 1170s. He was ordained by Archbishop Eskil of Lund (d. 1181/82), who was in exile in France at the time. It is nonetheless disputed whether and when Fulco in fact visited the Estonian region and what consequences his visit might have had. In either 1170 or 1171 Pope

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123 Paul Johansen, Nordische Mission, Revals Gründung und die Schwedensiedlung in Estland (Stockholm, 1951) (Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens Handlingar 74), pp. 88–106; Benninghoven, Orden, pp. 15–18; Tore Nyberg, “Deutsche, dänische
Alexander III promised the kings of the Danes, Norwegians, Svear, and Goths, as well as their princes and the Christian people, that whoever fought against the pagan Estonians would be granted an indulgence for one year similar to that for pilgrims to the Holy Sepulchre. It cannot be ruled out therefore that there was indeed a crusade to Estonia at that time or at least that one was really planned under Eskil. It is not known whether there was a connection between Fulco and the other letter of Alexander III, mentioned above, to the archbishop of Uppsala and the jarl Guttorm concerning the Finns and published two days before this Estonian letter, and, if so, what kind of connection.

Once the Wends had been defeated in northern Germany and Pomerania, the wars in that region turned into a form of infighting among Christians, while military campaigns against unbelievers were now undertaken in more distant places. These campaigns were above all a reaction to regular pillaging by the eastern Baltic peoples along the coasts of Denmark and Sweden. The Scandinavian rulers planned or carried out offensives against these groups...
during 1184–86. These campaigns served several purposes. On the one hand, they were intended to satisfy the desire of the nobility and the king to obtain the spiritual and political benefits entailed by the crusader status (simultaneously in 1192 a group of Danish knights moved to the Holy Land); on the other, they represented a belated continuation of the Viking-era raids and countered the raids of the pagans. They can also be seen as struggles for trading privileges and freedom of the seas. The Curonians, Osilians, and others were able to pose—at least as long as there was no peace—a serious threat to merchants, just like the Wends before them. For that reason towards the end of the 12th century Danish merchants (not in an ethnic sense but in terms of ‘statehood’) gathered together in St Knud’s guilds under royal protection, which, in addition to their commercial purpose, also had a military and probably even crusading-like function. The canonization of Duke Knud Lavard in 1169, too, was a sign of the curia’s support for the Danish Baltic mission, and his cult was in fact an expression of crusading ideology. The members of the St Knud’s guilds probably took part in trade with Rus’, just as the merchants of Gotland and northern Germany. The Danish crusades in the eastern Baltic are more likely, therefore, to have been aimed at improving communication with Rus’, rather than severing or disrupting it. Denmark’s attempts to gain power precisely in Ösel, then later in Reval (the St Knud’s guild first mentioned in 1326 may already have been founded there in the 13th century) and on the Daugava River were driven by commercial interests. In trade relations with Rus’, in which the Daugava served as the western transport route, Denmark’s efforts at dominance could undoubtedly be traced back to even older traditions than those of the north German merchants. The latter first gained the upper hand on the Daugava in around 1200.

King Valdemar 11 of Denmark’s problems and opponents in Livonia included not only the pagans but also the missionary and crusading policies of the

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128 Such as peace between the Osilians and Gotland. See HCL VII.2, p. 19.


archbishopric of Hamburg-Bremen. The latter’s activity is documented in great
detail in the Chronicle of Henry of Livonia, in contrast to the meagre informa-
tion given about Danish interests. The importance of the Christianization
of Pomerania, Prussia, and Livonia as a ‘German’ enterprise has clearly been
exaggerated in the historiography overall as a result of this bias in the sources.131
As a consequence, too little attention has been paid, on the one hand, to the
similar attempts at mission and conquest on the part of Scandinavian rulers
and, on the other, to the fact that the actual social and political basis in north-
ern Germany for Christian missions to Livonia was quite narrow. The main
role in the church of Üxküll (Riga), founded on the lower Daugava in the late
12th century, was played by members of a rather small number of houses of
ministeriales from the archbishopric of Bremen. This group of ministeriales
also provided the first bishop of the Livs, Meinhard (1186–96), and both of his
successors, Berthold (1196–98) and Albert (1199–1229), as well as their patron,
Archbishop Hartwig II of Bremen (d. 1207). However, the upper German
nobility was represented in Livonia essentially only in the form of occasional
crusaders; a famous exception was the abbot of Dünamünde and bishop of
Selonia, Bernard of Lippe (d. 1224).132
While our information about the commercial policy of the Danish kings
and archbishops of Lund in the Baltic remains largely hypothetical, a lot of
attention has been paid to the close connection between the Rigan mission in
Livonia, sent by the archbishopric of Hamburg-Bremen, and northern German
merchants and their interests.133 Bernd Ulrich Hucker has pointed out the close
ties between the ministeriales and the urban elite at the turn of 12th and 13th
centuries based on research into the social structure of the cities of Westphalia
and Lower Saxony. He argues that the ministeriales and the urban elite along
the eastern Baltic coast pursued common interests: the latter needed secure
trade routes and new markets, and the former new estates—with both groups
seeking their salvation at the same time.134 It is indeed impossible to deny

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131 A collection of the classic studies can be found in Heidenmission und Kreuzzugsgedanke in der deutschen Ostpolitik des Mittelalters, ed. Helmut Beumann (Darmstadt, 1963) (Wege der Forschung 7).
either the important share merchants had in financing military expeditions or the interdependency of the communication links between the Daugava River and Germany for the transport of arms and other essentials by merchant ships. Nonetheless, the Chronicle of Henry of Livonia does not portray the merchants as the driving force behind these policies but rather as the bishops’ followers and henchmen. Notwithstanding, it is clear that there was a close relationship between the nobility, the ministeriales, and the citizens of Livonia’s towns during the first decades of the 13th century. In 1226 a treaty was agreed in Riga granting the Order of the Sword Brothers the right to participate in the city government; at the same time a number of burghers contemplated joining the Order, which had some representatives on the town council. Some of the Sword Brothers were indeed from the urban milieu, just as in the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order in the 13th century.

The collaboration between the early Hanseatic merchants, the bishop of Riga, and the Sword Brothers should not, of course, be romanticized. A military conflict was just as liable to jeopardize as to secure trade routes. Around 1175 German traders fostered close peaceful relations with the Livs and possibly also with the Osilians. Hostile actions would have put these at risk. The role of merchants in Livonia’s early history was related very much to the start


137 LUB 6, no. 2717: “quod omnes fratres sint veri cives Rigenses... duo de fratribus vel unus erunt de consilio civitatis, ut intersint consilii civitatis, quando voluerint et potuerint interesse”; LVA, no. 128; Friedrich G. von Bunge, Die Stadt Riga im dreizehnten und vierzehnten Jahrhundert. Geschichte, Verfassung und Rechtzustand (Leipzig, 1878), p. 20.


of relations between Livonia and Rus': merchant interests lay much more in a peaceful approach than in war.140

1.5 The Papal Curia and North-Eastern Europe

Discussion of the interests of the different powers in the Baltic and of different social levels in developments in Livonia in the 13th century raises the question of the role of the papacy and the curia. The popes have often been viewed as an essentially leading and active force in Livonia or at the very least as mediators and overseers of the different political tendencies. This prevailing view has been revised during the last forty years or so. Ernst Pitz (1928–2009) has noted that the papal letters, which might appear to reflect the curia’s independent policy, actually refer back to the information supplied by the petitioner and that the curia was not in a position either to check the accuracy of this information or verify whether its orders had been carried out in north-eastern Europe. He argues that Innocent III did not conduct an independent policy in Livonia and that Bishop Albert’s plans had initially in fact only proved an obstacle to the pope in his grand crusading vision for the Holy Land.141 A papal letter relating to Livonia was more likely to reflect the interests of the Livonian petitioner than those of the curia.142 The stress laid on deficient communication is not merely a reflection of the concerns of today’s information society, either: there were already complaints about this in the Middle Ages. The procurators at the curia provided a more institutionalized form of disseminating information somewhat later. Leaving aside some possible reservations about Pitz’s study,143 his findings are generally correct. It is highly illuminating that the papal rescripts on the missionary work in Livonia can no longer be qualified as political correspondence, nor as one-sided and arbitrary interference by the curia in foreign affairs. The papacy’s interest and desire to conduct an

141 Ernst Pitz, Papstreskript und Kaiserreskript im Mittelalter (Tübingen, 1971) (Bibliothek des Deutschen historischen Instituts in Rom 36), pp. 19, 23, 44.
142 Pitz, Papstreskript, pp. 135–36.
independent policy still cannot be denied; the question is what means did it have of actually influencing the missions to Livonia.\footnote{144}

There were numerous embassies from Livonia to the curia seeking a favourable decision. Theodoric (d. 1219), Meinhard’s assistant and later the bishop of Estonia, and Bishop Albert of Riga were constantly travelling to Rome. The journeys undertaken by the papal legates and collectors to Europe’s fringes took a long time and did not lead to rapid success. It was extremely time-consuming to send back questions and obtain and send authorizations. On more than one occasion questions were raised on which the curia was unable to reach a decision because of lack of information and ignorance of local conditions.\footnote{145} This illustrates extremely well the slow journey time. It must also be remembered that sending an embassy to the other end of Europe was in itself laborious and expensive, not to mention the costs incurred at the destination itself.\footnote{146} An additional problem should be mentioned, namely that it has not been documented whether every letter entered in the register of the papal chancery ever reached its addressee and had any impact on the situation there (only a few originals or copies made in northern Europe are known).\footnote{147} Moreover, sometimes what mattered was less the actual circumstances of a letter than its formal aspects. Individuals with the power of decision in a particular matter were susceptible to influence. When a complaint or petition was submitted to the pope, influence had to be exerted on the members of the curia and, for

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[147]{Pitz, Papstreskript, pp. 78–79.}
\end{footnotes}
example, a suitable legate appointed. A legate’s powers were limited by his authorization, his acceptance, and the local conditions.

The significance of imperial or papal diplomas as weapons in the political struggle should not therefore be overestimated. Livonia was a truly marginal, remote province for the popes. The Baltic missions were driven by the centres of power of Scandinavia and northern Germany, not by Rome. The papacy’s main interest lay in the international politics of the age: the crusades in the Holy Land and against the Albigensians, the balance of power in Italy, and relations with the emperor and imperial pretenders. Livonia remained well in the background compared to these issues. The curia ultimately lacked the means to force through any ‘independent policy’ it might have in Livonia. Crusading politics in north-eastern Europe in the strict sense has been seen as non-papal in the second half of the 13th century too: the calls to crusade, based on meagre information, were a political instrument used by local rulers. The papacy’s own political proposals could typically be implemented on the ground if they coincided with the interests of an influential regional power. In the 14th century the papacy’s political initiatives continued to be extremely limited on Europe’s north-eastern periphery, despite the more regular communication

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due in particular to the curia’s more widespread practice of awarding benefices. Given the decisive importance of local relations and politics for events in Livonia in the 13th century, it follows that Livonian-Russian relations cannot be automatically interpreted as a papal-orchestrated attack on the Eastern church or a papal-organized defence against the Eastern threat. In answering the question of whether and to what extent these relations were influenced by independent papal decisions and what information these hypothetical decisions were based on, it is necessary to examine the specific circumstances of each individual case in the Livonian and Russian territories at the time.
Part 1
CHAPTER 2

The Beginning of the Crusades in Livonia and their Impact on Rus’

2.1 The Influence of Rus’ on the Eastern Baltic Coast at the End of the Twelfth Century

When the crusading missions—or expansion, depending on the point of view—set out from Denmark and northern Germany for the eastern Baltic coast at the end of the 12th century,1 the peoples of what is now modern Estonia and Latvia had already been living for several hundred years right next to the powerful medieval realm, or collection of principalities, of Rus’. Their relations with Rus’ could vary from more or less peaceful to overtly hostile. When permanent bases first began to be established for missionaries, crusaders, and merchants along the Daugava estuary, and then at the site of Reval in Estonia, the new centres of power that arose built their relations with their eastern neighbours on the basis of the earlier relationship of these peoples with Rus’.

The most important sources for the relations of the Estonian and Latvian regions with the Russian principalities before the 13th century are the accounts found in the Russian chronicles. These are highly susceptible to different interpretations, however. It is common for the chronicles just to mention the campaign of a particular prince against a given place or people sometimes in greater detail and at other times in very general terms. Nor do the sources specify whether the aim of a particular campaign was the conquest of the territory, the suppression of a revolt or simply a raid. This field of research has also been hampered by scholars’ attempts to find arguments for and against the legitimacy of Russia’s dominance in the Baltic during the period. Views range across the entire spectrum, from the past independence of the Estonians

and Latvians to their incontrovertible incorporation in the Russian realm. The perspective chosen on this issue in turn influences the approach adopted to the history of the 13th century. Depending on the political status accorded to the peoples living in the eastern Baltic on the eve of the crusades, the latter will either be presented as military campaigns directed against the pagans or entirely against Rus’.3

Looking at Estonia first of all, according to the Russian chronicles, a people called the ‘Chuds’, also mentioned as owing tribute to the Russian princes, were part of the history of the Russian realm. This term denoted the Finnic peoples of north-eastern Europe in the early Middle Ages, and mostly Estonians in the later Middle Ages. Some Chuds had attained a prominent position at the court of the early Russian princes. Military campaigns against the Chuds are mentioned in the chronicles from the 11th century. They were defeated by Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich (d. 1054) sometime around 1030. He built a fortress on the site of the later Dorpat, which stood firm until 1061, when members of a tribe called “sosoly” (сосолы) conquered the fortress and plundered the region as far as Pskov. Prince Mstislav Vladimirovich of Novgorod led three expeditions against the Chuds between 1111 and 1116 at places called “Ochela”, “на Бору” (Очела; на Бору), and Odenpäh, capturing the latter. Three further campaigns were also conducted against the same people by Prince Vsevolod Mstislavich of Novgorod (d. 1138), who took Dorpat but suffered a defeat in Klin. The Chuds attacked Pskov during the years 1176–80. This was countered by Prince Mstislav Rostislavich of Novgorod (d. 1180) by invading Ochela. Finally, several clashes between the Russians and the Chuds took place during the years 1190–92, with the Russians capturing Dorpat and burning Odenpäh to the ground. The picture is confusing, not only because various hypotheses, equally unconfirmed in the sources, have been put forward regarding the causes of these military campaigns, but because the ethnonyms and toponyms are far from always consistent and how its parts were related to one another.


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2 The difference in opinion is also the result of different views about what the Kievan realm actually consisted of and how its parts were related to one another.
being clear. The people referred to as Chuds did not just live in the area of modern Estonia but also in Votia, along the river Plius, and elsewhere east of Lake Peipus.\(^5\)

It proves difficult based on this evidence to draw firm conclusions regarding the connections between the different political entities in Russian and Estonian territory. Historians in the Russian historiographical tradition have viewed Estonian territory as dependent on Novgorod and Pskov for the period around 1200. They take the view that, if not all of Estonia, then at least Ugaunia and the small adjoining lands had always been part of the Russian realm, while the rest of the region was at least subject to Russian influence. It has been argued that the tribute intended for Novgorod was collected by the local ruling elites, who would sometimes refuse to hand it over, thus provoking the military campaigns of the Russian princes.\(^6\) On the other hand, Baltic German and Estonian scholars have noted, based on the Chronicle of Henry of Livonia, that any supposed former dependence of south-eastern Estonia was a thing of the past at the beginning of the 13th century. The Russian campaigns in Estonia at the end of the 12th and beginning of the 13th centuries did not, in their view, have a lasting impact, let alone justify talk of a tributary dependency or areas belonging to the territory of the Russian princes.\(^7\) The fact that the offensives against some castles ended with the collection of tribute by the Russian troops does not necessarily mean that the area was a dependency.\(^8\) Such dependency on Pskov or Novgorod would, in the case of Estonia, primarily concern the

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\(^8\) NLI, pp. 52–53, 183, 250–51; HCL XV.8, p. 99; XIV.2, p. 74.
lands of Ugaunia. Yet according to the Chronicle of Henry of Livonia there was no ‘Russian’ dominance in these areas at the beginning of the 13th century. Nevertheless, the fact that attacks by both sides are concentrated in certain periods indicates that a more complex set of relations was at play than a simple appetite for booty.9

The Novgorod chronicles do not mention either the events in the Baltic at the beginning of the 13th century or the campaigns carried out east of Lake Peipus or the river Narva unless they affected Novgorod’s core territory.10 Such developments remained outside Novgorod’s active area of interest and were only recorded to the extent that they might involve a prince, for instance, and could thus be integrated into the narrative of Rus’ as a historical dynastic entity. What occurred elsewhere was of no interest to the authors of the chronicles.11 It can therefore be inferred from the silence of the chronicles on these matters that Ugaunia and other Estonian lands were not part of the Rus’ sphere of influence. This view could be countered by pointing out that south-eastern Estonia would have been of more interest to directly neighbouring Pskov than Novgorod in any case. The problem is that there is no independent chronicle tradition in Pskov for this early period to allow this argument to be properly scrutinized. By contrast other events, such as Pskov’s interests in Tolowa, did find their way into the Novgorod Chronicle by virtue of the joint campaigns conducted by the princes of Novgorod and Pskov, and thus the chronicle’s silence does indeed suggest that there was no direct dependency of the Estonian areas.

Latvia is traversed by an important transportation route, the Daugava River. This fact alone was undoubtedly one of the reasons why the links between Latvian territory and Rus’ were more developed than those with Estonian territory. Control of this important trade route brought direct revenue in the form of taxes and dues and was also valuable in terms of regular and guaranteed trade. Not just the archbishop of Bremen or the king of Denmark showed an interest in controlling the Daugava, so did its closest neighbour, the principality

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9 On the dependency involved in tribute in Rus’, see Danilevskii, Древняя Русь, pp. 125–36.
10 See НСЛ xxv.6, p. 185; Timofei V. Gimon, “Военная история Балтийского региона в XII–XIII вв. и новгородская летопись,” in Висы дружбы. Сборник статей в честь Татьяны Николаевны Джаксон, ed. Natalia Iu. Gvozdetskaia et al. (Moscow, 2011), pp. 74–82.
11 Timofei V. Gimon, “Отражение в Новгородском летописании XII–XIII вв. неновгородских событий,” in Восточная Европа в древности и средневековье. Контакты, зоны контактов и контактные зоны. XI Чтения памяти В. Т. Пашуто (Moscow, 1999), pp. 139–44.
of Polotsk. Eastern Latvia's economic relationship with Rus' during the early period\textsuperscript{12} was both a prerequisite for and consequence of this interest.

It is striking that the Russian chronicles record surprisingly few military actions in Latvian territory compared with Estonian territory. Only the following events are mentioned. The army of the prince of Polotsk was defeated by the Semgallians in 1106.\textsuperscript{13} Following the repulsion of a Lithuanian (Lettgallian?) raid, an attack on Lettgallia was launched from Novgorod and Velikiye Luki in 1200.\textsuperscript{14} The Novgorod Chronicle records the campaigns of the Novgorod princes c. 1111 and 1180 to \textit{Ochela (на Очелу)}, a region usually identified with Adsel.\textsuperscript{15} The lack of reports about possible campaigns in Latvian territory might be explained by the fact that the local Polotsk chronicle tradition either never existed or has been lost (see p. 69), whereas the Novgorod tradition survived and was incorporated into the all-Russian chronicles from the 15th century. That there is no mention of clashes between Russian and Lettgallian forces over the highly prosperous and lucrative Daugava area is not necessarily evidence, therefore, that such clashes did not take place.

The Chronicle of Henry of Livonia confirms that at the end of the 12th and beginning of the 13th centuries the Daugava Livs and the Tolowa Letts were within the Rus' area of influence. The nature of their dependency and the extent of the influence remains unclear. Between Tolowa and Pskov lay Adsel, whose duty to pay tribute to Pskov is still testified to in the last quarter of the 13th century.\textsuperscript{16} According to Henry, Kokenhusen and Gerzike were principalities connected to Rus, but their immediate subordination to Polotsk is not mentioned. Perhaps one can treat them as sub-principalities that began to be able to act independently as Polotsk declined in influence. Polotsk nonetheless appears to have ranked above them in power and authority.\textsuperscript{17} Kokenhusen and Gerzike were strategic crossing points over the Daugava, making them important for all the groups involved in the Daugava trade. Moreover, the river Daugava was not navigable by ship along its entire course because of rapids between Holme and Gerzike, where goods had to be unloaded.

\textsuperscript{12} Evalds S. Mugurevich, \textit{Восточная Латвия и соседние земли в Х–ХIII вв. Экономические связи с Русью и другими территориями. Пути сообщения} (Riga, 1965).
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Лаврентьевская летопись}, p. 281.
\textsuperscript{14} NL1, pp. 45, 239.
\textsuperscript{15} NL1, pp. 20, 36; Ипатьевская летопись, p. 608. Cf. another identification of the toponym by Enn Tarvel, “Kas Otśela tšuudid olid Koivalinna eestlased?” in \textit{Keel ja Kirjandus} 18 (1975), 549–52.
\textsuperscript{16} PL 1, pp. 13–14; PL 2, pp. 22, 88.
\textsuperscript{17} HCL X.3, p. 34; XVI.2, p. 102; cf. XI.9, p. 57.
A distinction should also be made between directly dependent lands and communities over whom Russian princes only exercised a weak political influence. It has been claimed based on Henry’s information that Kokenhusen and Gerzike were Russian principalities governed by the Russian princes Viachko and Vsevolod at the beginning of the 13th century. Historians have used different formulations to describe the situation, ranging from a type of dependency not defined in more detail to classifying the territory of Latvia as originally part of Rus.\(^{18}\)

For their part, in the 20th century Latvian historians in particular have stressed Gerzike’s and Kokenhusen’s “independence”\(^{19}\)—both now in modern Latvia—without denying a certain connection to Polotsk. Starting from the premise that the term *rutheni* as used in Henry’s chronicle was not just an ethnic term but also indicated adherence to the Orthodox religion, they concluded that the majority of the population of these places consisted of Orthodox Lettgallians, with only the occasional Russian. The Russian influence should be seen in the context, not of political dependency, but commercial links and dynastic marriage.\(^{20}\) According to Henry’s chronicle, Gerzike and Kokenhusen do indeed appear not always to have been on good terms with Polotsk and acted with considerable leeway towards Lithuania and Riga.\(^{21}\) Latvian historians thus argued that the relationship with Polotsk was more akin to a bond

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between allies and friends rather than an outright dependency. Even while admitting that the patriotic romanticization of the ancient Latvian kings and their independence can no longer be accepted, unreserved qualification of the Daugava princes as subservient to Polotsk and as belonging to its dynasty is not plausible either.

There is general consensus among scholars that the dependence on Pskov of Tolowa and Adsel, which lies towards Pskov, was weak. Pskov did levy dues on them but it is not known with what regularity. West of Tolowa there was no duty to pay tribute. The Livs on the Daugava estuary had to pay tribute to Polotsk. This suggests that they were allied with rather faraway Polotsk instead of the closer principalities of Gerzike and Kokenhusen. Their tribute was apparently collected by the local rulers and then delivered to Polotsk. This unusual situation can be explained by the general decline of Polotsk as a power and its fragmentation into sub-principalities from the second half of the 12th century onwards. The former duty of paying tribute to Polotsk by the militarily weaker Livs remained in force even when the rulers of Gerzike and Kokenhusen could act independently to some degree. The dependency of the Livs appears to have been limited to the payment of tribute. Although the Livs took part in the Polotsk expedition against Smolensk in 1180, together with the Lithuanians, this can just as easily be seen as a joint action by allies rather than an obligation owed as part of a relationship of dependency. At any rate, it points to an alliance between the Livs and Polotsk. There was another Liv group living on the Gauja River in Livonia, near the coast. Archaeological findings have confirmed that Livs on the coast had contact with both Rus’ and Scandinavia.

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24 Keussler, Ausgang, p. 70; Spekke, History, p. 117; Auns, Социально-экономическая и политическая структура, pp. 18–19.
28 Ипатьевская летопись, p. 620.
names of their elders tend to suggest kinship with Scandinavians, however.\textsuperscript{29} Unfortunately the evidence that would permit us to decide whether the Livs of the Gauja were dependent on Polotsk is lacking.\textsuperscript{30}

The key issue in any assessment of events on the Daugava at the beginning of the 13th century is defining the personal ties of the princes of Kokenhusen and Gerzike. As mentioned above, it has been argued that these areas were Russian principalities governed by the Russian princes Viachko and Vsevolod. Henry’s chronicle calls the princes \textit{Viesceka} (or \textit{Wetseke}, \textit{Vetseke}, \textit{Vesceka}) and \textit{Vissewalde} (or \textit{Wiscewolde}, \textit{Wissewalus}, \textit{Wyssewaldus}). The Novgorod chronicles mention the prince of Kokenhusen in the context of the capture of Dorpat in 1224, using the variant ‘Viachko’. In the historiography both princes are linked with the Riurikid house under the names Viachko and Vsevolod, despite the fact that the name Vsevolod does not appear anywhere in the contemporary sources. Conversely, the notion has become widespread in 20th-century Latvian historiography that the impression given in Henry’s chronicle that these princes were Russian rulers should be understood not in ethnic but in religious terms and that consequently the individual referred to is the ‘Latvian’ king (or at most a ruler of Lithuanian descent) Visvaldis and perhaps, in the case of Vetseke, a prince of Liv or Latvian origin. The debate about the princes’ nationality is, of course, very much a 20th-century one. What is relevant to research into 13th-century history is their genealogical kinship, which would have partly determined their political relationships.\textsuperscript{31} Henry’s chronicle draws a distinction for Kokenhusen between the \textit{Rutheni}, who moved to Rus’ with the princes, and the \textit{Lethigalli} and the \textit{Selones}, who remained behind after Viachko’s departure.\textsuperscript{32} This would tend to suggest that the author of the chronicle differentiated between ethnic groups, not only according to religious markers.

\textsuperscript{31} A comprehensive introduction to the historiography on this issue is provided by Wolfgang Laur, “Überlegungen zur Herkunft des Wissewalde (Vsevolod) von Gerzike (Jersika),” \textit{ZfO} 35 (1986), 505; Evgeniia L. Nazarova, “Русско-латгальские контакты в XII–XIII вв. в свете генеалогии князей Ерсики и Кокнене,” in \textit{DG 1992–1993 годы}, 1995, p. 185. In the original charter between Vsevolod and Bishop Albert dating from c. 1210 the variant \textit{Wiscewolodus} is found. This name was understood as \textit{Wsewolodus} by the 16th century at the latest: \textit{LGU} 1, no. 2. \textit{Vissivaldr} as a Scandinavian version of Vsevolod is testified to in the sources: Fedor B. Uspenskii, \textit{Скандинавы}, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{HCL} XI.9, p. 58.
Between the two world wars the legal historian and genealogist Michael von Taube (1869–1961) drew up a genealogical chart according to which not only Viachko and Vsevolod, but also the Liv chieftains were descended from the Riurikid line. Vsevolod was thus the son of Grand Prince Mstislav-Boris Romanovich of Kiev (d. 1222), and the Liv chieftains Wane and Vesike were the sons of Prince Vladimir Iaroslavich of Galicia. Viachko belonged to the family of Polotsk princes. However, this creation of ties of kinship between the majority of the Lettgallian and Liv nobles on the one hand and the Russian dynasty on the other can hardly be sustained when it is based only on more or less similar name variants with no consideration for the historical context.

A key source for Taube's reconstruction (while only relying on its content selectively) was the so-called legend of Sviatokhna, entered under the year 1217 in the History of Russia of the Russian historian Vasili Tatishchev (1686–1750). This recounts how Prince Boris Davydovich of Polotsk married Sviatokhna, the daughter of Duke Casimir of Pomerania. She came to Polotsk together with a Latin priest and many Pomeranians. When Sviatokhna gave birth to her son Vladimir, she began to mistreat her stepchildren Vasilko and Viachko from Boris' first marriage. She sent Vasilko to the Daugava but Viachko, later killed by the Germans, to Pskov. Together with the Pomeranians, she planned, moreover, to get rid of Boris with the aim of securing the throne for her son Vladimir. But finally the people, disaffected at foreign rule, shook off the Pomeranian yoke with the help of the boyars and took justice into their own hands.

The plausibility of this account depends on the extent to which Tatishchev's narratives, which are not found in the extant Russian chronicles or other sources, constitute a reliable source for the Middle Ages. Did the author, when producing his work in the 1740s, have access to materials that have since been lost and whose contents have only been transmitted via his work? It used to

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33 Taube, “Russische und litauische Fürsten,” pp. 416–46, 455, 491–92; Michael von Taube, Ungern-Sternberg. Ursprung und Anfänge des Geschlechts in Livland (Tartu, 1940), pp. 140–41. Russian princes often have several names: the prince's name of pagan origin (e.g. Mstislav) and the Christian name at baptism (e.g. Boris). On the findings in Liv territory of pendants with so-called tribal signs of the Riurikids, see Ēvalds Mugurēvičs, “Piekariņi ar t.s. Rjurikoviču cilts zimi Latvijā 11.–13. gs.,” Arheoloģija un etnogrāfija 17 (1994), 76–83.
be thought that the source drawn upon for this story in the *History of Russia* is an extract from a now lost Polotsk chronicle. Tatishchev wrote:

This has been copied from the chronicle of Eropkin, which appears to have been compiled in Polotsk given that it narrates much about the Polotsk, Vitebsk, and other Lithuanian princes, although unfortunately I did not have time to write everything out, and he [Eropkin] did not show it to me again after that and I heard that he gave it away to make a copy of it.\(^{36}\)

However, it was further assumed that the extract referred to may also have been understood as a fictional parable about Russia under the empress Anna (1730–40). Thus Boris’ sons would symbolise the fate of the future empress Elisabeth (1741–61), while Anna’s favourite, the Curonian Ernst Biron (1690–1772), would take the role of Sviatokhna, with her Baltic descent, and the regent Anna Leopoldovna (1718–46) would correspond to Sviatokhna’s son.\(^{37}\)

Hence, it is most likely that the story about Sviatokhna does not have a historical basis. The question must further be raised as to whether Tatishchev, or his collaborators, could have written such a narrative based on the known sources. If Tatishchev did not use the Chronicle of Henry of Livonia, first printed in 1740, then he might have obtained his information about the Russian or Polotsk princes on the Daugava from the chronicle of Christian Kelch printed in 1695.\(^{38}\) Prince Boris of Polotsk and his son Vasilii might have originated in

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37 Petr Mikhailovich Eropkin (c. 1698–1740) and Andrei Fedorovich Khrushchov (1691–1740) also supplied Tatishchev with sources and were part of the circle of Artemii Petrovich Volynskii (1689–1740), who opposed the German clique at the court during Anna’s period in government and sympathized with Elisabeth. This circle drew up state reform plans intended to strengthen the aristocracy (the boyars of the pamphlet?). All three were executed in 1740 for conspiracy against Anna. They were cultivated men versed in several languages and able to acquire knowledge of historical works on Livonia written in Latin and German. It is also possible that Tatishchev himself made up the story, ascribing it to other authors to conceal his role.
38 Nazarova, “Русско-латгальские контакты,” pp. 182–84, 188–89. Among the sources mentioned by Tatishchev are the Baltic and Prussian chronicles of Christian Kelch (1657–1710), Peter of Dusburg (13th-14th century), Martin Cromer (d. 1589) and Albert Krantz (1448–1517). It is thus conceivable that Tatishchev conflated prince Vissika or Vissica of Kelch with the Viachko of the Russian sources by means of the episode relating to the conquest of Dorpat in 1224, turning *Vissewaldus* into Vasilko. The motives in Henry’s Livonian chronicle and in the Sviatokhna story are not entirely consistent with one another, however. Cf.
the legendary part of the Lithuanian chronicles from the 15th and 16th centuries, which deals with the Polotsk princes of Lithuanian descent. Tatishchev’s immediate source here might have been the chronicle of Maciej Stryjkowski (d. 1586/93), which he held in high esteem, possibly already known to him via a hand-written Old Russian translation. In Stryjkowski’s chronicle the narrative of the legendary Lithuanian royal house of Polotsk appears as a chronological link precisely before the year 1217.39

It is clear from this that the Tatishchev ‘information’ cannot be used to compile the genealogy of the Daugava princes and that the reconstruction produced by Michael von Taube ceases to be plausible.40 There are no written sources on the origins of Vetseke and Vissewalde.41 The infrequent variant of Viachko (as a shortened form of Viacheslav) found in the Russian sources nonetheless suggests a connection with the Polotsk dynasty because that name sporadically appears among its descendants. A Viachko is mentioned in Novgorod in 1224,42 but so is a Prince Viachko in 1168, apparently linked to Polotsk, along with Prince Volodar of Minsk.43

Evgeniia Nazarova has concluded that Vissewalde was not a Riurikid prince called Vsevolod but rather either a Lettgallian or Lithuanian, or a Russian

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Tatishchev, История, vol. 3, pp. 200–01, 261; vol. 4, p. 461; Christian Kelch, Liefländische Historia oder Kurze und eigentliche Beschreibung . . . (Frankfurt-Leipzig, 1695), pp. 55–58, 67–68. In Tatishchev’s work the Sviatokhna story is preceded by the Russian attack on Odenpäh in 1217, which he bases on Kelch.


42 NL1, pp. 64, 268.

43 NL1, pp. 32, 220.
native to the area. What is certainly beyond doubt is that both Vsevolod and Viachko were rulers connected to Polotsk at some point and considered Christians of the Orthodox rite. Vsevolod and Viachko (Viateslav?) cannot be interpreted as Christian names given at baptism, but they concur well with the Polotsk dynastic tradition in which names like Vsevolod and with the suffix -slav (Briacheslav) appear. If one bears in mind the adjacent regions and the thriving commerce with Polotsk, it appears quite feasible that the princes in Latvian territory, regardless of their origin, were tied to Polotsk at least by marriage. These Daugava princes can be considered part of the Russian cultural sphere and political world, just as Vetseke (Viachko) was later in the service of Novgorod. In 1224, when Viachko ruled in Dorpat, he was undoubtedly regarded as a Russian prince in the political sense. It is therefore irrelevant for this study whether these small states on the Daugava arose indigenously or were set up as bases by Polotsk.

The influence of the Orthodox religion is crucial when assessing the relations between Rus’ and its neighbours. Modern historical and archaeological research into the process of Christianization in the Baltic tends to conceive of a local society that had accepted (elements of) Christianity to a certain degree, but in which no ecclesiastical organization had been established. Recently, the concept of ‘prehistoric Christians’ has been proposed to describe the phenomenon. What is important here is that, unlike the impression created in the crusading chronicles, there was no conflict between the ‘pagan’ and ‘Christian’ elements in religion, that is to say, ‘paganism’ was not first replaced by ‘Christianity’ prior to formal (compulsory) baptism, but rather supplemented.

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45 Taube, “Russische und litauische Fürsten,” pp. 397–98. Some of the individuals mentioned here by Michael von Taube are in fact legendary. See also Baumgarten, Généalogies, pp. 32–33 (incorporating some legendary figures in the family tree); Sahanovich, “Полацк,” p. 6.
46 HCL XIII.4, p. 69; XVII.3, p. 113.
If there was such a vague distinction between pagan and Christian, it follows that there is even less justification for positing a pre-crusade contrast between Catholicism and Orthodoxy in the Baltic.

The archaeological material for 11th- and 12th-century Latvia (mainly from the river Daugava region, but also the river Gauja area) includes notable amounts of cross-shaped pendants and similar objects, which could be testimony of the spread of Christianity. In Gerzike, and perhaps Kokenhusen too, there were Orthodox churches. The area of the findings suggesting an Orthodox background overlaps rather well with the Russian political sphere of influence and it is likely that the phenomenon is primarily linked with local social elite. Christian attributes therefore could just as well have functioned as status symbols. There may very well have been a quite large number of people baptized in the Daugava area, but baptism can also be seen more as a political than a religious act.

As well as Gerzike and Kokenhusen, Henry’s chronicle also mentions Orthodox Christians in Tolowa. Since this area was linked to Pskov, it follows that Christianity there was received through Pskov, even though the degree of dependency was weak. Baptism in Tolowa may have first occurred as an expression of rivalry with Riga at the beginning of the 13th century, perhaps even somewhat earlier, if this proved politically advantageous to the local leaders. They may have been baptized in Pskov or, alternatively, Russian clerics could have travelled to the region together with the collectors of tribute. There may also have been baptisms in Adsel, located between Tolowa and Pskov.

Basic Christian terminology in the modern Latvian language has been borrowed from Old Russian. Words such as baznīca (<божница, church), grēks
Proximity makes it likely that at least the eastern Estonians, too, were also familiar with Russian Orthodoxy. From the 19th century at the latest, when the question of ecclesiastical priority acquired major political significance in the then German Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire, a number of historians contrasted ‘violent’ Catholicization with ‘peaceful’ Orthodox missionizing in Estonia. These assumptions are based on the fact that some basic Christian words in Estonian are also regarded as borrowings from Old Slavonic: *rist* (<крестъ, cross); *raamat* (<грамата, book); *papp* (<попъ, priest); *pagan* (<поганинъ, pagan); *ristima* (<крестити, to baptize); *paast* (<постъ, fast). On the other hand, the words *pagan*, *rist* and *papp* could equally be Western loan words (derived from the Latin and Middle Low German *paganus, Christ, pope*).57

Just as Catholic baptism in Livonia by one of the competing institutions such as Riga or Lund begins to symbolize the political subjugation of the country or the people, the predominantly political significance of baptism also comes to light in the case of the Russian rulers when they start to baptize people of Livonia. More profound differences in faith and doctrine surely remained alien to everyone apart from the clergy. Laymen would perceive the external differences in ritual and the daily observance of different feast days, and other similar practices. An individual’s religious denomination served first and foremost as a sign of political affiliation or subservience. A change in power could therefore be accompanied by a simple ‘change in denomination’; when new priests appeared, the baptized (or religious communities if they existed) would change their religion accordingly, but more along the lines of changing from the ‘Polotsk faith’ to the ‘Riga faith’ rather than from the Greek church to the Latin church. It should not be forgotten that, whereas today being a Christian is understood to mean an individual’s personal conviction,
the sources in the 13th century saw the subjection of a territory to the control of the church hierarchy as an indication of Christianity.58

The type of relationship between the territory of what would be Catholic Livonia and the Russian principalities at the end of the 12th century is therefore far from clear. No regular tribute is recorded in the sources for the period around 1200 except the tribute of the Daugava Livs. However, the existence of some kind of patron-clientele relationship is plausible for eastern parts of Latvia. The regular military conflicts suggest that Russian princes did not succeed in creating permanent lordship in south-eastern Estonia, the contacts between the Baltic and Russian areas were close enough to allow the mediation of Christian ideas and other forms of cultural impact.

2.2 Bishop Meinhard of Livonia, Polotsk, and the Mission to the Livs

In the last quarter of the 12th century the lower Daugava river was the meeting ground of a whole range of different interests. Trade depended on the good will of the Livs and their leaders, still obliged to pay tribute to Polotsk. The centres of Kokenhusen and Gerzike, which controlled the Daugava crossings, were another factor in the balance of power. The Lithuanians increased their raids for plunder in the adjoining regions. These, what might be called, ‘indigenous’ groups were then joined in the second half of the 12th century by the merchants of Gotland, Westphalia, northern Germany, and Frisia.

Accompanying the northern German merchants who came to the Daugava was the Augustinian canon Meinhard from the monastery of Segeberg in Holstein. As Henry’s chronicle relates, Meinhard arrived in the early 1180s “with a band of merchants simply for the sake of Christ and only to preach”.59 Historians have drawn attention both to Meinhard’s shared social ties and interests with the merchant class.60 It is likely that he was descended from the

59 HCL 1.2, p. 2.
Bremen _ministeriales_ and thus his familial ties meant he was acquainted with most of the leading figures in the Livonian crusade.\(^61\)

The personal nature of this religious mission has often been stressed in the scholarship; the desire for secular rule over the Livs is said not to have emerged until later. Archbishop Hartwig II of Bremen ordained Meinhard as bishop of Livonia in 1186, obtaining confirmation from Rome for the new bishopric by 1188 at the latest. Meinhard's undertaking was therefore nonetheless supported and approved by the ecclesiastical hierarchy. But the time for such a far-reaching enterprise was not propitious for Bremen. After the death of Archbishop Siegfried (1180–84), Hartwig II (1184–1207), who was allied with Henry the Lion and had been the duke's notary since 1158, was ordained archbishop. During the fighting between the Welfs and the emperor in 1189, Hartwig was forced to flee his see. In 1192 the cathedral chapter elected as archbishop the Danish pretender to the throne, Bishop Valdemar of Schleswig (from 1178/82), who was himself detained by King Knud VI of Denmark from 1193 to 1206. Hartwig was able to recover his position in 1194. This meant that the metropolitan of Bremen had little possibility of influencing developments in Livonia during this period.\(^62\) On various occasions at the turn of the 12th and 13th centuries Hartwig II was obliged to fight against his own vassals, the burghers of Bremen, and Count Adolf of Holstein (d. 1203). It might be presumed that the common foes of the archbishop and the Danish king in the form of Valdemar of Schleswig and Adolf of Holstein would serve, at certain moments, to bring the two together. At the beginning of the 13th century, however, Hartwig came into conflict with both the Welfs and Denmark, losing estates owned by the archbishopric to both of them.\(^63\)

The churches of Hamburg-Bremen and Denmark, simultaneously as collaborators and rivals, had conquered the southern Baltic coast by this time and sent missions there. Both of these missionary powers now began to look further east, towards the commercially important region of Livonia. Merchant interests would, of course, have to be taken into account in any eastern endeavours. But it would hardly be to the advantage of merchants to provoke a conflict

\(^{61}\) Hucker, “Herkunft”.


with Rus’ and its schismatic church. Nor is it plausible to argue that Meinhard’s activities actually concealed plans for the subjection of the Russian church.64

Üxküll, a Livish village on Daugava River, became Meinhard’s base, and he began to build a church there.65 When castles were built at both Üxküll and Holme sometime during 1185 and 1186,66 their locations made it possible to supervise transport on the river and its north bank in the direction of the Latvian interior and Polotsk, as well as trade with Daugmale, the fortified trade settlement on the opposite bank of the Daugava.67 The fords at these locations made crossing the river possible, but the rapids prevented maritime ships from travelling further upstream.

Meinhard died in the second half of 1196. At the end of the same year Berthold, the former abbot of the Cistercian monastery of Loccum, was appointed his successor and ordained bishop of Livonia. With papal approval, he gathered a crusading army against the Livs and was killed while leading it in the summer of 1198. Obtaining this papal approval for the Livonian crusade would certainly not have been easy given that in 1197 a number of northern German nobles, including Archbishop Hartwig II of Bremen, had committed themselves to take part in the crusade of Emperor Henry VI to the Holy Land.68 Berthold was succeeded in 1199 by Bishop Albert, who would finally become a successful leader of the Livonian crusade and who in 1201 founded the first Livonian city, Riga, which then became the seat of the bishopric, taking over from Üxküll.

Historians have tried to explain why and how Meinhard’s ‘peaceful’ mission had turned into an endless succession of military campaigns by the time of Berthold and Albert. In truth, drawing such a stark contrast is not entirely justified. Already during Meinhard’s time the pope had promised indulgences to warriors “against the perfidious Livs”, while armed men also formed part

of Meinhard’s entourage. Meinhard’s repeated disagreements with the Livs, quite serious according to Henry’s account, had made it necessary to use military means to defend the positions already gained. The church of Üxküll had fields, animals and residential buildings, a stake in the castles of Holme and Üxküll as well as a household. The church must have obtained these possessions from the Livs. Therefore an attempt must have been made at some point to introduce the church’s financing system and begin levying taxes. The Rhymed Chronicle dates the start of tax collection in Livonia precisely to the time of Bishop Berthold. It was of course inevitable that its rejection by the Livs, which was seen as a rejection of the faith, was met with the use of force. The sources say nothing, on the other hand, about any conflicts with Polotsk. It is hardly plausible that the church would have acquired its possessions to the detriment of Polotsk’s interests.

Meinhard in fact began his activity in the area of influence of the Polotsk princes, although it is extremely difficult to investigate his relationship with them because so little is known about the history of Polotsk in this period. The main source for the principality for the period around 1200 is the Chronicle of Henry of Livonia, whose earlier part, based mainly on oral tradition, raises a number of difficulties. For example, the chronicle refers in the context of the beginning of Meinhard’s missionary work c. 1184 to the Polotsk prince Woldemarus, i.e. Vladimir. He is again named later in the chronicle for 1206, this time already after Henry’s presumed arrival in Livonia c. 1205. This prince died suddenly in 1216. It is entirely feasible that he had governed for over thirty years, but, on the other hand, his existence is not attested to anywhere in the Russian sources. According to the archaeological evidence, the 12th century was Polotsk’s cultural and economic golden age, albeit accompanied by political fragmentation as the principality broke up into ever smaller parts (Polotsk, 69 HCL II.3, p. 9; cf. I.12, pp. 6–7; Raoul Zühlke, “Bischof Meinhard von Üxküll: ein friedlicher Missionar? Ansätze zu einer Neubewertung. Ein quellenkundlicher Werkstatthericht,” Hansische Geschichtsblätter 127 (2009), 101–21 cf. Marian Dygo, “Mission und Kreuzzug in den Anfängen der Christianisierung Livlands,” in Kryžiaus kary epocha Baltijos regiono tauty̆̄ istorinėje sąmonėje. Mokslinių straipsnių rinkinys, ed. Rita Regina Trimonienė and Robertas Jurgaitis (Šiauliai, 2007), pp. 66–84.

70 HCL II.2, pp. 8–9.

71 LR, line 527; cf. HCL II.7, p. 11 (priestly tax, 1198); cf. Hucker, “Zisterzienserabt Bertold,” p. 49, who is clearly mistaken in making a connection between the tax and the Polotsk tribute. The tithe was introduced in Livonia before 1207: HCL XI.3, p. 49.


73 HCL I.3, p. 2; XI.1, p. 32; cf. V.3, p. 16; VII.4, p. 21.
Vitebsk, Minsk, Drutsk, Logoiik). The interrelated and continually changing princes of the Iziaslavich dynasty (a local branch of the Riurikids)\textsuperscript{74} who ruled these areas lost their wider political significance, disappearing as a result from the Russian chronicles. In Polotsk the Veche (the town assembly) was probably able to increase in importance at the princes’ expense.\textsuperscript{75} Its former subordinate towns competed for the right to send their prince to rule in Polotsk. In addition to potential armed conflict, the decisive role was played by the Veche itself.

Prince Vladimir appears in at least nine or ten different contexts in the historical genealogies. According to the well-known genealogist Nikolai Baumgarten (1867–1939), he was the son of Volodar Glebovich of Minsk, i.e. the uncle of King Valdemar II of Denmark (1170–1241).\textsuperscript{76} No backing for this assumption can be found in the sources, however. Polotsk’s significant decline in power, which is also reflected in the confusion about its genealogy, explains why the Daugava principalities appear as independent powers in Henry’s chronicle and why Polotsk was not capable of defending its interests in Livonian territory.\textsuperscript{77}

From a Russian point of view, the end of the 12th century was a difficult period for Polotsk in terms of its external relations and/or in economic terms. One manifestation of this is the fact that around the turn of the century its previously magnificent construction activity came to a halt.\textsuperscript{78}

The genealogy and chronology of the princes of Polotsk in the second half of the 12th century is therefore extremely confused due to this paucity in the sources. On one occasion the Russian chronicle says that there was no prince in the city (1185/86).\textsuperscript{79} The date of Vladimir’s ascension to power remains unclear.

\textsuperscript{74} The descendants of the daughter of the Varangian prince Rogvolod or Ragnvaldr of Polotsk and of Grand Prince Vladimir Sviatoslavich.


\textsuperscript{76} Baumgarten, Généalogies, pp. 32–33. See also Alekseev, Полоцкая земля в IX–XIII вв., p. 282.

\textsuperscript{77} Alekseev, “Полоцкая земля,” p. 238.

\textsuperscript{78} Alekseev, Полоцкая земля в IX–XIII вв., pp. 193–219.

\textsuperscript{79} NL1, pp. 37–38, 228; Лаврентьевская летопись, pp. 403–04; Georgii V. Shtykhov, Древний Полоцк IX–ХIII вв. (Minsk, 1975), pp. 13–14; Alekseev, Полоцкая земля в IX–XIII
Is Henry’s chronicle therefore mistaken in its mention of Vladimir c. 1184 insofar as the chronicler has projected a contemporary figure onto the past? One hypothesis is that there might have been no prince at all in Polotsk during the last decade of the 12th century, which would in turn mean that there was no effective military force there. Polotsk and Chernigov fought together against Smolensk c. 1195–97. Nikolai Karamzin (1766–1826) claimed on the basis of the so-called Trinity Chronicle, which was burned during the Moscow fire of 1812, that a certain Prince Vasilko of Polotsk had taken part in this campaign. The link between Vasilko and Polotsk was evidently not based on the chronicles, however, but was adduced by Karamzin himself. An unnamed Polotsk prince invaded the territory of Lithuania in 1201; Lithuanians had previously plundered the Lovat region, which meant having to cross Polotsk’s terrain. Immediately following this the Novgorod chronicle narrates that the Novgorodians and the men of Velikiye Luki had gone on a foray to Lettgallia, which may possibly suggest the dependence of part of Lettgallian territory on Polotsk. Vladimir’s origin and the date of his ascent to power thus remain unresolved, but we are entitled to assume Polotsk’s relative weakness as a military power. Meanwhile the impact of the growing strength of neighbouring Lithuania on Polotsk, Kokenhusen, and Gerzike becomes apparent.

Having travelled to the Daugava with German merchants, Meinhard proceeded to obtain permission (licencia) from the prince of Polotsk to whom the Livs paid tribute, before starting his missionary work and building the church in Üxküll. The prince also gave Meinhard gifts. This may have occurred c. 1184. When in 1188 Pope Clement III confirmed the bishopric of Üxküll, which belonged to the ecclesiastical province of Bremen, it was described as located in Ruthenia. Since it was the archbishop who had sent the notifi-
cation to Rome, the diploma reflects the Bremen point of view, according to which Üxküll was located in Rus’. For the merchants who travelled along the Daugava to Russian towns, Üxküll was indeed the gateway to Rus’.

The fact that permission was granted by Polotsk signifies that its control of the Livs was beyond question and that Meinhard was seen there much more as an ally than an opponent. Obtaining permission from local rulers for missionary work was, for example, established practice in Pomerania. Moreover, the Russians were regarded as Christians, not as pagans, and relations between merchants and Polotsk were secure and stable. The work of Meinhard and his aides, carried out at first to a modest extent, did not result in any changes to existing relations. He adapted his activity to the prevalent conditions of trade on the Daugava, which was used by German and Scandinavian merchants as well as by Russian traders. The mutual exchange of gifts was part of diplomatic etiquette. Avoiding potential conflicts was surely also in the merchants’ interests.87

Therefore, Üxküll was indeed within Rus’ at this time. The older Livonian Rhymed Chronicle says that the river Daugava comes from the land of the Russians, that the Selonians lived next to the Russians and that the lands of the Selonians, Livs, and Lettgallians had been in the hands of the Russians before the foundation of the Order of the Sword Brothers. The master of the Order had driven the Russians back to their own land.88 There is no indication during Meinhard’s time that Polotsk’s rule over the Livs was indirectly under threat. Their duty to pay tribute does not appear to have borne any relation to the success or failure of the missionary enterprise.89

The construction of castles in Üxküll and Holme might have come to pose a threat to Polotsk.90 But Meinhard’s church held only one of the shares during building work; in Üxküll his personal share amounted to a fifth. Moreover, according to Henry of Livonia, the castles were built for defensive purposes against the Lithuanians. The ever more frequent and devastating Lithuanian raids constituted a threat to all powers on the Daugava, including Polotsk. The

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90 HCL I.5–9, pp. 3–4; Nazarova, “Регион,” pp. 74–75.
Novgorod Chronicle mentions the first Lithuanian pillage of Pskov under the year 1183.⁹¹ If it occasionally appears that Polotsk was on the Lithuanian side, one must allow for the possibility that the Polotsk princes or the cliques in power may have changed, as well as the fact that in Lithuania too there were a number of rulers who might be on hostile terms with one another. Even the building of the castles at a time when the church of Üxküll was still dependent on the Livs did not therefore necessarily signify opposition to Polotsk. Meinhard’s activity did not affect the interests of the Polotsk, Vitebsk, and Smolensk merchants and their unrestricted access to the sea.⁹² In the trade treaties from the 13th century all Russian merchants were granted the right to call at other Baltic Sea harbours. The ability to find protection from the Lithuanian raids was generally advantageous to trade.

Another subject in its own right is the creation of a new basis for interfaith relations in Liv and Latvian territory. Bishop Dionisii of Polotsk died in 1184; he was succeeded by Nikolai the Greek, the former bishop of Rostov.⁹³ A contentious attitude towards Catholicism might indeed be expected of a prelate of Byzantine origin, but he was hardly in a position to influence princely politics. On the other hand, there is no confirmation in the sources for the argument that the Roman curia had already seen the possibility of extending Meinhard's missions to Orthodox regions.⁹⁴ The location of the new bishopric “in Rus’” could potentially have been linked to the other meagre knowledge of Rus’ available in Rome and raised the hope that the bishopric based at Üxküll would be able to enlarge its sphere of influence. But such a hope is nowhere in evidence in the confirmation letter from Pope Clement III cited above, and it is doubtful whether such a prospect ever held practical importance for the churches of Bremen or Üxküll, let alone the Roman curia.

If one were to see any influence at all by the papacy on missionary activity in Livonia under Meinhard, then one may perhaps find it in the politics of the Danish kings. The Danish annals speak of a crusade led by King Knud VI (1182–1202) against Estonia in 1196 or 1197.⁹⁵ Danish knights also took part in a crusade to the Holy Land in 1197, as did Archbishop Hartwig of Bremen and Emperor Henry VI. One of Meinhard’s most important collaborators was the

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⁹¹ NL1, pp. 37, 227.
⁹³ Shchapov, Государство, p. 207.
Cistercian Theodoric (d. 1219), who may have visited the curia on more than one occasion with the Danish Archbishop Anders Sunesen (c. 1167–1228) of Lund during his stay in Rome. Henry’s chronicle relates in connection with Theodoric’s Rome visit that the pope decided that “they [the Livs] ought to be forced to observe the faith which they had freely promised”, that “already then the same bishop”, with the duke of Sweden, the Germans, and the Gotlanders, had launched an offensive against the Curonians, but was driven by storm onto the coast of Vironia, where they (the Swedes etc.) plundered for three days. The army was apparently led by the dux Suecie, most likely the Swedish Birger Jarl Broda (d. 1202). In fact, “the same bishop” seems to mean the still future bishop Theodoric. Scholarly views diverge as to whether two separate campaigns are at issue, a Swedish and a Danish one, or whether Henry, who learned of these events much later through hearsay and consistently played down Denmark’s participation in developments in Livonia, is silent about the king’s participation. After the death of Knut Eriksson (1195/96), the representative of the rival dynasty, Sverker Karlsson, who was closely related to the Danish kings, was elected Sweden’s ruler. A joint campaign by Sweden and Denmark during 1196–97 is quite feasible therefore.

In this context, Paul Johansen considers it accurate to speak of a major attack by Rus’ against the peoples living on the eastern Baltic coast. The Novgorodians raided Tavastia in Finland for booty in 1186; men from Pskov killed “[some] Chud people of the coast” in 1190, after which the Chuds towed their seven boats “along the rapids”, in other words perhaps on the river Narva,
“to the lake” (Lake Peipus). The following year the Novgorodians together with the Karelians launched an attack on Tavastia by boat. After that Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich of Novgorod surprisingly made an agreement with Polotsk to undertake a joint offensive against the Chuds or the Lithuanians, and then in winter, together with forces from Novgorod and Pskov, they captured first Dorpat and somewhat later Odenpäh in Ugaunia (Estonia).\(^{104}\) Knud VI’s earlier military campaign against Finland in 1191 was, according to Johansen, retaliation for these actions. However, the sources do not permit us to draw any connection between the Tavastia and the Ugaunia offensives of Novgorod, and the initial indecisiveness about whether Lithuania or Estonia would be the target of the attack indicates that these campaigns were purely plundering raids. The initial stage of the Livonian crusades did not bring any conflict with Rus’.

2.3 The Crusade in Livonia under Bishop Albert of Riga (1199–1229)

When the emperor Henry VI (1165–97) died in 1197, Otto IV (1175/76–1218), the son of Duke Henry the Lion (1129–95), and Philip (1177–1208), the son of Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa (c. 1122–90), were elected German kings the following year. Additionally, Henry VI’s own son Frederick II (1194–1250) had been elected king as a child when Henry was still alive. The rivalry among the claimants and papal recognition of the imperial coronation became the main feature of international diplomacy in early 13th-century Europe.

In northern Germany this conflict initially brought about an alliance between Otto IV and King Valdemar I of Denmark. One of the consequences of this alliance was to limit the capacity of the archbishopric of Hamburg-Bremen as a crusading power in the Baltic, since its incumbents became embroiled in the disputes over the imperial succession. When Archbishop Hartwig died in November 1207, the Bremen chapter reelected the Danish king’s erstwhile enemy, Bishop Valdemar of Schleswig, as the new archbishop. The following year the Hamburg chapter, whose territorial lord was the Danish king, proceeded to appoint the Bremen cathedral provost Burchard as archbishop, but he soon stepped down. The pope declared the Bremen election invalid, but Valdemar of Schleswig refused to accept the papal decision. He fled from Rome following his excommunication, and, with the help of King Philip, took up his position in Bremen. When Philip was murdered in the summer of 1208, Otto became the confirmed imperial pretender, whereupon he prepared to recover his royal power in Nordalbingia. Otto and the northern

\(^{104}\) NL1, pp. 38–40, 228–31.
German rulers waged war together on Denmark. Archbishop Valdemar was forced to leave Bremen in 1209, but returned shortly later. In 1214–15 the Danish king was victorious in fighting against the northern German nobles and in 1217 Valdemar of Schleswig (d. 1236) renounced Bremen once and for all. Gerhard of Oldenburg (d. 1219), allied with Denmark, had been elected archbishop in 1210 and he was now formally recognized.

The Danish church was led at the time by Anders Sunesen, the archbishop of Lund. As the primate of Sweden, he was in a position to interfere also in the affairs of the church in Finland. In 1206, before the start of a Danish campaign against Òsel, he was granted the right to appoint bishops in the surrounding pagan regions. At the beginning of the 13th century Denmark was, without doubt, the great power in the Baltic. The initiatives of Meinhard, Berthold, and Albert belonged in their initial stages in the same context as the Danish crusades against the pagans along the eastern Baltic coast. Moreover, it may be surmised that the Danish king laid claim to Livonia and Estonia as belonging to his area of influence even at the beginning of Albert’s activity. Denmark was able to take control of the port of Lübeck, allowing the king to oversee trade with Livonia. Albert approached King Knud VI of Denmark as early as 1199. This did not by any means signify the division of areas of influence, however. There could be no true equivalence between a missionary bishop with no real power and the most powerful ruler in the region. Albert could probably rely on the king’s good will, which itself may have entailed recognition of the king’s hegemony.

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Early in 1206 King Valdemar II, Anders Sunesen, and Bishop Nicholas of Schleswig (1192/1209–33), also the king’s chancellor, went on crusade to Ösel. A new castle was built there, although it had to be surrendered when the Danish position later became highly insecure. The army returned with the king to Denmark, but Anders Sunesen, who was one of the most cultivated men of his time, and Nicholas of Schleswig stayed on. They spent the winter with their entourages in Riga—coinciding with Bishop Albert’s absence—where they imparted doctrinal teaching. Apart from these pious objectives, this sojourn also appears to have served as a demonstration of Danish supremacy. Thus Sunesen later represented the Danish king in Reval. The king also had pretensions to control the south-eastern Baltic: some years afterwards the Danes also attacked Prussia.

The archbishopric of Lund also had certain interests in Sweden. Sverker Karlsson had come to the throne after the death of Knut Eriksson in 1196. He was descended from the rival lineage related to the Danish monarchy through marriage. The other pretender, the minor Erik Knutsson, obtained support from Norway. In 1204–05 Erik Knutsson led a revolt in Sweden against Sverker, who fled to Denmark. At the Battle of Lena in 1208 the Danish army under Anders’ brother, Bishop Peder Sunesen of Roskilde (d. 1214), was defeated, and Sverker and Archbishop Valerius of Uppsala were forced to remain in exile in Denmark. After a further Danish defeat in 1210 and the death of Sverker, Valdemar of Denmark and Erik of Sweden agreed peace, with the latter marrying Valdemar’s sister. This context helps to explain Lund’s influence on the Christianization of Finland. Bearing in mind the intermittently subordinate position of the archbishop of Uppsala to Lund and the dynastic background to the dispute for the Swedish throne, the mission to Finland represented a joint undertaking between Lund and Uppsala rather than an attempt to subject Finland to Lund at Uppsala’s expense.

After this period of warfare in northern Germany, the Danish king continued the conquest of Estonia in 1219 by attacking Reval. His vassal and ally Count Albert of Holstein (and Orlamünde, d. 1245) was already in Livonia...
during 1217–18. The pope had granted Count Albert approval at the beginning of 1217 allowing the count’s vassals who had taken crusading vows to the Holy Land to go to Livonia instead. However, soon a violent disagreement erupted between King Valdemar II and Bishop Albert. The Danish king claimed sovereignty over the whole of Estonia and Livonia. The Riga camp refused to recognize this, giving rise to one of the central motive forces in Livonian history over the following decades: the conflict between Denmark and the other powers in Livonia, itself further complicated by the already apparent differences between Bishop Albert and the Sword Brothers. The church in Livonia had emerged as a force to be taken seriously over the course of the preceding twenty years or so. It was capable, despite the internal conflicts, of resisting the ambitions of the Danish king in Livonia. Bishop Albert of Riga found backing against Lund and his own mother church in Bremen from the archbishops of Magdeburg. He may also have received support from secular rulers in Germany. For example, Bernd Ulrich Hucker sees Livonia as the ‘crusading ground’ of Otto IV. Thus Bishop Philip of Ratzburg (d. 1215), a follower of Otto IV, had gone to Livonia after the latter’s excommunication in 1210. Charters issued by Otto when he was already excommunicated enabled the military order founded in Livonia, the Sword Brothers, to secure for itself the Estonian lands of Sackala and Ugaunia in 1212 at the expense of local bishops. Livonia’s internal conflicts also included the supposed plan of the nobleman Bernard of Lippe (c. 1140–1224) to set up a hereditary secular kingdom in Livonia and Estonia. This was at odds with the plans of both Bishop Albert and the Danish king. At the same time, Bernard’s son, Archbishop Gerhard of Bremen

112 DD 1/5, no. 101. Cf. also DD 1/5, no. 61.

The attack on Wiek in 1220 led by King Johan Sverkersson of Sweden, who had succeeded to the throne in 1216 after the death of his rival Erik Knutsson, and his bishops was much more a challenge to Riga than to Denmark. The Swedes appear to have had good relations with the Danes in Estonia.\footnote{HCL XXIV.3, pp. 172–73; Nyberg, “Kreuzzug,” pp. 189–94.} In May 1223 King Valdemar was taken prisoner by Count Henry of Schwerin. The king’s imprisonment and the subsequent defeat at the Battle of Bornhöved in 1227 led to the collapse of Denmark’s supremacy in the Baltic countries, including in Livonia.

The attempt to find a solution to all these conflicts resulted in the delegation of a papal legate to Livonia at the request of Bishop Albert. Pope Honorius III appointed Bishop William of Modena (d. 1251), his former vice-chancellor. The legate had arrived in Livonia by June of 1225 at the latest. William had been appointed legate for Livonia and Prussia, Holstein, and the “Baltic islands.”\footnote{Donner, \textit{Kardinal Wilhelm}, pp. 45–48, 73–88, 133–34, 414–19.}

In the autumn following the legate’s arrival a war broke out in Estonia between the Rigans and the Danes over Vironia. According to Henry’s chronicle, its instigators were the vassals of the bishop of Leal (renamed Dorpat in 1235 after the actual location of the cathedral) at Odenpäh and the elders of Vironia. To resolve the conflict William of Modena, as arbitrator, brought the lands of Vironia, Jerwia, and Wiek under his temporary control under threat of ecclesiastical punishment. Having proved incapable, however, of solving the conflict before his departure, he later delegated his powers to his chaplain John. Even while William was still waiting for an opportunity to leave, Johannes von Dolen, a vassal of the bishop of Leal (Dorpat), began the conquest of Vironia. In the summer of 1227 the Rigans occupied northern Estonia and also seized Reval after besieging it. Both the chaplain John and the Danes then left the country, and in northern Estonia the Sword Brothers consolidated their power.\footnote{See the sometimes rather hypothetical account of events in Paul Johansen, \textit{Die Estlandliste des Liber census Daniae} (Copenhagen-Reval, 1933), pp. 704–10.} The legate’s task had been aimed, within the scope of his
powers, at solving the Danish-Rigan conflict. On no account did it repre-
sent an attempt to establish an ecclesiastical quasi-state structure in northern 
Europe which could then serve the curia as a base from which to coordinate a 
policy aimed at the subjection of Rus'.

2.3.1 **The Rigan Church and the Daugava Principalities**

For Bishop Albert, who was from the same milieu and region as the other bish-
ops of Livonia, that is to say the northern German *ministeriales*, the depen-
dence of the Daugava estuary region on his pagan and schismatic neighbours 
was not a new development. The small bishopric had to find a way of peace-
fully coexisting as far as possible with its more powerful neighbours, since, 
prior to the foundation of the Order of the Sword Brothers in c. 1202, it was 
otherwise reliant on the help of the crusaders who, for the most part, were 
there only temporarily. Peace meant the opportunity to trade, which the 
church’s economic well-being also depended upon. The more or less stable 
peace guaranteed the militarily weak church its existence. The Christians not 
only made peace with the local pagans in the face of their common enemy—
the Lithuanians—but also joined in alliances with them. The peace agreed 
with the Curonians in 1201 was, “as is the pagan custom”, sealed with a blood 
sacrifice. The following year peace was also concluded *more gentilium* with 
the Semgallians, later evolving into a military alliance. Following defeat at 
the hands of the Lithuanians in 1208, the leaders of Riga are still supposed to 
have decided no longer to fight with one group of pagans against the other 
in future. In the diplomatic practice of Rus’ and its western neighbours it 
was, moreover, acceptable to agree treaties according to the Russian way, by

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120 Mihkel Mäesalu, “Päpstliche Gewalt im Kreuzzugsgebiet: Gründete Wilhelm von Modena 
in Estland einen ’Pufferstaat’?” *Forschungen zur baltischen Geschichte* 6 (2011), 11–30; 

121 As argued by Jaakkola, *Suomen varhaiskeskiaika*, pp. 215, 220–23; Michael von Taube, 
“Internationale und kirchenpolitische Wandlungen im Ostbalktium und Russland 
zur Zeit der deutschen Eroberung Livlands (12. und 13. Jahrhundert),” *Jahrbücher für 

122 HCL V.2–3, p. 16.

Treaties with the Infidel on the Northern Frontier, 1200–1390,” *Journal of Medieval History* 

kissing the cross.\textsuperscript{125} There was a continual presence of pagans in Riga\textsuperscript{126} solely as a consequence of the commercial importance acquired by the new city in such a short space of time. There were even pagans among Bishop Meinhard’s personal staff: the pope had granted Meinhard permission to allow pagans to bring him food when sermonizing among them.\textsuperscript{127}

One would expect therefore that if the paganism of the ‘other’ side was not an obstacle to the formation of alliances then this would be even less problematic in the case of the Christian Russians. Yet difficulties soon came to light in Bishop Albert’s relations with Polotsk. The prince of Polotsk “unexpectedly” invaded Livonia in 1203, attacking the castle of Üxküll. The Livs paid a ransom to free themselves from the encirclement. When the prince decided to attack the castle of Holme afterwards, its archers injured so many horses that the ‘Russians’ did not dare to try to cross the Daugava to the island and left.\textsuperscript{128} Prince \textit{Wiscewalde} of Gerzike also came with the Lithuanians as far as Riga; he robbed the castles of their flocks and took two priests prisoner.\textsuperscript{129} The chronicle does not give the impression that these campaigns by Polotsk and Gerzike took place simultaneously. The episodes are nonetheless recounted one after the other and may allude to collaboration between the princes.

The motives for the Polotsk military campaign of 1203 have been accounted for in different ways by historians. The chronicler Arnold of Lübeck (d. 1211/14) relates that:

\begin{quote}

the Russian prince of Polotsk at one time tried to collect tribute from these Livs, which the bishop [Albert] refused to let him do. He therefore launched heavy attacks on the country and the city. But God in his grace always protected His family in need.\textsuperscript{130}
\end{quote}

It is for this reason that scholars have identified the cause of the attack in the failure to collect tribute from the Livs. The Livs, now already paying the church

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{126} HCL IX.14, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{127} LUB 3, no. 10a.
\textsuperscript{128} HCL VII.4, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{129} HCL VII.5, p. 22; cf. HCL VIII.1, pp. 23–24.
\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Arnoldi Chronica} V.30, p. 212: “Siquidem rex Rucie de Ploceke de ipsis Livonibus quandoque tributum colligere consueverat, quod ei episcopus negabat. Unde sepìus graves insultus ipsi terre et civitati sepe dicte faciebat. Sed Deus adiutor in oportunitatibus suos semper protegebat.”
\end{flushright}
taxes, were not paying any tribute and the old system by which it had been handed over no longer worked, with the result that the prince of Polotsk came with his army to collect it. The bishop of Riga, as lord of the Livs, was either unable to pay the tribute himself or did not wish to from fear that the relationship of subservience to the prince entailed by tribute could then extend to the person of the bishop.131 The modern biographer of Bishop Albert, Gisela Gnegel-Waitschies, has broadened the issue of the tribute into a directly constitutional question. The tithe introduced by Albert for the Livs had not only affected payment of the tribute to Polotsk; it also demonstrated the desire to establish a new principality in the region.132 It must indeed be recognized in this context that the bishop of Riga had developed a certain degree of control over the Livs, albeit shaky, by the fifth year of Albert’s episcopate, and the first signs were emerging of a new state not prepared to pay heed to the interests of the princes of Polotsk.133

During fighting against the Livs in 1205 the Rigan troops reached the castle of Ascheraden (modern Aizkraukle, Latvia), which they burned down and captured. The “Latin pilgrims” were then only three miles from Kokenhusen, whose prince Vetseke sent a messenger to ask the bishop for an escort, resulting in the signing of a peace treaty with Riga.134 Historians have explained these events firstly with the hypothesis that Viachko had taken part in Polotsk’s campaign two years earlier—for which there is no evidence in the sources—and he now feared that Albert, who had reached the Daugava with a strong army of pilgrims, would take revenge.135 The real threat posed to Viachko by Riga’s expanding zone of control is also cited as a possible cause.136 On the other hand, for Albert peace meant establishing safe borders with his only Christian (albeit schismatic) neighbour.

Early in 1206 Bishop Albert sent Theodoric, then abbot of the Cistercian monastery of Dünamünde (founded in 1205), as emissary to Vladimir of Polotsk bearing gifts and “wishing to acquire the friendship and intimacy…which he had shown to his predecessor, Bishop Meinhard”. However, Lithuanian bandits

132 Gnegel-Waitschies, Bischof Albert, pp. 69–70.
134 HCL IX.10, pp. 30–31; cf. XI.8, pp. 55–56.
135 Keussler, Ausgang, p. 17.
136 Gnegel-Waitschies, Bischof Albert, p. 73; Benninghoven, Orden, p. 71.
(latrunculi) robbed the abbot and his entourage along the way. In Polotsk it turned out that Liv emissaries had already sought the prince's help against the Germans. They blamed the bishop for the violence and called the “yoke of the faith” an excessive burden. This alludes to the severity of the duty to pay church taxes, particularly if this was on top of the tribute to Polotsk, although it is not possible to show either payment or non-payment of the tribute at this specific time. Under the influence of the complaints from the Livs, the prince of Polotsk failed to confirm the desired peace to Abbot Theodoric. Theodoric instead learned that the Livs and Polotsk planned to act jointly against Riga. He managed to send a message to Riga, upon which some crusaders and Albert delayed their planned departure westwards. When the abbot and the other emissaries returned to Riga, Vladimir sent his envoys with them with the intention that they act as arbiters in the conflict between the Livs and the bishop. It can be gathered from the account that the Russians were in Kokenhusen, from where a certain deacon Stephen of Polotsk was sent to Riga, together with Theodoric, to invite Albert to a meeting on the river Ogre. At the same time, the Russians began to raise an army, inviting the Livs and the Lettgallians to join them, which the latter declined. Albert cancelled the meeting on the Ogre, claiming that, although he was willing to receive the envoys from Polotsk, nowhere was it customary for a prince himself to go to meet such men. According to Henry, the meeting was in any case merely a ruse to lure the bishop from the city so as to harm him. After the failure of the arbitration, the Livs gathered together an army with the Lithuanians but were defeated by the Rigans and their allies at the Battle of Holme in 1206.

The sources give the impression that the bishop was trying to prevent the Livs receiving support from Polotsk in their conflict with the church of Riga, but Theodoric's embassy should not be understood as a refusal by Riga to pay tribute on behalf of the Livs. Albert simply wanted an agreement of the kind that had been possible when Meinhard was alive and intended to leave the country without waiting to see if any difficulties arose. The willingness of the Livs to join Polotsk's army was motivated by their desire to rid themselves of Riga's power over them. However, it may also—unlike the Lettgallians—indicate their former duty to provide military service to the Russian princes.

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137 HCL X.1, pp. 32–33. The robbery also allowed Henry to justify Theodoric's failure since without bringing any gifts Theodoric could hardly expect concessions from the prince.
138 HCL X.2, pp. 33–34.
139 HCL X.3, pp. 34–35.
140 HCL X.4, p. 35.
The attempt by the Livs to obtain the support of the Polotsk prince in turn indicates a willingness on their part to pay tribute. Insofar as Vladimir set the date and time of the meeting and sent his representatives there, he was acting like a judge in an argument between subordinates. This evidently reflected earlier practice on the lower Daugava. Albert, on the other hand, who could count on the support of two castles, the city of Riga, the Sword Brothers, and the crusaders, felt strong enough in his position to act as an independent ruler. Meanwhile, Henry’s chronicle portrays the Livs, not Polotsk, as the root of all evil. The castle of Holme had been taken from them now so that they could never again call up the “Russians and pagans” against the Christians. Polotsk must certainly have considered it its duty to protect the Livs from new burdens, which was precisely what Vladimir was now trying to enforce.

After the victory against the Livs at Holme, Albert and the crusaders left the country. Vladimir together with the neighbouring princes then completed the deployment of the army previously under way and began to lay siege to Holme, although the Lettgallians still repeatedly refused to serve in his army. After an eleven-day siege, Vladimir, who feared another landing by the crusaders, withdrew without having captured the castle. Polotsk had failed in its attempt to recover its effectively lost position of power along the lower Daugava.

Early the following year, in 1207, when Albert returned to the Daugava with the crusaders, Prince Viachko of Kokenhusen arrived in Riga with his retinue. After extensive negotiations, he asked, according to Henry’s chronicle, for help against the Lithuanians, offering Albert half of his land and its castle at Kokenhusen in return. Having made this promise, the treaty was agreed. There is consensus among scholars that the danger posed by Lithuania, which apparently forced Viachko to agree such a treaty, was real. The interests of trade too required that something be done to ward off Lithuanian incursions. The existence of two principalities with small hinterlands in the Daugava region would have hardly been possible without the profits brought by trade. Albert himself needed support against the Lithuanians. However, Kokenhusen


143 HCL X.8, pp. 37–39.

144 HCL X.9, p. 39.

145 HCL X.12, pp. 41–42.

146 HCL XI.2, p. 48.

was simultaneously under threat from Riga. The treaty agreed with the bishop was manifestly unequal. The danger inherent in it was demonstrated by the events of 1208, when the men of the knight Daniel of Lennewarden, a vassal of Bishop Albert, unexpectedly captured Kokenhusen. Although they “did not dare to kill the Russians because they, too, were Christians”, they pursued one part into flight and another they took prisoner. Following pressure from Albert, Viachko was released and was reinstated with his castle and his looted possessions. Furthermore, he was given soldiers and masons in compliance with the earlier agreement. This does indeed show an attempt by the bishop to take possession of half of the castle of Kokenhusen. The bishop’s men did not defer to the prince of Kokenhusen and some of them were killed by the Russians. The booty was sent by Viachko, together with a call to arms against Riga, to Vladimir in Polotsk. He was already in the process of raising an army when it transpired that Albert and the crusaders, contrary to all expectations, had still not left that year. When the Russians heard this, they and the Lettgallians and Selonians living there burned the castle of Kokenhusen to the ground and fled, “each one on his own way”. Viachko left somewhere in the direction of Rus’.148 Those fleeing were pursued: any Lettgallians and Selonians (obliged to pay tribute to Viachko) found and some Russians were killed as traitors.149

It appears that Daniel’s attack did not reflect Albert’s policy. It was either related to border disputes or a personal interest of this powerful vassal that did not coincide with the bishop’s interests.150 But Albert certainly made use of the situation to take control of the castle. It is not known where Viachko went when he surrendered defence of the castle. He may have put himself and his retinue at the service of another Russian prince or principality. All that is known is that he was in the service of Novgorod in 1223.

It is notable that religious differences do not come to light in Henry’s narrative of these events. Undoubtedly this was a clash between two powers with rather different political and cultural customs, but not one between the Eastern and Western churches. At stake was the expansion and loss of a local position of power. Hence, the Kokenhusen Russians were not killed because they were Christians, unlike the pagans. Viachko spent Easter in Riga with Bishop Albert as an honoured noble guest during the peace negotiation in 1207. One must assume that he took part in the cycle of church services during his stay.

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148 HCL XI.8–9, pp. 55–58.
149 HCL XII.1, p. 58.
When Bishop Albert returned to Riga with the crusaders in early 1209, he set out with his army for Kokenhusen, besieging it once again so that Riga could not be harmed by the "subtlety of the Lithuanians or false trickery of the Russians". A third of the castle now fell into the possession of the Sword Brothers. Even though the castle had been abandoned only about a year before, the chronicler narrates that it was "full of snakes and worms because of the filthiness (immundicia) of the former inhabitants." According to Christoph Schmidt, "snake" in this context was a metaphor for the Russians. He cites the description of Theodoric's embassy in 1206 as a comparison, in which the chronicler, paraphrasing Virgil, exposes the deceitfulness of Prince Vladimir of Polotsk: he bit like a snake in the grass. A schismatic may indeed count as a traitor to the church; in the context of the period's political history, however, it is likely that in this case political treachery rather than religious difference is what is meant.

At the beginning of spring that same year Albert discussed with the other leaders of the Rigan camp "how the new church could be freed from the plots of the Russians and Lithuanians". After remembering the damage that the prince of Gerzike had inflicted upon Riga, the Livs, and the Letts with the help of the Lithuanians, they decided to go to war against him:

For Prince Vsevolod of Gerzike had always been an enemy of the Christian name and especially of the Latins. He had taken the daughter of one of the more powerful Lithuanians as his wife and was, accordingly, almost one of them, since he was their son-in-law. Joined thus to them in all the bonds of friendship and family ties, he often acted as the leader of their army and helped them cross the Daugava river and supplied food whether they went to Russia, Livonia, or Estonia.

The danger posed by Lithuania at the time was allegedly so great that everyone fled to the forest, not only the Russians and the Livs but also the Letts. Here the chronicler sees the Christians as suffering together from the pagan attacks, although the Russians are somewhat ridiculed for fleeing like rabbits from such a small Lithuanian contingent. Hence, by joining forces with the Lithuanians, Vsevolod had even excluded himself from the Russian Christian faithful too.

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151 HCL XIII.1, p. 66. In the Old Testament *immunditia* describes ritual impurity and in the New Testament the lifestyle contrary to a holy life.  
153 HCL XIII.4, p. 69.
When the bishop’s army approached the castle of Gerzike, the Russians took refuge in the castle but were still defeated. According to Henry, the victors, “out of respect for the Christian name, killed only few of them. They took more captive and rather permitted them to escape by flight”. Vsevolod’s wife was among those taken prisoner while the prince himself escaped across the river. The plentiful booty included church bells and icons. When the prince, who had supposedly rejected an offer of peace, arrived in Riga and “humbly prayed them, as fellow Christians” to agree a treaty, the Rigans finally acquiesced. The peace treaty of 1209 provided for the return of Vsevolod’s wife and the other prisoners in exchange for an undertaking not to ally himself with the Lithuanians against Riga and the prince’s “fellow Russian Christians”. He first of all had to assign his property to the church of Riga, which was then returned to him by the bishop as a Fahnenlehen (fief with special prerogatives symbolised by a banner as the sign of investiture). In addition, Vsevolod promised, in choosing the bishop as his “father”, to inform Albert of all the malicious plans of the Russians and Lithuanians. He had to give up possession altogether of Autine and Sesswegen, which had already been occupied by Riga. The chronicler nevertheless adds curtly that the prince once again forgot all his promises. A charter referring to the treaty states that it was drawn up in Riga in the presence of many “nobles, clerics, knights, merchants, Germans, Russians, and Livs”. These Russians might have been Gerzike’s prisoners or equally merchants staying in Riga.

Manfred Hellmann has described this treaty as based on a fundamental misunderstanding. Double vassalage, which was common in Western Europe, had left Vsevolod’s relations with Polotsk intact, but the feudum oblatum (handing over the allod to the feudal lord and receiving it back as a fief) and its resulting obligations, legal relationship, not to mention the entire Western feudal system remained unintelligible to him. After all, the treaty had been concluded as a consequence of the heavy military defeat that required Vsevolod to accept even more onerous conditions than had been imposed on him before the conflict. However, he also retained a large degree of independence and power so that an analysis of his relationship with the bishop of Riga in excessively legalistic terms should be avoided: the determining factor was still the

154 HCL XIII.4, p. 71; LGU 1, no. 2; LUB 1, no. 15. See also LUB 1, no. 23; LVA, no. 63. Andris Levāns distinguishes with good reason between the act (1209) and date (c. 1211) of the charter: Andris Levāns, “Cum litterarum testimonio. Dokumentu producēšanas prakse Rīgas bīskapijā 13. gadsimta sākumā: piezīmes par medievistikas un diplomātikas attiecībām,” in LVIŽ, 2012, no. 1, 5–40.

155 Hellmann, Lettenland, pp. 131–33.
real distribution of power. He had already been forced to give up part of his territory before, this apparently being the reason for his hostility towards Riga. The relationship between Polotsk and Gerzike remains unclear in this regard. In the chronicle, Albert appears much more as the defender of Polotsk and other Russian territories against Lithuania and Vsevolod.156

Albert had an interest in obtaining support against the Lithuanians and in securing the territories won from Gerzike. His war against Gerzike should not be seen as a religious conflict between the Catholic and Orthodox faiths.157 The plundered ecclesiastical objects were also a valuable booty for the Latins. When Vsevolod began to rebuild his castle, the churches too were rebuilt and must have existed at least until the prince’s death in the 1230s.158 Another point in favour of the coexistence between the faiths is the spiritual and constitutional father-son relationship established between Vsevolod and Albert. According to the scholarly consensus, this relationship originates in the Byzantine Russian tradition and represents something of a ‘translation’ of the feudal relationship sought by Albert.159 Vsevolod was a negative figure in Henry’s chronicle, not because of his religion, however, but rather because of his political role.

In 1210 the church of Livonia was, according to Henry, in danger from the pagans and Russians, who surrounded her on all sides and planned to destroy her. For this reason, the Livonian leadership decided to work towards a peace with the prince of Polotsk. The embassy led by Rudolf of Kokenhusen for unknown reasons did not travel along the Daugava but through Wenden, where it was attacked by the Estonians.160 After Riga’s forces were defeated by the Estonians on the river Ymera in 1210, peace with Polotsk was even more urgent for Riga than before. A new embassy was led by a Sword Brother called Arnold. He offered to make peace with Polotsk, requesting freedom of movement for Rigan merchants on the Daugava in Polotsk’s territory. The prince’s


160 HCL XIV.7–8, p. 78.
envoy, Ludolf of Smolensk, then travelled to Riga. The resulting treaty guaranteed Polotsk the right to tribute, whether paid by the Livs or the bishop representing them. The treaty was probably concluded by the Sword Brothers and the merchants without regard for the interests of Albert (who was in Germany at the time) and indeed to his detriment. According to Henry, this was the first enduring peace between Riga and Polotsk.\footnote{HCL XIV.9, p. 81; Laakmann, “Zur Geschichte Heinrichs,” p. 66; Hellmann, “Begegnungen,” pp. 126–27. On the question of whether Ludolf was an envoy or merely an interpreter, see Vera I. Matuzova and Evgeniiia L. Nazarova, Крестоносцы и Русь Конец XII в.–1270 г. Тексты, перевод, комментарий (Moscow, 2002) (Древнейшие источники по истории восточной Европы), p. 163.} A common interest unifying the Sword Brothers and Polotsk might have been defence against the Lithuanians.\footnote{Benninghoven, Orden, pp. 90–91.} An equally important issue was freedom of trade. In Polotsk, for example, Rigan merchants might be in danger as a reaction to Vsevolod’s submission.\footnote{Nazarova, “Ливония,” p. 71.} The treaty also referred to the more remote destination of the Daugava trade, namely Smolensk, and it is possible that Ludolf was a German merchant resident there.\footnote{Johansen, “Novgorod,” p. 140; Nikolai N. Usachev, “К оценке западных внешнеторговых связей Смоленска в XII–XIV вв.,” in Международные связи России до XVII в., ed. Aleksandr A. Zimin and Vladimir T. Pashuto (Moscow, 1961), p. 210. Cf. Aleksandrs Ivanovs and Anatolijis Kuzņecovs, Smoļenskas-Rīgas aktis 13. gs.–14. gs. pirmā puse. Kompleksa Moscovitica-Ruthenica dokumenti par Smoļenskas un Rīgas attiecibām (Riga, 2009) (Vēstures Avoti 6), pp. 234, 257.} It is likely that Smolensk had a certain degree of influence over Polotsk during this period.

Two years later in 1212 this treaty was reviewed. The prince of Polotsk, on his own initiative and at the prearranged time, personally met Bishop Albert in Gerzike in his role as leader of all of Livonia. Something akin to a mediation role in the negotiations was played by Albert’s then ally and dependent, Prince Vladimir Mstislavich of Pskov. The fact that the meeting took place in Gerzike shows that this region did indeed belong more to Polotsk than to Riga, despite being a fief of the latter. The prince demanded an explanation from Albert about the people formerly (quondam) under a duty to pay him tribute, the Livs, and wanted to discuss the safety of the Daugava trade route. He also demanded that the baptism of the Livs be stopped since it was in his power whether or not to baptize his subjects (servos). “It is, indeed, the custom of the Russian princes not to subject whatever people they defeat to the Christian faith, but rather to force them to pay tribute and money to themselves”, narrates Henry. The bishop countered that he had not prevented the Livs from paying tribute,
rather they themselves had not wished to pay twice to two different lords. It 
thus appears that despite what had been agreed in the treaty of 1210 tribute 
was no longer being paid or at least not since 1210, perhaps because Albert did 
not recognize the treaty entered into by the Sword Brothers. Where the chron-
icle adds that the bishop sometimes (quandoque) paid this tribute for the Livs, 
this refers only to the first few years of the century. The account of the negoti-
ations gives the impression that Polotsk suddenly yielded, despite the fact that 
both sides were prepared for a possible conflict: the pax perpetua in defence 
against the Lithuanians and other pagans was agreed, Polotsk waived its claims 
to Livonia, including the payment of tribute, and the merchants were granted 
free access to the Daugava. Merchants from both sides were also party to the 
treaty. The prince hailed the bishop as his “spiritual father” and the bishop wel-
comed the prince as his son.165 Just as Vsevolod of Gerzike had “chosen” Albert 
as his father (eum in patrem eligens) when agreeing the peace treaty of 1209, so 
now the prince of Polotsk “hailed” him like a spiritual father (tamquam patrem 
spiritualem salutans). Certainly in this case there is no question of Albert hav-
ing any claims on Polotsk. The terminology of the father-son spiritual rela-
tionship adopted in Henry’s chronicle in this case is of Byzantine origin, i.e. the 
Western feudal bond was quasi ‘translated’ into the legal language adopted in 
the Rus’.166 There is again no doubt that Henry recognized Polotsk as Christian, 
even though this Christianity appeared suspect since it threatened Riga and 
did not concern itself with the baptism of its subjects.167

The reasons that forced Polotsk to make these concessions must remain 
within the realm of speculation. The issue was the Livs’ duty to pay tribute. 
The question of baptism as a means of subjecting the Livs to ecclesiastical and 
other burdens is really a euphemism for their refusal to be charged twice. An 
explanation for this is that the prince of Polotsk had become convinced of the 
unexpected strength of Albert’s position.168 The prince may have reckoned 
with the support of the Livs, but this was not forthcoming. Pressure from the 
Liv revolts had forced the bishop in 1211, in between the two Polotsk treaties,

165 HCL XVI.2, pp. 102–04; Gnegel-Waitschies, Bischof Albert, pp. 109–10; Dircks, “Krieg,” 
pp. 121–24.
166 Arbusow, “Das entlehnte Sprachgut,” p. 147; cf. Ivanovs and Kuzņecovs, Smoļenskas-Rīgas 
aktis, p. 244.
167 Cf. Jaan Undusk, “Sacred History, Profane History: Use of the Bible in the Chronicle of 
Henry of Livonia,” in Tamm, Crusading and Chronicle Writing, p. 73.
168 Keussler, Ausgang, p. 44; Laakmann, “Zur Geschichte Heinrichs,” pp. 78–79; Hellmann, 
Lettenland, pp. 139–40.
to replace the tithe of the Livs in part with a lighter fixed interest.\textsuperscript{169} Whereas the treaty of 1210 gave the Sword Brothers free rein to wage war in Estonian Ugania and Sackala, the Rigans had now agreed peace with the Estonians for three years and had a ‘free hand’ in the Daugava.

The merchants’ participation in the negotiations also suggests the resolution of the trade disputes. The Polotsk merchants themselves may have forced the concessions made by their prince.\textsuperscript{170} The independent political role played by the merchants and the major land owners involved in trade in Polotsk society must remain a mystery but one cannot ignore the prince’s need to accommodate the wishes of the town and its burghers. In Novgorod, in comparison, the merchant elite was able to influence politics in the 12th and 13th centuries. The fact that it was merchants who built the main churches demonstrates the economic vibrancy of this group. Their important political role is testified to by the frequency with which they appear in the chronicles, where they are also mentioned by name. If the prince of Polotsk was reliant on the merchants, their new position may also have forced him into the concessions. Difficulties in trade could have been more harmful for Polotsk overall than the missing tribute. Moreover, it is also conceivable that if the prince rather than the burghers received the tribute, they would understandably have no direct interest in it.

The key to explaining why Russian control of the Daugava collapsed so easily must lie in the difference between Polotsk’s power on the one hand and that of the Rigan church and the Sword Brothers on the other. The decline of Polotsk’s power weakened the relationship of dependency and reduced the options for military intervention. Riga’s consolidation and increase of its power was a gradual process rather than one with sudden, marked surges. A crucial contributory factor was that Russian dominance of the Daugava had not aimed at the creation of permanent local control mechanisms. Moreover, Riga could count on a crusading army regularly installed in the city, albeit during only one season of the year, on the bishop’s vassals who had moved to the country, and the Sword Brothers.

To summarize events on the Daugava at the beginning of the 13th century it can be stated that the non-payment by the Livs of the tribute to Polotsk was clearly the result of the introduction of ecclesiastical taxes. It is hard to overestimate the importance of the tribute issue in the relations between Riga and Polotsk. The treaty of 1212 required Polotsk to give up its demand for tribute


altogether. As regards the exchange of goods, Friedrich Benninghoven maintained that the Daugava route was closed from 1203, only reopening gradually between 1208 and 1212 when the treaties were agreed with Kokenhusen, Gerzike, and Smolensk. However, perhaps one should not refer so categorically to a long-lasting trade blockade similar to later trade embargos. Merchant ships had often called at Riga. Their avoidance of the Daugava route may have been related to the prevailing insecurity in regional relations, possible repression, and the real threat of war, all of which made the risk too great.

Knights from Kokenhusen attacked Gerzike in both 1214 and 1215, in spite of the feudal relationship now supposedly binding Bishop Albert and Vsevolod of Gerzike. According to the chronicle, the pretext was Vsevolod’s failure to perform duties by the vassal and in Vsevolod’s collaboration with the Lithuanians, such as the consilium et auxilium he had given them. During the attack of 1215, Vsevolod did indeed count on the support of Lithuanian troops. In his description of their assault on the castle of Gerzike, Henry mentions a lot of booty and the capture of many prisoners but not any deaths. Instead, Henry stresses that many were allowed to escape and that the knights showed great generosity towards the Russians. Henry thus identifies the causes of these wars in the failure to perform duties by the vassal and in Vsevolod’s collaboration with the pagan Lithuanians. The compensation claim against Vsevolod mentioned by Henry and the subsequent refusal to send an envoy suggest, however, that the origins date further back. The bishop’s policy (represented at the time by Bishop Philip of Ratzeburg) does not seem to have been the issue at all. The inference is obvious that there had been border conflicts between Kokenhusen and Gerzike.

It is apparent from these events that Gerzike’s ties with the bishop of Riga were still weak at this time, perhaps comparable with its former alliance with Polotsk, which continued in diluted form. In 1225 the influence of the church of Riga extended to both Gerzike and Pskov, i.e. as far as their borders. At the same time, in 1224 Bishop Albert allocated half of Gerzike—

175 Benninghoven, Orden, p. 127.
176 HCL XXIX.2, p. 208.
except for Autine—at that prince’s request to the knight Conrad of Üxküll (i.e. Meyendorff) as a fief on condition that whichever co-owner (the prince of Gerzike or Conrad) outlived the other would be granted the other half as well.\textsuperscript{177} This may relate to a part that had already been lost de facto;\textsuperscript{178} Autine had belonged to the bishop, or the Sword Brothers, for some time already. The specific hereditary relationship would be clarified by the hypothesis of Michael von Taube, who argues that Conrad of Üxküll was the son-in-law of Vsevolod of Gerzike.\textsuperscript{179} Thus in Livonia there was a fusion of old and new powers similar to that in the areas east of the Elbe. Although Taube’s hypothesis has been criticized with sound arguments,\textsuperscript{180} it is worth considering in view of the possible securing of Livonia’s first enfeoffments through the marriage of new vassals with the daughters of the old nobility. According to family tradition in the 16th century, the transfer of Kokenhusen to the bishop’s vassals was linked to the marriage of the fief’s first recipient with Viachko’s daughter.\textsuperscript{181}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{177} LGU 1, no. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Keussler, \textit{Ausgang}, pp. 46–48.
\item \textsuperscript{180} Schmidt, “Bild,” p. 515.
\item \textsuperscript{181} See LGU 1, no. 31: 1269, the widow of Theodoric of Kokenhusen, Sophia, transfers her husband’s fief to Johannes von Tiesenhausen; Taube, “Russische und litauische Fürsten,” pp. 422–33; Laakmann, “Zur Geschichte des Grossgrundbesitzes,” pp. 52–53. According to Tiesenhausen family tradition in the 16th century, the vassal Theodoric of Kokenhusen (mentioned under 1218 in HCL XXII.3, p. 150) married the prince’s daughter, Sophia of Kokenhusen, who remarried Johannes von Tiesenhausen when she was widowed. See \textit{Des Bannerherrn Heinrich von Tiesenhausen des Aelteren von Berson ausgewählte Schriften und Aufzeichnungen}, ed. Richard Hasselblatt (n.p. 1890), p. 7. Should there be any truth to the family tradition, such a treaty could only have come about in the spring of 1207, when Viachko assigned part of Kokenhusen to the bishop and his vassals. Nor should the possibility be ruled out that the prince’s daughter was still a minor at the time and remained at the bishop’s court (as a hostage?), with the marriage not taking place until later. An argument against Sophia’s Russian origin, however, is that in 1254 Sophia of Kokenhusen was enfeofed by counts Johann and Gerhard of Holstein with the former fief of a certain Bernhard von Hoje in Germany. See LGU 1, no. 34; LUB 1, no. 268; LUR, nos 751, 1130, 1189; cf. LGU 1, no. 338, 429, 514. The Tiesenhausen family may have originated from the county of Hoya on the Weser. See Astaf von Transehe-Roseneck, \textit{Die ritterlichen Livlandfahrer des 13. Jahrhunderts. Eine genealogische Untersuchung} (Würzburg, 1960) (Marburger Ostforschungen 12), pp. 32–33. The originally Greek name of Sophia was known in Germany and Denmark.
We do not know for certain either when Vsevolod of Gerzike died or when the power of the bishop of Riga and the Sword Brothers reached what would be its final limits in the Middle Ages, stretching across the Daugava to the principality of Polotsk. What is beyond doubt is that after the 1209 treaty agreed with Bishop Albert the area of Riga's political influence extended up to the border with Polotsk, which was located somewhere upriver from the later settlement of Dünaburg, even though military conflicts with Vsevolod continued after this. A register from the 17th century records that Bishop Nicholas of Riga (1229–53) confirmed the donation of Prince Wissewalde of Gerzike to the monastery of Dünamünde, namely an estate probably in the vicinity of the modern city of Dünaburg (Daugavpils, Latvia). On that basis, Riga's area of control on the Daugava would already have exceeded Polotsk's late medieval borders by the end of Albert's episcopate. However, given that this is a late register, the possibility of errors or even a forgery cannot be excluded. At the beginning of the 15th century these areas in fact belonged to the Livonian Cistercians.

The region of Gerzike was thus annexed to Livonia between 1220 and 1230 as a result of Riga's growing strength and at the expense of the relations that had
existed up to that time with Polotsk and Lithuania. Vsevolod met the papal legate William of Modena in Riga in 1225. This might indicate that some political contact had been set up or confirmed. Possible donations by Vsevolod to the monastery of Dünamünde suggest that a shift in political allegiance also entailed a change in ecclesiastical affiliation. The pagan regions of Gerzike were baptized as Catholic, while in Gerzike itself Orthodox and Catholic religious services could initially be found side by side, perhaps until the Orthodox churches were destroyed by the Lithuanians and the castle abandoned.

The fighting on the Daugava undoubtedly made trade more difficult, but at the same time Riga's growing strength also benefited its merchants, and presumably the region's native population did not remain entirely uninvolved in commercial activities either. Since not only German merchants traded along the Daugava, it is plausible that the sending of Estonian envoys from Ösel to Prince Vladimir of Polotsk in 1216 was related to this trade. What is certain is that the envoys urged the prince to fight with them against Riga. Vladimir had raised a large army made up of Russians and Lithuanians, but the start of the military campaign was interrupted by his sudden death that same year. Henry saw in this a sign of divine intervention or the intercession of the Virgin Mary: the church rejoiced “over the liberation from the Russians and other nations”.

At the beginning of 1222 Henry's chronicle relates the Mongol attack on the Polovtsians (Valvi), their appeals for help to the Russian princes, and the Battle of the Kalka River, in which Grand Prince Mstislav Romanovich of Kiev and many other Russian princes were killed. Smolensk, Polotsk, “and some other” Russian princes then sent envoys to Riga to renew the peace treaty. The Battle of the Kalka River has usually been dated by historians to 1223 or 1224. Was Henry mistaken here in his otherwise accurate chronology? Henry was

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189 HCL XXIX.4, p. 211.
190 HCL XIX.11, p. 134; XX.1, p. 135 (“a Ruthenis ac aliis gentibus”); XXV.2, pp. 178–81. The word gens, which often stands for 'pagan' in the Middle Ages, is also used by Henry in its neutral sense of 'people' (including Catholics). The Russians are not therefore being equated with pagans here: HCL XXI.1, p. 140; VII.3, p. 21; cf. IV.5–6, p. 14. See also Paul Görlich, Zur Frage des Nationalbewusstseins in ostdeutschen Quellen des 12. bis 14. Jahrhunderts (Marburg/Lahn, 1964) (Wissenschaftliche Beiträge zur Geschichte und Landeskunde Ost-Mitteeuropas 66), pp. 85–96.
191 HCL XXVI.1, pp. 186–87; HCL XXV.3, pp. 179, 182; cf. XXV.2.
otherwise well informed in general on the battle, being familiar with the course of events and the individuals killed in the fighting. It is not known whether the envoys from Smolensk and Polotsk were the same ones staying in Riga at the turn of 1223/24.193

It also remains unclear which dynasty succeeded Vladimir on the Polotsk throne. The Novgorod Chronicle relates under the year 1222 that the Iaroslavich line of Smolensk conquered Polotsk on 17 January, during the period of rule of the princes Boris and Gleb.194 The Iaroslavich line, descendants of Iaroslav Vladimirovich (d. 1054), are thus contrasted with the Iziaslavich dynasty of Polotsk. In 1239 Prince Aleksandr Iaroslavich of Novgorod married in Toropets the daughter of Prince Briacheslav of Polotsk,195 who, on the basis of his name, also belonged to the Iziaslavich.196 Some historians have connected the mention of Boris in 1222 with the fictitious information provided by the Polish chronicler Maciej Stryjkowski (c. 1547–c. 1586/1593), the Lithuanian chronicles and later Tatishchev, leading them to refer to the rule of a Lithuanian Prince Boris Ginvilovich in Polotsk in the 1220s.197 Stryjkowski dated the genealogy of Boris and his son Gleb to the beginning of the 13th century but this in fact goes back to the middle of the 12th century (cf. p. 71), with the result that this does not give grounds to connect this Boris with Lithuania.198 Perhaps this relates to the representatives of the local dynasty of Polotsk and its subordinate towns, who at a certain point were recognized as princes jointly.

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194 NL1, p. 263. The notice comes under 6730 (1222) in the Novgorod Chronicle and precedes the Battle of the Kalka placed here after the conquest of Dorpat under 6732 (1224). It is not found in the chronicle’s older recension.

195 NL1, pp. 77, 289.

196 The name of Briacheslav was present in this line. Shtykhov, _Древний Полоцк_, p. 14; Martin Dimnik, “Russian Princes and their Identities in the First Half of the Thirteenth Century,” _Mediaeval Studies_ 40 (1978), 178–79.


198 See also Dimnik, “Russian Princes,” pp. 178–79, who identifies the prince Rostislav Borisovich mentioned in Kiev in 1231 with a son of the Boris mentioned under the year 1222.
At the same time, contemporary Polotsk appears to have come under even greater influence from Smolensk, as revealed in the account of the Novgorod Chronicle from 1222. In the war of 1232 to succeed the previous prince of Smolensk, Mstislav-Fedor Davydovich, who had died in 1230, Prince Sviatoslav Mstislavich, who was descended from the other branch of this dynasty, then in turn conquered Smolensk together with the men of Polotsk. The house of Smolensk had thus consolidated its power in Polotsk after Boris and now its representative Sviatoslav proceeded to appropriate power for himself in his native city.199

But the conflicts between Riga and Polotsk formed just the surface of their relations. The early 13th century was also when Riga began to emerge as the most important town in Livonia, largely thanks to the Daugava trade. Alongside the conflicts highlighted by Henry’s negative attitude in the chronicle towards Polotsk as the enemy of the bishop and the ally of the pagan Lithuanians, there were also commercial relations.

While Mstislav-Fedor was still in power, but after the death of Bishop Albert on 17 January 1229, a trade treaty between the Russians, Gotland and Riga was agreed in 1229 by the Smolensk envoys with the inclusion of Polotsk and Vitebsk.200 As well as the merchants from Gotland, Lübeck, Münster, Soest, Groningen, Dortmund, and Bremen, the parties to the treaty also included the Rigan church and the Order of the Sword Brothers. Among its signatories, a certain “Thomas of Smolensk” (Тоумаш Смолнянинъ) is named, presumably a German merchant resident in Smolensk. The text states that prior to this the merchants had had no peace and that there had been a dispute (розлюбие) between the Germans and the citizens of Smolensk. Does this refer to a mil-

199  NL1, pp. 72, 281; Alekseev, Смоленская земля, pp. 233–34; The papal bulls of Gregory IX from the beginning of 1229 to the bishops of Linköping, Lübeck and Riga, and to the Cistercians on Gotland and in Dünamünde, prohibiting trade with the Russians while they threatened the Finnish converts, related to events in Finland and had no bearing on the relations between Riga and Smolensk: ST 1, no. 75; REA, no. 3–5; LUB 3, no. 100a. Cf. Kattinger, Gotländische Genossenschaft, pp. 211–14.

itary conflict between Polotsk and Livonia, or purely commercial disputes? In 1226 the legate William of Modena had ensured that if the Sword Brothers were to take possession of as large an area in Lettgallia as Albert had given to Theodoric of Kokenhusen in Warka, they would not have to share this with the bishop. By *Warka* is probably meant modern Varkļāni, south of Lake Lubāns. The attempts to gain power in eastern Lettgallia by the bishop’s vassal Theodoric and the Sword Brothers could have led to conflicts with Polotsk and Smolensk. However, in terms of the text of the treaty, which deals solely with trade and the sojourn of merchants abroad, the legal system, and similar matters, it makes much more sense to assume that trade conflicts are being referred to. A number of Germanisms in the Russian text—it is also dated *anno Domini* and not, as in the Old Russian tradition, according to the creation of the world—show that it evolved during the course of complex negotiations. This treaty of 1229, which was mainly based on the existing tradition, in turn created the legal basis for Daugava trade throughout the remainder of the Middle Ages, and was subsequently confirmed and renewed on numerous occasions.

The collapse of Polotsk’s control on the Daugava did not result from any religiously motivated conflict. Internal developments in Polotsk caused the fragmentation of political power there, a process that had already begun before the arrival of the crusaders in Livonia. The dominance of Riga emerged gradually and for a period of time its system of rule was a form of condominium.

### 2.3.2 The Conquest of Lettgallia

Whereas Polotsk was no longer able to play an independent role among the Russian principalities at the beginning of the 13th century, with the result that it was now at one remove from their inner conflicts, the Rigan wars and alliances with the lands of north-eastern Lettgallia and eastern Estonia brought Riga into contact with Pskov, Novgorod, and other Russian powers. In the early 13th century a conflict broke out in Rus’ between two princely families which was to become one of the main features of the Russian political history of the period. These families were the Vsevolodovich of Suzdal, the descendants of Vsevolod Iur’evich (d. 1212), and the Rostislavich of Smolensk, the descendants of Rostislav Mstislavich (d. 1167). After the death of Vsevolod, a dispute erupted

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between his sons over the title of grand prince of Vladimir. In Novgorod this struggle caused the rapid changes of the prince accepted by the city. Novgorod was in turn able to influence its weaker neighbour, Pskov, although recent research shows that it is still not entirely accurate to call Pskov a direct subordinate town of Novgorod in the 13th century. Their political aims however coincided from time to time, added to which one or more princes from one of the dynasties was able to exercise an influence in both cities.203

In the winter of 1208–09 Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich was driven from Novgorod and Mstislav Mstislavich ‘the Bold’ (‘Udaloi’) of Toropets from the Smolensk dynasty was appointed the new prince. Mstislav was able to maintain his position over several years until there was a change in the balance of power, with Novgorod captured by Iaroslav Vsevolodovich in 1215. The Novgorodians soon became dissatisfied with him, however, and in 1216 the troops of Vladimir-Suzdal were defeated on the river Lipitsa by Novgorod and the prince of Smolensk. There was a change of prince in Novgorod just about every year after that. In 1216 and 1217 Mstislav ‘Udaloi’ was on the throne. He was followed from 1217 to 1218 by Sviatoslav Mstislavich-Borisovich, and from 1218 to 1221 by Vsevolod Mstislavich-Borisovich, both also from the Smolensk dynasty. Power in Novgorod was then regained by the Suzdal faction. In 1221 and 1224 Vsevolod Iur’evich was named prince while still a minor; in 1223, 1225–29, and 1230–36, Iaroslav Vsevolodovich, later represented by his minor sons Aleksandr and Fedor, held power. Mikhail Vsevolodovich from the Chernigov dynasty kept the throne in 1225 and 1229–30, and was later represented by his minor son Rostislav.204

Contemporary Pskov was ruled by Vladimir, the elder brother of Mstislav Mstislavich ‘Udaloi’, although we do not know when his reign began. The Novgorod Chronicle mentions him for the first time in 1208. Immediately before Novgorod expelled Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich that winter and as the first step in the power shift towards the Rostislavich, Vladimir led an army against Lithuania together with the Novgorod posadnik Tverdislav, but he is


still not referred to as the prince of Pskov at this time. Perhaps, as suggested by Valentin Ianin, he had simply taken part with its army in the fighting. In 1209 he is already called Vladimir of Pskov. He was expelled from Pskov in 1212, whereupon he went to Livonia. Vladimir is once again mentioned as prince of Pskov in 1216, probably having returned there sometime around 1215. He went to Pskov after the Battle of Lipitsa in 1216. After that he is repeatedly mentioned in the sources over the next few years until the mid-1220s.

Also in 1208 the Ymera Letts were baptized according to the Latin rite, having previously drawn lots as to whether they should accept baptism from Riga or Pskov, given that the rest of Tolowa had been baptized *eorum tempore* by the Pskov Russians, to whom it had *semper* paid tribute. The Orthodox baptism of Tolowa had taken place just a short time before, possibly in response to Riga's practice of linking a region's submission to its conversion to Christianity. Nearby Ydumea and Wenden had been baptized by Riga in 1206 and 1207. The Ymera Letts were apparently not under an obligation to pay tribute to Pskov, but they were nevertheless somehow linked to Tolowa. The sources testify to the dependence of a part of Tolowa on Pskov, namely the Trikaten region ruled by Talibald. The exact extent of his rule and consequently that of Pskov is not clear. Between Tolowa and Pskov lay Adsel, which was, as would appear logical, also obliged to pay tribute to Pskov.

In 1208 the Lettgallian elders Russin of Sotecle, Waridote of Autine, and Talibald of Beverin entered into an alliance with the Sword Brothers, who had a presence in Wenden at least by 1207. The alliance also provided for joint action against the lands of Ugaunia and Sackala in southern Estonia. These Lettgallian leaders henceforth always acted as the allies or subjects of the Order and the bishop of Riga, with the exception of the revolt of the Livs and a section of the Lettgallians in 1212, when Russin was killed. In 1214 Talibald's sons from Tolowa submitted to the rule of Bishop Albert and undertook to adapt the faith received from the Russians to the Latin observance as well as to pay the fixed tax. A priest was sent to them by Bishop Philip of Ratzburg.

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205 Летопись по Воскресенскому списку, ed. Iakov I. Berdnikov et al. (St Petersburg, 1856) (PSRL 7), p. 120.
206 SL1, p. 274; NL4, pp. 196–97.
207 Ianin, Средневековый Новгород, p. 262; Pickhan, Gospodin Pskov, pp. 98–103.
208 HCL XI.7, p. 55.
Henry mentions Vladimir’s return to Pskov before this. To a certain extent therefore Philip’s action was also a way of asserting precedence over the potential claims of Pskov and Vladimir in this region. In 1215 the Sackalians and Ugaunians seized Talibald and “roasted him like a fish” on the fire: “Since he was a Christian and one of the number of faithful Letts, we hope that his soul is gladly rejoicing for such a martyrdom in eternal happiness in the company of the holy martyrs.” According to Indriķis Šterns (1918–2005), this passage provides proof of Talibald’s Catholic rebaptism since Henry would not have praised an Orthodox martyrdom. However, his conversion to the Latin faith did not necessarily mean a personal religious conversion or rebaptism, but rather that the place and people under his rule had been joined in an external relationship with another ecclesiastical hierarchy, a bond which manifested itself in the payment of taxes and belonging to a particular episcopal see. The new priest would also have changed the rite in the case that Russian religious services had ever been held in Trikaten. One’s religious confession had above all political significance in Livonia at that time. This explains how a man who had previously been baptized in the Orthodox faith but had later collaborated with the bishop of Riga and the Sword Brothers could be represented as a martyr. Indeed, the reverse could be true. Scholars have often pointed out that the chronicler did not praise Bishop Theodoric of Estonia as a martyr when he was murdered in Reval in 1219 because he had been a political opponent of Riga at the time.

Prince Vladimir Mstislavich of Pskov, who had come to Livonia in 1212 after apparently being expelled from Pskov, at first became Bishop Albert’s bailiff in Autine. When the bishop’s possessions here were transferred to the Sword Brothers in 1213, Vladimir replaced his own son-in-law Theodoric as bailiff in Ydumea after he had gone to Germany. Henry’s attitude towards Vladimir is overtly hostile. During his tenure as bailiff of the Ydumea Letts and the Lettgallians he “reaped many things he had not sowed”. For this reason, his administration of justice did not entirely please the bishop of Ratzeburg “or anybody else”. Vladimir “at last gratified the wishes of many people and went to Russia”. It is difficult to judge the reasons for this dissatisfaction on the basis

211 HCL XVIII.2–3, pp. 115–16.
215 HCL XVI.6–7, pp. 111–12.
216 HCL XVII.4, p. 113.
of this parable. The chronicle gives the impression that Vladimir took decisions that were detrimental to the church—perhaps also relating to Henry’s own church in Papendorf.

In the winter of 1213–14 Vladimir returned with his wife, sons, and entire familia to Livonia, where he proceeded to act as bailiff in the castle of Metimne in Ydumea and collected taxes. The priests Henry and Alebrand even sent him gifts. Together with the Sword Brothers, Vladimir took part in repelling a Lithuanian raid.217 As magistrate of Ydumea, he had, according to Henry, become particularly infuriated over the local priest Alebrand, who pleaded with the prince because of the oppression of the poor and the confiscation of their property, since this could provoke neophytes into rejecting Christianity. The prince is said to have threatened to diminish Alebrand’s property, a threat which he did indeed carry out some years later during a military campaign. After a while Vladimir returned with his familia to Rus’.218 This passage points to a conflict between Vladimir and the church over the latter’s possessions. This is because immediately after the baptism of the region legal jurisdiction in Ydumea belonged to the very same Alebrand from whom it was later withdrawn. Henry is able to report precisely with regard to Alebrand’s administration of justice that this later declined “throughout all Livonia, Lettgallia, and Estonia at the hands of diverse lay, secular judges”.219 It is precisely in this aspect that the differences between Vladimir on the one hand and Henry and Alebrand on the other must be sought. A possibility might be the division of the bailiff’s revenue with the episcopal ruler, then represented by Philip of Ratzeburg, with whom, incidentally, Vladimir’s wife and familia shared lodgings in early 1214 at the bishop of Riga’s residence.220 The fact that Vladimir came back is a sign that this conflict was not the cause of his departure. This must clearly be sought in the political state of affairs in Pskov.221 There was no comparison between the position of a prince in Pskov and that of a bailiff in Ydumea either in terms of prestige or income, so that Vladimir would not have returned to Livonia unless forced to leave Pskov.

218 HCL XVIII.2, p. 115.
219 HCL X.15, pp. 46–47.
220 HCL XVIII.1, p. 115.
Vladimir’s activity in Lettgallia is a good example of the permeability of the religious frontier in contemporary Livonia. Vladimir was the bailiff in a Catholic bishopric, undoubtedly without having been rebaptized; his family and entourage were staying with the bishop of Riga. His son-in-law’s territory (see p. 116), where he was based, later belonged to the same Theodoric of Bekeshovede, this time not as a bailiff’s district but as a fief. According to one hypothesis, the name of the castle and town of Wolmar are even derived from ‘Vladimir’.222

In the winter of 1216–17, as Vladimir, once again reinstalled as prince of Pskov, attempted to secure Ugaunia, the Pskovians went to Tolowa to collect tribute as always, raizing the castle of Beverin to the ground. Although they were able to burn down the castle, the Sword Brothers from Wenden outnumbered them and thus succeeded in taking them prisoner. When envoys from Novgorod came to Livonia early in the spring of 1217, the prisoners were released and returned honourably to Rus’.224 It cannot be inferred from this, however, that Novgorod also would have taken a share of Tolowa's tribute. Novgorod was governed at the time by the brother of Vladimir of Pskov, Prince Mstislav, and their policies were closely intertwined. One could pose the purely hypothetical question whether Tolowa's tribute did not after all make up part of the income of the princes rather than the town community, which would mean that Pskov'sburghers as a whole would not have been that interested in obtaining it.225 In Rus' it was normal for one third of booty and tribute to be distributed to the prince’s entourage and two thirds to the community. This was precisely how, in 1212, Mstislav Mstislavich divided the booty acquired

224 HCL XX.5, pp. 137–38.
225 Evgenia L. Nazarova has suggested that this relates to a conflict between Pskov and Novgorod. See idem, “Латгальская дань в системе отношений между Новгородом и Псковом,” in Восточная Европа в древности и Средневековье. Политическая структура.Древнерусского государства. VIII Чтения памяти В. Т. Пашуто (Moscow, 1996), p. 66.
in Warbola, in Estonia, with the Novgorodians. In Rus’ at the beginning of the 13th century the first rudimentary principles governing the distribution of estates between the town and the prince were already in place; Tolowa’s tributary dependency was nothing unusual. When Tolowa switched to the church of Riga in 1214, the Pskovian right of tribute was not disputed in itself but its collectors were arrested in 1216 and 1217 in response to the burning of the castle. When peace was agreed in 1224, the outstanding Tolowa tribute was finally paid to the envoys from Novgorod and Pskov. In other words, payment had been suspended in the meantime due to the virtually uninterrupted succession of wars at the time.

Late in the summer of 1218 Prince Vsevolod Mstislavich of Novgorod (d. 1249) and Vladimir of Pskov laid waste to Estonian and Latvian territory, burning Henry’s and Alebrand’s churches among other things. The army of Vladimir’s son Iaroslav, the very same who had once lived in Bishop Albert’s house, besieged the castle of the Sword Brothers in Wenden and devastated the lands of the Lettgallians, Ydumea Letts, and the Livs. Once the troops had gathered together, they all surrounded the castle of the Wends. When the latter refused the Russian offer of peace (i.e. to pay the required ransom), the army returned via Ugaunia to Rus’, where the Lithuanians had plundered Pskov in the interim. That same year and in the following years the Lettgallians and Pskov attacked one another. At the beginning of 1219 Pskov’s peace envoys were in Livonia and Albert’s in Novgorod in 1220. Henry remains silent on whether peace was finally agreed with Pskov. Perhaps in this way he wished to conceal the tensions between the bishop and the Order, since the military campaign previously mentioned involved the Sword Brothers and their Lettgallians, not the bishop. Bishop Albert was thus able to put his relationship with Pskov into order.

In 1221 Pskov sent back to Riga the letter of peace of 1217 written at Odenpäh (see p. 121) thus rejecting the peace and in the late summer invaded Livonia with a large army from Novgorod, Pskov, and north-east Russia led by Sviatoslav (d. 1252), the brother of Grand Prince Iurii Vsevolodovich (d. 1238), with his Lithuanian allies. The Russians once again pillaged the Order’s territory in Lettgallia and Ymera, as well as Ugaunia, which the Order also laid claim to,

227 HCL XXVIII.9, pp. 206–07: “tributum, quod semper habebant in Tolowa, eis restituentes.”
228 HCL XXII.2–6, pp. 148–52; NL1, pp. 59–60, 261; Vahtre, Muinasaja loojang, pp. 132–133. On the date, see Berezhkov, Хронология p. 254.
229 HCL XXII.7, 9, p. 152; XXIII.5, pp. 158–59; XXIV.1, p. 169.
as well as the episcopal possession of Treyden. Virtually the only opposition encountered by Rus’ was, however, *propter discordiam, que fuerat in terra*, provided by the Order.\(^{230}\) The conflict between the Sword Brothers and the bishop of Riga thus played a role in this campaign too. Henry is well informed on this episode, relating that the Lithuanians remained an entire month in Pskov on their way back before returning home.

At the end of 1224 Novgorod and Pskov envoys were in Riga, peace was agreed, and the Tolowa tribute was paid to Pskov or the prince of Pskov. Tolowa itself was divided between the bishop of Riga and the Sword Brothers, with Bishop Albert receiving two thirds and the Order one third.\(^{231}\) It can be assumed that the *discordia* regarding Tolowa lasted some time, just like the issue of possession of Sackala and Ugaunia. The Order used its alliance with the Lettgallians to draw them into its sphere of influence, taking the view that it was no longer necessary to share the Lettgallian lands with the bishop.\(^{232}\) The Order obtained Adsel, while the bishop received the borderlands Berezne, Purnau, Abelen, and Abrene, part of which fell to Pskov during the border disputes during the 14th to 16th centuries. It was evidently not particularly important for relations between Pskov and Livonia whether these areas were already subject to Livonia at the time and had been annexed to it via the alliance, or whether their actual submission did not take place until later. For Pskov was still collecting tribute in Adsel in the 1280s, and the border disputes between the archbishopric of Riga and Pskov are first documented from the 1340s.\(^{233}\) Pskov’s influence seems to have been driven from the area gradually, which may also have contributed to the origin of the border conflict. The Teutonic Order’s castle at Marienburg (modern Alūksne, Latvia)\(^{234}\) was first founded here in 1342, the bishop’s castle of Marienhausen (modern Viļaka, Latvia), somewhat further south-east, probably not until before the beginning of the 16th century. In the period from 1220 to 1230, after the submission of Estonia, the Sword Brothers probably also began the conquest of eastern Lettgallia, a venture that was not completely

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\(^{231}\) HCL XXVIII.9, pp. 206–07; XXIX.1, p. 207.


\(^{234}\) This Marienburg is not to be confused with Malbork, modern Poland.
successful until the end of the 13th century or even later. This did not result in a conflict with Pskov, however, but with Polotsk and Lithuania (see p. 239). The subjugation of Lettgallia by the church of Riga and the Sword Brothers during the first decades of the 13th century created rivalry with Pskov to a certain extent. On some occasions baptism by a given centre of power could also be a sign of subjugation. But these conflicts never attained the character of religiously motivated or legitimated war. In the eastern part of the area the seignorial claims of Pskov and the Livonian authorities overlapped and there were periods of political cooperation between Pskov princes and the church of Riga.

2.3.3 The Conquest of Estonia
Prior to the war of the crusaders and missionaries from Riga with the Estonians, envoys were sent to Ugaunia in 1208 to demand the return of the possessions of the merchants robbed before the foundation of Riga in 1201. The robbery had occurred at the behest of the Livs while the merchants were en route from the Daugava to Pskov. The Ugaunians thus bore responsibility for the robbery, and it was precisely against Odenpäh, the settlement through which the Riga-Pskov route ran and which was Ugaunia’s dominant centre in the early 13th century, that the first offensive against the Estonians was launched. Another subject for discussion in 1208 was what had been unjustly purloined from the Lettgallians by the Ugaunians. Clearly the same goods were not at issue, for the goods stolen from the Lettgallians could just as well have originated from a plunder raid, whereas the merchants were Germans.

An ancient trade route from the Daugava River to Pskov passed through Ugaunia. The trading activity of the Livs in this area is also documented. For example, in a Novgorodian birch-bark document from between 1130 and 1150, a certain Ilia and Dmitrii write to a Liv called Mostka in Pskov claiming debts for goods sold to the Livs (blankets, carpet, and cloth). The increasing

236 HCL XI.7, p. 54; HCL XIII.5, pp. 71–72.
238 HCL XII.6, p. 61.
239 The fact that discussions took place in 1208 regarding the wrong committed prior to 1201 does not mean that the Riga-Pskov trade route was closed before the truce of 1212 (as proposed by Benninghoven, *Rigas Entstehung*, p. 53). See also HCL XIX.4, p. 127.
importance of the German merchants on the Daugava and the subjugation of the Livs undoubtedly led to commercial rivalry. The proposal by the Livs to steal the goods in Ugaunia either reflects the start of this rivalry or a specific dispute.

While Bishop Albert’s interests in the early 13th century seemed to be focused on the Daugava, the Sword Brothers turned their attention to Sackala and Ugaunia. The start of the war against these lands was primarily their idea and one that was potentially extremely dangerous in view of the weakness of the Rigan camp and its dependency on the seasonal crusaders. The Order’s interests also coincided with those of its Lettgallian allies and perhaps also a merchant group in Riga in view of the difficulty in using the Daugava trade route in the first decade of the 13th century because of the continual military activity.

In 1210 Prince Mstislav Mstislavich of Novgorod and his brother Prince Vladimir of Pskov invaded Ugaunia and laid siege to Odenpäh, which was forced to buy peace. Many people were then baptized by Russian priests. The Russians promised to send more priests to continue with the baptism, but this never occurred because the Ugaunians soon received priests from Riga and allowed themselves to be baptized by them. The Russian baptism is not questioned by Henry of Livonia: the Rigans simply arrived before the Russians following their conquest of Odenpäh that same year. They had, as the chronicler is able to show, taken the apostolic duty of baptism more seriously. Baptism was needless to say for both sides equally a sign of political power.

What was the connection between the attack on Odenpäh by Vladimir and Mstislav, and Riga? At the beginning of 1210 Bishop Albert had agreed peace with Ugaunia, which was rejected by the Sword Brothers, presumably against Albert’s will. Relations between Albert and Pskov had been strengthened by the marriage of Vladimir’s daughter and the bishop’s brother Theodoric. The chronicler mentions this marriage for the first time in early 1212. This alliance between the opposite ends of the Daugava-Pskov trade route must have been sealed earlier, however, possibly before the Pskov campaign of 1210 or the compensation claim by the merchants in 1208 for the stolen goods. Theodoric was in Livonia from 1203. The alliance between the bishop and Pskov made it possible for them to apply pressure jointly on Ugaunia, which had control of the route. It appears that the campaign conducted by the Mstislavich line had

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241 HCL XIV.2, p. 74; NL1, pp. 52, 250; Vahtre, Muinasaja loojang, pp. 65–66.
242 HCL XIII.5, p. 72.
243 HCL XV.13, pp. 100–01.
244 HCL VII.1, pp. 18–19.
not damaged the bishop’s interests. In the winter of 1210–11, when the Rigans launched an offensive against Sontagana, they were supported by a *maxima turba Ruthenorum*. The chronicler adds that Pskov “was then at peace with us”. The collaboration with Pskov also gave Bishop Albert the opportunity to put pressure on the Sword Brothers, who had consolidated their control in Lettgallia with the help of the local elders, including those obliged to pay tribute to Pskov. When, on the Order’s initiative, Odenpäh was attacked in 1210, Bishop Albert happened to be absent from Livonia.

The view has been expressed in the historiography that the collaboration between Albert and Vladimir is tantamount to an agreement to divide Estonia between them. Before the offensive against Odenpäh (i.e. at the end of 1209), Prince Mstislav of Novgorod launched an attack on the Chuds in *Τύρμα* (*Търма*), where he obtained plentiful booty. The place concerned is probably Torma near the later town of Wesenberg. At the beginning of 1212 Riga attacked Ugaunia, Waiga, and Jerwia at the initiative of the bishops in Livonia at the time (Theodoric of Estonia, Philip of Ratzeburg, Yso of Verden, and Bernard of Paderborn). When Prince Mstislav of Novgorod heard that the Germans were in Estonia, he too immediately set off with his army for Waiga and Jerwia. Not finding any Germans there, he invaded Harria and besieged the castle of Warbola, which paid a ransom to free itself from the encirclement. After the Russian campaign, the Sackalians and Ugaunians began to raise an army. The Rigans thereupon left Fellin without completing the baptism they had recently begun there. The priests were pursued and killed by Lembitu, the most famous of the Estonian elders of Sackala. The Estonian army, taking advantage of the absence of the Pskov troops that were in Estonia together with Mstislav, wreaked devastation during a rapid strike on Pskov. In the account of the campaign conducted by Mstislav and Pskov it is particularly important how the words *et non inventis Theutonicis progressus est in Harien*

are interpreted. Did the prince intend to attack the Rigans or join with them? In the case of an intended attack, it would have been logical to pursue them rather than set off in a completely different direction towards Warbola. Once the Russian military campaign had started the priests too had to leave Fellin, having arrived shortly before to carry out the baptisms following the peace concluded between Riga and Sackala. It does appear that here Mstislav and the Rigans acted more like allies. Yet one can hardly believe that northern Estonia had been ‘promised’ to Rus’ (i.e. Novgorod and/or Pskov). This must have been a political collaboration between Bishop Albert and Vladimir of Pskov249 and by extension with Novgorod, too, which from a Russian perspective continued the traditional relationship of dominance of Rus’ with the Estonian lands: here they alternated their raids without the subservience of any Estonian region being formalized over the long term. Ugaunia and its main centre Odenpäh250 were obviously able to keep control of the relevant section of the trade route. Pskov’s promise to begin the baptisms in Ugaunia in 1210 was a form of subjugation long known from the practice of the Rigan missionaries and signified Ugaunia’s subordination to Pskov. This could not be accepted by the Sword Brothers, however.251

Another aspect of Albert’s relations with Pskov was his pressure on the Sword Brothers. The marriage of the knight Theodoric confirmed the collaboration and consequently limited the Order’s activity, since its claim to rule Estonia was at first not explicitly approved by the bishop.252 For Pskov, on the other hand, this alliance guaranteed a strong relationship with the flourishing city of Riga during a period in which their political interests in Lettgallia or Ugaunia had not yet come into conflict.253

After the ice had melted in 1212 and Bishop Albert had sailed for Germany, Henry relates how Prince Vladimir Mstislavich was driven from Pskov, which he attributes to the marriage of Vladimir’s daughter and the bishop’s brother

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250 Dorpat had been razed to the ground by the Lettgallians (Pskov’s allies?) and abandoned in the winter preceding 1211: HCL XV.7, p. 96.

251 Cf. Benninghoven, Orden, p. 140.


Theodoric. Vladimir and his retinue, who had fled with him, first went to Polotsk and then Riga (see p. 110). According to Henry's chronicle, the expulsion took place in early 1212. On 1 February of the same year Mstislav began his campaign against Harria and Jerwia. The description of this offensive in the Novgorod Chronicle already refers to Vsevolod Mstislavich-Borisovich, also descended from the Smolensk dynasty, as prince of Pskov. It is possible that Vladimir was in Riga in the spring. When Albert returned to Riga, Vladimir received gifts from him and his blessing, and the bishop took care of him. Although the chronicler's aim here may be to highlight Vladimir's subsequent lack of gratitude, the treatment of the prince in accordance with his rank and status should not be doubted. This may be one of the reasons why Vladimir could not remain longer in Polotsk: maintaining the prince and his entourage was costly while his lodging as a prince in the service of another based in a castle subordinate to Polotsk was obviously not an option. Vladimir did not seek refuge with his brother Mstislav in Novgorod either. It has been argued that this is a sign of the disagreements between the brothers and their different Livonia policies, but there may just as well have been other reasons. Mstislav and Vladimir acted as allies both before and after these events. Vladimir's hereditary lands of Toropets and Rzhev were probably by then under the rule of the third brother, Davyd (d. 1226/27).

In 1211 and 1212 a virulent plague that swept across Livonia may have affected Pskov too. The Russian Veche towns often underwent a change of ruler during times of hunger and plague, since the opposing factions were able to exploit the resulting social unrest. Approximately at the same time, Vladimir was active in the vicinity of Velikiye Luki against the Lithuanians, possibly to the detriment of Pskov's burghers. Pskov had not profited as much from the alliance between Vladimir and Albert as it had hoped: the Sword Brothers were increasingly bringing Tolowa under their control and had also occupied Ugaunia, which Vladimir had failed to conquer when he had occupied Odenpäh. Speculation as to causes must of course remain

255 HCL XV.13, pp. 100–01; XVI.1, p. 101.
257 HCL XV.7, p. 95.
258 NL1, pp. 52, 249; Pickhan, Gospodin Pskov, pp. 99–100.
259 Friedrich Koch, Livland und das Reich bis zum Jahre 1225 (Posen, 1943) (Quellen und Forschungen zur baltischen Geschichte 4), p. 48; Benninghoven, Orden, p. 120; Schmidt, "Bild," pp. 515–16.
hypothetical. The essential point in this context is that the quarrels between Vladimir and the leading factions in Pskov were evidently not of a religious nature or attributable to Vladimir’s collaboration with Albert the Catholic or ‘German’,\(^\text{260}\) but had purely political causes.

As for Mstislav’s Warbola campaign, there is no reason to reject the possibility that the Russians and the Rigans had agreed on a joint offensive, which, however, failed due to lack of coordination—Henry’s chronicle constantly mentions other similar cases. This does not mean, however, that there was an agreement to divide up Estonia between them. Mstislav, Vladimir, Albert, and the Sword Brothers, as well as the burghers of Novgorod and Pskov, all had their own interests, which might occasionally overlap without needing to be laid down in a formal treaty. Sackala and Ugaunia initially raised an army against Pskov, going on to attack the Rigan priests, who, from an Estonian point of view, were just as much their enemies as the Pskovians. Novgorod and Pskov were not involved in any military conflicts with Livonia until Vladimir returned to Pskov. Thus in 1213 the father-in-law of Vsevolod of Gerzike, the Lithuanian chieftain Dangerutis, agreed a treaty with Novgorod,\(^\text{261}\) but his capture by the Sword Brothers on his way back home certainly does not mean that this treaty was explicitly aimed against Livonia.

In 1216 Vladimir emerged once again as prince of Pskov, but now his relationship with Livonia was indeed very different, at least in Henry’s view: “When the Grand Prince Vladimir of Polotsk died there arose a new adversary of the Livonian church, Vladimir of Pskov, who rose up with a large army of Russians from Pskov and came into Ugaunia and encamped at Mount Odenpäh.” The conflict arose over Ugaunia or was at least exacerbated by it. This territory was claimed by Pskov and Vladimir, learning from the Rigan practice, after the baptism promise, although it had in fact been subjugated by the Sword Brothers. In Odenpäh Vladimir acted as though he was in an occupied land, staying for a while in the castle and collecting taxes.\(^\text{262}\) At the same time the Pskovians resolved to demand their tribute from Tolowa (see p. 112). Once Vladimir had finished collecting taxes, the bishop’s men, the Sword Brothers, and the Ugaunians formed a united front against the Russians of Odenpäh and the pagans. In the first few days of 1217 they set off from Odenpäh to plunder


\(^{261}\) *HCL* XVII.3, p. 113.

\(^{262}\) *HCL* XX.3, p. 136.
Nogardiam. This is presumably the same raid as that of the “Lithuanians” on the river Shelon mentioned in the Novgorod Chronicle under 1217/6725.263

Vladimir, the Novgorodian army led by the posadnik Tverdislav Mikhalkovich, and their Estonian allies from Ösel and Harria, as well as the Sackalians, who had been baptized by the Rigans, besieged Odenpäh in 1217. The troops who rushed to the aid of the besieged, among whom were Sword Brothers, crusaders, and the bishop’s men, including Vladimir’s son-in-law Theodoric, were able to penetrate to the stronghold but were forced to give in due to lack of food supplies. The Rigans left the castle following negotiations and peace was agreed. Vladimir invited Theodoric to Pskov in confirmation of the peace, but the Novgorodians treated him as though he were one of their prisoners, taking him from Vladimir. Peace was confirmed by Albert’s emissaries in Novgorod, who also put in a good word for Theodoric. The chronicler thus creates the impression that Novgorod had sought to continue the joint ‘conspiracy’ with the Estonians rather than seeking peace. The envoys from Novgorod are nonetheless mentioned in Livonia under the year 1217.264 It seems at any rate that at least a provisional agreement had been reached, since the Novgorodian army did not return to Estonia until 1218, during which time Novgorod had changed prince twice: after Mstislav ‘Udaloi’ had left for south-western Rus’, Sviatoslav Mstislavich-Borisovich of Smolensk, followed by his brother Vsevolod, acted as princes of Novgorod. Theodoric, for whom Novgorod hoped to receive ransom money, is mentioned as being in Livonia again as of 1220.265

The Novgorod Russians had probably treated Ugaunia as a subject land since 1217 where they considered themselves still entitled to collect the tribute first introduced in 1210. The various conflicts and peace agreements thus affected Ugaunia and Tolowa; any Russian campaigns to other regions would have only been raids for plunder without any greater aim. The occupation of Odenpäh in 1217 does not reflect the claim of Rus’ to the entire Estonian region.266 Russian principalities were still allies for the other Estonian lands, such as Ösel.

After the crusaders arrived in Riga in 1217, the Estonians once again sought the support against the Rigan church, but the deployment of the Russian army

263 HCL XX.5, pp. 137–38; NLI, pp. 57, 257–58; Benninghoven, Orden, p. 140; Berezhkov, Хронология, p. 254; Vahre, Muinasaja loojang, pp. 115–16.

264 HCL XX.5, 7–8, XXI.1, pp. 138–41; NLI, pp. 57, 258; Berezhkov, Хронология, p. 254; Vahre, Muinasaja loojang, pp. 116–19.

265 HCL XXIII.9, p. 164.

266 Cf. for the opposite view, for example, Gnegel-Waitschies, Bischof Albert, p. 123; Vladimir T. Pashuto, Внешняя политика Древней Руси (Moscow, 1968), p. 231; Rebane, “Denmark,” p. 192; Krötzl, “Finnen,” p. 52.
was delayed as a result of the change of ruler in Novgorod. It can once again be seen that the military offensive did not depend on the prince but on the leaders of the Novgorod town community. The army from the Estonian lands assembled in Sackala suffered a defeat at the Battle of Fellin in the spring. When Sackala was subjugated once again, narrates the chronicler, its people had turned apostate “as a result of agreement with the pagans and Russians”.267

Almost immediately after the death of Emperor Otto IV in May 1218, on whose support Bishop Albert had been able to rely throughout this time,268 the latter met King Valdemar of Denmark in June and, as Henry puts it in his chronicle, invited him to lead a war in Livonia. Twice in this section the chronicle stresses that the enemies of the Livonian church were the Estonians and the Russians.269 In the historiography, too, it has often been pointed out that this request for assistance occurred after the Russian threat following the defeat at Odenpäh in 1217 and the expected military campaign of Novgorod.270 Moreover, Bishop Albert may have been looking for an ally against the Sword Brothers.271 On the other hand, it is quite feasible that the Danish king still saw Livonia as his area of interest. For instance, Denmark had control of shipping transport to Livonia. Now the claim to Livonia’s submission to Danish sovereignty was reiterated.

In the late summer a military expedition left Riga for Reval and Harria. As they passed through Sackala, the Rigans came across the envoys from Ösel and the Russians assembling their army. The great Russian army led by Prince Vsevolod Mstislavich-Borisovich of Novgorod and Prince Vladimir Mstislavich of Pskov was already in Ugaunia. Vladimir’s son Iaroslav was also on his way there with a separate contingent. According to Henry, Rus’ had spent two years preparing for this campaign. After the fighting, known as the Battle of Puide (in southern Estonia), the Russians devastated Ymera and surrounded Wenden (see p. 113).

At the beginning of 1219 the peaceful state of affairs between Pskov and Livonia seems to have been restored.272 This lasted until 1221, when Pskov rejected the peace agreement reached at Odenpäh.273 The official peace should

267 HCL XXI.2, 5, pp. 141–44; Benninghoven, Orden, pp. 143–45.
269 HCL XXII.1, pp. 146–47.
270 For example, Johansen, Nordische Mission, p. 103; Gnegel-Waitschies, Bischof Albert, pp. 122–28; Skyum-Nielsen, Kvinde, p. 283.
272 HCL XXII.9, pp. 152–53.
273 HCL XXV.3, p. 182.
have been stable from 1217 but this was not the case. A possible explanation for this is that Henry glosses over the conflicts between Bishop Albert and the Sword Brothers, presenting the Rigans as unified at every opportunity, insofar as he contrasts them with the Danes and other rivals. Consequently, it is not always possible to establish which of the power elements in Livonia was now leading the struggle against Pskov and Novgorod. The Sword Brothers certainly seem to have played a much larger role in these conflicts than the representatives of the bishop's camp.

In 1221 Livonia was ravaged once again by Novgorod near Wenden, Ymera, and in Ugaunia. The sources do not explicitly mention any possible role played by Pskov, but there are nonetheless clues as to its participation: the rejection of the peace agreement and the presence of Lithuanians in Pskov on their way back point towards a joint venture. A succession of counter-attacks was launched from Livonia in response as far as the church non longe a civitate Nogardia, from which the Lettgallians took icons, bells, incense vessels, and other ecclesiastical objects as valuables. The Ugaunians and the Sackalians plundered Votia and Ingria, meting out vengeance two or three times to the Russians according to the chronicler. In this context, Henry refers to the building of castles in Sackala and the dread of Rus' in Ugaunia.

The war in Livonia was now also drawing the attention of the north-western Russian princes due to the primacy of the Suzdal dynasty in Novgorod. This heralded the start of considerable changes in the relations of Novgorod and Pskov with Livonia during the next decade. While the rule of the Sword Brothers and the bishop of Riga became consolidated in Ugaunia, Sackala, and Tolowa, 'German' Livonia became not only a rival but also a partner of certain political groups in Pskov and Novgorod. Their policy was aimed against the princes of Vladimir-Suzdal, whose attempts to subordinate the power structures of Pskov and Novgorod must have become increasingly evident. The differences between Novgorod and the princes of Vladimir-Suzdal were not that

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274 HCL XXV.3, pp. 181–83; NL1, pp. 60–61, 262–63; Berezhkov, Хронология, p. 254, Vahtre, Муинасаа лооианг, pp. 151–52. The representative of the same Suzdal dynasty, the minor Vsevolod Iur’evich, now acted as prince of Novgorod. The Russians had previously reached an agreement with the Lithuanians, whom Henry here calls Litowini, following the Russian practice.

275 HCL XXV.5–6, pp. 184–85; Vahtre, Муинасаа лооианг, pp. 151–53. Evgeniiia Nazarova (“Место Ливонии,” pp. 357–58) suggests that an agreement with Pskov allowed the Livonian troops to cross Pskov’s territory.

pronounced at first, however; more important was the joint struggle, especially for the conquest of the Estonian regions of Ugaunia and Sackala.

Novgorod and Pskov further consolidated their position in Estonia in 1223, when the Estonians concluded a peace treaty with Rus’ and Russian troops advanced towards Reval, Fellin, Odenpäh, and other towns “to fight against the Germans and Latins and all the Christians”.277 For the chronicler, these Russians, by helping apostates, had separated themselves from Christians, which was why they were subsequently treated so harshly, more harshly than the pagans.278 For Sackala and Ugaunia, the agreement involved a certain degree of subjection to Rus’. This also manifested itself in lodging the Russian princes in the castles. Waremarus, the Russian princeps in Fellin, was killed by the Lettgallians in early 1223.279 Moreover, the presence of the troops required that they be housed and fed at the expense of the native population. Bishop Albert did not, however, see any serious danger for Livonia from Russian control in these districts. On the contrary, he exploited this situation to make demands of the Sword Brothers, claiming a third of Estonia for himself and another third for Bishop Hermann of Leal (Dorpat).280

The embassy from Sackala (and Ösel?) to the grand prince of Suzdal, Iurii Vsevolodovich, points furthermore to the possibility that there were groups in Novgorod who did not wish for a continuation of the conflict with Livonia. The Novgorod and Pskov army of Prince Iaroslav, the brother of the grand prince, consolidated its power in southern Estonia and besieged Reval without success, in addition to the pillaging carried out on the advice of Ösel, as Henry narrates.281 The raid shows that Iaroslav, apart from the attempt to subjugate southern Estonia, did not have any other military interests beyond the pursuit of booty, since Rus’ had not so far had any conflicts with Denmark’s Estonian dominion.

If Iaroslav’s raid remained an isolated episode, Novgorod sent the former prince of Kokenhusen, Viachko, with money and men to Dorpat in order to consolidate its power in Estonia. Viachko, who appeared “like a snare and

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278 HCL XXVII.2, pp. 195–196.
279 HCL XXVII.1, p. 193. He might have been of Scandinavian descent. See Matuzova and Nazarova, Крестоносцы, p. 185.
280 HCL XXVI.13, p. 192.
a great devil" to the Sackalians and other Estonians, was anxious to gain possession of as much as possible of Ugaunia and the neighbouring lands by means of tribute and plunder raids. The relationship between Pskov and Novgorod nevertheless remains unknown in this context. Whereas Vladimir Mstislavich remained the prince of Pskov, the Suzdal Vsevolodovich had long been on hostile terms with the royal house of Smolensk. Vladimir himself had once laid claim to Ugaunia. Sending Viachko from Novgorod to the Estonian territories could be seen as a sign of the opposition to Pskov that was gradually becoming apparent.

It was only now, in 1223 and 1224, that the Russians began to take serious steps to consolidate their power in Estonian territory. Their model was undoubtedly none other than ‘German’ Livonia. This revealed the advantages of continuous rule both in military and economic terms as opposed to the looser form of dependence based on tribute. However, the permanent administration of a territory would require much greater resources than Novgorod and Pskov evidently had at their disposal, as well as necessitating the rapid assembly of armies around a permanent centre. In Livonia there were groups specially organised for this purpose, namely the Sword Brothers, the crusaders, and the bishop’s vassals, whereas in Rus’ the družina (дружина) (retinue) of a prince were always travelling with him and were therefore not in a position to occupy an area on a permanent basis.

The bishop’s envoys exhorted Viachko to break away from the apostates, but he refused because Novgorod and the Russian princes had promised him the right of possession of Dorpat during his lifetime as well as support against the Germans. Although Henry is highlighting Viachko’s continuing treachery and collaboration with the rebels, Viachko had been given the chance to leave the castle unimpeded with his entourage and possessions during the siege of Dorpat in 1224. After the castle was captured, however, all Russians were killed except one messenger. This once again reveals Henry’s view of Viachko as the Christian helper of apostates. This attitude cannot of course be extended to all Russians or schismatics. It was Henry’s personal opinion regarding a specific individual.

Even during the siege of Dorpat there were rumours in the Rigan army about the approaching Russians. Henry reports the gathering of the Novgorod army
in Pskov, which nonetheless broke up when it heard of the castle’s capture.\footnote{HCL XXVIII.5–6, pp. 202–05.} This piece of information is not confirmed by the Russian sources. What is certain, however, is that the war had come to an end for the time being after the capture of Dorpat. That very year, in 1224, envoys came from Pskov and Novgorod to Riga. Peaceful relations were reestablished and Pskov’s right to the tribute that it had always collected in Tolowa was reconfirmed. At the same time, an agreement laid down the division of Tolowa between the bishop and the Sword Brothers,\footnote{HCL XXVIII.9, XXIX.1, pp. 206–07.} confirmed the following year by the papal legate William of Modena.\footnote{HCL XXIX.4, p. 211.} Novgorod was forced to tolerate the loss of the Dorpat region because of disagreements with its Suzdal princes.\footnote{NL1, pp. 63–64, 267–68.}

Vladimir Mstislavich is mentioned in the sources for the last time in the winter of 1225–26, when he fought the Lithuanians at Torzhok with his son and his brother and Iaroslav Vsevolodovich. His politics were increasingly aligned with those of Suzdal, signifying dependence on a growing force in Rus’. It is not known when he died nor whether he lost power in Pskov and, if so, when.\footnote{NL1, pp. 64, 269; Pickhan, Gospodin Pskov, pp. 103–04; Cf. Fennell, Crisis, p. 92; Valentin L. Ianin, Новгород и Литва. Пограничные ситуации XIII–XV веков (Moscow, 1998), pp. 49–51; Nazarova, “Место Ливонии,” p. 359.} Henry probably would have mentioned this in his chronicle if it had occurred prior to 1227 given that he was generally well informed of Russian affairs and was hostile towards Vladimir. In fact, he names the prince of Pskov for the last time in 1218.

During the conquest of Estonia the idea manifested itself clearly that the baptism of an area simultaneously meant subjugation of the territory. But this contest was of importance primarily in terms of relations among Catholics themselves, not between Catholic and Orthodox powers. The crusaders’ conquest of Estonia began in cooperation with Pskov and developed into rivalry only later. It was a political rivalry, not a religious one. The rhetoric against Russians in Livonian sources was directed against certain individuals or provoked by their role as allies of apostate Estonians in particular military situations. Russian territory itself was never the target of crusaders’ campaigns.
Livonia and Rus’ in the 1230s and 1240s

3.1 Livonia, Pskov, and Novgorod c. 1230

The 1240s has often been regarded in historiography as being the most important period for relations between Rus’ and Latin Europe during the Middle Ages. The Battle of the Neva in 1240 and the Battle of the Ice at Lake Peipus in 1242 have been seen as crucial turning points in the historical development of relations between Rus’ and its western neighbours. The immediate background to the events of the 1240s dates back, however, to the previous decade. Moreover, it would first have to be shown that these battles and other events in the 1240s were indeed exceptional in the context of the 13th century as a whole.

The Novgorod Chronicle describes the military campaign of Prince Iaroslav Vsevolodovich of Novgorod against the Tavastians under the year 1228. This campaign was a failure because a quarrel took place within the Novgorod army caused by disaffection with the prince. In the same year Iaroslav led his army together with Novgorod’s posadnik Ivanko and its tysiatkii Viacheslav towards Pskov. When the Pskovians found out about their approach, they holed themselves up in the city and would not let the prince enter. Prince Iaroslav returned to Novgorod and rumours began to circulate that he wanted to take the most eminent men of Pskov prisoner. In Novgorod Iaroslav convened the Veche and declared that he had had the best intentions towards Pskov: he had merely wanted to deliver gifts, but Pskov had dishonoured him. Iaroslav then raised an army from Pereiaslav, but this time he made known that his intention was to attack Riga. It was a large army and its garrisoning in Novgorod caused the price of food to rise. These tensions must be seen in the context of the resistance of Pskov and Novgorod to rule by the Suzdal dynasty as represented by Iaroslav.

When news reached Pskov that Iaroslav’s troops were ready, the town agreed a treaty with Riga and requested military aid in the event of an attack by Novgorod or Prince Iaroslav. The treaty was guaranteed by sending forty hostages from Pskov to Riga. The Novgorodians themselves assumed that the attack on Riga was merely a pretext used by the prince to disguise his real aim, namely the defeat of Pskov. The prince sent a messenger to Pskov asking it take part in the attack on Riga, seeking to convince the people that Iaroslav had no evil intentions towards them as long as his opponents were handed over to him. Pskov’s response was to refuse to take part in the campaign or to hand
over its leaders. The Novgorod Chronicle represents Pskov’s perspective as follows: if the prince truly intended to kill the Pskovians and abduct their women and children, then he was no better than the pagans. Novgorod too refused to take part in the campaign following Pskov’s own refusal. The offensive did not take place and the army had to be disbanded.

The Livonian auxiliary army then stationed in Pskov and the “Germans, Chuds, Lettgallians and Livs” also returned home, but the men who had received a reward (придатъкъ) from the prince of Novgorod were driven from Pskov: “Follow your prince, you aren’t our brothers”. Iaroslav and his wife then left Novgorod for Pereiaslav, leaving his sons Fedor and Aleksandr, who were still minors, and his bailiff (тиунъ) Iakim behind. When the famine which had struck Novgorod lingered on because of heavy rainfall and a bad harvest, Archbishop Arsenii, who was accused of corrupting the prince, was removed from office. In the city the houses of the followers of the Suzdal Prince Iaroslav were plundered. Boris Negochevich was appointed the new tysiatiskii. Iaroslav rejected an agreement, for he did not consent to the conditions demanded by the city regarding the prince’s powers. Iakim fled the city with Iaroslav’s two sons. Mikhail Vsevolodovich from Chernigov was elected the new prince, arriving in Novgorod in 1230.1

The Russian historian Evgeniiia Nazarova has suggested that the fears harboured by Pskov that Iaroslav wanted to assume control there and take reprisals against his opponents had a basis in fact.2 For shortly before Iaroslav’s failed military campaign Prince Vladimir Mstislavich, the same who had reigned intermittently in Pskov for at least fifteen years, is supposed to have died. In this case, the throne of Pskov may have been vacant and Iaroslav Vsevolodovich could have attempted to take power by force. However, the prince did not dare rely on support from only his small retinue and the contingent from Novgorod, which he considered untrustworthy in any case, and thus deployed the military might of north-eastern Rus’. This turned out to be a threat to Novgorod itself, not to mention the supply problems caused by the size of the army. Pskov’s participation in the attack on Livonia would have constituted a violation of the defensive treaty concluded with Riga and endangered the hostages held there. This treaty had already been agreed when Iaroslav announced his offensive. The followers of the prince of Suzdal, who had themselves been corrupted by

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2 Evgeniiia L. Nazarova, “К истории Псковско-Ливонского договора 1228 г.,” in Восточная Европа в древности и средневековье. Международная договорная практика Древней Руси. IX Чтения памяти Владимира Т. Пашуто, ed. Elena A. Melnikova et al. (Moscow; 1997), pp. 46–49; Matuzova and Nazarova, Крестоносцы, p. 302.
the prince, were banished from Pskov, after which his opponents gained the upper hand in Novgorod too.3

Pskov’s argument against the plan to attack Riga was, according to the chronicles, the wrong that Novgorod had inflicted on Pskov in the previous Livonia offensives. The campaigns of 1217 against Odenpäh, 1221 against Wenden, and 1223 against Reval are mentioned.4 The Novgorodians and/or their prince had allegedly kept the entire booty, whereas the Pskovians were only left to suffer under Livonia’s retaliation campaigns. Iaroslav’s aim of attacking Livonia appears to have been a tactical move to gain prestige in Novgorod and Pskov or to recover the prestige he had lost. Pskov was under pressure but could not place hope in the traditional ally of Novgorod. Its position towards the prince wavered and it never had any choice but to seek allies in Livonia. Now when the son of Vladimir Mstislavich claimed the throne of Pskov, he was also able to rely on support from his family ties with the bishopric of Dorpat: the knight Theodoric, Vladimir’s son-in-law, was the brother of Bishop Hermann of Leal (Dorpat), and of Bishop Albert (d. 1229). Pskov and Novgorod had agreed a peace with Livonia in 1224–25 which was on the whole favourable to them. Pskov once again received tribute from Tolowa and the fighting over Estonian territory came to an end. Once conditions in Estonia and Lettgallia stabilized, Pskov and Livonia became natural allies, dependent on one another against their more powerful neighbours. The fact that Livonia subsequently supported the factions in Pskov opposed to Suzdal may simply be the accidental result of the balance of power. There is, as a result, no reason to refer to a party ‘disposed to the West’ and one ‘hostile to the West’.

The Novgorod Chronicle cites “Riga” and the “Rigans” as Pskov’s allies. A few years later it mentions Dorpat and Odenpäh in this role instead. This appears to reflect Bishop Albert’s great authority and prestige. Upon his death, his relationship with Pskov was therefore continued by his brother, Bishop Hermann of Dorpat.

3.2 The Legation of Baldwin of Aulne

Bishop Albert of Riga died on 17 January 1229. The cathedral chapter of Riga elected Nicholas, a canon of Magdeburg Cathedral, as his successor, while the archbishop of Bremen, seeking to reestablish his rights as metropolitan, chose

4 Ianin, Средневековый Новгород, p. 262.
Albert Suerbeer, a canon of Bremen Cathedral. In April 1230 the pope entrusted his legate Cardinal-Deacon Otto of St Nicola in Carcere (d. c. 1250) with the resolution of the affair. Cardinal Otto delegated the matter to the Walloon monk Baldwin from the Cistercian monastery of Aulne-sur-Sambre in the diocese of Liège. Cardinal Otto himself visited Denmark in the summer of 1230. It is therefore likely that the dispute over the Rigan election was also related to the conflict between Denmark and the Sword Brothers over possession of northern and western Estonia. Baldwin arrived in Riga in July 1230. Despite being the representative of the head of Christendom, the only authority his position had was spiritual. He could only enforce his decisions in practice if he had the backing of a major Livonian power. Baldwin instead attempted to act independently, which brought him into conflict with both the Sword Brothers and the bishopric of Riga. He nonetheless achieved some successes at the start. At the turn of 1230–31 the Curonians submitted themselves to the church of Riga in consequence of the famine afflicting Livonia, as well as Rus’, and it was Baldwin who agreed the treaties of submission with them.

Circumstances changed after that, however. In October 1230 Cardinal Otto decided the dispute over the bishopric of Riga in favour of Nicholas, who proceeded to be consecrated in the spring of 1231, arriving in Riga that summer. Disagreements had meanwhile emerged in Riga over the division and baptism of Curonia, forcing Baldwin to flee to the monastery of Dünamünde. Baldwin left the country and obtained a number of privileges from the pope at the beginning of 1232. He was granted the powers of legation in Livonia, Gothlandia, Vinlandia, Hestonia, Semigallia, Curlandia, et ceteris neophytorum et paganorum provinciis et insulis circumpositis; he was allocated Curonia and the bishopric of Semgallia during his lifetime, as well as the right to the return of the areas which should have been under ecclesiastical control since the time of William of Modena but which were in fact administered by the Sword Brothers.

Baldwin returned to Livonia by 1233 at the latest, when he immediately met with opposition. The Sword Brothers had occupied part of Curonia and refused to return it. Baldwin set up his bases in Estonian territory in Wiek and

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5 DD 1/6, no. 110.
7 On the events, see Donner, Kardinal Wilhelm, pp. 159–162; Johansen, Estlandliste, pp. 702–733; Benninghoven, Orden, pp. 269–301. Some aspects of these accounts are extremely hypothetical.
8 LUB 1, no. 115; Epistolae saeculi xii et regestis pontificum romanorum selectae per Georg H. Pertz, ed. Carl Rodenberg, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1883) (MGH), no. 461; DD 1/6, no. 127.
Vironia. That summer he attempted to take possession of the castle of Reval in the name of the pope, but the Sword Brothers refused to hand it over. In the fighting that followed (August–September?), Baldwin's men were defeated on Reval's fortified hill, today's Toompea. The legate fled to Riga and excommunicated the Sword Brothers, but this did not stop the Order from again seizing power in northern Estonia.

Livonia was now politically divided into at least two camps. Baldwin's opponents included the Sword Brothers, Bishop Nicholas of Riga, and the city of Riga. He had support mainly from the family of Bishop Albert and from the bishopric of Dorpat. His supporters also certainly included a section of Riga's cathedral chapter, the Cistercian monasteries of Dünamünde and Falkenau, founded around this time, the vassals from Vironia, the Estonians and Curonians, and possibly some individual Sword Brothers.

Traditionally historians have argued that the aim of Baldwin's legation was to establish an ecclesiastical state in the Baltic. This view has been heavily criticized by Manfred Hellmann. His argument must be fully endorsed, namely the notion that there was a plan to set up an ecclesiastical state in northern Europe must be regarded as fanciful speculation. It has been argued that the curia needed a possession in Livonia to serve as a base for sending missions to the pagans and the Russians. Baldwin was determined to use the opportunity of eastward expansion to consolidate his own power and it was the pope who was behind the idea of propagating Catholicism in Rus'. In Paul Johansen's view Rome may have learned precisely through the legations of William of

Modena and Baldwin of the opportunities in eastern Europe, its commercial potential, and of the prospect of spreading Catholicism in Rus’ by exploiting its internal conflicts and the threat posed by the Mongols.14

However, what one actually sees in Baldwin’s legation is the role of a papal arbiter who simultaneously ruled as bishop of Semgallia15 and had no intention of expanding towards Russia.16 In the sources relating to Baldwin a number of episodes involving Rus’ are indeed mentioned. Among the papal letters Baldwin obtained as backing at the beginning of 1232, there is one prohibiting the Christians under the area covered by his legation from agreeing peace or a truce “with the pagans and Russians of these lands” without the legate’s approval or to conduct peace talks or levy taxes.17 The fact that the pagans are mentioned first in this decretal suggests that its purpose was not to prepare an expansion towards Rus’, but to protect the legate from any potential alliance between a Livonian faction and foreign powers. The expression “pagans and Russians” in this instance covers all of Livonia’s neighbours indiscriminately.

In the main source on Baldwin’s mission to Livonia, the papal summons of 1234 calling Bishop Nicholas of Riga, some individual members of Sword Brothers and the Order as a whole, and the city of Riga to a papal hearing, the crimes committed by the accused against the church and the legate are listed point by point. This document is based on the complaints communicated by Baldwin and thus reflects his viewpoint. The Russians are mentioned two or three times. The Sword Brothers are accused of not allowing the burial of the ecclesiastical vassals who had been killed in the battle on Reval’s fortified hill. This had profaned the church, with the result that “the newly baptized and others” gradually approached to watch the scene with curiosity. This was done so that “the neophytes, the Russians, and the pagans would see that [the Order] excelled the church of Rome”.18 As regards papal policy towards Rus’, this extract means nothing other than that there were neophytes whose

17 *HRM* 1, no. 28; *LUB* 1, no. 121: “ne cum paganis terrarum illarum aut Rutenis, sive super pace vel treuga tenenda, sive aliquo censu taxando tuae legationis tempore.”
18 *DD* 1/6, no. 199, para. 16; Hildebrand, *Livonica*, no. 21, para. 16: “et tam in cimiterio quam in ecclesia super altare et corporale sanguinem effundentes; corpora in cumulum congregantes. Unum de occisis qui ecclesie fuerat fidelior quasi domini pape vices tenetem super acervum occisorum erexerunt et ad confusionem ecclesie maiores minime permiserunt quod tradarentur sepulture; quousque processu temporis neophiti et alii ad huiusmodi spectaculum videndum advenissent. Ut a neophitis, Rutenis et paganis ecclesia Romana maiores viderentur.”
faith was weak in Reval in 1233, as well as Russians and pagans to whom true Christians would not have shown the degradation of the church of Rome.\(^{19}\)

The Sword Brothers are also accused of:

invoking the heretical Russians and pagans from the surrounding region against the bishop and the cathedral of Leal [i.e. the bishopric of Dorpat]\(^{20}\) [and] against this bishop’s vassals and the newly baptized. They laid siege to the castle of Dorpat, [while the Order] supplied the Russians and pagans with craftsmen, arms, and money, [the Russians] depopulated the vicinity, captured 450 neophytes and killed them, without taking into account that the bishop of Leal [Dorpat] had been entrusted with apostolic letters to come to the aid of the bishop of Semgallia and the legate [Baldwin] to put an end to the viciousness of these brothers of the Order.\(^{21}\)

The summons adds that the Order had “completely destroyed the Cistercian monastery of Falkenau with the help of the aforesaid Russians and pagans, razing its buildings to the ground, following which most of the community moved from Livonia to Germany”.\(^{22}\) In the accusations, not the Russians, but the brothers of the Order who had risen against the church are described as schismatic.\(^{23}\) Baldwin thus considered the Russians possible enemies of Livonia,\(^{24}\) and an alliance with them was just as compromising for the Order as working with the pagans. But just how should these accusations against the Order be interpreted?\(^{25}\)

The military campaign of Rus’ against the bishopric of Dorpat did indeed take place in 1234, but the background to it goes back further. As previously mentioned, Viacheslav, a follower of the Suzdal dynasty, had been removed from the office of tysiatskii in Novgorod in 1228 to be replaced with Boris Negochevich. Mikhail from Chernigov was appointed the new prince. When he arrived, he promised to respect the city’s rights. In 1229 Mikhail returned to


\(^{20}\) The bishopric of Dorpat was called Leal (*Lealensis*) until 1235. See *LUR*, no. 405; cf. nos 229, 232.

\(^{21}\) *DD* 1/6, no. 199, paras. 16, 25; Hildebrand, *Livonica*, no. 21, paras. 16, 25.

\(^{22}\) *DD* 1/6, no. 199, para. 28; Hildebrand, *Livonica*, no. 21, para. 28.

\(^{23}\) *DD* 1/6, no. 199, para. 38; Hildebrand, *Livonica*, no. 21, para. 38.

\(^{24}\) See also Krötzl, “Finnen,” p. 54.

Chernigov, leaving his son Rostislav as his representative in Novgorod. The tension in the city continued, as did the famine, and in 1230, when Rostislav had left for Torzhok, there was another turn of events in Novgorod. The houses of the prince of Chernigov’s followers were burned down and they in turn were either killed or forced to flee. Boris Negochevich and his companions fled to Chernigov. Rostislav was also sent home to his father. Iaroslav was summoned from Pereiaslav as the new prince, arriving in the city on the second last day of 1230. He was actually represented in the city by his minor sons Fedor and Aleksandr. The famine became even worse towards the spring and the related unrest also increased. In 1231 the Novgorod Chronicle states that “God laid bare to us sinners His bounty, swiftly showing His grace: the Germans hurried from overseas with grain and flour and did much good”. In the autumn Iaroslav and the Novgorodians attacked the Chernigov Land in an offensive against Mikhail.26

In spring 1232 Boris Negochevich and his followers returned to Novgorod together with Prince Sviatoslav of Trubchevsk (a castle in the region of Chernigov). Sviatoslav claimed the throne of Novgorod but turned back halfway, convinced of the hopelessness of the undertaking. When Boris and his followers did not succeed in Novgorod, they made their way to Pskov, where they took Viacheslav Gorislavich prisoner. He was evidently a supporter of Iaroslav Vsevolodovich and may have been identical with the tysiatiski of Novgorod mentioned in 1228 and whose presence in Pskov would have been on Iaroslav’s orders.27 Boris could count on support in Pskov. There were also rebellions against Iaroslav in Novgorod. However, when Iaroslav himself turned up, he took the Pskovians who were in Novgorod prisoner and demanded from Pskov the release of his man Viacheslav and the banishment of Boris and his followers. At the same time the families of Iaroslav’s opponents in Novgorod were detained and their property confiscated. After a trade embargo imposed on Pskov, Viacheslav was finally released by the one side and the wives of Boris and his companions by the other, “but peace was not reached”. Pskov did not surrender until the winter, when Iaroslav appointed his brother-in-law Iurii prince; Boris and his companions, together with their families, who had been banished from the city, found refuge in Livonia.28

In spring 1233 Boris and his followers together with Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich, the son of Vladimir of Pskov, and “the Germans” attacked Izborsk. Pskov succeeded in winning back Izborsk in a counteroffensive, killing a German called Daniel in the process, and taking Iaroslav Vladimirovich

27 Ianin, Средневековый Новгород, p. 262.
prisoner. He was handed over to Iaroslav Vsevolodovich, who sent the prisoner to Pereiaslav. Iaroslav Vladimirovich was thus one of the opponents of the house of Suzdal in Pskov. This reference to his arrest and imprisonment is reason to assume that his role in Pskov's revolt against Iaroslav Vsevolodovich went back several years. In the same year “the Germans” penetrated to Tesovo, where they had captured a certain Kirill Sinkinich, bringing him to Odenpäh, where he was held captive from mid-August 1233 until March 1234. Early in the spring of that year Iaroslav Vsevolodovich reached Novgorod with his warriors from Pereiaslav. He pushed through to Dorpat with his army and that of Novgorod. He allowed his army to lay waste to the country around the castle, but faced resistance from the Germans from Dorpat and Odenpäh. Iaroslav was victorious in the battle and “a number of the best Germans” were also killed. Some of the Germans drowned when the ice on the river Emajõgi cracked under them; others were killed, others wounded, and others fled to Dorpat and Odenpäh. Iaroslav devastated the surrounding country, but finally made peace at the request of the Germans “on Iaroslav's terms, with the Novgorodians all returning safe and sound, although some of the men from the north-east of Rus' had fallen.”

This account can be directly connected with Baldwin's complaint that the Sword Brothers had called on the Russians to plunder Dorpat. Nonetheless, the relations described between Novgorod, Pskov, and Dorpat explain Iaroslav Vsevolodovich's attack much better than any supposed invitation from the Order. The attack took place in the early spring of 1234, before the ice melted. The faction hostile to Baldwin at this point had already been successful in securing the legate's dismissal and replacement by William of Modena on 9 February 1234, appointed legate for a second time, but news of this had not yet reached Livonia. Bishop Hermann of Dorpat himself would most likely not have been in the country during the attack—in 1233 he was in Germany—but the bishopric still came to Baldwin's aid and was opposed to the Sword Brothers. The abbot referred to only by the initial ‘P’ of the Cistercian monastery of Falkenau, possibly founded in 1228, was staying near the

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29 NL1, pp. 72–73, 282–83.
31 Hildebrand, Livonica, nos 18–19; DD 1/6, no. 172.
32 Friedrich G. von Bunge, Livland, die Wiege der Deutschen Weihbischöfe (Leipzig, 1875) (Baltische Geschichtsstudien 1), pp. 31–32; Benninghoven, Orden, pp. 288–89.
34 Benninghoven, Orden, p. 288.
Cistercian Baldwin. The Russian chronicles do not mention either the siege of Falkenau or its destruction, but do report the destructive advance reaching the area surrounding Dorpat. Baldwin’s complaints can thus be placed in the context of events taking place in Livonia without difficulty. While on the one hand the bishopric of Dorpat assisted the opponents of Iaroslav Vsevolodovich, the prince in turn may have supported the Order. There is no reason to rule out contacts and concerted action between the Order and Iaroslav Vsevolodovich.

The bishopric of Dorpat and Pskov were dependent on one another in the periods when those who held power in Pskov were disposed against the Suzdal dynasty or the local group that supported it. Their principal problem was the conflicts with their more powerful neighbours, the Sword Brothers, and the princes of Suzdal, and Novgorod, which was occasionally controlled by the princes of Suzdal. The central figure unifying the policies of Dorpat and Pskov was, in the 1230s and 1240s, Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich, who sought to enforce his claim to Pskov. He must have been born c. 1200, for in 1218 he already appears leading the army. In 1225 and 1226 he fought together with his father Vladimir of Pskov and Iaroslav Vsevolodovich against the Lithuanians at Torzhok. He spent some years as a youth at the house of Bishop Albert in Riga with the result that he must have been familiar with the Catholic rite, although this does not of course allow us to infer that he was predisposed towards Catholicism or had a German wife, as has sometimes been argued. It is known that he was married twice and that his second wife was murdered by her stepson in Odenpäh sometime before 1243, but it is not known who his wives were. It cannot of course be ruled out that he was married to a Livonian, but there are no sources to indicate this apart from a very late tradition. Iaroslav’s relations with both Livonia and Rus’ demonstrate once again that one should not ascribe too much importance to the religious frontier in Livonia in the 13th century.

Iaroslav Vladimirovich may have been freed from his imprisonment in Pereiaslav (since being captured in Izborsk) as early as 1235 if his ransom had

35 LUB 1, no. 135; LVA, no. 200.
36 HCL XXII.4, p. 151. See also Nazarova, “Князь Ярослав Владимирович,” p. 40. On the figure of Iaroslav, see also Andrei V. Kuzmin, “Торопецкая знать в XIII веке. Из истории Смоленской земли,” Russia mediaevalis 10 (2001), 68–72.
37 NL1, pp. 64, 269.
38 Pickhan, Gospodin Pskov, p. 110.
39 NL1, pp. 79, 297.
been paid by his followers in Livonia.\textsuperscript{41} In the material referred to above on the relations between Dorpat and Pskov, one of the key fortresses mentioned was Odenpäh. The first four vassals of Bishop Hermann in Odenpäh were his brother Theodoric, also Vladimir Mstislavich’s son-in-law, his brother-in-law Engelbert von Tiesenhausen, Helmold von Lüneburg, and Johannes von Dolen.\textsuperscript{42} Odenpäh\textsuperscript{43} itself was therefore also tied to the lineage of Iaroslav Vladimirovich through the marriage between his sister and Theodoric, so that it is hardly surprising that Iaroslav himself and his followers were mainly based there and which would explain the importance placed on Odenpäh’s role in the Novgorod Chronicle.

It is not known whether Iaroslav Vladimirovich ever actually reigned in Pskov, although he relentlessly pursued power there; if he did, then perhaps before Pskov’s capitulation in the face of Iaroslav Vsevolodovich in the winter of 1232–33.\textsuperscript{44} Although Pskov was ultimately subject to the Suzdal dynasty—in the 1230s and 1240s the position of the north-eastern Russian dynasty became consolidated throughout Rus’—he cannot be regarded as a hopeless claimant to the throne.

The relations of the factions in Novgorod and Pskov to Livonia are usually explained with reference to commercial interests.\textsuperscript{45} This fact is either welcomed as a positive attitude of openness towards the West or condemned as profit-driven greed, depending on the scholar. It may certainly be taken for granted that trade was essential, to a greater or lesser extent, to all the elites in these cities. The different urban groups relied on political and military support. Which faction assisted Livonia in the end and which the house of the Vsevolodovich might even be a matter of chance. It would be simplistic and anachronistic to refer to a ‘Western’ or ‘Eastern’ orientation. The military campaign of 1233 against Izborsk, which was linked to the political struggle in Novgorod and Pskov, belongs more to the history of Rus’ than that of Livonia.

Only the see of Dorpat, not the whole of Livonia, was directly affected by Iaroslav Vsevolodovich’s attack of 1234. The peace of 1234, which was based on that of 1224, does not appear to have touched on any territorial issues. It was apparently thanks to this peace treaty that Kirill Sinkinich, who had been

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} NL1, pp. 74, 285; Nazarova, “Князь Ярослав Владимирович,” p. 42.
\item \textsuperscript{42} HCL XXVIII.8, p. 206.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Mäesalu, “Burg Otepää,” p. 147; Tvauri, \textit{Muinas-Tartu}, pp. 250–54.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Pickhan, \textit{Gospodin Pskov}, p. 110. Evgeniia Nazarova (“Князь Ярослав Владимирович,” pp. 40–41) estimates that Iaroslav may have ruled in Pskov c. 1228 or immediately thereafter, probably until c. 1231.
\item \textsuperscript{45} E.g. Pickhan, \textit{Gospodin Pskov}, p. 112.
\end{itemize}
taken hostage, was released.\(^{46}\) Other terms of the peace would have touched on the question of the support given to the opposition in Pskov and Novgorod against Iaroslav Vsevolodovich. Iaroslav’s options were themselves limited. The famine continued in Rus’, just as in Livonia, making calling up and supplying a large army extremely difficult.\(^{47}\)

There are therefore no grounds for linking Baldwin’s mission with plans to convert Rus’ to Catholicism. In his complaints against the Sword Brothers he cited the compromising argument that the Order had collaborated with pagans and heretics, insofar as it had incited them against the cathedral of Dorpat and the monastery of Falkenau. After the fighting on Reval’s fortified hill in 1233, Baldwin had fled to Riga, where he proceeded to excommunicate a number of Sword Brothers and deposed several clerics who were sympathetic to the Order. These measures failed to have the desired effect, however. The Order took reprisals against Baldwin’s supporters and seized the possessions of the monastery of Dünamünde in northern Estonia.\(^{48}\) As a possible response to this, King Valdemar II and Count Albert of Holstein blocked the port of Lübeck.\(^{49}\) To recover Estonia Denmark had brought a case against the Order before the pope. The Order in turn sought support from Count Albert of Saxony (d. 1261).\(^{50}\) Baldwin, who had left Livonia by this time (1234), brought complaints against the Order and his other opponents.\(^{51}\) The pope’s judgement, not issued until February 1236, was finally unfavourable to the Order and Bishop Nicholas of Riga. In April it was resolved that the castle of Reval with all the lands belonging to it should be returned to the Danish king.\(^{52}\) The papal legate William of Modena had also arrived in Livonia no later than August 1234.\(^{53}\)

At the same time, the Sword Brothers, and later the Teutonic Order, and the princes of north-east Rus’ continued to collaborate. In 1235 Prince Iaroslav


\(^{47}\) See NL1, pp. 73, 283; *Annales Stadenses*, p. 361.


\(^{51}\) Hildebrand, *Livonica*, no. 20.


Vsevolodovich left Novgorod for Kiev, leaving his 15- or 16-year-old son Aleksandr behind in Novgorod. Then the Novgorod Chronicle narrates under the year 1237:

The same year the Germans came in great strength from beyond the sea to Riga and all united there; both the men of Riga and all the Chud Land, and the men of Pskov from themselves sent a help of 200 men, and they went against the godless Lithuanians; and thus for our sins they were defeated by the godless pagans, and each tenth man came back to his home.\(^{54}\)

It is in this way that the Battle of Saule of 1236 is described in the Novgorod Chronicle.

According to the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle, the master of the Sword Brothers, Volkwin, had sent messengers to Rus’ asking for help after the arrival of the crusaders, who wanted to fight the pagans. This help was indeed provided, and the Estonians, Letts, and Livs also joined the offensive against the pagans. The crusader army set off for Lithuania on a raid, but while returning fell victim to an attack by Samogitians and Semgallians at Saule on 22 September. Master Volkwin and 48 brothers were killed, in other words approximately half of the Sword Brothers.\(^{55}\) As regards the location of the battle, most historians agree in identifying Saule with modern Šiauliai in northern Lithuania.\(^{56}\)

In our context it is crucial to analyse the role of the support army from Pskov in this battle. Lithuania, which was in the process of consolidation—it was just about at this time that Mindaugas took power in Lithuania—represented a dangerous and increasingly powerful opponent to the states not only of Livonia but also of Pskov and Novgorod. This explains the shared interest of the Order and Pskov in fighting against Lithuania. Livonia, Rus’, and the crusaders thus formed a Christian coalition against the Lithuanian pagans. It was a political, not religious alliance, however. The Nikon Chronicle, compiled in the 16th century, relates that a small group of Novgorodians also took part in the battle. However, it is not clear where this information comes from; it is not found in the sources more contemporary with the battle.\(^{57}\) The arrival of a

\(^{54}\) NL1, pp. 74, 285; Лаврентьевская летопись, p. 514.

\(^{55}\) LR, lines 1881–1958. The number of those killed ranges from 48 to 61 in the sources. See Benninghoven, Orden, pp. 347–48.

\(^{56}\) Benninghoven, Orden, pp. 331–39.

\(^{57}\) Летописный сборник, именуемый Патриаршей или Никоновской летописью (продолжение), ed. Boris M. Kloss et al. (Moscow, 2000) (PSRL 10), p. 105: “ести же
large crusading army in Riga was a noteworthy occurrence, also raising hopes in Rus’ that the attacks of the pagans could be resisted. Moreover, at the time both Novgorod and Pskov were politically subordinate to the Suzdal dynasty in the form of Aleksandr Iaroslavich.

Baldwin of Aulne had already accused the Order and Iaroslav Vsevolodovich of working together. The Novgorod Land had been devastated by Lithuania in 1234 following Iaroslav’s Dorpat campaign. The Battle of Saule cannot be linked either to the papacy’s missionary policy or the influence of the Catholic church or, conversely, the dwindling influence of Rus’. Livonia’s expansion policy at the time was very clearly towards the south; a large, still unconquered area in north-east Lithuania, on the border with Polotsk, was earmarked for the diocese of the bishop of Semgallia in 1237.

After the Battle of Saule, the Lithuanians were able to resume their military activities. In the opinion of Friedrich Benninghoven, ‘Catholic’ Livonia lost a large part of its territory south of the Daugava in 1236 and 1237. The Sword Brothers did not recover from this blow. After the defeat, the talks over an alliance between the Sword Brothers and the Teutonic Order, which had been dragging on for some time, were brought to a swift conclusion. In the spring of 1237 news of the defeat at Saule reached the negotiating parties in Germany. This weakened the position of the Sword Brothers so dramatically that they agreed to incorporation without conditions and were forced to return northern Estonia to the Danish king. On 12 May 1237 the merger of the two orders was confirmed by the pope and announced in June by the grand master of the Teutonic Order, Hermann von Salza.

58 Annales Stadenses p. 363; LUB 1, no. 149.
59 According to Benninghoven, Orden, p. 347.
61 Benninghoven, Orden, pp. 349–52.
Vladimir Kuchkin argues that the Sword Brothers also asked Novgorod for help after the defeat at Saule, but without success because Novgorod was tied up in wars in Finland. The *vita* of Prince Aleksandr Iaroslavich narrates how a dignitary, Andreas (Андрейш), came from a western land from the community of those called the “servants of God” (слуги божия) to admire the beauty and intelligence of Aleksandr. According to Kuchkin, this Андрейш was Andreas von Felben, the subsequent provincial master of the Teutonic Order in Livonia (1241, 1248–53). Friedrich Benninghoven suggests that he may have been a former Sword Brother. However, the *vita* of Aleksandr, compiled in Vladimir in north-eastern Russia several decades afterwards (the original version possibly in the 1260s) and whose contents were not ordered in the exact factual and chronological sequence, cannot be considered reliable in this respect. We should not assume that the only possibility for diplomatic contact between the Sword Brothers or the Teutonic Order and Novgorod between 1236 (Aleksandr’s independent assumption of power in Novgorod) and 1240 (the account in the *vita* is immediately before the Battle of the Neva) was connected to the Battle of Saule, never mind take for granted that the messenger Андрейш is to be identified with Andreas von Felben. The episode in the *vita*, whose purpose is, according to the conventions of the genre, to demonstrate Aleksandr’s bravery, beauty, and fame, cannot be identified with a specific time or event. Political contacts between neighbouring countries had presumably taken place both before and after the Battle of Saule.

The high degree of political tension in Livonia, Novgorod, and Pskov in the 1230s resulted in the formation of two groups of allies both of which included Catholic and Orthodox participants. The argument of being allied with schismatics was used in the polemics of the time, but was addressed to an ‘outside’ audience with the objective of discrediting rivals. At the same time the Pskov Russians participated in the 1236 crusade against pagan Lithuanians.

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3.3 The Treaty of Stensby of 1238 and the Military Campaigns against Rus’ of 1240–42

In contrast to Baldwin of Aulne, William of Modena, who had by now arrived in Livonia (1234), acted in concert with the military orders. He mediated in strained relationships, appointed the Dominican Henry as bishop of Ösel, and used the new bishop Engelbert for the bishopric of Curonia. When William revived the bishopric of Ösel, which had become vacant after 1228 due to the political instability, he met with the opposition of the local vassals, who refused to relinquish their estates. The opposition was led by the brothers Odward and Heinrich von Lode, who could only be defeated by the might of the Order. In 1238 William thus announced an alliance between the Teutonic Order and the bishop of Ösel.67 The bishopric of Leal was renamed Dorpat after the actual location of the cathedral. The following year the former bishop of Modena left for Prussia. Meanwhile the Danish king proceeded with his case at the curia to regain Estonia. An agreement was finally reached on 7 June 1238 in the form of a treaty signed in Stensby, on the Danish island of Zealand, between the Teutonic Order and the Danish king for the return of northern Estonia to the Danish monarch.68 The Teutonic Order, the new territorial lord in Livonia following the merger with the Sword Brothers, had to relinquish Harria and Vironia. The Danish king could implement his claims only in part, however. He had to relinquish Jerwia, but continued the proceedings before the curia, laying claim to Wiek and the small lands of central Estonia (Alempois, Nurmekund, Mocha, and Waiga).

The terms of the Treaty of Stensby69 provided for the return of Revala, Jerwia, Harria, and Vironia to the Danish king. Jerwia was simultaneously transferred by the king to the Teutonic Order on condition that it did not build any castles there without his consent and that the land remained in the diocese of the bishop of Estonia (i.e. of Reval). The king also promised not to attack Ösel and Wiek. The Order undertook not to invade either the returned territories or the lands confiscated from the pagans and to be transferred to the Danish king. The pagans’ land to be conquered jointly in the future (de terris acquirendis a paganis communibus expensis regis et fratrum) would be split between them, with two thirds for the king and only one third for the Order.

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69 DD 1/7, no. 9; LUB 1, no. 170.
Many aspects of how the actual handover of northern Estonia took place remain unclear. William of Modena issued a decree excommunicating all violators of the peace in the territory under his legation.\(^7\) This would seem to suggest that the proceedings did not go particularly smoothly. The former Sword Brothers presumably resisted the handover, with the result that the provincial master of the Teutonic Order, Hermann Balk, had to leave the country because of the rebellion of his new confreres. He died in the spring of 1240 in Germany. The vassals of Harria and Vironia, among them the former vassals of the Sword Brothers, would also have put up resistance. This opposition, which was detrimental to the interests of the Teutonic Order, was nevertheless subdued and thus in the summer of 1238 a sufficiently large Danish military force was to be stationed in Reval.\(^71\) The English chronicler Matthew Paris (d. 1259), who was not very accurately informed about the Baltic, relates in his *Chronica maiora* under the year 1240 that at that time (*illo tempore*) there was a false rumour according to which the Danes planned to attack England. In fact, they had only loaded ships with both men and women to repopulate the lands devastated by the ‘Tatars’.\(^72\) This may be an echo of the Danish takeover of Vironia and Harria in 1238–39, which in England was associated with the main event in eastern Europe at the time, the Mongol invasion of 1240–41. The treaty between Denmark and the Teutonic Order was therefore very much a compromise. The return of territory to the king of Denmark was not so much an achievement of Gregory IX or William of Modena, but is rather attributable to the exceptional point in time during which there was a power vacuum while the military order in Livonia recomposed itself. Part of the compensation promised to the king in return for ceding Jerwia was two thirds of the lands that he, together with the Teutonic Order, conquered from the pagans in the future. The treaty itself mentions pagans. Many scholars have nevertheless read into it plans either for an aggression or a preventive attack on Rus’, taking the view that behind the treaty was a papal policy of uniting the Catholic forces in the region in preparation for a military campaign against Rus’ to bring it under Roman authority. In 1240, as is well known, three conflicts with Rus’ in the Baltic are documented in the sources: the Neva campaign, which was repelled by Prince Aleksandr Iaroslavich; the conquests in Votia; and the

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\(^7\) Donner, *Kardinal Wilhelm*, pp. 428–29, no. 11.


\(^72\) *Matthaei Chronica*, vol. 4, p. 9.
occupation of Pskov (Battle of the Ice). A highly influential historiographical tradition sees these campaigns as a coordinated attack aimed at conquering Rus’ and/or converting it to Catholicism.

The origins of this view lie in the veneration as a saint of the prince of Novgorod at the time, Aleksandr Iaroslavich. Aleksandr ‘Nevskii’—the saint was first given this sobriquet in the literary tradition of the 15th century—was the progenitor of the grand princes and tsars of Moscow. This explains why the dynastic local cult that grew up around him from the end of the 13th century in Vladimir later spread to the whole of Russia. Aleksandr’s veneration as the progenitor of the ruling dynasty merged simultaneously with the local tradition of Novgorod and Pskov, which represented Aleksandr as a courageous commander who fought against Livonia and Sweden—opponents that Pskov and Novgorod also had to fight against in the 14th and 15th centuries. During Aleksandr’s lifetime these cities were often opposed to him but he always succeeded in suppressing the opposition. Particularly in the Russian sources of the 16th century an image of a hero was created in line with the political requirements of the time.

To examine the validity of the view that these three campaigns were a coordinated attack we must establish what their aims were and whether or not they were indeed coordinated. Coordination in this sense should be understood as an agreement about the timing and location of the military campaigns, not simply the exploitation of a propitious opportunity.

The historiographical tradition linking the three campaigns together is based on their proximity in time and especially Aleksandr Iaroslavich’s participation in all three of them. The very treatment of Livonia and Rus’ as coherent entities is what makes possible the notion of an attack by the ‘West’ against Rus’ in the first place. The most comprehensive exposition of the theory of concerted action and the plan to conquer Rus’ has been elaborated by the Finnish historians Jalmari Jaakkola and Gustav Adolf Donner. The entire period from the 1230s to approximately 1270 represented, according to Jaakkola, a “crisis” in the relations between Rus’ and Europe in which Finland and Bishop Thomas of Finland (resigned 1245, d. 1248) played key roles. Donner proceeded on the premise that even Innocent III may already have sought to use Livonia

73 For a biography of Aleksandr, see Fennell, Crisis; Kuchkin, “Александр Невский”.
as a base from which to achieve the submission of the Russian church. The papacy’s plans against Rus’ had assumed solid form in the Treaty of Stensby, which laid the groundwork for a joint military venture. The ‘crusades’ of 1240 from Finland and Livonia had been specifically planned to take advantage of the propitious moment in which Rus’ had been weakened by the Mongol invasion. The church’s leading role in the plans to subjugate Rus’ and force it to accept Catholicism was also testified to by the participation of bishops in the campaigns on the Neva and against Pskov. The aim of the Neva campaign had been to block a transport artery of vital importance to Novgorod, while the attacks on Votia and Pskov were intended finally to lead to the conquest of Novgorod. Since such thorough preparations took a considerable amount of time, it had not been possible to realize the plan agreed in Stensby until 1240. Collaboration was also indicated by the fact that the Livonian military campaigns had already been prepared even before the Battle of the Neva and because they took place in late summer, which was an unusual time of year for warfare. The fact that the Danes took part in the campaign against Pskov was another sign of a coordinated undertaking. A further argument was that William of Modena served as legate in Sweden, Denmark, and Livonia.75

Donner’s arguments, which have not been significantly expanded upon, have been adopted by various scholars, sometimes with a slightly different emphasis or analysis. The influence of the destructive advance of the Mongols on the timing of the campaigns has been differently assessed.76 The Mongols’ westward advance began in 1235 and reached Rus’ in 1237. Led by Batu Khan (d. 1255), they occupied Ryazan and Vladimir. Grand Prince Iurii Vsevolodovich fell in the Battle of the Sit River on 4 March, in which the army of the principality of Vladimir was defeated. Batu advanced towards Novgorod, but turned back when about one hundred kilometres away. He invaded Rus’ again in 1239, this time towards the south. In the autumn of 1240 the Mongols captured Kiev, pushing further forward towards Poland and Hungary. Between 1240 and 1242, however, Novgorod, Pskov, Polotsk, and Smolensk were not directly affected by the Mongol conquest. It is true that Novgorod later had to pay tribute, but in this period there was only an indirect economic effect on it and Pskov.

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Therefore the military strength of these centres was probably not greatly hampered at the time. The claim that the Catholic side had weighed up the possibility that Novgorod might not be able to call on assistance from the east against the attackers means an exaggeration of the scale of the warfare taking place on the western frontier of the Novgorod Land.

Just as thoroughly as Donner, the subject has been investigated from the Russian perspective by Igor Shaskolskii. He reiterates the views of Donner and Jaakkola by stressing the leading and coordinating role of the pope rather than William of Modena or Bishop Thomas of Finland. He argues that the Treaty of Stensby did not yet set out the details of the campaigns, but was merely an agreement in principle. The aim had been the conquest of Novgorod and its conversion to Catholicism. Friedrich Benninghoven maintains that the church of Rome, the early Hanseatic merchants, the politically linked groups of Pskov and Dorpat, the Estonians, and the Baltic Finns of Votia, whose interests coincided in some respects, took part in the campaigns. Critics of this cooperation theory have remained in the minority.

As can be seen, there are only indirect arguments in favour of treating the three campaigns as a single interrelated war. The Treaty of Stensby foresaw the Teutonic Order and the Danish fighting together against the pagans. Rus' is not mentioned on one single occasion in the text. Of course, we do not know what verbal agreements the powers might have reached in addition. However, the Treaty of Stensby certainly cannot be cited as evidence of plans to subjugate Rus' under the ecclesiastical authority of the popes. None of the known papal letters relating to Livonia or Finland c. 1240 mentions schismatics or Russians. They only refer to the dangerous pagans and the mission, meaning the conversion of the pagans to Catholicism.

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77 Shaskolskii, Борьба Руси против крестоносной агрессии, p. 154.
78 Shaskolskii, Борьба Руси против крестоносной агрессии, pp. 147–59.
79 Benninghoven, Orden, p. 369.
The participation of Catholic bishops in military campaigns was the norm rather than the exception in the 13th century. Their participation in these instances does not offer any proof whatsoever of the direct interest of the curia or the pope or that they were directing events. The contention made by Donner and his followers that conducting the campaigns in the summer showed the unusual nature of the events is also unjustified. The naval campaign on the Neva in July was connected to the navigation season; the campaign against Pskov took place in September, slightly later in other words; and in Livonia the second half of the summer was in fact the usual period for military campaigns.82 As regards the area covered by William of Modena’s legation, it was completely normal for a legate’s powers to stretch across an extended area, in his case across the entire Baltic region east of Denmark.

On the basis of the sources, therefore, at the most we can speculate that the different autonomous powers acting independently from one another were able to take advantage of a propitious moment in time.83 Erroneous conclusions have resulted from the earlier view in which 13th-century Pskov was regarded as a direct subordinate town of Novgorod. The collapse in the power of the Suzdal princes in Pskov was probably not unwelcome to the burghers of Novgorod. In 1241 Aleksandr Iaroslavich himself left Novgorod due to internal conflicts.

Scholars who argue that the pope was behind the actions, whether directly or indirectly, are thus able to adduce only insufficient evidence. For these claims to be valid one must first examine whether the curia took any steps at all against Rus’ c. 1240. General conclusions about the causes and aims of the three campaigns cannot be drawn until the three events have been looked at separately.

### 3.3.1 The Battle of the Neva in 1240

Three independent written sources can be drawn upon for the Battle of the Neva: the early recension of the First Novgorod Chronicle, the vita of Aleksandr Iaroslavich, and the so-called ‘Testament of Magnus’ (Рукописание Магнуша). The latter was a fictitious testament drawn up in Novgorod in the 15th century under the name of the Swedish king, Magnus Eriksson (1319–63). It in turn influenced the description of the battle in the late chronicles.

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The Novgorod Chronicle narrates under the year 1240 that a large fleet of Swedes, Norwegians, Finns from Finland Proper, and Tavastians landed on the Neva at the point where the Izhora River flows into it (Свеи ... и Мурмане, и Сумь, и Емь). The Swedes had their princes and bishops with them, “wishing to take possession of Ladoga, or in one word, of Novgorod, and of the whole Novgorod Land”. When news of the landing reached Novgorod, Prince Aleksandr went with the Novgorodians and warriors from Ladoga against them and defeated them on 15 July. The commander of the Swedish army, Spiridon (Спиридон), and others, including, according to some claims, a bishop, were killed (а инии творяху, яко и пискупъ убьенъ бысть). The enemy left in the middle of the night. Four men from Novgorod are listed as killed and it is added that, of the Novgorodians and the warriors from Ladoga, twenty men or fewer had been killed.84

According to the account in the vita of Aleksandr, the idea occurred to the “king of the Roman land” (король части Римскыя), who had heard of the virtues of the holy prince, of seizing Aleksandr’s land. He gathered a great army and came to the Neva, from where he sent messengers to Novgorod to the prince: “If you are able, wage war against me, I am here already and shall conquer your land”.85 Aleksandr first prayed in Novgorod’s St Sophia Cathedral86 then hurried with a small army—he could neither call on his father for help nor were all Novgorodians able to join him—against the superior enemy. The elder of the Ingrians, the baptized Pelgui (Пелгуй, Пелугии, Пелгусий), had a vision before the battle in which the martyrs Boris and Gleb promised to help Aleksandr. A great battle “with the Romans” took place on 15 July in which Aleksandr wounded their king in the face. Many enemies were also killed by an angel of God.87 The enemies fled on their ships, taking their fallen with them, who were then lowered into the sea. Aleksandr returned victorious. A number of Aleksandr’s retinue are also mentioned (such as Novgorodians and Polotskians) as taking part in the battle.88

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85 Cf. 2 Kings 19:9.
86 Cf. 2 Kings 19:14–20; Ps 35:1–2.
87 Cf. 2 Kings 19:35–37. The intention behind the reference to book two of Kings might have been to identify the Swedes with the king of Assyria and Aleksandr with King Hezekiah of Judah. See also Danilevskii, Русские земли, pp. 192–94.
88 Begunov, Памятник, pp. 162–68; 188–90. Against the rational reinterpretation of the miracles recounted in the medieval texts (for example, Danilevskii, Русские земли, pp. 187–88), see Lur’e, Россия, p. 127.
The ‘Testament of Magnus’ has King Magnus of Sweden bluntly warn his children, brothers, and the Swedish people against attacking Rus’ while the peace treaty is in force. His warning includes a list of Sweden’s historic defeats, one of these being the Battle of the Neva in 1240: “The first to rise was Prince Berger (Бергерь, Бельгерь) and he came to the Neva and Prince Aleksandr Iaroslavich went against him on the Izhora River, driving him away and defeating his army.”

Unfortunately it is not clear how reliable the accounts of the battle in these sources really are. The Battle of the Neva is not recognizably referred to by either a Swedish, Finnish or Livonian source, nor by the curia. The ‘Testament of Magnus’ is a late literary text; the *vita* is a text written according to hagiographical conventions more than twenty years after the events it describes and based on oral tradition; the extract from the chronicle, which is probably more or less contemporary, contains contradictions. The chronicler, who was writing in Novgorod, knew of the battle only at second hand, unlike Henry of Livonia, who often took part in battles himself, and one cannot expect the details he provides to be accurate. How much of these accounts derives from the literary tradition and is simply guessing about what occurred? What do they actually describe?

John Lind has suggested, contrary to what is generally assumed, that even the early recension of the First Novgorod Chronicle had already been influenced by the *vita* of Aleksandr. Since it is impossible that the leader of the Swedish army was called Spiridon, which was an extremely unusual name in Scandinavia, this erroneous identification may be a conflation of with the name of the then archbishop of Novgorod, Spiridon, who is mentioned in the *vita*, and could have originated when the text of the *vita* was joined to that of the chronicle during the rivalry between Novgorod and Sweden at the end of the 13th century and during the 14th century. Other scholars have criticized this argument with good reason: no conclusions about the history of the text can be drawn on the basis of how the Novgorod chronicler wrote a name of

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91 Lind, “Early Russian-Swedish Rivalry,” pp. 274–78. Lind’s argument is more complex than can be done justice to here.
the “Swede” that was, to him, foreign.92 Moreover, the author of this part of the Novgorod Chronicle uses expressions in his work that are typical of hagiographical texts. Even the author of the chronicle’s original variant took the oral tradition as his point of departure, with all its uncertainties about what had happened (“and some thought that . . .”).93

The significance of the Battle of the Neva in the stance taken by the Baltic powers towards Rus’ is tied to the question of the so-called Tavastia crusade. A letter from Gregory IX to the archbishop of Uppsala from the end of 1237 mentions that the Tavastians had reverted to their pagan beliefs and that approval could be given for a crusade to force them back to Christianity. The Swedish rhymed chronicle, the *Erikskrönikan*, written in the third decade of the 14th century, contains an account of the crusade of Birger Jarl to Tavastia.94 This crusade has traditionally been dated to 1249–50. However, more recently the idea that Birger’s crusade took place slightly earlier, around 1238–39, mainly on the basis of this letter from Gregory IX, has gained increasing acceptance among scholars.95 The letter indicates that the apostasy of the Tavastians was attributable to incitement by enemies of the cross from the surrounding areas (*inimicis crucis prope positis*). The text also refers to “a number of barbarians” (*quosdam barbares*) who had fought against the *novella ecclesie Dei plantatio*.96 These “enemies of the cross” were understood to include Novgorod, and the Karelians or other Finnish tribes.97 In fact, the letter does not contain anything

94 *Erikskrönikan enligt cod. Hol. Dz jämte avvikande läsarter ur andra handskrifter*, ed. Rolf Pipping (Uppsala, 1963) (Samlingar utgivna av Svenska fornskrift-sällskapet H. 231, vol. 68), lines 89–154. Also lines 155–56: “That same land was baptized throughout; I mean, the Russian prince lost [the land]” (“Thz samma land thz vart alt cristith/ jak tror at rytza konungen mistit”). The conflicts between Novgorod and Sweden in Karelia that were taking place when the chronicle was written in the 1320s have evidently been projected on to the past. The Christians are contrasted with the pagans in this episode.


95 FMU 1, no. 82; ST 1, no. 86.
that could be clearly construed as a conception of Rus’ as an enemy of the Catholic faith. Firstly, the letter does not use clear and precise terminology. It is more logical in general to consider as “enemies of the cross” all those neighbours of the Tavastians, or a section thereof, who had been baptized but then fallen into apostasy: Rus’ was not one of the immediate neighbours of the Tavastians.

If the Battle of the Neva had been connected with approval for a crusade obtained from Gregory IX in 1237, it would follow that the Neva campaign would also have been conducted by the institutions proper to crusade. In this sense, it is of secondary importance whether the Neva undertaking was a consequence of the Tavastia campaign or replaced it. It is doubtful whether it can be argued that papal crusading policy was being steered against Novgorod. The key point is that the Neva region was still pagan at the time. This would make it possible to refer to a missionary war that was not aimed against Christian Rus’. However, the Neva was indeed a trade route of vital importance to Novgorod and its control by Sweden would have completely clashed with Novgorod’s interests. The Neva campaign could be placed in the same context as attempts by previous and successive Swedish rulers to gain control of the region of the Neva and Volkhov estuaries. Precisely such a view of the events on the Neva as a military campaign in a strategically important area is above all consistent with the sources, and as one of many campaigns, rather than an attempt to impose Catholicism on Novgorod. The Battle of the Neva first acquired its significance as a turning point in history in the later literary tradition from the beginning of the 14th century, when Sweden became a constant military opponent of Novgorod. The announcement in the Novgorod Chronicle that the enemies wished “to take possession of Ladoga, or in one word, of Novgorod, and of the whole Novgorod Land” functions more as a rhetorical device to emphasize the heroism of the prince and the Novgorod army. The suggestion that the Swedes tried to build a castle in the area is also pure speculation.

99 Pirinen, Suomen kirkon historia, pp. 60–61; Shaskolskii, Борьба Руси против крестоносной агрессии, p. 154.
100 Nazarova, “Крестовый поход,” p. 197; Floria, У истоков, pp. 145–49.
101 See also Dmitrii S. Likhachev, Человек в литературе Древней Руси (Moscow, 1970), p. 46. One of the elements reflected in Aleksandr’s vita could also be a heroic tradition of the boyar class of Pruskaia street in Novgorod. See Ianin, Очерки, pp. 123–35; Nazarova, “Crusades,” p. 185.
According to the Novgorod Chronicle, the Swedish “prince” was also present at the battle; the army leader Spiridon and possibly also a bishop were killed. We know that all incumbent Swedish bishops were still alive after 1240.\textsuperscript{103} John Lind, proceeding on the assumption that the Neva campaign was a consequence of the ‘crusade’ to Tavastia, added that Birger Jarl might have been the “prince” referred to. Birger (born c. 1200/10, d. 1266) does not appear as jarl until 1248, but he was already playing a leading role in Swedish politics from the 1230s. He had probably already served as leader in 1240 of a navy (\textit{ledung}) assembled from the coastal areas and based on the army. Lind found confirmation for his theory in the form of the “master Bel’ger” (\textit{месьерь Бельгерь}) mentioned in the ‘Testament of Magnus’.\textsuperscript{104} However, Lind’s notion that a hypothetical, later lost Novgorod Chronicle could have served as a basis for this late account is not persuasive.\textsuperscript{105} Igor Shaskolskii was convinced of the apocryphal nature of the information regarding Birger’s participation and of its origin in folklore. He argued that not Birger, but the jarl Ulf Fasi had led the Swedish army. Vladimir Pashuto further developed Shaskolskii’s suggestion to the effect that both jarls, Birger and Ulf Fasi, had fought at the Neva against Aleksandr.\textsuperscript{106}

It has also been contended that the Norwegians could not have taken part in the Battle of the Neva, as claimed in the Novgorod Chronicle, because the internal political situation was too unstable at the time.\textsuperscript{107} However, it is still feasible that some Norwegian knights took part, albeit not a large number.\textsuperscript{108} The chronicle appears to list all Novgorod’s Scandinavian opponents and their leaders as a way of glorifying the bravery of the Novgorodians and their prince without this necessarily representing an accurate list.\textsuperscript{109}

Ultimately, all that can be said with certainty is that the Battle of the Neva took place. The rest remains unknown: who was behind it, what the plans of...
the Swedish navy were, and who was in command of the troops. We certainly cannot make claims about plans by the popes or the Scandinavian monarchs to subjugate Rus’ or Novgorod to the Catholic church. The only source pointing in this direction, the letter of Pope Gregory IX of 1237, deals with the peoples of Finland and does not refer to Rus’. The reference in the *vita* to the “king of the Roman land” and the claim in the Novgorod Chronicle that bishops took part, both of which are fictitious, pursue a particular aim or have a partial basis in fact: the function of the “king of the Roman land” in the text of the *vita* is to be a worthy opponent of the ‘King of Israel’, namely Aleksandr, while, on the other hand, bishops did also take part in other military campaigns apart from crusades.

Friedrich Benninghoven has also put forward a hypothesis about the participation of the former Sword Brothers or their successors, the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order, in the Battle of the Neva. This was based on the notions of William of Modena’s coordinating role and of coordinated campaigns. Benninghoven argued that his theory (with reservations) was also confirmed by the 16th-century Voskresenski Chronicle, which also mentions “masters” (*местери*) in the Swedish army. The First Novgorod Chronicle, however, refers to a “prince” in the same passage. It appears that in the course of the revisions made in the 15th century the earlier terminology of “prince”, “men” (*князь*, *мужи*) etc. in the episodes relating to Sweden was replaced by more current terms, such as “master” and “governor” (*местерь*, *наместники*) etc., which also showed Livonian influences. The Sword Brother Rudolf von Kassel, who had served in diplomatic missions, later bore the name Rudolf ‘von Nu’, which is probably reminiscent of the Neva. Even if he did take part in the battle, however, this does not automatically mean that the Teutonic Order was present as an institution. Rudolf von Kassel belonged to the opposition to the new leadership after the merger of the Sword Brothers with the Teutonic Order, and in 1240 he could not even have been in the country; he could just as easily have taken part in the occupation of Votia in 1240–41, which would equally create an association with the Neva region.

110 летопись по Воскресенскому списку, p. 147: “собра силу велику, местери и бискупи свои”. The expression is in fact already present in the older (15th century) chronicles: sl1, p. 305; Симеоновская летопись, p. 61.

111 NL1, p. 291: “и събра вои множество, силу велику зело Свея съ княземь и пискупы своими”; cf. NL1, p. 77: “Свеи съ княземь и съ пискупы своими”. The corresponding passage in the *letopisi* (except the older rescension of the First Novgorod Chronicle) is influenced by the *vita* of the saintly Aleksandr.

Aleksandr’s victory at the Neva did not guarantee his position in Novgorod. After Pskov fell under the control of his opponents, he left Novgorod sometime at the end of 1240 or beginning of 1241, and “went out from Novgorod with his mother and his wife and all his court, to his father in Pereiaslav, having quarrelled with the men of Novgorod”\footnote{NL1, p. 78; Kuchkin, “Борьба,” pp. 135–36; Vasilii F. Andreev, “Александр Невский и Новгород,” in Средневековая и новая Россия. Сборник научных статей к 60-летию профессора Игоря Я. Фроянова, ed. Vladimir M. Vorobev et al. (St Petersburg, 1996), p. 249.}. This also shows that no great threat was felt in Novgorod—the invasion of Votia did not begin until after Aleksandr’s departure and the Battle of the Neva had already been relegated to the past.

3.3.2 The Conquest of Votia in 1240–41

Independent sources for the campaign against Votia are provided by the Novgorod Chronicle, the \textit{vita} of Aleksandr Iaroslavich, the chronicle of the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order by Hermann von Wartberge (1360s and 1370s)\footnote{Anti Selart, “Die livländische Chronik des Hermann von Wartberge,” in Geschichtsschreibung im mittelalterlichen Livland, ed. Matthias Thumser (Berlin, 2011) (Schriften der Baltischen Historischen Kommission i8), pp. 59–85.}, and an extant charter of the Bishop of Ösel from 1241.

According to the Novgorod Chronicle, the Germans and Estonians arrived in Votia in the winter of 1240–41. There they plundered, imposed tribute on the land, and built a castle in Koporye. They also plundered Tesovo, and were only thirty versts from Novgorod, killed merchants, and “from the Luga river reached as far as Sablia”; the Lithuanians, Germans, and Estonians took all the horses and cattle from the Luga, so that nothing could be ploughed in the villages in the spring. Aleksandr had returned in 1241, and now attacked the Germans in Koporye with the Novgorodians, the warriors from Ladoga, the Karelians, and the Ingrians, seizing the castle and taking some of the Germans as prisoners to Novgorod, but releasing others. Aleksandr had the treacherous Votians and Chuds hanged, however. The following year when peace was made Votia and Luga were returned by “the Germans” to Novgorod.\footnote{NL1, p. 78. Cf. SL1, pp. 310–11; NL4, p. 227.} “Lithuanians” in this context will have meant the subjects or allies of the Teutonic Order in Lettgallia.

Aleksandr’s \textit{vita} relates that during the years after the Battle of the Neva people came from a land to the west and built a castle in Aleksandr’s land. The castle was soon almost completely destroyed by Aleksandr and “they themselves” were either hanged, taken prisoner or set free out of an enormous sense
of mercy. Hermann von Wartberge mentions the construction of the castle of Koporye and that “the Russians of Votia” were made liable to pay taxes. A charter from Bishop Henry of Ösel states that he agreed an alliance with the Teutonic Order in Riga on 13 April 1241. This provided for the division of power between them in the land located between “already converted Estonia and Rus, that is, in Votia, the Neva, Ingria, and Karelia, and hoped for their conversion to the Christian faith”. They immediately sought papal approval for this division. This land had been conquered by the building of a castle there by the Teutonic Knights and with the consent of many of its inhabitants. Now the collection of taxes by the church was agreed, but the fields of the “Germans”, which were already enfeoffed in the vicinity of the castle, and the fields of the Order were exempt from the tithe. All real power in the land would thus be reserved to the Order. The castle mentioned was probably that at Koporye. The occupation of the region was achieved rapidly, since the fiefs had already been distributed by the spring. This makes it likely that there was collaboration on the part of local leaders—perhaps indeed with the “treacherous Chuds” later hanged by Aleksandr.

The campaign against Votia must be seen in the context of the missions to the pagans. The Votians were still mainly pagan at the time. The vita of Aleksandr Iaroslavich mentions an elder of the Ingrians, who, unlike his people, was baptized. In fact, even at the beginning of the 16th century the influence of Christianity in the Baltic-Finnish areas in north-west Rus’—in Votia, the lands of the Ingrians, and Karelia—was no more than superficial. Archaeologists have discovered precisely in the vicinity of Koporye a change in burial customs to ones resembling Christian burial c. 1240, which may be related to these events. Without discussing at this point what the relationship between the

116 Begunov, Памятник, p. 190.
118 LUB 3, no. 169a; Schirren, Verzeichniss, p. 2, no. 15.
119 See also Nazarova, “Crusades,” p. 187.
120 Begunov, Памятник, p. 189.
Christianity of the theologians and its popular manifestations consisted in, it is significant that Votia and Karelia were regarded at this point as pagan lands.

Aleksandr’s *vita* later deals with the construction of the castle of Koporye in Aleksandr’s land, bearing in mind that the *vita* considers Novgorod a personal possession of the prince. However, it is not clear how secure Novgorod’s control was in Votia at the time. Two dates are cited in the early history of Votia: 1069, when the Votians went to war against Novgorod, and 1149, when Novgorod attacked the Tavastians, who had invaded Votia. Evidence of the firm link between Votia, or at least a part of it, and Novgorod emerges in the first half of the 13th century. The Novgorod Chronicle records a famine among the Votians in 1215. This shows that the region fell within the chronicler’s range of interest, as does the description of the military campaign of 1241. According to Henry of Livonia, the Livonians took “Russian captives” from Votia and Ingria; the latter was described as belonging “to the kingdom of Novgorod.” There are a number of references to Votia’s dependence on Novgorod from the second half of the 13th century. It is nevertheless unknown how much of Votia fell within this dependency c. 1240. The reference to collaboration with the local elite in both the charter of the bishop and the account in the Novgorod Chronicle about the hanging of traitors indicate an opposition aimed against Novgorod or the prince which could be exploited by those who had occupied the land and levied taxes on it. The written sources do not say anything about the occupation of the fortified settlements of Votia (Kaibolovo and Voronino).

The Votia campaign was therefore a continuation of the process of Christianization already under way in Estonia. Its aim was to conquer the pagan territories and obtain rule over them by means of baptism. The campaign against Novgorod was launched because of the ties between Votia and

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123 HCL XXV.6, p. 185.
126 According to Riabinin, *Финно-угорские племена*, p. 28, the possibility still cannot be excluded that the fortified settlement at Kaibolovo was destroyed during the warfare of 1240–41.
Livonia and Rus’ in the 1230s and 1240s

Novgorod, but the crusade was not explicitly aimed against Christian Rus’. The references not only to Votia, but also to the Neva, Ingria, and Karelia thus point towards greater plans in the region, but also to the fact that the pagan territories north-east of Estonia were treated as a single unit.127 Similarly, the subjection of the trade route into Rus’ to the control of the Livonian powers appears to have been a step in the same direction. Tesovo, Luga, and Sablia were located on the winter route that led to Novgorod and were also the main settlements in an otherwise extremely marshy landscape. The Votia campaign is consistent with the continual conquest of pagan lands provided for in the Treaty of Stensby. Commercial considerations may also have played a part in this respect. According to the Treaty of Stensby, however, Denmark too should have taken part in these events, yet there is no evidence of this in the sources. The argument has long been proposed that it was by means of the Votia campaign that the Teutonic Order managed to secure its positions against none other than the Danish king.128 From 1238 to 1346 the Teutonic Order did not share a common border with Votia and Novgorod at all.

Extremely revealing in this context is the treaty between the Teutonic Order and Bishop Henry of Ösel. King Valdemar II died on 28 March 1241, but news of this is hardly likely to have travelled as far as Riga by 13 April, when the treaty was agreed. It is noteworthy that both Bishop Henry and the Teutonic Order had the opportunity to take action against the Danish king. Henry was politically weak and reliant on the Order.129 Thanks to the Order’s support, the bishop was indeed able to administer his diocese, in return for which he had to transfer land ownership to the Teutonic Order. A constant dissatisfaction with the transfer of northern Estonia seems to have festered among a section of the Order, while on the other hand the Danish monarchy laid claim to Wiek and the former small lands of central Estonia held by the Order. Not until 1251 did King Abel of Denmark waive his rights to the territories of Bishop Henry.130 For this reason, the Order’s collaboration with the bishop of Ösel appears logical and it is also understandable that it was aimed against Denmark’s interests.

128 Johansen, Estlandliste, p. 140.
129 See also LUB 3, no. 169; Busch, Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 22–23, 87–88.
Bishop Henry went to the pope in Rome “concerning his affairs” in 1241, perhaps precisely in relation to the case against the Danish king.

On the assumption that the return of Harria and Vironia to the king of Denmark had caused great dissatisfaction among the vassals there and that the enfeoffments of Koporye cited in the treaty between the bishop and the Order did take place, Paul Johansen argued that the vassals of Harria and Vironia had taken part in the Votia campaign. The vassals Dietrich von Kivel and Otto von Lüneburg did in fact later have interests in Votia. In Vironia there were indeed a number of vassals who had not received their fiefs from the king, and the legitimacy of part of the possessions of Kivel was not recognized by the Danish king. However, this does not justify drawing such a close connection between the occupation of Votia and the vassalage of Vironia, as Johansen does. Nor is such a cooperation demonstrated by a treaty apparently agreed against the Danish king: on 1 October 1243 the bishops of Riga, Dorpat, and Ösel together with the deputy master of the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order concluded a treaty in Riga regarding “the cultivation of the vineyards of the Lord among the pagans”. Each party promised the others “counsel and aid” (consilium et auxilium) in the endeavour. This treaty has been interpreted by some historians, in the aftermath of the Battle of the Ice, as being aimed against Rus. However, over a year had passed since the battle, peace had been concluded, and Aleksandr and his brother Andrei had long since left Pskov. On the other hand, the Danish king persisted constantly in his claims

131 LUB 3, no. 169; Busch, Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 87–88. See Bunge, Livland, p. 43, 86–87 no. 7.
132 Johansen, Estlandliste, pp. 140–41. Conversely, Friedrich G. von Bunge in Das Herzogtum Estland unter den Königen von Dänemark (Gotha, 1877), p. 36 concluded that the Danish king’s vassals did not take part in the Votia campaign. After northern Estonia had been handed over to the king, some vassals of the Teutonic Order left the country but the majority were able to rearrange their relationship with the new territorial lords (Benninghoven, Orden, p. 306). In other words, the tension between the vassals and the Danish king should not be made an absolute determining factor.
133 Johansen, Estlandliste, pp. 135–39, 800.
134 LUB 6, no. 2725; Fünfundzwanzig Urkunden zur Geschichte Livlands im dreizehnten Jahrhundert aus dem Königlichen Geheimen Archiv zu Kopenhagen, ed. Carl Schirren (Dorpat, 1866), pp. 8–9, no. 10.
135 Axel von Gernet, Verfassungsgeschichte des Bisthums Dorpat bis zur Ausbildung der Landstände [Jurjew (Dorpat), 1896] (Verhandlungen der gelehrten Estnischen Gesellschaft zu Dorpat 17), pp. 103–04; Ramm,Папство, p. 133.
in Livonia. Thus the treaty of 1243 was more likely to be aimed against the Danish king.

The actions of the Teutonic Order in Votia in 1240 most probably aimed first and foremost at continuing the missionary conquest of the ‘pagan’ areas of the region. While it did indeed provoke the conflict with Novgorod, it was not aimed against a ‘schismatic’ enemy. The main motivation for the Order was to prevent the potential expansion of the king of Denmark in a territory immediately bordering the royal possessions in Estonia.

3.3.3 Livonia and Pskov, 1240–42

In 1240 a military campaign was launched from Livonia against Pskov, resulting in the overthrow of the faction that supported the rule of Aleksandr Iaroslavich. Early in the spring of 1242 Aleksandr recaptured the city and on 5 April defeated the Livonian army in what has become known as the Battle of the Ice. The independent sources for these events include the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle, the First Novgorod Chronicle, the vita of Aleksandr Iaroslavich, the Laurentian Chronicle, and the Chronicle of Suzdal. It is doubtful to what extent the information found in the chronicles of Pskov can be regarded as original.

The Rhymed Chronicle records after the transfer of northern Estonia to the Danish king that Bishop Hermann of Dorpat had come into dispute with the Russians “at this time”. The Russians had turned against the bishop and done him much harm. The bishop asked the Teutonic Knights for help, and their master had also come to his aid. The “men of the king” — a contingent from Danish territory — had also arrived to give help.

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136 A copy of the treaty from the 16th century published by Carl Schirren reads: “Andreas gerens vicem Magistri per Liuoniam Estoniam et Gwyroniam”. Consequently, in this case not Curonia, but rather Vironia (Wyronia, according to Johansen, Estlandliste, p. 801) or Jerwia (Gerwia) are concerned. Cf. the title of the provincial master in LUB 1, nos 169, 236, 241, 285; LUB 3, nos 169, 258a.

137 Bunge, Livland, pp. 32–33; Busch, Nachgellassene Schriften, p. 25; Benninghoven, Orden, p. 444. Cf. DD 1/7, no. 327.


140 I.R, line 2070: “bie den ziten”.
The chronicler also writes that this army took Izborsk, where all Russians who defended themselves were killed. Russians from Pskov clashed in fighting with the Order, the men of the Danish king, and the army of Bishop Hermann, and were defeated at Izborsk. The Russians fled to the River Velikaya. A siege of Pskov then began, whereby “many knights and squires / deserved their right to a fief”. The city surrendered, weakened from the lost battle, its prince Gérpolt freely handed over the castle and good land to the knights so that the master of the Order would take care of them. The Order’s army then left Pskov, leaving behind two knights and a small contingent of Germans to guard the territory. When the prince of Novgorod heard of this, he came with his army to Pskov and drove away the two knights, who were acting as bailiffs: “if Pskov were held / it would be a great thing for Christendom / until the End of the World. / It is a misfortune / if somebody has conquered good lands / but failed to man it well: he may well complain at the damage”, writes the chronicler in conclusion. The prince of Novgorod returned to his city but then the prince of Suzdal Alexander arrived with a large army and advanced further on to Livonia. When the bishop of Dorpat learned of this, he prepared for an attack. The armies of the Order and Dorpat, even united, were too small and they were overwhelmed by the superior number of Russians. Twenty Teutonic Knights were killed and six were taken prisoner. Aleksandr returned to his land. After describing the battle, the chronicler adds that the Order’s master Herman Balke had been at war with both the Russians and the pagans for five and a half years and had then died. The capture of Izborsk in 1240 and the two knights with their small entourage are also mentioned in the chronicle of Hermann von Wartberge. The Novgorod Chronicle has the following account. In 1240, after the Battle of the Neva, Izborsk castle was captured by the Germans, namely by the men from Odenpäh, Dorpat, and Fellin, acting together with Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich. When news of this reached Pskov, an army left to fight the enemy and was defeated. The Germans proceeded to burn the outskirts of Pskov together with their churches and icons, books, and gospels. They destroyed a number of villages near Pskov, besieged the city for a week, and took the children of the venerable men hostage. Then the “treacherous” Pskovians, Tverdilo Ivankovich and others, let the Germans into the city and

141 LR, lines 2143–2144: “manich ritter und knecht/ vordienten wol wir lêhenrecht”.
142 LR, lines 2195–2201: “wêre Plezcowe dâ behût/ daz wêre nû dem cristentûme gût/ biz an der werlde ende./ ez ist ein missewende,/ der güte lant betwungen hât/ und der nicht wol besetzet hât: der claget wen er den schaden hât”.
143 LR, lines 2065–2298.
144 Hermanni Chronicon, p. 29.
set themselves up together with them as rulers of Pskov, plundering the villages of the Novgorod Land as well. Some Pskovians fled with their women and children to Novgorod. When the Germans invaded Votia, the Novgorodians asked Iaroslav Vsevolodovich to send them a prince, but were not satisfied with whom they received, namely Andrei Iaroslavich, and asked for Aleksandr. He did indeed come in the spring of 1241, capturing Koporye together with the Novgorodians, the warriors from Ladoga, the Karelians, and the Ingrians. In March 1242 Aleksandr, with the Novgorodians and his brother, attacked the land of the Chuds and besieged Pskov, where he took the Germans and the Chuds prisoner and sent them “in chains” to Novgorod. He himself fought the Chuds and had his army destroy their lands. Following the crushing defeat of a Russian reconnaissance unit, the prince and his troops moved to the lake, where they were followed by the Germans and Estonians. In the battle “by the Raven's Rock on the narrow [of Lake Peipus]” on 5 April the Germans were defeated and the Chuds took to flight. That same year a German embassy was sent to Novgorod or to the prince promising to return everything that had been conquered from the prince in his absence: “Votia, Luga, Pskov, Lettgallia”. The prisoners on both sides were released as were the hostages of Pskov.\footnote{NL1, pp. 77–79.}

Aleksandr’s \textit{vita} narrates that in the third year after the Battle of the Neva Aleksandr had set out in the winter for the land of the Germans with a great army. The Germans had at that time already taken Pskov and installed their bailiffs (тиуны) there.\footnote{In some manuscripts the term \textit{наместники} (governors) is found, but dates from a later period. See Begunov, \textit{Памятник}, p. 169; cf. p. 190.} Aleksandr killed some of the Germans, took others prisoner, and freed the city from its conquerors. He then went to the land of the Germans to destroy it. Aleksandr achieved a great victory in the battle, taking many prisoners, including those called the “knights of God” (божии ритори). In Pskov he was glorified by the priests for defeating the aliens (иноязычники). The prince nonetheless warned Pskov not to betray him during his lifetime nor that of his grandchildren.\footnote{Begunov, \textit{Памятник}, pp. 190–91.} The chronicles of Pskov are the only source to add the date of the Battle of Izborsk as 16 September, but their other accounts may have been influenced by both the Novgorod chronicles and the \textit{vita} of Aleksandr.\footnote{PL 1, p. 13; PL 2, p. 81. Cf. Grabmüller, \textit{Pskover Chroniken}, pp. 134–35; Pickhan, \textit{Gospodin Pskov}, p. 114. The second Pskovian \textit{letopis’} dates the battle to 16 October (PL 2, p. 21). See also Ernst Bonnell, \textit{Russisch-liwländische Chronographie von der Mitte des neunten Jahrhunderts bis zum Jahre 1410} (St Petersburg, 1862), commentary p. 73.} The Laurentian Chronicle records that Andrei was sent by his
father Iaroslav to the Novgorodians to help them and also refers to the battle on the lake and that many prisoners were taken.149

The mention in the Novgorod Chronicle of Iaroslav Vladimirovich and the men from Odenpäh, Dorpat (i.e. the soldiers of the bishop of Dorpat), and Fellin (i.e. the Teutonic Knights) indicates a direct analogy with the events of the 1230s, when Izborsk was temporarily occupied by a Russian army allied with Dorpat. It is highly plausible that none other than Iaroslav Vladimirovich is called Gêrpolt in the Rhymed Chronicle.150 The taking of hostages to guarantee the treaty indicates an analogy to 1228, when a Livonian contingent settled in Pskov and the agreement was likewise guaranteed through the handing over of hostages.

Although the accounts found in these independent sources are highly consistent with one another, it is hard to discern the significance of these events in the overall context of contemporary relations between Livonia and Rus'. A central role is clearly played by the bishop of Dorpat and Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich, whereas the Rhymed Chronicle and the chronicle of Hermann von Wartberge, both chronicles of the Teutonic Order, concentrate on the

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150 For a discussion of the different identifications, see Begunov, Kleinenberg and Shaskolskii, “Письменные источники,” pp. 219–24. The name ‘iaroslav’ should be reproduced in the Latin or German text as, for example, Gerceslawe (HCL XXI.4, p. 152) or *Geroslaw. There is no mention of a prince called Iaropolc c. 1240 in either the Russian or the Livonian sources, however. It is likely that the second part of the name has been changed or even translated in the text of the Rhymed Chronicle: the Middle High German suffix -balts, -polds corresponds to the Old Russian -slav. A Russian prince of unknown origin called Iaropolc was in Novgorod in 1268 (N11, pp. 86, 316). Nazarova, “Псков и Ливония,” pp. 594–96, suggests that Gêrpolt was a son of Iaroslav; Kuzmin, “Торопецкая знать,” pp. 72–75, on the other hand, suggests that the Iaropolc of 1240 is identical with that mentioned in 1268 and was, moreover, a son of Mstislav Mstislavich the Bold. There is no basis in the sources for either supposition.
actions of its members. Yet even the Rhymed Chronicle mentions that the bishop asked the Teutonic Knights for help, in other words that this was a catalyst for the campaign. The Rhymed Chronicle also mentions the Danish king’s vassals, but under the year 1240 rather than 1242. The bishop of Dorpat is acting throughout as territorial lord, not as missionary. Although these events are sometimes regarded as an attempt, instigated and countenanced by the papacy, to subjugate the territory and church of Rus’, this cannot be demonstrated by any of the sources in relation to the campaign against Pskov. The description in the Novgorod Chronicle of the burning of churches and holy scriptures in the vicinity of Pskov is not a sign of the heresy of the occupiers but simply of their criminal behaviour overall. The Novgorod Chronicle deals with the destructive campaigns that took place in Novgorod’s territory in 1240–41 separately: in relation to Pskov, the chronicler refers to the destruction of the villages in the Novgorod Land, but in relation to Koporye reference is made to localities on the Luga river. There is no basis in the sources for treating the campaigns as a combined attack on Novgorod from two sides.

The Rhymed Chronicle, and the tradition derived from it, appears to associate the campaign against Pskov and the Battle of the Ice with the first master of the Teutonic Order in Livonia, Hermann Balk. Balk had already left the country in 1238 and died in 1240. He was succeeded by Dietrich von Grünningen (1238/39–1246) and Andreas von Felben (1241, 1248–53). The Rhymed Chronicle mentions the master’s participation in the 1240 campaign against Pskov, but not, however, in 1242. The mention of the “men from Fellin” in the chronicle appears to point to the Order’s territory in Estonia. However, the expression in the context of the Order’s great castle that was nearest to Novgorod may have referred to the Order as such. On the other hand, Evgeniia Nazarova argues that the commander of Fellin played a key role in the occupation of Pskov.

The fact that the Rhymed Chronicle refers principally to the Teutonic Knights does not necessarily mean, however, that the Teutonic Order played the most important role or that its master or his deputy, Andreas von Felben, personally led the campaign. It has long since been pointed out that the attack on Rus’ was not in the general interest of the Teutonic Order in Livonia. Its main opponents were in the south: in Curonia, Samogitia, and Lithuania, not to mention in Prussia. In 1241–1242 the Teutonic Order in Livonia, led by the Livonian provincial master, Dietrich von Grünningen, seized Curonia with mil-

151 Cf. for example, Kronika Wielkopolska, p. 82, para. 61; cf. p. 89, para. 74.
152 Cf. NL1, p. 86.
itary support from the Danish vassals and the bishoprics of Riga and Ösel.\footnote{Aleksandr Baranov, “Завоевание Курляндии Тевтонским орденом в 1241–1242 годах,” in Ледовое побоище в зеркале эпохи. Сборник научных работ, посвященный 770-летию битвы на Чудском озере, ed. Marina B. Bessudnova (Lipetsk, 2013), pp. 140–52. Cf. Erich Chudzinski, “Die Eroberung Kurlands durch den Deutschen Orden im 13. Jahrhundert,” Phil. Diss. Erlangen (Borna-Leipzig, 1917), pp. 19–25; Benninghoven, Orden, p. 374; Militzer, Von Akkon zur Marienburg, p. 375.} According to Friedrich Benninghoven, the campaigns against Rus’ were informed by the attitudes and separate policy of the former Sword Brothers who had survived the Battle of Saule but could not come to terms with the transfer of northern Estonia to Denmark and thus tried to assert their authority by means these attacks.\footnote{Benninghoven, Orden, p. 374; Bernhard Dircks, “Russisch-livländische Beziehungen in der zweiten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts,” Jahrbuch des baltischen Deutschtums 1986, 1985, pp. 26–28; Hellmann, “Begegnungen,” p. 133; Hellmann, “Stellung,” pp. 8–9.} There is no evidence, however, that there was a confrontation between two different tendencies in the Order. After the merger of the two orders, the Teutonic Order pursued a determined policy of forcing the former Sword Brothers into the background.\footnote{Dieter Wojtecki, “Zur Identität einiger livländischer Landmeister des Deutschen Ordens im 13. Jahrhundert,” Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands 20 (1971), 66–68; Militzer, Von Akkon zur Marienburg, p. 373.} In support of the view that there were two opposing visions of conquest, or at least different political tendencies, recourse is made to the unproven assertion that the Order had indeed wanted to launch a campaign from Livonia to conquer Pskov or even Novgorod in 1240. Taking part in the campaign against Pskov and the attempt to capture Votia are not incompatible with the Order’s plans south of the Daugava.

At the centre of the campaign against Pskov was therefore the bishopric of Dorpat and its relationship with Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich dating back to the 1230s and, by extension, to the Pskovian opposition to Aleksandr Iaroslavich, who sought Iaroslav Vladimirovich’s ascension to power in Pskov.\footnote{Stern, “Dorpat-Pleskauer Kämpfe,” pp. 89–90; Nazarova, “Крестовый поход,” p. 201. Cf. Pickhan, Gospodin Pskov, p. 118.} Prince Iaroslav’s closest supporters were constantly in touch with Odenpäh,\footnote{Karl H. von Busse, “Die Burg Odenpäh und ihre frühere Bedeutung, ein historischer Versuch,” Mitt. Riga 6 (1852), 333–35.} which explains why the “men of Odenpäh” come first in the list of the “Germans” in the chronicle. The fact that the “men from Fellin” come last in this list indicates the smaller role of the Teutonic Order in comparison. The start of the offensive may have been determined by a propitious moment in Pskov’s internal political situation. The “harm” (\textit{leit}) mentioned in the Rhymed
Chronicle inflicted by Rus’ on Bishop Hermann, who had to suffer it during a long time, and the danger for Christians are not a direct reference to the earlier military activity in the borderlands between Dorpat and Pskov c. 1239–40. There was a constant internal political opposition in Novgorod and Pskov which sought support from various external powers—the princes of Suzdal, Smolensk, and Chernigov among others. Trade relations with Livonia were crucial for all groups. We cannot say that one group had a particular interest in trade with Livonia. Rather, we are dealing with pretenders from the different political tendencies to the princely throne, with one of these being Iaroslav Vladimirovich.

Pskov’s surrender in the face of the oncoming Livonian army constituted a change of prince from the city’s point of view. The limits of the authority of the Order’s two bailiffs remain unknown. Iaroslav Vladimirovich’s relationship with the support army from Livonia was extremely complex, and his power in Pskov was secured by means of the hostages. The Novgorod Chronicle names Tverdilo Ivankovich “together with others” as the real ruler of Pskov. He had “made himself ruler in Pskov with the Germans”. Iaroslav’s position also depended on Tverdilo. There is no indication of who in Livonia was promised the hostages, whether the bishop of Dorpat or the Order. When describing Livonia’s peace embassy, however, the chronicle deals with the release of the hostages and other terms of peace affecting the Order more than the bishop of Dorpat. The Rhymed Chronicle also mentions the fiefs that the bravest knights had earned in the battle of Izborsk, although this may simply be part of the conventions typical of battle descriptions. If anyone did indeed receive a fief, this would have first meant confiscating estates from the supporters of Aleksandr Iaroslavich, for example. Such a course of action would have inevitably exacerbated the division among the burghers of Pskov.

A charter of 1248 provided for the division of the principality of Pskov between the bishopric of Dorpat and the Teutonic Order. It mentions that the principality “was donated by Prince Ghereslawus, its heir, to the mentioned church of Dorpat”. Albert Ammann has attempted to show that this donation originally dates to 1239 and would thus account for the planned attack on Pskov. This dating has been widely accepted. In the register of charters brought from Mitau to Stockholm in the mid-17th century, there is, moreo-

159 LR, lines 2069–76.
160 LUB 3, no. 200a; Schirren, Verzeichniss, p. 4 no. 38, p. 129 no. 67; cf. no. 52.
ver, the following entry: “1239 Dorpat. How the kingdom of Pskov was divided between the Order and the diocese of Dorpat.” However, this may simply be a misreading from a transumpt of 1299 regarding the charter of 1248. Despite the lack of a documentary basis, the promises of Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich—or something that the bishopric could subsequently construe as promises—c. 1240 appear plausible. Any military aid had to be paid for, and the “donation” of a principality might have been the form the remuneration took. This donation can presumably be understood in terms of feudal law, as in the case of Vsevolod of Gerzike: perhaps Iaroslav had donated Pskov to the bishop of Dorpat and then received it back as a fief. The relevant passage in the Rhymed Chronicle states “that Gêrpolt who was their prince / gave with his good will / the castle and the good lands / into the hands of the Teutonic Knights.” This might have referred to this donation, which had already been granted to the Order in 1240 as partial remuneration for taking part in the campaign against Pskov. Iaroslav’s right of inheritance was in itself obviously fictitious. Pskov was not a heritable principality; its princes were appointed and expelled, as was the case in Novgorod. Iaroslav’s hereditary lands would have been Toropets and Rzhev, but his—continual?—presence in Livonia during the 1230s suggests that he was not able to establish himself there or that these possession did not satisfy his ambitions. Iaroslav Vladimirovich appears in the sources again in 1243, when his wife, who had been killed by her stepson in Odenpäh and buried in Pskov, is mentioned, and also in 1245, when he fought as leader of the warriors of Torzhok along with Aleksandr Iaroslavich against the Lithuanians’ campaign of destruction. He had probably died by 1248.

According to the Novgorod Chronicle, Aleksandr left Novgorod after the capture of Pskov and was not called back until after the invasion of Votia. This means Novgorod did not regard the change of power in Pskov as a threat

163 Schirren, Verzeichniss, p. 129, no. 52.
166 Ianin, Новгород и Литва, p. 51.
167 NL1, pp. 79, 297; Pickhan, Gospodin Pskov, p. 118.
168 Another view is that he was again in Livonia after 1245 and that his ‘donation’ dates to the period immediately preceeding 1248: Busse, “Die Burg Odenpäh,” p. 336; Peter von Goetze, Albert Suerbeer, Erzbischof von Preussen, Livland und Ehstland (St Petersburg, 1854), pp. 24–26, 137–43; Hellmann, Lettenland, p. 177.
despite the destruction of Novgorod villages by Tverdilo. For the 1242 campaign against Pskov, Andrei also came from Suzdal, again suggesting that Aleksandr, in reconquering Pskov, was acting more in his own sovereign interests rather than those of Novgorod. At the same time, the opposition to Aleksandr in Novgorod shows that there too there were people who sympathized with the change of power in Pskov.

The Rhymed Chronicle says that after the conquest of Pskov the army of Aleksandr and Andrei advanced further “into the lands of the [Teutonic] brothers” (in der brāder lant)\(^{169}\) in March and April of 1242, once the bishop of Dorpat had sent his men to help the Order. “The lands of the brothers” could indeed have served to describe the whole of Livonia, but the chronicler distinguishes quite clearly between the different dominions and by “the lands of the brothers” principally refers to the Order’s territory.\(^{170}\) The Russian army consequently must have advanced as far as Tolowa or Sackala; the campaign of destruction lasted long enough for the Livonians to be able to raise an army. Bearing in mind that the Order had an interest in having Pskov under its control, however, the issue of the Tolowa tribute is certainly another factor in this context. The destructive advance of Rus’ could have made its way there precisely because payment of the tribute had been refused. As the army of Rus’ made its way home, the troops of the Order and the bishop of Dorpat caught up with it. In the ensuing battle Aleksandr and Andrei were victorious. The dimensions of this battle have occasionally reached absurd proportions in the historiography Anatolii Kirpichnikov has calculated that the Livonian army really could amount to a maximum of 30–35 knights and over 300 sergeants and natives and the Russians would have had been slightly more, amounting to a total of about 1000 men for both sides together.\(^{171}\)

According to the account in the Russian chronicles, a peace was agreed in Novgorod in 1242, in which “Germans”—does this mean the Teutonic Order?—ceded Votia, Pskov, the Luga, and Lettgallia to the prince and/or Novgorod. Thus the status quo was preserved in the peace.\(^{172}\) The Pskov and Votia cam-

\(^{169}\) L.R., lines 2220, 2227. The expression stifte roub und brant appears seven times altogether in the Rhymed Chronicle. See Werner Meyer, “Stilistische Untersuchungen zur Livländischen Reimchronik,” Phil. Diss. (Greifswald, 1912), p. 79.

\(^{170}\) L.R., lines 6670–6774. See also L.R., lines 6481, 7971; cf. lines 7569, 9803.


campaigns were therefore not connected with one another until the peace with the Order. But a separate question is what was meant by Lettgallia (Лотыгола) in this context. Novgorod had no interest in Lettgallia, therefore the chronicle means here restoration to Pskov and Aleksandr. Since there are no reports of a temporary handover of Lettgallia during Aleksandr’s rule, it would appear plausible to assume that Pskov had relinquished the tribute from Tolowa during the war and that its right to collect tribute there was now being reinstated.\footnote{Auns, Социально-экономическая и политическая структура, p. 18; cf. Hellmann, Lettenland, pp. 170–71.} If the Order shared in the seizure of power in Pskov, it may indeed have been recompensed with the tribute of Tolowa or the entire right of possession, but was forced to accept the restitution after the loss of Pskov. It is altogether feasible that Aleksandr also had interests in the Daugava, since he had just married a princess of Polotsk.\footnote{See Ammann, Kirchenpolitische Wandlungen, p. 228; Shtykhov, Древний Полоцк, p. 14; Ianin, Новгород и Литва, p. 51.} Aleksandr and his father Iaroslav Vsevolodovich exercised considerable influence in the Smolensk-Polotsk region throughout the 1240s.\footnote{NL1, p. 79; Fennell, Crisis, pp. 100–02.}

The place given to the Battle of the Ice as a significant event even in world history is based on purely ideological concerns and has little to do with the historical evidence.\footnote{Begunov, Kleinenberg and Shaskolskii, "Письменные источники," pp. 169–73; Nolte, Drang, pp. 196–232; Selart, "Aleksander Nevski," pp. 129–40.} A distinction must be made between the great importance that the Battle of the Ice has undoubtedly had in the 20th century and its importance for contemporaries in the 13th century. In the debate about how much significance should be given to the battle, we must first define the frame of reference, i.e. whether viewed in terms of the family of the grand prince of Vladimir, Pskov, Novgorod, the bishopric of Dorpat, Rus’ or Europe. As far as the sources from Rus’ are concerned, this was a story about how Aleksandr lost control of Pskov only to win it back. The traitors (переветники) in Votia and Pskov mentioned in the Novgorod Chronicle had betrayed the prince, not Rus’ or the Orthodox religion. The warfare of 1240–42 “most likely did not change at all the attitude of Novgorod and Pskov towards Livonia and Sweden. The West was not seen as much of a threat or less so following the defeat”.\footnote{From Dircks, “Krieg,” p. 133. Cf. Fennell, Crisis, pp. 105–06; Hösch, “Ostpolitik,” p. 100.} This judgement by Bernhard Dircks can be endorsed with the qualification that the very notions of East and West are themselves anachronistic. These events belong exclusively in the context of local struggles for power, and in the case of
Livonia and Rus’ in the 1230s and 1240s

Pskov we are dealing with ‘internal political’ conflicts as much as with ‘external relations’. To the extent that the church and questions of religious confession played a role at all—which was in any case in the form of justification rather than cause—this was of such a marginal nature that it left no mark in the sources.

In a wider sense, however, Livonia’s attempts to gain control in Votia and Pskov during 1240–42 appear as significant. The political forces in Livonia were able to maintain a position east of Lake Peipus for some time. The event is lent an aura of exceptionality by the fact that we know in retrospective that Lake Peipus became a dividing line during the Middle Ages between the Orthodox and the Catholic worlds. In the contemporary context, this signified on the one hand the continuation of the mission among the Votian pagans and on the other a political intervention in Pskov, quite separate ideologically and geographically from the former. We are not dealing with a unique decision in history but with episodes from a policy practiced both before and after the Battle of the Ice. The fact that first a victory was achieved, which itself proved fleeting when Livonians came to face a stronger opponent in the shape of Aleksandr, depended on circumstances beyond Livonia as well as on arbitrary factors, principally internal political conditions in Novgorod and Pskov.

The crusade planned by the Danish king on the basis of the Treaty of Stensby never took place. In December 1240 Pope Gregory IX authorized Uffe, the archbishop of Lund (1230–52), to grant the same indulgence to those who had taken crusading vows for Estonia as those who fought in the Holy Land. The reason given is that the people of Estonia who had converted to Christianity were under threat from the neighbouring pagans. In other words, no crusade led by the Danish king had yet gone to Votia or the Neva region. In 1241 the successor to the throne was the main political issue in Denmark. The deceased King Valdemar’s sons, King Erik (co-regent since 1232) and Duke Abel of Schleswig, could not come to an agreement. During the ensuing civil war it was impossible to launch a crusade. When the brothers did finally set out for Reval in 1244, they only got as far as Ystad, where they turned back, perhaps because of the constant tension between them, which made it impossible for them to lead a campaign together. In February and March of 1245 the archbishop of Lund received renewed papal permission to preach the crusade against the barbarians and the pagans who posed a threat to the Estonian Christians. The approval of Innocent IV permitted King Erik to use a third of the tithes from the ecclesiastical province of Lund over the course of three years in the fight

178 DD 1/7, no. 62; LUB 1, no. 167.
179 Annales Danici, pp. 111, 193.
against the pagans and barbarians who were harming the Estonian neophytes.\textsuperscript{180} In 1247 the pope again granted the king the right to use a portion of the church tithes of Lund for such an offensive,\textsuperscript{181} but once more it failed to materialize.\textsuperscript{182}

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\textsuperscript{180} DD 1/7, nos 165, 168–70.
\textsuperscript{181} DD 1/7, nos 264–65.
\textsuperscript{182} For further information, see Selart, “Die Kreuzzüge in Livland,” pp. 133–36.
Rus’ in the Catholic Sources from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century

4.1 The Sources for South-Western Rus’

When investigating the papal letters and other written sources relative to Rus’ which originated outside the Baltic region, it must be remembered that, apart from the Ruthenia or Rucia that bordered on Livonia, there was also ‘another’ Rus’, namely south-western Rus’—Galicia, Volhynia, and the Kiev region—which was a lot more important from the wider perspective of European politics as a whole. It was precisely in this region that contacts between the Catholic and Orthodox worlds were closest. Most of the ideas and knowledge about Rus’ that reached central and western Europe were transmitted via Poland and Hungary, not Livonia or Scandinavia.

There has been regular discussion about the evidence in the sources for this region of attempts to unify the two churches under papal primacy. Historians have often repeated the claim that envoys of Innocent III offered the title of king to the prince of Galicia and Volhynia, Roman Mstislavich, as early as 1204, but that Roman refused it.\(^1\) The source cited for this is the so-called Königsberg or Radziwiłł Chronicle, whose manuscript dates from the end of the 15th century.\(^2\)

However, the proponents of this view have failed to take into account that this information was added by the publisher based on the works of Vasilii Tatishchev when the chronicle was first published in 1767,\(^3\) but is actually missing from the original manuscript.\(^4\) The year of the supposed coronation, 1204, coincides with the year in which Constantinople was famously captured, and was also the year in which the Bulgarian tsar Kaloyan was crowned king by the papal legate as a result of mediation by Hungary. Tatishchev may therefore

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2 Радзивиловская летопись, ed. Margarita V. Kukushkina et al. vols. 1–2 (St Petersburg-Moscow, 1994).
have derived his conjecture about Roman Mstislavich from these events. In other words, it would appear that a number of sources and events have been conflated rather than this being a case of a medieval source still extant in the 18th century but then later lost.  

Roman Mstislavich was killed in battle in 1205. His widow and two young sons Daniil (d. c. 1264) and Vasilko (d. 1269) became the focus of an intense power struggle in which both the boyars and the people of Galicia, as well as its eastern and western neighbours, were involved. The widow and her two sons received protection from the king of Hungary and the duke of Krakow. King Andrew II (d. 1235) added to his Hungarian titles that of “king of Galicia and Vladimir”. He had ruled as prince in Galicia for a few years at the end of the 12th century, but Galicia had in fact been ruled for a longer period by Mstislav Mstislavich ‘Udaloi’, who promised his daughter to the Hungarian king’s son and heir Andrew. After Mstislav’s death in 1228, Galicia was conquered by another son-in-law of Mstislav, Daniil Romanovich, following a brief period of rule by the Hungarian king. Once Daniil Romanovich had suppressed the strong opposition supported by Hungary, he was able to consolidate his power throughout Galicia and Volhynia over the next decade. Daniil

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and Vasilko intervened repeatedly in the internal conflicts of Poland, while the rulers of Poland and Hungary attempted to secure their power in western Rus’.

It was against this background that Pope Innocent III wrote to the clergy and laity of Rus’ in 1207, arguing for the pope’s primacy and the union of the churches under Rome’s authority, promising to send his legate Cardinal Gregory of San Vitale to the region. The letter was related to the supposed success of the idea of church union in the Balkans and the claims to power of Catholic rulers, i.e. Hungary. Even assuming that Innocent’s letter had any consequences whatsoever, these had no lasting effect. The creation of an enduring ecclesiastical union in Galicia-Volhynia was precluded by the fluctuating balance of power there.

A number of late Russian chronicles describe the violent Catholicization of the country that followed the coronation of Andrew II’s son, the Hungarian prince Coloman (d. 1241), as king of Galicia c. 1216. The reliability of these late accounts is certainly questionable. Andrew II had written to the pope that “the princes and the people of Galicia… [wish] in future to remain in unity and obedience firmly with the holy church of Rome, but only that otherwise they be permitted to keep their rite.” In addition to these various dynastic relations, there was also a considerable Latin diaspora in the lands of southwestern Rus’. The Polish Dominicans had established a convent in Kiev by the 1230s, or perhaps even in the 1220s. Its foundation in 1222 was attributed to St Hyacinth (d. 1257), one of the founders of the Dominican Order in Poland, according to a vita composed in the 14th century. St Hyacinth had participated in the organization of a crusade against the Prussians in the 1230s, coming into

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11 Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia, no. 1: “quod Galicie principes et populus nostre dictioni subieci humiliter a nobis postularunt, ut filium nostrum Colomanum ipsis in regem prefecteremus, in unitate et obedientia sacrosancte Romane ecclesie perseveraturis in posterum, salvo tamen eo, quod fas illis sit alias a ritu proprio non recedere”. See also Fennell, Crisis, pp. 28, 37; Maiorov, Галицко-Волынская Русь, p. 356.
contact with events in the Baltic as a result. According to legend, Hyacinth had preached in Kiev, converting many Russians to the Latin faith. Kiev was ruled at the time by Prince Vladimir Riurikovich (d. 1239), who saw himself as an ally of none other than Daniil Romanovich in the struggle for power in southwestern Rus’. When the Polish province of the Dominican Order was founded in 1226/28, the missionary undertaking in Prussia was taken over by the friars of Masovia while responsibility for the mission in Rus’ was taken over by the convents of Sandomierz, which also included St Mary’s convent in Kiev. The majority of the Catholic community in Kiev would have comprised foreign merchants and its Dominican convent would have been located next to an earlier merchant church.12

As the Polish chronicler Jan Długosz (d. 1480) reports under the year 1233, however, Prince Vladimir expelled the Dominicans and their leader, Prior Martinus de Sandomiria, from Kiev.13 Vladimir Riurikovich and Daniil Romanovich were at war with Hungary at the time. Sometime around 1233–34 Prince Mikhail Vsevolodovich of Chernigov, who had been at war with Daniil, captured Kiev, overthrew its ruler, the same Vladimir Riurikovich, and handed the city over to Iziaslav, the son of Mstislaw ‘Udaloi’.14 Sometime later, however, Vladimir Riurikovich was able to return to Kiev. In 1236 Kiev was occupied by the Suzdal prince Iaroslav Vsevolodovich. Power in Kiev was subsequently assumed by Mikhail of Chernigov, but in 1238 he fled to Hungary faced with the threat of the Mongol advance. Shortly afterwards Rostislav Mstislavich from the Smolensk dynasty became prince of Kiev. Daniil in turn forced Rostislav to abandon the city, replacing him with one of his boyars as governor.15 The Dominicans must have been linked to one or other of the rivals and driven out of the city during the course of this power struggle. Apart from these political motives, it is of course possible that religious reasons also played a role. Indeed

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13 Ioannis Długossi annales, vol. 3, p. 266 (1233). Długosz also transmits Old Russian sources in his work. The Dominican prior Martin of Sandomierz was one of William of Modena’s companions in 1235.


15 The exact dating of these events remains uncertain.
in the summer of 1233 the conditions for a change in ecclesiastical policy were ripe when Metropolitan Kirill of Kiev died.\textsuperscript{16}

Part of the political background to the expulsion of the Dominicans from Kiev is also indicated by the fact that Gregory IX issued a series of letters relating to Rus’ precisely in February and March 1233. On 24 February he wrote to the Polish Dominicans forbidding them from conducting marriages of Catholic women to the heretical Russians, since he had been informed that they proceeded to have their wives rebaptized according to their rite.\textsuperscript{17} In a letter dated 25 February to the archbishop of Gniezno and the bishop of Krakow, the pope rebuked the Polish princes, who are said to have suppressed their people with such harshness that they had fled to the Prussians and heretical Russians.\textsuperscript{18} In another letter to the archbishop of Gniezno, the provost of Wroclaw (Breslau), and the Polish Dominicans dated 27 February, the pope instructed them to ensure that the Polish princes lived in peace in future and, if fighting among themselves, that they did not enter into any alliances with the Saracens, Russians or other enemies of the Catholic faith so as not to defile it.\textsuperscript{19} On 15 March in a letter to the Polish provincial prior of the Dominican Order and the Dominicans in Rus’ the pope promised that those who heard their preaching in Rus’ would receive an indulgence of forty days and other special privileges.\textsuperscript{20} On 15 June 1234 the pope took under his protection the Dominican Ulricus, his fellow friars, and all Latins in Kiev as a “bastion for the eulogy of the name of the Lord in Rus’”.\textsuperscript{21}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{17} DPR, no. 7; HRM 1, no. 34; \textit{Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque finitimarum historiam illustrantia}, ed. Augustinus Theiner, vol. 1 (Romae, 1860), no. 44. Cf. \textit{Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia}, no. 759.
\bibitem{18} HRM 1, no. 35; \textit{Vetera monumenta Poloniae}, no. 45; \textit{Epistolae saeculi xiii}, vol. 1, no. 513.
\bibitem{19} HRM 1, no. 36; \textit{Vetera monumenta Poloniae}, no. 46.
\bibitem{20} HRM 1, no. 38; DPR, no. 8. These and other letters relating to the dioceses of Gniezno, Krakow, and Olomouc were evidently requested simultaneously by an embassy. See August Potthast, \textit{Regesta pontificum Romanorum inde ab a. post Christum natum MCXCVIII ad a. MCCCIV}, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1874), pp. 780–82.
\bibitem{21} HRM 1, nos. 39–40; \textit{Vetera monumenta Poloniae}, nos. 55–56; DPR, nos. 9–10; \textit{Akta Grodzkie i Ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z Archiwum tak zwanego Bernardyńskiego we Lwowie}, ed. Aleksander Stadnicki, vol. 7 (Lviw, 1878), pp. 2–3, no. 2.
\end{thebibliography}
in political activity in which they attempted to discredit the opposing party by accusing them, among other things, of collaborating with the schismatics. This would have been followed the reprisals in Kiev in the second half of 1233 or beginning of 1234.

During this same period some Polish princes did in fact cooperate with Russians. When Prince Leszek the White was killed in 1227, a struggle for the throne of Krakow ensued in which Duke Conrad of Masovia received backing from the princes of Volhynia and the pagans. Around 1230 the armies of Daniil captured Kalisz and destroyed the area near Wrocław. The Polish provincial prior of the Dominican Order had his residence in Krakow; its second centre was Wrocław. Duke Henry the Bearded of Silesia occupied Krakow in 1232 and waged constant war against Conrad over Greater Poland over the next several years. These events do not allow one to speak of a break in papal policy towards Rus’ in the 1230s, as affirmed by Boris Floria, who argued that the previously passive attitude of the Polish clergy changed to encourage the active mission to Rus’ from now on and was also able to influence papal policy. Rather, the policy of the Polish higher clergy and secular lords is reflected in these letters in which allying with the schismatics is cited as a valid argument in the struggle against their opponents.

These papal letters evidently failed to have any real impact on either the relationship between the different religious confessions on the frontier between Poland and Rus’ or the activities of the Dominicans there. Thus a Dominican convent in Halych was founded c. 1238, where the Franciscans were also active. The mendicant activity prepared the groundwork for the actual negotiations for church union in the following decades. South-western Rus’ (Galicia, Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov) formed a common political space with Poland and Hungary throughout the 1220s and 1230s. Prince Daniil of Galicia’s schismatic affinities did not prevent him, for example, from being a constant ally of the dukes of Austria.

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22 Kronika Wielkopolska, pp. 82–83, paras. 61–62. The chronicler mentions that the soldiers of both Henry and Conrad destroyed the churches. See also Bronisław Włodarski, Polska i Ruś 1194–1340 (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 91–135.
23 As argued by Floria, У истоков, pp. 139–44.
26 See Maiorov, Галицко-Волынская Русь.
In 1257 the pope confirmed to the bishop of Lebus the latter's request for jurisdiction over all Latins in Rus', meaning in this case in south-western Rus'. The reason behind this claim is unclear. It appears to have been related to the issue of possession of the monastery of Opatów in Lesser Poland, which had been founded by Duke Casimir the Just (1177–94). Sometime around 1232–33 Gerhard, the abbot of the collegiate church of Opatów, was ordained Latin bishop in Rus', with one source referring to the Catholic population there (*G[erardus] Ruthenorum episcopus pro catholicis ibi degentibus de novo fuerat creatus*). Several decades later Gerhard is described as a Cistercian. The appointment of this missionary bishop may have been the result of the activity of another bishop, the Cistercian Christian of Prussia, who was linked to Poland and had been awarded the privilege of founding bishoprics and appointing bishops. Thus the papal letters to the Dominicans discussed above also reveal the rivalry between the different religious orders. In 1232 the pope informed the Polish provincial of the Dominicans that the archbishop of Gniezno (Fulco, 1232–58) planned to found a bishopric in Rus'. Duke Conrad of Masovia, who had also been behind the foundation of Gerhard's episcopal see, appears to have had close ties with the Cistercians, whereas Henry the Bearded was closer to the Dominicans. Opatów had shortly before been transferred by Henry, who had just gained control of the region of Sandomierz, to the bishopric of Lebus. After the death of Gerhard (after 1254), Lebus was thus apparently laying claim to its inheritance.

The missionary activity of the Dominicans had already extended further east by that time. On the basis of a Hungarian tradition relating to a *Magna Hungaria* far in the east, the Hungarian Dominicans evidently moved to Bolghar or the Bashkirs in the 1230s. From there they brought reports to Latin

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27 DPR, no. 33; cf. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae*, no. 926; AV, nos. 70, 83.
28 On Gerhard and the donation of Opatów to Lebus, see *Kronika Wielkopolska*, p. 82, para. 61; p. 101, para. 105. In 1254 Gerhard is mentioned as the first bishop from Rus’ immediately after the first bishop of Lithuania, Vitus, in a sequence of a number of Polish prelates.
Europe full of hope that the peoples and rulers of those regions wished to join the church of Rome. These ‘eastern Hungarians’ allegedly did not, however, dare convert to Catholicism for fear of persecution from the pagans and Russians, while the latter in turn feared the merger of two Hungarys as a prelude to the conquest of Rus’. Around 1235 the grand prince of Vladimir and Suzdal, Iurii Vsevolodovich, had replied to a request from the Mordvins to baptize them that the issue was already in the hands of the pope, since “soon the time will come when we will have to adopt the faith of the Roman church and join the papal obedience”. This still did not prevent him from expelling the Dominicans from his lands and forbidding them from preaching to the pagans in the Volga regions. In this period, when rumours were circulating throughout Europe about the ‘Tatars’ and their Christian king Prester John, it was expected that the pagan peoples would convert to the Catholic faith in quick succession. There was very little doubt about how far this desire for conversion corresponded to reality. Thus the union of the church of Rus’ with Rome might have indeed appeared feasible. In the 1230s there were also discussions for union between the Empire of Nicaea and Rome, which alternated with calls to crusade against the schismatics of Bulgaria and Greece. In December 1235 Gregory IX called on King Béla IV of Hungary and his brother Coloman, who continued to hold the title ‘king of the Russians’, to support the Latin Empire in a crusade against Nicaea.

It is in this context that Pope Gregory IX wrote to an unnamed prince of Rus’ in 1231. In the registers of Gregory IX the addressee is given as illustri regi Russie but in the copy published by Aleksandr Turgenev (1784–1846), based on a later Vatican manuscript, this was expanded to Georgio illustri

32 Dörrie, *Drei Texte*, p. 159.
Regi Russie.\textsuperscript{36} Assuming that “George” is not an error (perhaps mistaken for the pope's name?), a possible candidate for the addressee would be the grand prince of Vladimir and Suzdal, Iurii Vsevolodovich (1212–38) given that Iurii is the Russian equivalent of George.\textsuperscript{37} Others have instead suggested that Daniil Romanovich was the recipient of this letter.\textsuperscript{38} In the letter Gregory IX first sets out the case for papal supremacy of the church before going on to mention that, according to information provided by the bishop of Prussia, the prince in question, although a Christian, followed with his people the rite of the Greeks and Russians. Now, however, the pope had heard he was ready, with his kingdom, to join in union with the church of Rome. The mention of Bishop Christian of Prussia may be an argument against Iurii of Vladimir as the addressee. Christian (d. 1245) was a Cistercian from Pomerania and had become the missionary bishop to the Prussians in 1215. He enjoyed close ties with Duke Conrad of Masovia, whereas Iurii’s known contacts with the Catholic clergy took place through the Hungarian Dominicans. At the same time Iurii also intervened in the struggle for power in Kiev, Daniil’s brother Vasilko was Iurii’s son-in-law, and Prince Mikhail of Chernigov his ally.\textsuperscript{39} Most likely the letter was connected with the policy of the Polish princes, however.

4.2 \textit{Rutheni} in the Chronicle of Henry of Livonia

The Chronicle of Henry of Livonia and its account of Rus’ were discussed in chapter two. However, the attitude to Rus’, the Russians, and the schismatics found in this source, which is indeed the main source for the history of Livonia


\textsuperscript{38} For example, Altaner, Dominikanermissionen, p. 215; Forstreuter, Preußen, p. 25; Bârlea, Konzile, pp. 61–62; cf. Floria, У истоков, pp. 143–44.

\textsuperscript{39} Maiorov, Галицко-Волынская Русь, p. 605.
in the early 13th century, requires further overall analysis. The German historian Christoph Schmidt investigated the image of Rus’ in Henry’s chronicle, concluding that this was entirely negative:

Whereas Henry can also be read as an ethnographic source for the Livs, Letts, and Estonians, relating countless details about their ancient beliefs, his perception of the ‘Rutheni’ is governed to such an extent by the political, military, and religious conflict that impressions about the culture and life of the east Slavs are totally lacking. Incomprehension, rejection, perhaps also fear, thus combine to form an extremely negative image of Rus’, which was already considered as virtually the natural opponent even at the formative stage of the Livonian state.40

According to Schmidt, the Russians came increasingly to be seen as Livonia’s enemies as the chronicle narrative progresses and more pagans adopt Christian values through baptism.41 There is no doubt that the political and military context was important for Henry’s chronicle, but it is highly questionable to claim that he places particular stress on the religious conflict. On the contrary, the Christianity of the Russians is repeatedly stressed in the chronicle. The judgements pronounced by Henry about the Russians should not be taken out of their context. A great number of them, for example, relate to the activities of Prince Viachko, an undisputed military foe of Livonia, as well as a Christian helper to the ‘apostate’ Estonians. The question is to what extent the chronicler’s attitude towards Viachko can be extended to the whole of Rus’. The enduring political cooperation between Prince Vladimir Mstislavich of Pskov and Bishop Albert suggests that religious conflicts in fact played a much smaller role in Livonian history. A disparaging attitude on the part of the chronicler towards Rus’, becoming more deeply rooted over time, corresponds to the development of relations between Livonia and Rus’, not to religious differences. Henry describes a war with the pagans in Livonia and Estonia; the Russians enter the picture merely as the helpers of the pagans and thus the war against Rus’ is regarded as secondary. Schmidt’s explanation for the lack of ethnological descriptions of Russians therefore has no foundation, for even though Henry had taken part in several expeditions against the pagans, he still lacked personal contact with the regions comprising Rus’. Henry’s chronicle is

not, after all, a relevant source for the everyday life and customs of the Danes either, even though they obviously shared the same religious denomination as Henry. The very nature of the genre of the missionary chronicle demands that there should be a description of the vanquished pagan culture, something which was not necessary in the case of the Russians and the Danes.

Indeed, the attitude to the Danes in Henry’s chronicle is also extremely negative. He considered them intruders in Livonia; the priests of the Danes had come “into a foreign harvest”.⁴² According to Henry, the Swedes had already revealed at the end of the 12th century that, unlike the Germans, they were not concerned about baptism, but preferred to obtain tribute instead.⁴³ He makes the same accusation about the princes of Rus’.⁴⁴ Accordingly, Plures . . . matres sought to win over Estonia, a daughter of the Livonian church, in the hope of obtaining levies and booty, and one of these “mothers”, namely Rus’, had been “always sterile and barren”.⁴⁵ The others were therefore the Danish and Swedish rulers, who in Henry’s opinion, unlike Riga, were similarly interested only in their revenues. In 1220, when Bishop Albert was unable to obtain papal support against the Danish king, he sought backing instead from the newly crowned emperor Frederick “against the grievous disturbances both of the Danish king and of the Russians or of pagans”. However, since the emperor was occupied just then with preparations for his crusade to the Holy Land, he did not help Albert, but instead urged him to live in peace with Denmark and Rus’.⁴⁶ In this section in Henry’s chronicle the Danes, Russians, and the pagans are again cited together as enemies of the Livonian church.

Henry’s judgemental attitude towards Riga’s rivals is most clearly expressed, without regard for the question of their religious adherence, in his so-called eulogy to the Virgin Mary.⁴⁷ In 1221 King Valdemar II of Denmark sent his bailiff, the knight Godesalcus, to Riga, with the aim of implementing on the ground the subordination to the Danish monarchy confirmed by Albert in 1218. When this knight was forced to leave Livonia, his ship ran into danger at sea. Henry praises the Lord for punishing the bailiff for having dishonoured the Virgin

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⁴² HCL XXIV.2, p. 170.
⁴³ HCL I.13, p. 7.
⁴⁴ HCL XVI.2, p. 103.
⁴⁶ HCL XXIV.4, p. 173.
Mary, the guardian of Livonia. Henry lists the rulers who had fought against Livonia and suffered defeat, mentioning in succession the princes of Rus’ (Vladimir of Polotsk, Vsevolod Mstislavich of Novgorod, Vsevolod of Gerzike, Viachko of Kokenhusen), the Swedish jarl Karl, Bishop Karl of Linköping, King Valdemar II of Denmark, and the elders of the Livs, Lettgallians and Estonians who had fallen in battle:

And what kings whether of pagans or of Danes or of other nations, have fought against Livonia and have not perished? Consider and see, you princes of the Russians, or the pagans, or the Danes, or you elders of whatever people. Fear this gentle Mother of Mercy. Adore this Mother of God and give satisfaction to Her, Who takes such cruel revenge upon Her enemies.48

Hostility towards the Danish king is also shown by the Rhineland Cistercian Caesarius of Heisterbach (d. after 1240) in an exemplum connected to Livonia:49 He interprets the king’s imprisonment by Count Henry of Schwerin between 1223 and 1225 as a punishment imposed by the Virgin for his claims to extend his power over the Livonian church.50 Henry’s work is clearly apologetic in nature. We are dealing with a chronicle of the Rigan church, whose aim was to defend that church from its rivals and those who looked upon it with envy. One of the arguments used by Henry is indeed Livonia’s very location, threatened on all sides, *in medio plurimarum nationum ac Ruthenorum adiacentium, qui omnes consilium fecerunt in unum, ut eam destruerent*.51 The schismatic attitude of Rus’ revealed itself as a certain inclination to enter into alliances with the pagans and apostates, which was the very predisposition that made it so dangerous.52 Similar accusations, not only aimed against the schismatics, had already been brought by earlier chroniclers of the missions to the Baltic. Both Adam of Bremen (d. 1081/85) and Helmold of Bosau accused the Saxon rulers of only caring about their revenues and not bothering about the baptism of

51 HCL XIV.7, p. 78.
52 See for example HCL XIV.5, p. 75; XVI.5, p. 111.
the Slavs. Their policies are supposed even to have incited the people to turn apostate on occasion.\footnote{Lotter, “Crusading Idea,” p. 284.}


### 4.3 Papal Policy: Livonia and Rus’

A direct interest on the part of the papacy in Livonia’s policy towards Rus’ is said to be reflected in the papal letters. In general, implementing a consistent policy requires the relevant information to be systematically organized to some degree. However, it is not clear to what extent connections were made between the reports about Livonia and Rus’ that reached the curia with reports about Poland and Rus’ or Hungary and Rus’. An issue that would later form a political link between Livonia and Poland, the missionary activity and crusades in Prussia, was only at its incipient stage during the episcopate of Albert of Riga. Moreover, even if the papacy had wished to take steps to convert Rus’
to Catholicism through its policy in Livonia, it would have lacked the means to realize this ambition.

A connection had already been drawn between Livonia and Rus’ as early as the confirmation issued in 1188 by Clement III to Bishop Meinhard of Üxküll (see p. 80), but it was not until the pontificate of Innocent III that more detailed and substantive information began to emerge. In 1203–04 the future bishop of Estonia, Theodoric, made his way to Innocent III in Rome accompanied by Caupo, the quasi rex of the Livs of Treyden. According to Henry’s chronicle, Caupo was also asked by the pope about the peoples living on Livonia’s borders. The pope may also have been referring to these reports when he wrote to the clergy of Constantinople in 1205 in connection with their return to obedience under Rome. Innocent says that he had made a good catch fishing insofar as he had converted the pagans in Livonia, restored the unity of the church in Bulgaria and Wallachia, and sent legates to Armenia. After spending the winter of 1206–07 in Riga, Archbishop Anders Sunesen of Lund sent the pope a report of his activities. Bishops Albert and Theodoric told the pope about the Livonian church at the Lateran Council of 1215. At the very latest by the time of these last reports it would have been possible to mention the wars conducted against the Russian princes on the Daugava, although Pskov and Novgorod were still not regarded as opponents of the Rigan church at this time.

At the Lateran Council the pope also proclaimed that the Greek church had returned to the cradle of the Catholic church. This certainly represented the desire rather than the reality, but after the foundation of the Latin Empire there was at least a certain basis for this belief. The next set of negotiations for ecclesiastical union took place between the Empire of Nicaea and the Roman

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57 HCL VII.3, p. 21; LR, lines 322–84.
60 HCL XIX.7, p. 132; LUR, no. 71.
church between 1218 and 1222. The prerequisites for the papacy to be able to exercise an independent policy towards the schismatics were therefore present in Rome. However, there is no evidence in the sources that papal policy towards Rus’ too was driven by Livonia.

In 1222 Honorius III informed the “judges” of Livonia (judicibus in Livonia) that he had learned from the bishop of Livonia (i.e. Albert) that Russians had settled in Livonia who observed the Greek rite, ignored Latin baptism, neither celebrated the feast days nor observed the rules of fasting, and dissolved the marriages of neophytes. The pope urged the secular rulers to ensure that these Russians remained under the Latin observance where the Greek rite differed from that “of the head, that is the church of Rome”. Friedrich Benninghoven has pointed out that this letter was related to a diplomatic campaign carried out by Bishop Albert against the Order of the Sword Brothers. Three further letters were issued on the same day admonishing the Order. In other words, this letter was not directed primarily against the Russians, but the Sword Brothers. Plausible candidates for the location of the Russian settlement referred to would appear to be Tolowa and Adsel, since these had originally been baptized according to the Orthodox rite and were now controlled by the Order, but just as conceivable would be the precursors of the emerging urban settlements of Wenden and Fellin. The use of the Greek rite indicates the presence of Russian clergy. The “dissolution of the marriages” of the newly baptized may be the result of the different beliefs of the Catholic and Orthodox churches regarding marriage between relatives. The Eastern church adhered to the requirement that had emerged in the early Middle Ages whereby marriage was forbidden to relatives up to the seventh degree of consanguinity. The Catholic church, having taking into account the impracticability of enforcing this requirement among the nobility, took a more lenient approach to marriages between relatives. The Lateran Council of 1215 resolved that only marriages up to the fourth degree of consanguinity would be forbidden. This meant that some marriages that were valid from a Catholic point of view were not permitted as far as Orthodox believers were concerned. This letter suggests at least the possibility that in the area under the control of the Sword Brothers or in those areas allied to them, such as Tolowa, Russian clergy were able to exercise their duties with the Order’s consent. Any change in religious adherence for

62 HRM 1, no. 12; LUB 1, no. 55; LVA, no. 101.
63 Benninghoven, Orden, p. 235; Pitz, Papstreskript, pp. 108–09. See also LUR, nos. 179–180b; LVA, nos. 98–100.
64 Dekrete, pp. 257–58, para. 50; Podskalsky, Christentum, p. 179.
the newly baptized Christians would probably have meant simply a change in rite, that is, even supposing that Orthodox religious services took place at all in Tolowa at the beginning of the 13th century. Whenever there was a change in the balance of power or principal ally, the recipient of any church taxes would also have changed. Just as the penetration of real ‘German’ power in everyday life was not sudden but took place over a number of decades and in several phases—this was a particularly long process especially in the peripheral areas—there was a long transitional period from a confessional point of view, in which the original pagan, the original Orthodox (particularly in Latvian territory), and the Catholic elements merged with one another.

On 16 November 1224 Honorius III sent a letter to all Christians in Rus’ (universis Christi fidelibus per Russiam constitutis) calling upon them to make donations to support the bishops of Livonia, Selonia, Leal (i.e. Dorpat), and others proclaiming the Gospel and protecting the land from pagan attacks. At the same time the pope also took the opportunity to define the limits of the bishopric of Selonia. The embassy that this letter had aimed at may have set out from Livonia in the autumn following the capture of Dorpat at the end of August 1224. Relations with Novgorod had still not been definitively resolved by this time. Thus in 1223 the peace with Smolensk and Polotsk in the Daugava region was renewed. Even before the siege of Dorpat the Rigans had attempted repeatedly to avoid clashing with Viachko by demanding that he leave the castle. In view of the fact that Livonia’s approach was to avoid conflicts with Rus’, the letter of Honorius III may represent an attempt to persuade the rulers of Rus’ not to aid the pagans. We do not of course know exactly who was understood as the addressee in Livonia on the one hand and whom the papal chancery considered it addressed to. What is certain is that this letter does not express any hostility towards Rus’.

In 1225 the papal legate William of Modena was in Livonia. “The Russians of Novgorod and from other cities” (including Vsevolod of Gerzike) sent envoys asking him to confirm the peace between Riga and Pskov and Novgorod agreed in 1224. William listened to their concerns and “strengthened their faith with many exhortations”, so that the Russian envoys returned home full of joy—this expression in the chronicle is intended to indicate the harmony reigning
among Christians.\textsuperscript{68} When William returned to Rome, Honorius III issued two letters in which a connection was made between Livonia and Rus'. Both are dated 17 January 1227. One is addressed to the princes of Rus',\textsuperscript{69} the other to the German citizens of Visby.\textsuperscript{70} In the latter the pope first took the town and church of Visby, which had shown great courage in defending the church of Livonia and Estonia, under his protection from those in a position to impede this struggle to convert the Osilians and other pagans. In other words, this letter was aimed against King Valdemar II of Denmark,\textsuperscript{71} particularly with reference to the military campaign against Ösel that William was attempting to organize. The capture of Dorpat in 1224 may also have been a sign of the hostilities against the Russians. The former letter states that the pope had also been told by his legate that the envoys of the Russian princes, with whom the legate had met, had asked him to visit their lands. The envoys had implied that they would be willing to renounce their errors (i.e. the Orthodox religion), which had been brought about by—\textit{sicut dicitur}—bad preachers and for which God had punished the Russians enough. The pope now asked the Russian princes to send out their letters and envoys for the legate’s commission. Honorius III also urged them to safeguard a stable peace with the Christians in Livonia and Estonia and not to prevent the spread of Christianity, unless they wished to face punishment by the pope. It is quite clear that this letter was based on the meeting between William of Modena and the Russian envoys in Riga in 1225. It was already possible to infer the idea of submission of the Russian church merely from the desire to conclude peace with the Latins. Gerzike was indeed more firmly controlled by Riga in 1224 than before (see p. 101), which is consistent with the strengthening of the military and social position of Catholicism along the Daugava’s middle course.

The question remains to what extent this letter to the Russian princes reflects the true situation in Livonia and to what extent William’s personal perspective or, indeed, Honorius’ own policy towards Rus’. Some scholars have seen this letter as evidence of a serious intention on the part of the papacy to convert Rus’ to Catholicism.\textsuperscript{72} Others have argued that William himself came up with such a plan as a result of the contacts he had made in Riga.\textsuperscript{73} A third

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\textsuperscript{68} Cf. Undusk, “Sacred History,” pp. 70–74.
\textsuperscript{69} HRM 1, no. 21; DPR, no. 4; LUB 1, no. 93: “Universis Regibus Rusiae”.
\textsuperscript{70} HRM 1, no. 20; BD, no. 207; LUB 1, no. 94; LVA, no. 148.
\textsuperscript{71} Benninghoven, \textit{Orden}, p. 218.
\textsuperscript{73} Gnegel-Waitschies, \textit{Bischof Albert}, p. 165; Benninghoven, \textit{Orden}, p. 198; Pitz, \textit{Papstreskript}, p. 145.
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possibility has also been proposed, namely that Novgorod cherished the desire for closer relations with the Catholic world given that the prince of Novgorod at the time, Mstislav Vsevolodovich of Chernigov, was the son of a Polish princess and had extensive involvement in the relations of south-western Rus' with Poland and Hungary, as well as because of Novgorod's own need to find allies against the princes of Suzdal.\(^\text{74}\) Novgorod was indeed in a difficult position at the time. Grand Prince Iurii Vsevolodovich was attempting to overrun the city by blockading its eastern trade routes.\(^\text{75}\) Thus there must have been a meeting in Riga at which the issue of faith was discussed, although its content and outcome and remain unknown. William's hopes probably belonged in the context of the other negotiations taking place for ecclesiastical union and were no doubt misunderstood at the curia. William, as the pope's former vice-chancellor, must have had an overall view of eastern European affairs. However, on the basis of both of these letters, which, moreover, had no apparent consequences, it cannot be affirmed either that Rome conducted a consistent policy towards Rus' through Livonia or that papal hostility towards Rus' was a determining factor in that policy.

The ‘normality’ of relations between the Livonian powers and the principalities of Rus' is stressed even further by the commercial links that quickly developed during this period between Livonia's emerging towns and Polotsk, Smolensk, Pskov, and Novgorod. There was not always a straightforward relationship between trade and political power. During the period of Danish dominance in the Baltic up to the 1230s it is too early to speak of the supremacy of German merchants in the region. Both German and Scandinavian merchants were represented in Novgorod and Gotland, at the heart of the Baltic maritime routes and trade.\(^\text{76}\) To a certain extent this issue also informed relations in Danish-controlled Estonia. In 1221 Rigan merchants were arrested in Rotalia by the Danes and were not released until the Rigans threatened with war.\(^\text{77}\) Yet although commercial interests were undoubtedly a consideration, they cannot be regarded as the decisive factor. The relationship between merchants and the authorities in Riga was not always entirely unproblematic.\(^\text{78}\) The trade conducted by the Danish St Knud’s guilds had been superseded by Lübeck and other German towns on the Baltic since the second quarter of the 13th century, when the power of the Danish monarchy began to decline. In the absence of


\(^{75}\) NL1, pp. 64, 267–68.


\(^{77}\) HCL XXV.5, pp. 184–85.

\(^{78}\) HCL XXV.3, pp. 181–82.
any effective royal protection, the network of St Knud’s guilds also fell apart.\(^79\) It is notable that in the first half of the 13th century the mainly Saxon and Westphalian origin of the burghers of Riga can be identified from their names.\(^80\)

Commercial ties undoubtedly also influenced relations between Rus’ and Livonia. Occasional commercial conflicts with Novgorod at the beginning of the 13th century evidently did not last long. In 1201 a minor conflict with the “Varangians” was mentioned but quickly resolved.\(^81\) The merchants then travelled overland (горою) wishing for peace, which could mean a route through northern Estonia or equally from Riga via Pskov.\(^82\) Around 1205–07 the Gotlanders’ enclave and the merchants using it must have received a privilege from Prince Konstantin Vsevolodovich which is mentioned in later sources.\(^83\) Trade relations between Novgorod and the Baltic towns had become established by this time, taking the form that would later characterize them. The land route also gained in importance with the emergence of Livonia’s medieval towns.\(^84\) Yet for the Roman curia these issues, as we have seen, remained irrelevant. At the local level the ‘states’ of Livonia on the one hand and Pskov and Novgorod on the other had emerged by the 1220s at the latest as essentially equal military opponents who had to take account of the other side’s interests.\(^85\)

Yet it has also been observed that there was no revival of the anti-Latin polemical literature in Rus’ in the first half of the 13th century.\(^86\) In the 1230s and 1240s talks about church union continued between Rome and the Empire of Nicaea, as did the calls to crusade against the schismatics, but these referred to the Greeks and Bulgaria and had no bearing on relations with Rus’, let alone

\(^81\) NL1, pp. 45, 240; Rybina, Torgovlja, p. 107; Rennkamp, *Studien*, p. 65.
\(^82\) Goetz, *Deutsch-Russische Handelsgeschichte*, p. 37.
\(^83\) Rybina, Торговля, p. 108; Kattinger, *Gotländische Genossenschaft*, pp. 173–75. Kattinger’s assertion that St Peter’s yard is not mentioned in the privilege of 1205/07 due to the participation of German merchants in the crusades should be discarded because at this time the German crusaders had not yet clashed with Novgorod.
Apart from the crusading letters of the 1240s mentioned above, which were aimed at Denmark (see p. 169), there was also a number of papal letters replying to various requests from the Teutonic Order and related to the crusades in Prussia. But these too only concerned the pagans, not Rus’ or the schismatics. They concerned a major uprising that began in Prussia in 1242 and lasted until 1249. Innocent IV issued a succession of letters between 1243 and 1245 ordering the preaching of the crusade to aid the Teutonic Order in this conflict.

4.4 Papal Policy: Finland and Rus’

Rus’ had been depicted as an enemy since the 1220s and 1230s in some papal documents concerning the region of Finland. Taking the number of burials without grave goods as a measure of the degree of Christianization, the south-western coast of Finland was converted at the end of the 12th century, Tavastia from the early 13th century, and Savolax and Karelia at the turn of the 13th and 14th centuries. This Christianization took place from the West, not the East, and that applies also to the eastern locations of Savolax and St Michael and to some extent even to Karelia. The spread of Christianity and conquest of the region is documented only sparsely in the written sources. For example, it is not clear when the so-called Tavastia crusade of Birger Jarl took place, which has been dated to both 1239 and c. 1249 (see p. 150). There are approximately only 300 known documents relating to Finland from the 12th to 14th centuries. Thirteen of them refer to the enemies of the Christian people.

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88 DD 1/7, nos. 112, 114; PUB 1/1, nos. 146, 148, 150, 151, 169. Cf. Donner, Kardinal Wilhelm, p. 270; Busch, Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 25–26; Maier, Preaching, pp. 77–78.
89 For Finland in sources from the 11th to 14th centuries, see Luigi De Anna, Conoscenza e immagine della Finlandia e del settentrione nella cultura classico-medievale (Turku, 1988) (Turun Yliopiston Julkaisuja B, 180), pp. 213–80.
These enemies fall into three groups: the pagans in general, the peoples of Finland and Karelia, and the Rutheni. Jukka Korpela has argued that the expressions found in these sources should not be regarded as definitive terms. However, this does not detract from the fact that the information on which the letters are based originated from the lands of the Baltic, where it was possible to draw distinctions between different ‘tribes’ and peoples. At the same time, there is no doubt that Rus’ appears only sporadically in this list of enemies. The terms *inimici*, *infideles*, and *pagani* used in these documents do not refer to the schismatic Russians. Moreover, since these papal letters were requested by a particular party, they also give expression to the information supplied by that person. As such they must be placed in the specific political context in question. Novgorod’s role in the relations between the inhabitants of Finland Proper, the Tavastians, Karelians, and other Finnish peoples should not be overestimated.

In January and February of 1229 Gregory IX issued a number of letters that impinged on trade in the Baltic. The petitioner was the bishop of Finland and the letters were addressed to the bishop of Linköping, the abbot of the Cistercians on Gotland, the provost of Visby, the bishop of Riga, the cathedral provost of Riga, the abbot of Dünamünde, the bishop of Lübeck, the dean of Lübeck, and the abbot of the Benedictine monastery of St John in Lübeck. These letters were consequently dispatched to all the hubs of Baltic trade. They relate that while the bishop of Finland was promulgating the name of the Lord among the worshippers of idols, the Rutheni, who were nearby, repeatedly attacked those who adopted the Catholic faith, causing considerable alarm and inflicting great harm on them. The addressees were therefore to ensure that merchants did not conduct any trade with the Russians, under threat of ecclesiastical punishment, until they desisted from their persecution of newly baptized Christians. A separate letter, again composed at the request of the bishop of Finland, instructed the bishop of Linköping and the ecclesiastical authorities on Gotland to ensure that the merchants of Gotland did not sell any weapons, horses, ships or food to the pagans, the enemies of the Finnish church, since this could harm the church. Such trade embargos against the pagans had also been applied earlier in the Baltic. The exchange of goods with non-Christians was partially prohibited by the church to the extent that

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94 REA, nos. 3–5; cf. nos. 1–2; ST 1, no. 75; LUB 3, no. 100a.
95 REA, no. 7; ST 1, no. 76.
it might prove a military threat to Christians. Canon 24 of the Third Lateran Council (1179) lists weapons, iron, and wood for ships among such forbidden items. A similar list was reissued by Innocent III in his proclamation of the crusade of 1213 and again two years later in the call to crusade at the Fourth Lateran Council. The first similar order in northern Europe against pagans was issued to Bishop Christian of Prussia by Pope Honorius III in 1218.97 Under Gregory IX the list of banned goods also appears in those letters directed against the pagans; in the letters referring to the Russians, trade was forbidden altogether, but only as long as Rus' continued to harm newly baptized Christians.98 This ban was thus provoked by certain political activities by Rus’—in this specific context, of Novgorod—not by its schismatic views. Nor does the embargo conceal a ‘secret plan’ to annex Rus’.

Novgorod was indeed militarily active in Finland at this time. In 1227 Prince Iaroslav Vsevolodovich went on a raid for plunder with the Novgorodians to Tavastia. The Laurentian Chronicle mentions in this context that he performed baptisms in Karelia.99 Given the practice in Livonia, where baptism also represented subordination to the secular power in question, this could be seen as an application by the Russians of the Livonian model to Karelia. The Tavastians responded the following year by attacking Ladoga, where they were met by local warriors and the Ingrians. The Novgorodian army led by the prince redeployed to the River Neva, but halted there because of emerging opposition to Iaroslav.100 Pope Gregory’s letters from early 1229 may very well have been

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97 For example, ST 1, no. 69; PUB vol. 1/1, no. 25. See also Mažeika, “Of Cabbages and Knights,” p. 66.
98 Cf. for example Hehl, Kirche, p. 42.
99 Лаврентьевская летопись, p. 449: “Того ж лет княз крсти множество Корель мало не все люди”. The Novgorod Chronicle mentions in the same year the campaign by the prince in Tavastia, in which lots of booty was acquired, and the burning to death of four witches in Novgorod: NL1, pp. 65, 270. John Lind takes the view that the notice about baptism from the Laurentian Chronicle represents a later (14th century), unreliable addition. See Lind, “The Russian Testament,” p. 204; John Lind, “De russiske krøniker som kilde til kontakter i østersøområdet,” Det 22. nordiske historikermøte Oslo 13.–18. august 1994. Rapport 1: Norden og Baltikum, ed. Aleksander Loit (Oslo, 1994), pp. 42–45. Nonetheless, politically motivated baptism in one of Livonia’s neighbouring regions in the 1220s is indeed plausible because there are several examples in Livonia itself, including of Russian princes.
100 NL1, pp. 65, 270. On the fighting in Karelia in the 13th and 14th centuries, see Heikki Kirkinen, Karjala idan kultuuripiirissä. Bysantin ja venäjän yhteyksistä keskiajan Karjalaan (Helsinki, 1963) (Historiallisia tutkimuksia 67), pp. 75–102; Shaskolskii, Борьба Руси против крестоносной агрессии; idem, Борьба Руси за сохранение выхода к Балтийскому морю в XIV веке (Leningrad, 1987).
written in response to these hostilities. The bishop of Riga and the abbot of Dünamünde were among the addressees in their capacity as spiritual dignitaries of Riga as a centre of trade. It thus appears the intervention of the bishop of Finland was the catalyst for this papal response.

On 24 November 1232 Pope Gregory IX sent an epistle to the Sword Brothers in Livonia. He called upon the Order to protect a new plantation of the Lord in Finland at the request of the bishop of Finland. The Russians are described in the letter as “infidel”. Finland also fell under the area covered by the legation of Baldwin of Aulne. It has been concluded on the basis of this evidence that the bishop of Finland, Baldwin, and above all, the pope had come up with the plan to subjugate Novgorod via Finland and that the “enemies” mentioned in the sources relating to the crusade in Finland were none other than the Russians. In fact this letter again reflects no more than Prince Iaroslav’s Tavastian campaign of 1227.

The Russians are at least mentioned on one occasion as enemies of Christianity in this letter. However, it should not be forgotten that the main contemporary conflict was between the pagans and the Christians, in which the Russians of Novgorod were only intermittently involved. Hence Rus’ cannot be regarded as an enemy of the Finnish mission regardless of time and place simply on the basis of this one letter. To consider the events in 13th-century Karelia and its immediately neighbouring areas as a war between the Swedes and the Russians would be to underestimate the Finnish peoples and overestimate the means at Novgorod’s disposal. If the expression rutheni is regarded, moreover, in a ‘geopolitical’ sense, that is, as referring to the part of Karelia dependent on Novgorod, it could equally include the pagans and hence Karelia itself, for it took several centuries for Karelia to become Christian.

The enduring confrontation between Sweden and Novgorod was only just

101 Cf. Korpela, “Russian Threat,” pp. 163–64. According to Korpela, Rus’ here is not a specific geographical designation, and the letters are related less to Finland as such than to the entire Baltic region. Nevertheless it is precisely the bishop of Finland who appears as the petitioner: “venerabilis frater noster Finlandensis episcopus nobis exposuit”. See REA, no. 1.


beginning in the 1230s; it may in some sense be regarded as more serious from the 1280s onwards. This shift had less to do with papal ‘policy’ than with the spread of knightly culture from the Continent to Sweden, leading to the need to conduct crusades there too and thus converting the existing conflict for control of the pagan peoples of Finland into crusades. Any claims based on the sources discussed in this section that there were plans to subjugate Rus’ in the first half of the 13th century106 or that Rus’ posed a threat to the Catholic church in Livonia and Finland107 must be viewed with great scepticism. Jukka Korpela has concluded that in Finland from the 11th to the 13th centuries it is not possible to identify either any perception of a danger posed by Rus’ or any confrontation between the churches. The sources refer primarily to the pagans as the enemies of Christians.108

It is always possible to explain any critical attitude towards Rus’ that occasionally surfaces in the sources for north-eastern Europe in the first half of the 13th century with reference to the political context. Political relations and power politics determined the vocabulary used in the chronicles and papal letters. The papal curia may very well have constructed an idea of Rus’ as a schismatic land judging by these letters, but this information was not gathered systematically and the number of relayed reports was small. No intention to undertake crusades directly against Rus’ can be drawn from the sources from this period. The possible papal initiative in relation to the legation of William of Modena, to subject the church of Rus’ to papal authority, proved a unique, one-off idea and is not evidence of the existence of a consistent policy.

106 For example, Pashuto, Внешняя политика, pp. 240–41; Shaskolskiii, Борьба Руси против крестоносной агрессии, pp. 147–157, 227–33.
Part 2
Relations between Rus’ and Livonia under Archbishop Albert Suerbeer (1245–73)

5.1 The Foundation of the Archbishopric of Riga

The central figure in relations between Livonia and Rus’ at the end of the 1240s and during the 1250s was the archbishop of Riga, Albert Suerbeer (d. 1273). He had been unsuccessful in his attempt to become bishop of Riga in 1229–30, and was instead later appointed primate of Ireland and archbishop of Armagh in 1240. In 1245 Bishop Christian of Prussia died and at the turn of 1245–46 Albert Suerbeer was appointed as his successor with the rank of archbishop. His title stated that he was archbishop of Prussia, Livonia, and Estonia. However, Bishop Christian had lost his possessions in Prussia to the Teutonic Order, with the result that the new archbishop lacked any form of income, apart from which there was no vacancy in Livonia. He was assigned the bishopric of Chiemsee as a living in 1246 and the position of bishop of Lübeck in 1247, although in this capacity he was the suffragan of the archbishop of Bremen. Thus although Albert had extensive powers at his disposal during his episcopate, he lacked the military strength to back them up and consequently his ability to exercise real influence was slight.1

William of Modena had divided Prussia into four bishoprics in 1243: Culm, Pomesania, Warmia, and Samland. Archbishop Albert inherited the conflict between Bishop Christian and the Teutonic Order. The latter used its political influence to try to stop the foundation of a strong ecclesiastical metropolitan in Prussia. In 1249 Suerbeer promised not to locate his episcopal residence in Prussia against the will of the Order.2 It was finally decided in 1251 to make Riga the centre of the archbishopric. The territory of the former bishopric of Semgallia was added to the bishopric of Riga. Suerbeer was in any case


2 Forstreuter, “Gründung,” pp. 12–18. See also LUB 1, nos. 208–09.
prevented from taking up residence in Riga until after the death of Bishop Nicholas of Riga in 1253. Albert lost his office in Lübeck in 1253–54 as a result of the reorganization of these ecclesiastical provinces.3

On 2 April 1246 Albert Suerbeer was appointed papal legate in Prussia, Livonia, Estonia, Gotland, Holstein, and Rügen.4 The appointment as legate may have served as a means to enable the archbishop, who had neither a fixed residence nor income, to claim his living and the control of his suffragans. One month later Innocent IV exhorted Albert in his capacity as legate also to act with great energy in Rus', where the churches had expressed the wish to join the obedience of the Roman head of the church.5 The appointment of a legate for Rus' in 1246 was not unexpected. Contacts had been established between the pope and the princes of Galicia; hopes that the church of Rus' would become subordinate to Rome could be taken seriously. Why Albert Suerbeer in particular was appointed legate may have been due to the fact that, as the successor to Bishop Christian of Prussia, he was considered to inherit the latter's involvement in Russian affairs. Another matter altogether is to what degree the attempts by Innocent IV to achieve ecclesiastical union met with local support.6

As already mentioned, Albert Suerbeer's power as archbishop was defined by his opposition to the strongest political power in his area of jurisdiction, the Teutonic Order. It was also under pressure from the Order that Albert Suerbeer forfeited his powers as legate in 1250. In 1254, however, Innocent IV announced that Suerbeer had lost these powers only in Prussia, not in Livonia and Estonia, or in Rus'.7

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4 In 1244 William, the former bishop of Modena, and cardinal-bishop of Sabina since 1244, was appointed papal legate for Livonia, Prussia, Estonia, Curonia, Finland, Gotland, Öland, Sengallia, Lithuania, the Culm Land, the archbishopric of Gniezno, the bishoprics of Prague and Olomouc, and the possessions of the duke of Austria. He did not travel to the area of his legation, however, but stayed in Lyon. See Donner, *Kardinal Wilhelm*, pp. 283–87;

5 *LUB* 1, nos. 189, 191; cf. no. 291; *HRM* 1, no. 66; *DPR*, no. 14; Goetze, *Albert Suerbeer*, pp. 14–19; Forstreuter, “Fragen,” p. 258.


7 In 1247 the Teutonic Order obtained the appointment of Jacques Pantaléon, the future Pope Urban IV (d. 1264), as legate in Poland, Pomerelia, and Prussia: *LUB* 1, nos. 214, 262, 291;
The foundation of the archbishopric of Riga fixed the terms of ecclesiastical government in Livonia and Prussia for the rest of the Middle Ages. The combination of missionary bishops of uncertain hierarchical status and dioceses with sometimes disputed borders was replaced with a firmer structure. However, the attempts to continue the Catholic mission in Rus’ collapsed. The position of Albert Suerbeer as papal legate proved ineffective in this highly unstable political situation.

5.2 Polotsk, Livonia, and Lithuania

Sometime towards the mid-13th century Lithuania began to consolidate its power under Grand Duke Mindaugas (d. 1263). This process was accompanied by the rapid growth of Lithuanian military power and the first moves towards territorial expansion in Russian territory. The enlargement of Lithuanian territory occurred through different means simultaneously, ranging from conquest to the formation of alliances. The former princely houses who recognized the supremacy of the Lithuanian grand dukes often retained power in the towns of Rus’. However, Mindaugas’ consolidation of his power met with resistance from Lithuanian rivals. Around the middle of the century this opposition was represented by Mindaugas’ nephews Tautvila (d. 1263) and Edivydas (d. c. 1253). According to the Hypatian Chronicle, Mindaugas sent these dukes together with his brother-in-law Duke Vykinas of Samogitia (d. c. 1253) to attack Smolensk with the promise that “whatever you conquer you shall keep”. When the three dukes had set out, Mindaugas sent his army after them to kill them. Tautvila and Edivydas fled to Vladimir in Volhynia, where they took refuge with their brother-in-law Daniil Romanovich and his brother Vasilko.8

Daniil and Vasilko then sent a message to the Polish princes that “it is the right time for Christians to attack the pagans, since they are at war with one another”, i.e. presumably a reference to the internal power struggle in Lithuania. Although no help was forthcoming from Poland, Vykinas secured agreements “with many Sudovians” and “with one half of the Samogitians” by means of gifts and money. The “Germans in Riga” answered Daniil: “We will make peace with

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8 Ипатьевская летопись, p. 815. Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (1866–1934) dates the event to approximately the end of 1248, beginning of 1249. See Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, “Хронологія подій галицько-волинської літописи,” in Записки Наукового товариства імені Шевченка 1901, 3 (41), p. 35.
Vykintas on your account, even though he has killed many of our brothers". The Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order (немци братья) promised to send help to Tautvila. A joint campaign by the escaped dukes, Volhynia, and Riga was launched against Mindaugas during the course of which Tautvila with some of Daniil’s troops (с полоном Даниловым) went to Riga, where he was received with honour and baptized.⁹ Hence, a Christian coalition was formed against Mindaugas, led by the pretender to the Lithuanian throne, Tautvila. In 1248 a treaty was agreed in Langebrücke in southern Estonia, according to which the lands beyond the Daugava, which were to be subjugated to Christianity, would be equally divided between the archbishop of Riga, the bishop of Dorpat, and the Teutonic Order, the cost of the construction of castles and towns borne jointly, and hostages equally divided between the archbishop and the Order.¹⁰

This agreement should also probably be judged against the background of a complex internal situation in Lithuania.

Mindaugas, who had learned that “the Teutonic Order (божии дворяне), the bishop, and all the warriors of Riga” had given help to Tautvila, “secretly” got in touch with the master of the Order, Andreas, sending him many valuable gifts and money and promising him further gifts if he agreed to have Tautvila killed or to expel him (аще убьешь и женеш Тевтивила). Andreas made the baptism of Mindaugas a precondition of his help. The latter did indeed send envoys to the pope and was later baptized. The anonymous Russian chronicler, who belonged to Daniil’s milieu, complains about the master of the Order:

Oh woe! He blinded your eyes with gold and now he is going to do you another injury. Mindaugas indeed sent the envoys to the pope and received the baptism, [but] his baptism was feigned, he made sacrifices in secret to his gods . . . he sacrificed to his gods and burned the dead and clearly followed the pagan customs.¹¹

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¹⁰ LUB 3, no. 200a. Cf. Taube, “Russische und litauische Fürsten,” pp. 408–09, 451, 463. In 1245 Bishop Henry of Ösel sought a rescript from the pope that would ban the selling of weapons to the pagans. See Busch, Nachgelassene Schriften, p. 88, no. 2; LUB 1, no. 201.

¹¹ Ипатьевская летопись, pp. 816–17.
Relations between Rus’ and Livonia

Grand Duke Mindaugas of Lithuania and his wife Martha were baptized in 1251 and crowned two years later. For Mindaugas this step was necessary to be able to obtain the political and military support he needed. The Teutonic Order viewed Mindaugas’ baptism as the independent policy of the Livonian branch of the Order and its master, Andreas von Felben. This must have been contrary to the endeavours of the main leadership. Andreas von Felben was therefore deposed in 1254 and replaced by Eberhard von Sayn as provincial master. Behind this may have been the desire by the Prussian branch of the Order to expand and consolidate its territory. A peace between Mindaugas and Lithuania’s northern neighbour Livonia would not have favoured such aims. Yet Mindaugas had after all been baptized and crowned at the initiative of the Teutonic Order and been put in touch with the pope through the mediation of Andreas von Felben. Whereas for Mindaugas the issue was the power struggle with Tautvila, for the Order what mattered was its rivalry with the archbishop of Riga. Mindaugas was crowned king by Bishop Heidenreich of Culm in 1253, and that same year Albert Suerbeer, in fulfilment of a papal instruction, ordained a priest of the Teutonic Order, Christian, as bishop of Lithuania. The archbishop received obedience from the new bishop and did not grant him any exemption. The Order was nevertheless able to obtain a papal dispensation releasing Christian from this oath. At the same time an alternative bishop of Lithuania, the Dominican Vitus, had also been ordained by Archbishop Fulco of Gniezno. He had already given up attempts to reside in Lithuania by 1254. Mindaugas donated extensive landed property to the Teutonic Order


and Bishop Christian of Lithuania, although these lands were actually in areas not under his control,\textsuperscript{15} namely principally in Samogitia, Sudovia, and Selonia. The granting of Selonia to the Order was simultaneously a measure aimed at thwarting the claims of the archbishop of Riga in the same region.\textsuperscript{16}

Mindaugas had thus succeeded in dividing the support sent to his enemies from Livonia. “Andreas was to blame for the fact that the Lithuanians were not baptized and for this reason the brothers of the Order (братья) [later] deposed him from office,” narrates the Russian chronicler, who had a hostile attitude towards Mindaugas. The Order proceeded to join Mindaugas’ side in the military conflict. Around 1252 Tautvila lost the support he had been receiving until then in Samogitia and Sudovia, while Mindaugas for his part tried to come to terms with Daniil.\textsuperscript{17} Finally Tautvila, Daniil, and Mindaugas were able to reach a temporary reconciliation.

In 1262 Tautvila is mentioned as prince of Polotsk. Already in 1258 “the Lithuanians together with the Polotskians” had captured the locality of Voishchina, not far from Smolensk.\textsuperscript{18} It is impossible to determine with certainty when Tautvila became prince of Polotsk, whether already at the end of the 1240s or not until during the course of the subsequent fighting.\textsuperscript{19} According to the Hypatian Chronicle, Tautvila’s baptism in Riga took place c. 1250. Therefore if he had already taken control of Polotsk before that, he must have succeeded to the throne as a pagan. On the assumption that this is not feasible, it has been suggested that Tautvila was baptized twice, first in the Orthodox religion and then as a Catholic.\textsuperscript{20} However, as previously mentioned, we do not know for certain whether he governed in Polotsk prior to his Rigan baptism.

\textsuperscript{15} See Gudavičius, Mindaugas, pp. 336–38.
\textsuperscript{17} Ипатьевская летопись, pp. 817–20.
\textsuperscript{18} NL1, pp. 82–83, 310–12.
His double baptism is thus unlikely. It would seem highly unlikely as well that a pagan could be recognized as prince in a Christian city.\textsuperscript{21}

The Hypatian Chronicle first says that Tautvila had been baptized by the “Rigans”. Later on, following the account of the baptism of Mindaugas, it says that Tautvila was able to obtain the support of the bishop and provost of Riga (пребощь Вирьжань).\textsuperscript{22} The rivalry surrounding the baptism highlights the conflicts between the Rigan church and the Teutonic Order.\textsuperscript{23} Thus Tautvila’s baptism is attributed to both Bishop Nicholas of Riga\textsuperscript{24} and Archbishop Albert Suerbeer.\textsuperscript{25} However, since the baptism took place before 1251 it is reasonable to assume that it was conducted by Nicholas given that Albert Suerbeer did not arrive in Riga until 1253.

While Tautvila was consolidating his power in Polotsk in the 1250s, the bond with the Rigan church he had established meant that Riga was able to lay claim to ecclesiastical authority over Polotsk. This is described in later sources. In the legal proceedings between the Teutonic Order and the Rigan church at the beginning of the 14th century the Order is accused of being to blame for the fact that Polotsk had renounced the Catholic faith it had once held. Henry, the prior of the Cistercian monastery of Falkenau, had heard from a Cistercian lay brother, who had been staying in Polotsk “at the time”, “and from many other reliable men”, that the rex of Polotsk and his people had converted to Christianity and that they had had bishops, prelates, and other clergy. But then the brothers of the Teutonic Order had suppressed the people so harshly that

\begin{footnotes}
\item[21] Where Stryjkowski, Kronika, vol. 1, p. 285 mentions the prince by the name of Theophila, adding that he był ochrzczony w Ruską wiarę, this is evidently not the Orthodox name at baptism of Tautvila, but a learned derivation of the prince’s pagan name and a corresponding inference about his religious denomination. Cf. Ammann, Kirchenpolitische Wandlungen, p. 273.
\end{footnotes}
they called on the pagans for help, and the latter and the brothers of the Order drove the believers from the land, killed them, and took them prisoner. The cathedrals were also destroyed in the aftermath.\textsuperscript{26} According to another version, Polotsk was once ruled by a prince who converted to Christianity. Since he had no legitimate heirs, however, he left the land to the Riga church. It was the Order’s fault that the land had been captured by the Lithuanians, during which two cathedrals, \textit{Czelouiensis videlicet et Rutheniensis ecclesie consistentes in regno predicto}, had been destroyed.\textsuperscript{27} The Teutonic Order responded to these accusations that Polotsk had always adhered to the Russian church.\textsuperscript{28}

If it is true that the ruler of Polotsk converted to Christianity, it follows he must have been a pagan and he must therefore be identified with Tautvila.\textsuperscript{29} Tautvila did in fact have at least one son whose legitimacy might be seen as doubtful from the viewpoint of the Catholic church if, for example, he had been born when his parents were still pagan. These affirmations were not written down until over fifty years after Tautvila’s death, however. There are nevertheless reports closer in time to the events of a Russian bishop as suffragan of Albert Suerbeer: in 1255 Pope Alexander IV took the archbishop and the bishoprics subordinate to him under his protection, namely of Ösel, Dorpat, Curonia, Vironia, Culm, Warmia, Pomesania, Samland, \textit{Rutheniensis et Wersoniensis}.\textsuperscript{30}

According to this source, the “Russian bishopric” was regarded quite unanimously as a Catholic bishopric of Polotsk or an entitlement to one.\textsuperscript{31} The bishopric of Vironia in the ecclesiastical province of Riga, which is mentioned in the same list, was no more than an entitlement that could not be realized. The list of bishoprics originated from Suerbeer’s milieu, not from the curia itself.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Das Zeugenverhör des Franciscus de Moliano (1312). Quellen zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens}, ed. August Seraphim (Königsberg, 1912), p. 27, witness VII, para. 14: “quod ille ecclesie cathedrales...fuerunt postea destructe”.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Zeugenverhör}, p. 169, supplement V, para. 14.
The *Czelouiensis ecclesia* referred to in the accusations against the Teutonic Order must be the bishopric of Selonia, which was merged with the bishopric of Riga in 1226.\(^{32}\) The *Wersoniensis episcopatum* referred to in this source has been identified as Karschau, where the castle of Georgenburg was built.\(^{33}\) *Wersoniensis* and *Czelouiensis ecclesia* are never mentioned together in the same text, however, making it more likely that they are actually both different written forms of *Seloniensis*. It is not clear when Selonia, which is located on the border between Lithuania and Polotsk, was integrated into the Livonian state system. It was still in any case a scene of virtually continual military confrontations between Lithuania and the Teutonic Order at the end of the 13th century. In the case of the location of the “Russian bishopric” mentioned in this source, consideration could also be given to Galicia-Volhynia.\(^{34}\) If the Russian bishop Gerhard, who was still alive in the 1250s, had ever had any links with Bishop Christian of Prussia, this relationship would also have been inherited by Albert Suerbeer. However, since the old Orthodox episcopal see was located in Polotsk, it was that town that could be regarded as the see of a suffragan of the archbishop of Livonia during its political alliance with Riga. Because at the beginning of the 14th century Polotsk itself was mentioned as the location of the *Rutheniensis ecclesia*, preference should also be given to localization in Polotsk.

In 1263 King Mindaugas and both of his sons were assassinated in the course of internal conflicts in Lithuania. The conspirators, Dovmont, Treniota, and Tautvila, soon started fighting among themselves, resulting in the death of Tautvila the same year. Tautvila's son, whose name is not known, fled to Novgorod. The new ruler in Polotsk was Duke Gerdenis of Nalsen. The circumstances of the change in power as well as the question of which rival powers were involved in it remains unclear. Whereas the Rigan church later claimed that the ruler of Polotsk, who had no legal heirs, had left his landed property to the church, the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order in turn cited charters regarding the donation of a territory in eastern Lettgallia to the Order in support of its case. In Riga a charter was drawn up on 28 December “when God had been [in the world] for 1000 years and 200 years and 60 years and 4 years”

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33 Johansen, “Lettenland,” p. 110. It has also been interpreted as an erroneous form of the word *Revaliensis*. See Goetze, Albert Suerbeer, pp. 70, 144–46. On the foundation of Georgenburg in 1259–60 (i.e. about five years after the list of bishoprics was recorded), see Peter, Chronicon 111.83 (80), pp. 95–96.

34 Cf. Goetze, Albert Suerbeer, p. 71.
(1264), in other words depending on whether 25 December (more likely) or 1 January is taken for the start of the year, either at the end of 1263 or the end of 1264 according to the modern calendar.\(^{35}\) This charter documents the peace concluded between the Livonian master of the Teutonic Order and the city of Riga on the hand, and Polotsk and Vitebsk on the other hand. The charter was issued in the name of Duke Gerdenis, who promised to waive his claims to Lettgallia and “to the land that Prince Constantine (Костянтинъ) had given to the master and his brothers by means of his sealed charter”. The Order for its part promised not to bring any claim “to Rus’, which is called Polotsk”. Mutual freedom of trade was also promised.\(^{36}\) Although the charter of Gerdenis is written in Russian, it was drafted according to the Latin diplomatic code, and even the date is given anno Domini. On 16 August 1264 Pope Urban IV, in addition to other privileges benefiting the Teutonic Order, confirmed the Order’s right of possession to these estates, “which Constantine, the illustrious king of the Russians . . . had donated to you . . . in his Russian realm”.\(^{37}\)

Very different hypotheses have been proposed regarding the identity of this Prince Konstantin.\(^{38}\) Polotsk had at one time indeed been ruled by Prince Konstantin the Armless (Безруки), whose origins are unknown. He is named in an “exhortation” written by the bishop of Tver, Simeon of Polotsk (d. 1289), to a Polotsk prince of this name. Simeon himself is mentioned as bishop of Tver for the first time in a document dating from the winter of 1271–72.\(^{39}\) His “exhortation” describes a feast of Prince Konstantin of Polotsk during which Bishop Simeon warned the prince against placing unjust bailiffs in office.\(^{40}\) It transpires from this text that Simeon had been bishop of Polotsk prior to the 1270s while Konstantin was ruler. A reference to the 1260s is thus grounds for

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36 PG 1, no. 1; LUB 6, no. 3036. See also PG 3, pp. 112–17.
37 LUB 1, no. 380. Cf. LUB 1, no. 345 (1260), which in a protective privilege of Pope Alexander IV for the Teutonic Order mentions its (future) possessions in Rus’. These allegedly came from both normal donations and recent conquests from the Mongols.
identifying this prince with the Konstantin mentioned in the papal confirmation of 1264.41

Konstantin is repeatedly mentioned in the sources from the Teutonic Order in the 14th century. His name and his donation are associated with territorial disputes between the archbishop of Riga and the Order in eastern Lettgallia, near Lake Lubāns. This disagreement inscribes the prince's name firmly in the Order's historical tradition.42 The donation is described in more detail in the documents relating to the proceedings between the archbishop and the Order over fishing rights in Lake Lubāns. The area covered by the Livonian 'Donation of Constantine' was thus the Order's territory of eastern Lettgallia: Rositten and Ludsen on the border with the principality of Polotsk. Therefore an additional reason behind the documents from Duke Gerdenis and Urban IV confirming the donation was the rivalry between the bishopric (and later archbishopric) and the Order over the subjugation of Lettgallia.43

Before discussing the 'subjugation' of eastern Lettgallia one should first define what is meant by the term in this context. The subjugation of a territory in Livonia did not necessarily mean in every case the military conquest of the territory. Rather, it signified bringing the previous balance of power into a new framework, a process which often occurred gradually in which one dominant player was replaced by another. The area comprising Catholicized Livonia in the 13th century was a conglomerate of possessions connected through their various interrelations and the territories adjoined to them.44

Control in south-eastern Lettgallia at the beginning of the 13th century was evidently exercised by Polotsk to a greater or lesser degree. As early as 1226 a vassal of Bishop Albert of Riga, Theodoric of Kokenhusen, had laid claim to lands there, making him a rival of the Sword Brothers. The papal legate William of Modena had reached the following decision at the time: if the Order should succeed in acquiring estates in Lettgallia of similar worth, it would not have to share them with the bishop.45 Later, in the 15th century, this region of Warka (evidently modern Varakļāni south of Lake Lubāns) was a fief

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42 Die Statuten des Deutschen Ordens nach den ältesten Handschriften, ed. Max Perlbach (Halle, 1890), p. 132, para. 11.
45 LUB 1, no. 84; LVA, no. 129.
of the house of Tiesenhausen, the heirs of Theodoric, despite being in the area controlled by the Order rather than the archbishopric. In the 16th century the Tiesenhausen family tradition claimed that its forefathers had taken possession from the Russians of a lot of land on the border, particularly in the area of Bersohn (about 40 km north-east of Kokenhusen), where the Schwaneburg was later built, and had received it entirely from the archbishop as a fief. In 1256 the terra Warkunde, which was part of the territory of Gerzike, was granted to the Order on the condition that the archbishop and his people would not be prevented from fishing and that what already belonged to them should also be left to them in future. Thus throughout the 13th century the interests of the Rigan church in Lettgallia collided with those of the Order. This may have led the archbishop to claim that the principality of Polotsk had been left to the Rigan church. Its opponent, the Teutonic Order, supported his claims in the form of the charters of the 'Constantinian donation'. In the end, the Order was more successful in Lettgallia in the 1260s.

These scattered details create the impression that volatile relations of power were at work in eastern Lettgallia, themselves accompanied by volatile conditions in Polotsk after Tautvila's death in 1263. With the help of Prince Konstantin the Order defied the pretensions of the archbishop, although the Rigan church later claimed that it had subjugated Polotsk to Catholicism through Tautvila. Consequently, we could look for Konstantin among the forces opposed to Tautvila—either in the former dynasty of Polotsk or possibly among the members of the princely house of Smolensk. If he is identical with the individual mentioned by Bishop Simeon of Tver, then it follows he must also have really ruled in Polotsk.

The confirmation charter issued by Gerdenis fits in generally with the political situation of the 1260s. Duke Gerdenis of Nalsen governed in Polotsk until

47 LUB 1, no. 288; LVA, no. 432; Hermanni Chronicum, p. 40. Cf. LUB 1, nos. 329, 330; LUB 2, no. 968; Benninghoven, Orden, p. 455, no. 125; Fenske and Militzer, Ritterbrüder im livländischen Zweig, p. 318, no. 396.  
49 Cf. Aleksandrov and Volodikhin, Борьба, pp. 35–36.
his death in 1267.\textsuperscript{51} He was subject to the authority of the Orthodox Grand Duke Vaišelga of Lithuania. At this time, around 1265, a certain Iziaslav is also mentioned as prince of Polotsk, who together with Prince Iziaslav of Vitebsk was likewise subject to Vaišelga.\textsuperscript{52} Iziaslav and Konstantin were the names represented in the tradition of the local princely dynasty. The accusations later levelled against the Teutonic Order, namely that it was guilty of destroying the Catholic church in Polotsk, may possibly refer to the treaty between the Order and Gerdenis, given that in it the Order recognized Gerdenis' power in exchange for Polotsk having waived its claims in Lettgallia. It remains unclear whether the ‘Constantinian donation’ at the time the treaty was agreed was a waiver renouncing territory where control had already been lost, the recognition of the feudal supremacy of the Order,\textsuperscript{53} or remuneration for the promised help in claiming the throne. The political situation was ripe for the conclusion of such a treaty immediately after Tautvila's death in the winter of 1263–64, when Konstantin may have represented the opposition against Tautvila because the latter was an opponent of the Order. If the treaty contained the agreement that Polotsk would be granted to Prince Konstantin and Lettgallia to the Order, then both of these aspects could indeed only be implemented essentially at the expense of the archbishop of Riga. Merely the fact that the Order had the donation confirmed by the pope is evidence of a conflict with the archbishop. One of the parties to the treaty between Gerdenis and the Order was the city of Riga, which by the end of the 1260s at the latest acted in concert with the Order against the archbishop.\textsuperscript{54} After the loss at the Battle of Durben in 1260, when the army of the crusaders and the Livonian lords was defeated by Lithuanians, Livonia and the Teutonic Order in particular found themselves

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\textsuperscript{52} PG 1, no. 2; LUB 6, no. 3037; Hub 1, no. 616. See also Hellmann, Lettenland, p. 194; Gorskii, Русские земли, p. 53. A sentence from the treaty discusses some transfer of property: "Чего ся есме отступили въ Ризе, к тому вамъ не прискилать ни люди, ни земли, ни воды, ни борті" (translation: “you must not covet that which we [[! have renounced in Riga, neither the people, the lands, the waters nor the honey trees”). This can thus be seen as indirect proof of the authenticity of the treaty of Gerdenis and the ‘Constantinian donation’.
\textsuperscript{53} Known as the feudum oblatum. Cf. a contemporary example in Perlbach, “Urkunden,” pp. 17–18. See also LUB 3, nos. 1226–27.
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in a difficult position. In Lithuania internal conflicts broke out after the murder of Mindaugas. It goes without saying that both Lithuanian and Livonian parties were prepared to make potentially enormous concessions in order to consolidate their faltering positions.\footnote{Cf. Hellmann, \textit{Lettenland}, p. 198.} The fact that the Gerdenis’ charter had been drawn up in Riga following the model of a Latin charter indicates that the Lithuanian dukes did not yet have their own chancery at the time.\footnote{Benninghoven, “Der livländische Ordensmeister,” pp. 152–53. Cf. Hellmann, \textit{Lettenland}, pp. 197–200.}

It is clear that the volatile conditions in the Daugava region, the change of power in Polotsk, and the frequent warfare had an impact on trade. Nonetheless, this does not permit us to speak of a breakdown in trade relations. Their continuation is testified to in the trade treaties signed by Riga with Smolensk, Polotsk, and Vitebsk, which guaranteed the freedom of movement and trade by the merchants of both parties. Such treaties were concluded with Polotsk and Vitebsk in 1263–64 and c. 1265 (i.e. sometime between 1264 and 1267).\footnote{PG 1, nos. 1–2. See Leopold K. Goetz, \textit{Deutsch-Russische Handelsverträge des Mittelalters} (Hamburg, 1916) (Abhandlungen des Hamburgischen Kolonialinstituts 37. Reihe A: Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften 6), pp. 327–29; Benninghoven, “Der livländische Ordensmeister,” p. 153; Rennkamp, \textit{Studien}, pp. 209–12.} Likewise the 1229 Smolensk treaty was reconfirmed in this period by all Smolensk princes after their ascension to the throne.\footnote{Petrukhin, “О датировке списка А,” pp. 163–65; Gail Lenhoff and Janet Martin, “Smolensk after the Mongol Invasions: a Reconstruction,” \textit{Die Welt der Slaven} 59 (2014), 121–22.}

The consolidation of the Lithuanian state in the middle of the 13th century marked the arrival of a new player of strength in the politics of eastern Europe. It extended its influence over neighbouring Russian principalities and confronted the crusaders and the Teutonic Order in Livonia and Prussia. The political alliances of pagan Lithuanian princes were often transacted in the form of baptism. At the same time a ‘false’ religious denomination never prevented cooperation when it proved profitable.

5.3 The Attempts at Church Union in South-Western Rus’ and the Legation of Albert Suerbeer

One of the most studied aspects of the history of Rus’ in the 13th century is the relationship of Prince and later King Daniil Romanovich of Galicia-Volhynia to the church of Rome during the 1240s und 1250s. Daniil has particular
significance among Russian rulers of the 13th century as a crowned king, even allowing for the fact that some Hungarian rulers had been crowned as kings of ‘Rus’ (Galicia-Volhynia) even earlier. Daniil found himself in a difficult situation after the military campaigns of the Mongols in the 1240s, having been forced to recognize their supremacy. By contrast, the peripheral situation of the area under his control in Rus’ also enabled him to put up a certain amount of resistance. In addition, he also had to protect himself from the claims to power of the Polish princes and the Hungarian king, not to mention against Lithuania.

One of the issues discussed at the Council of Lyon held in 1245 was the fight against the Mongols, which became intertwined with the desire to send missions to them. Another issue was the possible alternatives for overcoming the schism. One of the participants at the council was a certain archiepiscopus ruthenus nomine Petrus, who had been driven from his diocese by the Mongols. Most probably he was an otherwise unknown Orthodox bishop of Belgorod near Kiev. However, the main subject for discussion at the council was the struggle against Emperor Frederick II. The interests of this conflict also dictated the ultimately unsuccessful negotiations that took place between 1245 and 1254 between Innocent IV and the emperor of Nicaea, John III Doukas Vatatzes (1221–54). This was not the only contact between the Greeks and the papacy at the time. Before the Council of Lyon letters had been sent to the Bulgarian tsar Kaliman Asen (1241–46) in March 1245, asking him to recognize the pope as supreme leader of the church. In addition, the mendicant orders were granted the right to send missions to various Muslim, pagan, and eastern Christian peoples. At the same time, the clergy of the Orthodox countries of the Balkans were urged to recognize the union of the churches.

After the Mongol invasion, Prince Daniil Romanovich and his brother Vasilko were able to reestablish their power in Galicia and Volhynia only with great difficulty. Not until 1245 did Daniil defeat the army of his opponents Prince Rostislav Mikhailovich of Galicia of the Chernigov dynasty, and his allies King Béla IV of Hungary and Prince Bolesław the Chaste of Krakow at the Battle of Jaroslaw. That same year Daniil had to undertake a journey to the

Horde, where he recognized his dependence on the Mongol rulers. As a means of reestablishing and consolidating his position, Daniil wanted to widen the circle of his Western allies, and one of his new allies was the church of Rome. In the context of the fight against the Mongols, Rus’ was regarded at the time of the Council of Lyon as a Christian land just like Poland and Hungary, and the Russians undoubtedly considered Christians. The rivals to the Romanovich line from within the Chernigov dynasty must have also fostered contacts with the curia, just as other Russian princes, for whom the fight against Mongol supremacy was the most pressing concern of the day.

The *vita* of Innocent IV relates that at the Council of Lyon envoys were sent to various peoples in an attempt to win them over to the faith. Among those mentioned is Archbishop Albert of Livonia and Prussia, who had been sent to the Russians in response to their request to the pope for a legate. The other extant sources mention Albert as a legate in Rus’ somewhat later. However, a delegation to the Mongol great khan had already set out from Lyon led by John of Plano Carpini in April 1245. On its way through Poland the embassy stayed with Duke Conrad of Masovia, where a meeting was held with Daniil’s brother Prince Vasilko Romanovich, who happened to be staying also in Łęczyca. The delegation, accompanied by the extremely helpful Prince Vasilko, continued its journey to Rus’, where the Catholics held a meeting with the Orthodox bishops of Volhynia. Plano Carpini delivered the papal letters in which the church of Rus’ was exhorted to submit to the supremacy of Rome. Any decision in this matter was deferred because Prince Daniil was just then making his way along the Volga to Batu Khan. Carpini finally met Daniil in person in the river Don region.

On its way back from the Mongol capital at Karakorum, Plano Carpini’s legation reached Batu Khan’s camp on the Volga at the beginning of May 1247. A month later the legation met Daniil and Vasilko in Kiev, not returning to Lyon (via Hungary) until the autumn. According to Carpini’s account of his

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63 DPR, no. 11.
travels, Daniil and Vasilko had declared that they wished to have the pope as their lord and father and the holy church of Rome as their mother and teacher. The princes also sent their letters and envoys back with Carpini to the pope. The pope's letters dated 27 August 1247 to Daniil and Vasilko may have been in response to this meeting in June. In them the princes are addressed as though they had joined the church of Rome. The pope takes them under his protection from other rulers who showed no respect to Rome, but also from “crusaders and other clerics”. Innocent IV granted the Russian bishops and clergy permission to use leavened bread at communion and “to observe other of their own rites that are not incompatible with the Catholic faith observed by the church of Rome”. The very next day Archbishop Albert was granted authority to appoint men born outside wedlock as priests and bishops in Rus' and Prussia. In the Russian context this created a means of accepting Russian clergy who were the children of Orthodox priests, who, from the point of view of Rome and its doctrine of the celibacy of the priesthood, were illegitimate.

At the beginning of September the pope told Albert that Daniil did not wish to die in sin and had therefore sent his envoys and letters to the pope. Innocent IV ordered the legate to travel in person to Galicia and bring about the union of the churches. Thus the reference in the vita of Innocent IV that at the Council of Lyon Albert had been sent as legate to Rus' at the request of the Russians may have been connected precisely to this embassy. The princes of Galicia-Volhynia were also provided with a series of privileges during the subsequent months. They were advised to seek the help of the brothers of the Teutonic Order in Prussia at the approach of the Mongol army. For Daniil these privileges and offers of support signified the strengthening of his position vis-à-vis both the Mongols and the king of Hungary as a claimant to power in Galicia. Thus the policy towards Rus' adopted by the curia in the 1240s was part of the overall attempt to achieve the union of the churches and also part of the fight against the Mongols, who were a constant preoccupation because

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70 DPR, nos. 20–22; AV, nos. 53–55; HRM 1, nos. 67–69.

71 DPR, nos. 23–24; AV, nos. 56–57; HRM 1, nos. 70–71.

72 DPR, nos. 26–27; AV, no. 58; LUB 1, no. 195; HRM 1, nos. 72–73.

73 DPR, nos. 25, 28–29; AV, no. 59; HRM 1, no. 74. See also AV, no. 60; HRM 1, no. 75.

74 DPR, nos. 30–31; AV, nos. 65–66; PUB 1/1, no. 204; HRM 1, nos. 77, 79; *Epistolae saeculi XIII*, vol. 1, no. 481. See also Forstreuter, “Zur Geschichte,” p. 298.

of the real threat they posed to the Polish and Hungarian rulers. Daniil and Vasilko were far from being the only Russian rulers to take seriously the possibility of obtaining help from the West against the Mongols. The activity of the mendicant orders, whose members acted as preachers or at least were entitled to do so, also extended as far as Rus'; paving the way for further contact between Catholic powers and the Russian principalities.

According to the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, the pope sent a bishop “of Beren'sk and Kameneck” (пискупа Береньского и Каменецкого) to Daniil in connection with the talks taking place during 1246–48 to offer him the royal crown. The chronicler says that the prince replied: “The army of the Tatars does not cease its hostility to us, how can I accept the crown without your help.” In the autumn of 1253 Daniil nonetheless allowed himself to be crowned—according to the account in the chronicle, this was at the insistence of his mother and the Polish princes as well as thanks to the assurance of help given by latter and the papal envoys. Daniil’s coronation acquires added significance insofar as his rival Mindaugas, the ruler of Lithuania, was crowned in the same year. The Old Russian chronicle relates:

He [Daniil] accepted the crown from God, from the church of the Holy Apostle and the throne of Saint Peter, and from his father Pope Innocent and all of his bishops. Innocent damned those who profaned the Greek Orthodox faith and wanted to hold a council regarding the correct faith
and the union of the churches. Daniil accepted the crown from God in the city of Drohiczyn.\(^8\)

There is no doubt that the coronation is seen as honourable and legitimate by the chronicler and that the pope—who indeed had granted permission for the observation of the Greek rite—is regarded as a positive figure and as head of the church. The Hypatian Chronicle proudly uses the word \textit{Король}, “king”, in relation to Daniil, a term which only appears very rarely in Russian literature.\(^8\) Daniil was crowned by the papal legate Abbot Opizo of the Benedictine monastery of Mezzano Scotti (in the Trebbia valley, Italy). Meanwhile the negotiations between the emperor of Nicaea, John Vatatzes, and the church of Rome continued. Similarly the fact that the Russian metropolitan, Kirill, who had previously been appointed to his office by Daniil, was ordained by the patriarch of Nicaea in 1247 need not have signified a hostile move against Rome. During his journey Kirill also mediated in the conflicts between the prince of Galicia and the king of Hungary.\(^8\)

The course of events creates the impression that, although according to the provisional plans Archbishop Albert should have been dealing with the matter of church union with Galicia, his name is not mentioned later on and the mediation of ties with Galicia was taken over by the Polish church hierarchy. Albert’s itinerary during the period from 1240 to 1250 is too full of gaps to provide any details of any possible journey to Volhynia or Galicia. In the summer of 1246 he was in northern Germany, and in the second half of the summer of 1247, when he was entrusted with the task of bringing about the union with the church of Galicia, he was in Lyon. Albert was once again in northern Germany at the end of 1247. His presence in Lübeck from 1249 to 1253 has been shown, although there are long interruptions in the evidence from late spring 1249 until autumn 1251, as well as in the first half of 1252.\(^8\) During this time he could indeed have been occupied with the task entrusted him. Some scholars have

80 Ипатьевская летопись, p. 827. On the recognition of the Greek rite by the Catholics, see \textit{Itinerarium Willelmi} XI.1, pp. 191–92.
83 See \textit{LUR}, nos. 550–51, 553, 574a, 579a, 585, 590, 607–08, 610, 613, 669, 671, 678–79, 701–02, 707; cf. no. 716.
concluded that he nevertheless did not actually embark on his legation. On the other hand, there is some evidence that such a journey took place. The 15th-century chronicle of Jan Długosz narrates:

Pope Innocent IV sent Albert, the former bishop of Armagh, but who by then had been appointed archbishop of Prussia, to the Russian prince Daniil, exhorting him [Daniil] to obey the pope and the church of Rome. The cunning and stubborn prince did not obey the apostolic [legate], however, and acted towards the church of Rome not as a loyal disciple but like an enemy, spurning the apostolic legate without deference.

It would appear from this that Albert Suerbeer, or a vice-legate under him, did in fact visit Daniil and Vasilko, but that this course of action did not lead anywhere. The reasons for this could have been resistance to change from the clergy of Rus’ or perhaps pressure from the Catholic clergy. The curia’s attempts to organize a crusade against the Mongols were equally unsuccessful, since they did not find the necessary acceptance in Western Europe. Furthermore, Innocent IV died in 1254. He had advocated with great zeal the submission of the Greek church. The failure of these attempts is shown by the fact that the conquests of King Mindaugas in Rus’ were sanctioned by Pope Alexander IV in 1255. Daniil was forced to recognize Mongol supremacy and take part in their campaigns against Lithuania and in Polish territory. At the instigation of the clergy of Moravia and Poland (the bishops of Olomouc and

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86 Ioannis Długossi annales, vol. 4, p. 68 (1249): “Innocentius Papa quartus Albertum episcopum olim Armacanum, tunc vero in archiepiscopum Russie [!] promotum, ad Danielem Russie ducem, obedientiam sibi et Ecclesie Romane ab eo prestatum iri requiriens [mittit]. Sed dux callidus et rebellis neque requisicioni apostolice paruit, neque se fidum, sed hostem Ecclesie Romane egit legatumque apostolicum sine honore dimisit”. See also Ioannis Długossi annales, vol. 4, pp. 57–58 (1246).

87 DFR, no. 32; HRM 1, no. 88; *Vetera monumenta Poloniae*, no. 107. The mediator of the information about the Mongols is mentioned here as “our son in Christ, the prince from Rus”. See also LUB 1, no. 268; PUB 1/1, no. 289, which orders the preaching of the crusade against the Mongols for Livonia, Estonia, and Prussia.


89 HRM 1, no. 93; *Vetera monumenta Poloniae*, no. 123; PUB 1/1, no. 311. Cf. AV, no. 76.
Wrocław), Alexander IV warned Daniil in 1257 under threat of punishment to submit to the church of Rome. At the same time, the politics of the princes of Galicia remained closely tied to their Catholic neighbours. For example, Daniil Romanovich, Duke Siemowit of Masovia (d. 1262), and the Teutonic Order in Prussia acted together in the conquest of Sudovia in the 1250s. From the end of the 1240s Daniil intervened in the struggle over the inheritance of Duke Frederick II of Austria (d. 1246). The collaboration between King Béla IV of Hungary and Daniil was forged during the course of this conflict. Daniil’s son Lev married the daughter of Béla IV; his other son Roman married Gertrude from the line of the dukes of Austria, although this marriage lasted only a short time. This intervention embroiled Daniil and Roman in an unsuccessful war with the other claimant to Austria, the then margrave of Moravia, Ottokar II of Bohemia.

Archbishop Albert Suerbeer was appointed papal legate with the intention that he should bring about ecclesiastical union with Prince Daniil Romanovich. However, this plan failed for several reasons. Suerbeer’s room for manoeuvre was hampered by his weak position in Livonia and Prussia; Catholic Europe never was able to realise the planned crusade against Mongols. However, although Orthodox, Daniil actively participated in the politics of the Catholic countries of the region.

90 DPR, nos. 34–35; AV, no. 85; HRM 1, no. 95. See also Vetera monumenta Poloniae, no. 142 (crusade "contra Licwanenses, lacintiones, et alios paganos et scismaticos, qui terris christianorum confines existunt"); cf. no. 143; AV no. 84; Ioannis Długossi annales, vol. 4, pp. 153–55 (1266).

91 Their rivals in the conquest of the Sudovians were Casimir of Kujawy (d. 1267) and Bolesław the Chaste of Krakow, who sent their own missionaries to the Sudovians (PUB 1/2, no. 4; Vetera monumenta Poloniae, nos. 119, 142, 143; Stopka, “Próby chrystianizacji,” pp. 53–60). The Sudovians were not finally conquered until 1278–83. See PUB 1/1, no. 298; Forstreuter, Preußen, pp. 23–27; Bronisław Włodarski, “Problem jaćwiński w stosunkach polsko-ruskich,” Zapiski Historyczne 24 [1958–1959] (1959), issues 2–3, pp. 30–33; Vera I. Matuzova, “Тевтонский орден во внешней политике князя Даниила Галицкого,” in Dżakson and Melnikova, Восточная Европа в исторической ретроспективе, pp. 147–50. Cf. Ludat, Bistum Lebus, pp. 261–63; Bărlea, Konzile, pp. 64–65; Kotliar, “Галицко-Волынская летопись,” p. 131.

92 Kosztolnyik, Hungary, pp. 201–06; Kotliar, “Галицко-Волынская летопись,” pp. 120–23; Günther Stökl, Das Bild des Abendlandes in den altrussischen Chroniken (Cologne-Opladen, 1965) (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Geisteswissenschaften 124), pp. 26–29. The measures taken by the Moravian and Silesian clergy against Daniil were motivated by the alliance between Daniil and Béla.
5.4 The Attempts at Church Union in Northern and North-Western Rus’

A series of papal letters relating to Rus’ were sent to various addressees on 3 May 1246. A missive to “all those in Rus’ who believe in Christ” said that “in your land until now, not without bringing ruin upon [your] souls, the customs and rites of the Greeks have been followed, who left the unity of the church for reasons of superstition, which must be condemned.” However, since the pope had now learned that the Russians were willing once again to obey the Apostolic See, he was sending his legate, Archbishop Albert of Prussia and Livonia, to Rus’:

>a man particularly close to our heart, of seemly behaviour, blessed with learning and famous of ripe counsel, who brings you the word of life and publishes our will and that of our brothers. We have entrusted him with the task of assuming the office of legate in your land.

A second letter with the same content was also sent to the “venerable Russian prince”,93 who was also taken by the pope under his protection.94 The same day the pope exhorted Archbishop Albert to act zealously in accordance with the powers bestowed upon him as legate in Rus’;95 and granted him the authority to appoint Latin bishops in Rus’ from the ranks of the Dominicans, Franciscans, and other monastic orders, as well as from the secular clergy.96 To the aforementioned prince were also sent, “with the same authority held by those sent to the Tatars” (meaning Plano Carpini’s embassy), the Dominican Alexius and “his companion, who had been with him in Bohemia”. They were entrusted with the task of reporting on the journey to the prince.97

It has been suggested that these letters were addressed to Prince Daniil of Galicia-Volhynia in view of the contacts between him and the papacy at the time. This resulted in the hypothesis that for reasons of chronological consistency the letters sent at the beginning of May 1246 must have been mediated by a different, otherwise unknown embassy from that of Plano Carpini (see p. 213),98 since he had already set out on his journey a year before. However,

93 DPR, no. 12; cf. no. 13; AV, no. 43; cf. no. 44; HRM 1, no. 65.
94 DPR, no. 16; HRM 1, no. 62.
95 DPR, no. 14; LUB 1, no. 191.
96 DPR, no. 15; LUB 1, no. 190. Cf. HRM 1, no. 61; Ramm, Папство, p. 163.
97 DPR, nos. 17–18; HRM 1, nos. 63–64. Cf. AV, no. 60; HRM 1, no. 75. See also Patze, “Frieden,” pp. 80–81. The companion’s name was Henry.
98 Goetze, Albert Suerbeer, p. 20; Altaner, Dominikanermissionen, p. 221.
the letters of 3 May are not addressed to Daniil or Vasilko Romanovich, but to the unnamed Russian prince or Russian Christians as a whole. The name of the prince given as \textit{Joannes} in the edition published by Aleksandr Turgenev is not found in other editions.\textsuperscript{99}

There are really no grounds for considering the rulers of Galicia as the recipients of the letter addressed to the unnamed prince. James Zatko takes the view that the prince ‘John’ mentioned by Turgenev can be identified with Prince Ivan Vsevolodovich of Starodub (d. 1247), the brother of Grand Prince Iaroslav of Suzdal-Vladimir. The latter was travelling in Mongolia in 1246, making it possible that his younger brother was acting on his behalf in his absence in the search for allies against the Mongols.\textsuperscript{100} Nonetheless, since Ivan Vsevolodovich is a rather marginal figure in Russian history, another theory sees Aleksandr Iaroslavich behind the name \textit{Joannes}.\textsuperscript{101}

In the 1240s resistance to Mongol supremacy continued in Rus’. Scholars have occasionally discussed the existence of different approaches to the Mongols taken by Russian princes, distinguishing between those who attempted to rebel against the foreign domination by seeking support from the West and those who adapted to the situation. However, there was certainly no such division in the first decade following the campaigns led by Batu Khan. This was a period in which the forms of new, post-conquest political organization in Rus’\textsuperscript{102} were only at their early stages. It would be anachronistic to distinguish between a party ‘disposed to the West’ and one ‘hostile to the West’. Any possible union with the church of the popes was not an end itself for Russian princes, but rather a means, just as the negotiations for union were for the Byzantine rulers. There are therefore no grounds to divide Russian princes into a group hostile to union (e.g. Aleksandr Iaroslavich) and one favourable to union (e.g. Daniil Romanovich or Andrei Iaroslavich). What mattered was the significance of any potential ally that might be gained through such contacts.

Grand Prince Iaroslav Vsevolodovich of Suzdal-Vladimir was sent to the Horde by the new Mongol overlords in 1243 and again in 1245. On the first

\textsuperscript{99} HRM 1, no. 65; cf. DPR, no. 12; AV, no. 44. Cf. Potthast, \textit{Regesta}, no. 12097.


\textsuperscript{101} Patze, “Frieden,” p. 81.

occasion he was recognized by Batu Khan as the foremost of Russian princes. In 1245 Iaroslav was sent by Batu on to Karakorum to the great khan, where he was fatally poisoned on 30 September 1246. The poisoning is recounted by John of Plano Carpini in his travel account, while Iaroslav’s violent death is also mentioned in some Russian chronicles. According to Carpini, Iaroslav was poisoned by the khan’s mother, Töregene, who ruled as regent during the interregnum in the Horde that lasted from 1241 to 1246, when her son Güyük came to power (1246–48). When Carpini arrived at the great khan’s residence, the dux Ierozlaus de Susdal Ruscie was also staying there. The grand prince was called to the khan’s mother, who handed him something to drink, following which Iaroslav, “the grand prince of part of Rus’ called Suzdal”, died seven days later, so that everyone believed that he had been poisoned with the objective of taking full possession of his land. The khan Güyük then quickly sent envoys to Rus’ to Iaroslav’s son Aleksandr, summoning Aleksandr to appear before him to receive his father’s land from him. Aleksandr paid no heed to this invitation, however, since everyone feared that if he appeared before the great khan, he would either be killed or imprisoned forever. On his return journey Carpini met a messenger from Iaroslav’s wife and from Batu Khan, who was on his way to Iaroslav unaware that he had already died. It is possible therefore that Batu and the great khan disagreed about the rulership of Rus’, making Iaroslav the victim of court intrigues between the Mongols. Numerous Russian princes and their envoys were travelling at the time between Rus’ and the centres of Mongol rule. On his way to central Asia Carpini met one of Iaroslav’s sons at Batu’s court, possibly Aleksandr.

On 23 January 1248 Pope Innocent IV sent a letter to Prince Aleksandr Iaroslavich of Suzdal (duci Susdaliensi):

103 Лаврентьевская летопись, p. 470.
104 Лаврентьевская летопись, p. 523 (Suzdal Chronicle); Ипатьевская летопись, p. 808. Cf. NL1, p. 304. See also Lur’e, Россия, p. 125.
109 See NL1, p. 79; Лаврентьевская летопись, p. 471.
As we have learned from our ambassador to the Tatars, our penitentiary John of Plano Carpini of the Order of Friars Minor, your father, wishing to become a new man, with advice of his counsellor the knight Temer, joined full of humility the obedience of his mother, the church of Rome, through the hands of the same brother [Carpini]. The people would certainly have heard of this if such an unexpected and unfortunate death had not taken him away.

The pope proceeded to exhort Aleksandr as Iaroslav’s “legitimate heir” together with his people also to join the obedience of the church of Rome and the pope, God’s representative on earth. The pope also recommended that when the Mongols began to approach he should send a message to the Teutonic Order in Livonia so that it could send him help.\footnote{HRM 1, no. 78; Arbusow, “Römischer Arbeitsbericht,” \textit{Latvijas Universitātes Raksti} 17 (1928), 326, no. 19.} In the letters sent to Daniil and Vasilko Romanovich shortly before in August 1247 the pope had also, as we have seen, advised sending a request for help to the Order in Prussia.\footnote{See DPR, nos. 30–33; AV, nos. 65–66; PUB 1/1, no. 204; HRM 1, nos. 78–79. See also Forstreuter, “Zur Geschichte,” pp. 298–99.} Carpini had already returned by November of the previous year (1247) and presumably would have informed Pope Innocent of the death of Iaroslav and the presumed succession of his eldest son Aleksandr. It is thus feasible that contacts with Aleksandr could have been established during the interim, as is suggested by the emphasis placed on his role as Iaroslav’s legal heir. In 1247 Iaroslav was succeeded by his brother Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich, who became grand prince in line with the practice of succession according to age. This was challenged by Iaroslav’s sons Aleksandr and Andrei Iaroslavich, both of whom travelled to Batu Khan at the turn of 1247–48, and from there on to Karakorum. Andrei returned in 1249, overthrew Sviatoslav, and himself assumed power in Vladimir, while his older brother Aleksandr was promised power in Kiev, but actually spent most of his time in Novgorod. Aleksandr’s remoteness from the centre of power in Vladimir signified his defeat in the struggle between the brothers, in which Andrei was able to strengthen his position further in 1250–51 by marrying the daughter of Daniil Romanovich.\footnote{See John Fennell, “Andrej Jaroslavič and the Struggle for Power in 1252: An Investigation of the Sources,” \textit{Russia mediaevalis} 1 (1973), pp. 49–51; Fennell, \textit{Crisis}, p. 106.} The emphasis placed on Aleksandr’s rights in the letter from the beginning of 1248 reflects in the first instance the practice of inheritance from father to son that had become the norm in
Western Europe, but may also indicate that the pope’s informant, (Carpini?) was familiar with the power struggle in Rus’.

Had Iaroslav Vsevolodovich really agreed to join the union of the churches? Carpini himself does not mention it in his travel account. According to a later 17th-century tradition, before his death at the Horde Iaroslav is even supposed to have joined the Third Order of St Francis (the Tertiaries). The situation of the grand prince before his poisoning must have been truly desperate—did his promise even immediately precede his death? In such an extreme situation any hope of receiving aid would appear acceptable as a means of rescue. Even the fundamental recognition of Rome’s ecclesiastical supremacy may be considered a possibility during the period in which the traditional state system of Rus’ had collapsed. On the other hand, difficulties in communication or confusing the desire with the reality may also have played a role. Just as baptism and the subservience it entailed was understood in a political sense in eastern Europe, so it was possible to infer from a Russian prince’s desire to enter into alliances and coalitions that he wished to submit himself to the church of Rome.

By the time this letter from Innocent IV would have reached Rus’, assuming it ever did, Andrei and Aleksandr had left the country. Another papal missive to Prince Aleksandr of Novgorod is dated 15 September 1248. From this it emerges that the pope had learned through the agency of his apostolic legate, the archbishop of Prussia, of Aleksandr’s wish and agreement to recognize the pope as head of the church and to build a cathedral in his city of Pskov as a sign of this commitment. The pope also exhorted Aleksandr to receive the archbishop, who had wished to visit him in person, with honour. Based on the premise that Aleksandr Iaroslavich always and without qualification treated the church of Rome and its representatives disparagingly, scholars have proposed various theories that allow them to interpret this document in


such a way as to explain away its reference to Aleksandr. Departing from the visual similarity between Pleskowe (Pskov) and Ploscowe (Polotsk), “Aleksandr” here has been identified with Prince Tautvila of Polotsk\(^{116}\) or Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich, who laid claim to Pskov.\(^{117}\) Such theories cannot be sustained, however.\(^{118}\) Pskov had surrendered to Aleksandr before the Battle of the Ice in 1242 and at that time Aleksandr was also governing as prince of Novgorod. The mediation role of Archbishop Albert Suerbeer, who had not yet been sent to Livonia, makes it doubtful that the letter bore any direct relation to that of January, particularly when one takes into consideration the time needed to cover long distances.\(^{119}\) It may indeed have been a response to Aleksandr’s reaction, but could also be a separate answer to other reports apart from those of Carpini. In the September letter there is, moreover, no reference to Iaroslav Vsevolodovich and his promise to recognize obedience to the pope. The existence of two separate communications between the pope and Aleksandr Iaroslavich nonetheless demonstrates the prince’s intention of looking for allies in Livonia and Prussia. Under the treaty dated 3 October 1248 agreed in Langebrücke under the auspices of Albert Suerbeer’s vice-legate, the former Cistercian abbot Nicholas of Dargun, the principality of Pskov was divided between the bishop of Dorpat and the Teutonic Order. This had allegedly been donated by the principality’s heir, Prince Ghereslawus, to the church of Dorpat (see p. 165).\(^{120}\) This confirmation points to the continuing claims of the Order and the bishopric of Dorpat to Pskov. However, it is unclear how this relates to the archbishop of Riga’s policy and his hope of founding a bishopric in Pskov.\(^{121}\)

There are no later references to a Catholic bishopric in Pskov in the extant sources. But the *vita* of Aleksandr Iaroslavich does contain an account of the dismissal of papal envoys. This immediately succeeds an episode placed under the year 1252, although the chronology of the hagiographic text is not


\(^{120}\) LUB 3, no. 200a; Schirren, *Verzeichniss*, p. 2; p. 4, no. 38; p. 129, no. 67.

\(^{121}\) Cf. Hellmann, *Lettenland*, p. 178. It should also be mentioned here that Pskov endeavoured continually throughout the 13th to 15th centuries to rid itself of Novgorod’s episcopal control and establish its own bishopric. See Prinz-aus der Wiesche, *Die Russisch-Orthodoxe Kirche*, pp. 76–120.
always reliable. According to the story, the pope, who had heard of Aleksandr’s honour and fame as well as the greatness of his land, chose the two most intelligent of his twelve cardinals, namely Agald\textsuperscript{122} and Gemont, to send to him to discuss the Word of God. But the prince made known that his people “already knew everything for themselves and would not accept their doctrine”, upon which the envoys departed.\textsuperscript{123} The form of the names does not allow us to identify the envoys.\textsuperscript{124} The later Russian chronicles also date the event to 1252,\textsuperscript{125} but this derives from the fact that the text of the \textit{vita} was integrated section by section within the text of the chronicles, making their chronology unreliable. The dismissal of the embassy may have occurred at the end of the 1240s or start of the 1250s, when Aleksandr’s position was already sufficiently stable and he was no longer reliant on the support or goodwill of Livonia.\textsuperscript{126} While Andrei Iaroslavich had come to power in Vladimir, his brother Aleksandr travelled to the Horde in 1252. The same year a Mongol army led by Nevru attacked Andrei at the same time as another army attacked Daniil Romanovich. Andrei and his younger brother Iaroslav were defeated in the battle. Andrei fled, enabling Aleksandr to secure the throne of grand prince of Vladimir. The oldest sources agree that Andrei escaped overseas to Sweden.\textsuperscript{127} The Laurentian Chronicle relates that Andrei, his consort, and their entourage fled “to an unknown land”.\textsuperscript{128} The Sofia First Chronicle is more precise when it says that he went to Novgorod and from there to Pskov, where he waited for his princess. From Pskov, Andrei made his way to Reval and then on to Sweden, where he was received by the “Swedish master” (местерь же Свеискы). He

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\textsuperscript{122} Agald, also: Галд, Гаад.
\textsuperscript{123} Begunov, \textit{Памятник}, pp. 193, 175–76.
\textsuperscript{125} SL1, pp. 328–29; NL1, pp. 305–06.
\textsuperscript{128} Лаврентьевская летопись, p. 473.
then also brought the princess from Reval over to Sweden. Conversely, the Novgorod tradition of the 15th century reports that Andrei was killed in battle by “Germans” or “Chuds”. This is contradicted by the fact that he is mentioned as prince of Gorodets and Nizhny Novgorod in 1256 and his death in 1264 as “Andrei of Suzdal” is documented. The presence in Sweden of Prince Andrei of Suzdal as the same brother of Prince Aleksandr of Novgorod who had fled from the “Tatars” is also mentioned in the saga of King Haakon IV Haakonsson of Norway, written in Norway by the Icelandic author Sturla Póðarson (1214–84) c. 1264–65.

Under the year 1253 the Novgorod Chronicle mentions a campaign by the Lithuanians which was repulsed by Prince Vasilii Aleksandrovich together with the Novgorodians. It follows that Aleksandr, who had settled in Vladimir, had installed his minor son Vasilii as his representative in Novgorod. Directly after this the chronicle narrates that the Germans attacked Pskov the same year, but retreated when an auxiliary army arrived from Novgorod. The Novgorodians then returned to Novgorod and from there crossed beyond the Narva River, where together with the Karelians they plundered the land. After this campaign, another joint campaign was undertaken by Pskov and Novgorod during the course of which the Livonian army was defeated, “for they began it against themselves, the accursed transgressors of right,” observes the chronicler. Livonia then sent embassies to Pskov and Novgorod to sue for peace.

Who took the initiative to attack Pskov? If one goes back to the Langebrücke treaty of 1248 confirming the division of “Iaroslav’s inheritance”, possible candidates would appear to be the bishop of Dorpat and the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order. Albert Suerbeer himself had been in Livonia since August 1253 at the latest. The counteroffensive in an area not defined more precisely than “beyond the Narva River” suggests that northern Estonia may have been linked to this campaign. By 1253 Albert Suerbeer’s hopes of extending his power by means of ecclesiastical union with Pskov had vanished, making the attempt to take control of the city by force seem plausible. Meanwhile, the Lithuanian

130 SL1, p. 328; NL1, p. 304; cf. NL4, p. 230. See also Fennell, “Andrej Jaroslavič,” pp. 55, 61.
132 Icelandic sagas and other historical documents relating to the settlements and descents of the Northmen on the British isles, vol. 2: Hakonar saga, and a fragment of Magnus saga, with appendices, ed. Gudbrand Vigfusson, London 1887 (Rerum britannicarum mediæ ævi scriptores 88), p. 275, para. 280: “Þar var ok með jarli Andrés konungr af Sursdölum bróðir Alexandrs konungs af Hólmgarði; hann hafði flýit austan fyrir Tattarum”.
133 NL1, pp. 80, 307.
king Mindaugas and the Teutonic Order in Livonia considered themselves allies. This makes it justified to speak of the Lithuanian and Livonian campaigns as coordinated. Bernhard Dircks takes the view that “Lithuanians” should be understood in this case as a campaign by Tautvila of Polotsk undertaken not with the Order, but the archbishop of Riga and the bishop of Dorpat. The Lithuanian connection remains no more than hypothetical, however. A reprisal action in Danish territory suggests the participation of vassals from there, just as these often took part in the campaigns of the Teutonic Order. The sources certainly do not mention additional efforts at church union in relation to Pskov and Novgorod.

In the winter of 1253–54 Aleksandr’s brother Prince Iaroslav Iaroslavich fled from north-eastern Rus’ to Pskov, where he became prince. The following year Iaroslav was summoned to Novgorod to replace the ousted Vasilii Aleksandro维奇 as prince. This represented a change of power in Novgorod, so that the fact that Iaroslav settled in Pskov in itself could possibly be seen as a hostile manoeuvre towards Aleksandr Iaroslavich. Aleksandr’s army arrived in Novgorod in 1255, the city was forced to submit again to the grand prince in return for some concessions. Iaroslav afterwards settled for some time in Ladoga. Aleksandr’s authority in Novgorod remained unstable, however. In 1257, when Mongol officials were conducting a census in Rus’ for tax collection purposes, Aleksandr was in their service and helped them extend the tax collection campaign to Novgorod as well. As a consequence of rumours about this tribute, unrest broke out in Novgorod, and against his father’s wishes Aleksandr’s son Vasilii, who had since returned to Novgorod, also rebelled and fled to Pskov. When the grand prince and the Mongol officials arrived in Novgorod, they were not paid any tribute, nor was Aleksandr in a position to force the city to do so. He therefore arrested his son in Pskov and sent him to north-eastern Rus’, imposing a punishment on Vasilii’s retinue, which had apparently been responsible for the conduct of the minor prince. The following year the grand prince, accompanied by a number of other princes, visited the Horde, and then in the winter of 1259–60 he attempted once again to force Novgorod to pay tribute, this time accompanied by Andrei Iaroslavich, Prince

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137 NL1, pp. 80, 307.
Boris Vasilkovich of Rostov (d. 1277), and the Mongol officials. Despite the city having declared its willingness to pay the required tribute, riots broke out during the collection. The operation was still successful to a certain degree, because Aleksandr’s minor son Dmitrii was installed as prince in Novgorod.139

Under the year 1262 the Novgorod Chronicle describes fortification works but then a peace concluded with Lithuania. In the autumn a major offensive was launched against Dorpat. Apart from the Novgorodian army of Aleksandr’s son Dmitrii, the contingent included his son-in-law Konstantin Rostislavich from the Smolensk dynasty, his brother Iaroslav Iaroslavich, and Prince Tautvila of Polotsk with the Polotskians and the Lithuanians. Dorpat was captured, a large amount of booty was collected, and many people killed; “but the power of the Holy Cross and of St. Sophia always overthrows those who are wrong. And so this town, its strength was for nothing, but by the aid of God it was taken,” relates the chronicle rather gloatingly.140 As can be seen from the account of the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle, however, only the town, not the castle, was seized. It appears that King Mindaugas of Lithuania and Prince Tautvila of Polotsk had come to an arrangement in the meantime, since the Rhymed Chronicle links the campaign of Rus’ against Dorpat with the alliance between King Mindaugas and Grand Prince Aleksandr.141 Mindaugas had previously, according to the Rhymed Chronicle, renounced Christianity under pressure from the Samogitians, which represented an abandonment of the political alliance with the Order.142 In 1259 a revolt by the Semgallians had broken out, while in 1260 the Livonian army suffered a devastating defeat by the Samogitians at the Battle of Durben in Curonia. The following year the Samogitians invaded Livonia itself and a rebellion erupted in Ösel. At the end of 1261 and in 1262 Mindaugas openly renounced the alliance with the Order.


140 NL1, pp. 83, 311–12; Begunov, Памятник, p. 193. Dmitrii was a minor and had the role of army leader only in a symbolic sense. See Klug, “Fürstentum Tver,” p. 48.

141 LR, lines 6462–69. See also LUB 1, no. 216; Evgeniia L. Nazarova, “К вопросу о литовско-русском союзе 1262 г.,” in Староладожский сборник, ed. Adrian A. Selin (St Petersburg-Staraja Ladoga, 1998), pp. 12–19. In Nazarova, “Псков и Ливония,” p. 601 and Matuzova and Nazarova, Крестоносцы, pp. 245–46, 335, it is pointed out that the sources do not document the presence of Pskovians at Dorpat in 1262. Cf. for the opposite view Valerov, Новгород, pp. 179–80, where the reference to Pskovians in PL 2, p. 82 is considered plausible.

142 LR, lines 6339–6461; Ипатьевская летопись, p. 817.
and advanced as far as Wenden with Duke Treniota. Following the Russian offensive against Dorpat, Treniota devastated Wiek at the start of 1263, razing Old Pernau to the ground. However, following Mindaugas’ assassination in 1263, Lithuania became embroiled in internal conflicts, allowing the Order to reestablish its position in Curonia during the subsequent years. The Semgallians yielded again to the Order in 1272.\(^{143}\)

In connection with the campaign of 1262 the Rhymed Chronicle describes the devastation of the area around Dorpat, the capture of the town and the assault on the castle, which was also where the bishop lived, by the Russians. This chronicle of the Order ridicules the mortal fear of the clergy and stresses the merits of the brothers who rushed to help in the defence of the castle.\(^{144}\)

For the chronicler, the Russian offensive was part of an attack by the Lithuanian king on the Order motivated by his apostasy. In the treaty between Mindaugas and Novgorod Lithuania indeed proved to be the stronger party. The subject of the conflict with Lithuania over Toropets disappears thereafter from the Novgorod chronicles. As a consequence, some scholars have concluded that Novgorod may have recognized the sovereignty of the Lithuanian dukes in this region.\(^{145}\) Novgorod obtained in return, through Lithuania’s military support, the chance of winning booty in Livonian Dorpat, which was located near the border.

At the same time Novgorod also agreed a peace treaty with Gotland, Lübeck, and all the Hanseatic cities aimed at guaranteeing trade and in which a number of disputed issues are mentioned as now being resolved. These did indeed include many a conflict in Karelia, whose main alliance was with Novgorod; but now it was proclaimed that Novgorod would not take any responsibility for the evil that had occurred in Karelia. The treaty was concluded in the name of Prince Aleksandr and his son Dmitrii in the period between Dmitrii’s accession as prince of Novgorod (1259) and Aleksandr’s death (1263). The letter of the capitaneus and the council of Reval to Lübeck, probably written in the summer of 1259, contains a reference to an injustice (on the Russian side?) in the German trading enclave in Novgorod.\(^{146}\) Perhaps the treaty was indeed drawn up at the time by the envoys.\(^{147}\) The extant manuscript, in addition to the seals of the archbishop of Novgorod and Novgorod as a whole, also bears the seal of

\(^{143}\) See Benninghoven, “Der livländische Ordensmeister”.

\(^{144}\) LR, lines 6608–62.

\(^{145}\) Ianin, Новгород и Литва, pp. 52–53.

\(^{146}\) LUB 1, no. 215; DD 2/1, no. 244, HUB 1, no. 527; LUR, no. 915; cf. no. 992b.

\(^{147}\) Goetz, Deutsch-Russische Handelsverträge, pp. 72–90; Rennkamp, Studien, pp. 65–69.
Prince Iaroslav Iaroslavich, who did not accede to the throne of Novgorod until 1265. The same parchment from the former city archive of Riga also preserves the text of a trade agreement of 1191/92. It is clear that the seal of Prince Iaroslav does not indicate late ratification of the treaty but serves to certify the copy later made (c. 1270) and sent to Riga.

In the middle of the 13th century the princes of northern Rus’ also had contacts with bordering Latin countries and the papal curia. The hope of building an anti-Mongol league became confused with the idea of the ecclesiastical union between the Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches and the political interests of local potentates. These intentions failed, leading to a series of military conflicts. On the whole, however, this was a period in which the political system of Rus’ was changing and being reorganised and when it was potentially open not only to personal, commercial, and political, but also ecclesiastical cooperation.

5.5 Didman’s Votia Campaign of 1256

On 19 March 1255 Pope Alexander IV wrote to the archbishop of Riga informing him of the need to appoint a new bishop in the region. It can be gleaned from the letter that nobles viri Otto de Luneborch et Tidericus de Kivel fratres Rigensis et Revaliensi diocesium acted as the petitioners at the curia. They must have informed the pope that a not insignificant number of pagans in the surrounding regions wished to convert to Christianity. The pope issued Albert Suerbeer with the necessary authority and instructed him to appoint a bishop for these pagans, without ignoring the rights of other institutions, particularly the Teutonic Order. The letter was issued in Naples as part of a series of letters in favour of the Teutonic Order and thus apparently all applied for at the same time. On 3 August the same year, together with privileges intended for

148 GVNP, no. 29; LUB 1, no. 3033.
150 LUB 1, no. 281; BD, no. 492.
151 See LUR, nos. 772a–78 (1 to 19 March 1255); cf. no. 779.
a Rigan monastery, the pope granted Archbishop Albert, at his own request, permission to appoint a bishop for the people of Votia, Ingria, and Karelia. These lands, whose peoples were in the process of converting from paganism to Christianity, were seen as part of the church province of Riga.152

The Novgorod Chronicle relates in this regard that Swedes, Tavastians, Finns, and a certain Didman (Дидман) had arrived with his people and a large army (съ своей волостью и множество) in 1256 and built a castle on the Narva River. The Novgorodians sent messengers to north-eastern Rus’ to the prince asking for an army and themselves began to gather the contingent:

And they, accursed ones, having heard, fled beyond the sea. Prince Alexander arrived in the winter of the same year, and the Metropolitan [Kirill] with him; and the prince took the road together with the Metropolitan, and the men of Novgorod did not know where he was going, some thought that he was going against the Chud people. And having reached Koporye, Alexander went against the Tavastian people; but the Metropolitan returned to Novgorod, and many other men of Novgorod turned back from Koporye. And the Prince went with his own force and with the men of Novgorod [to war].153

This passage is linked to a comment in the chronicle under the year 1294: “Titmanovich (Титмановичь) secretly put up his father’s fort on this side of the Narva River (отии городок на сеи стороне Нарове), and the men of Novgorod went and burned it down, and they took and burned down his big village.”154

These accounts are interconnected. The question is what the aim of these campaigns was and who instigated them. It was pointed out as long as ago as the 19th century that the name Didman in the Novgorod Chronicle refers to Dietrich von Kivel, one of the most important vassals of northern Estonia.155 But was his position as an individual vassal so important that he alone can be regarded as the driving force behind these events? Paul Johansen considers Kivel truly such a key figure, the real ruler of Vironia, who may have been

152 LUB 3, no. 283b; LUR, nos. 783–84.
153 NL1, pp. 81, 308. Cf. Лаврентьевская летопись, p. 474; SL1, pp. 333–34. In addition to the Tavastia campaign, the Sofia Chronicle also mentions (mistakenly?) an army against the Chuds. The latter could here also mean the inhabitants of north-western Votia.
154 NL1, p. 328
155 Busse, “Die Burg Odenpäh,” p. 344; Goetze, Albert Suerbeer, pp. 147–57. Nazarova, “Crusades,” pp. 191–92 believes that “Didman” was Dietrich’s son, Tidemann von Kivel, but Tidemann’s son was called Otto, who also gave his name to the otii gorodok mentioned in 1294. Tidemann (see LUB 1, no. 513) is in any case simply another version of Dietrich. See also Johansen, Estlandliste, p. 867.
enfeoffed in Votia as early as 1241 (see p. 158). Dietrich von Kivel and Otto von Lüneburg were also vassals of the archbishop of Riga. The archbishop was in France in December 1254 and in Lübeck at the beginning of the summer (?) of 1256. We know that Albert Suerbeer generally acted in Vironia against the interests of the Danish king. The Votia campaign of 1255–56 promoted by the archbishop cannot therefore be seen as part of a planned crusade by the Danish monarchy in the pagan territories adjoining Estonia. There are also no direct accounts for 1256 to indicate that the Teutonic Order was involved in the campaign in Votia as had been the case in 1241. Such a crusade had still not been carried out and in fact never would never be. The Novgorod Chronicle mentions Didman and “his people”, which is to say those dependent on him, although they are mentioned last in the sequence. Aleksandr Iaroslavich also undertook a series of reprisals in Tavastia. However, if this campaign is to be seen as a Swedish-Finnish crusade, it would make sense if the territory to be captured lay within the sphere of interest of the archbishop of Uppsala, which Votia was not. The Swedish king obtained a summons from the pope between 1255 and 1257 to the archbishop of Uppsala to preach the crusade, since the people of his kingdom were suffering from frequent raids conducted “by the enemies of Christ, vernacular known as Karelians, as well as by the pagans of other neighbouring lands”. The relations between Denmark and Sweden in the 1250s were unstable, although a peace treaty was agreed in 1256.

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156 Johansen, Estlandliste, pp. 137–39. 510. Johansen’s belief that Kivel was the owner of the village or castle on the Narva is pure specualtion, which the sources would tend to contradict.

157 Goetze, Albert Suerbeer, pp. 147–57; Johansen, Estlandliste, pp. 800, 823; Transehe-Roseneck, Die ritterlichen Livlandführer, p. 50.

158 LUR, nos. 764, 803.


160 ST 1, no. 106; FMU 1, no. 113. The letters of Pope Alexander IV dated 11 March 1256 on the preaching of the crusade for Estonia, Livonia and Prussia are linked to the crusade of the Teutonic Order on Livonia’s southern frontiers. See LUR, nos. 797–800. Cf. DD 1/7, nos. 318–20; LUB 1, nos. 210–12, 257; PUB 1/1, nos. 225, 326; BD, no. 507; Vētra monumenta Poloniae, no. 137; SD 1, no. 463; LUR, nos. 626–28, 715.

161 See ST 1, nos. 96, 99, 105. In 1260 Duke Karl, the son of Ulf Fasi, was killed at the Battle of Durben in Curonia while fighting in the army of the Teutonic Order: Erikskrönikan, lines 272–361; Lindkvist, “Crusades,” p. 129.
The castle built in 1256 may have been located somewhere near the mouth of the river Narva. This would have given its possessor the means of controlling the waterway to Pskov, but also the Luga river route to Novgorod, the very route that the Livonians had already tried to capture in 1241. This would also have been an ideal departure point from which to complete the conquest of the rest of Votia. Such plans were in place, as the appointment of the bishop for Votia, Ingria, and Karelia demonstrates. Thus in 1262 a certain Bishop Henry of Votia, who was in Germany, is mentioned; probably in 1268 the former knight of Stade and canon of Hamburg cathedral, Frederick of Haseldorp, who later became bishop of Dorpat, was appointed bishop of Karelia.

The military campaign of 1256, which can be placed in the context of a crusading policy that lasted throughout the 13th century, may thus have been brought about at the instigation of Sweden. Some vassals in northern Estonia used the campaign to expand the area under their control east of the Narva River. The significance attributed to this event ranges from the narrowly regional to Europe-wide. Interpretations in the latter mould take it for granted that the campaign was initiated by the pope. It would appear that, by ascribing the key role in these events to their specialist area of research—whether the Finnish church, Albert Suerbeer or the figure of Dietrich von Kivel—historians have often been able to ascribe particular importance to their subject.

In 1253 the Novgorodians and the Karelians had gone on plundering raid in Vironia, on the other side of the Narva River. A little later in 1255–57 a series of revolts broke out in Novgorod. In this context the attempt to baptize the Votians, Ingrians, and Karelians, as well as the aim of controlling the estuaries of the rivers crucial to Novgorod’s trade, would have appeared absolutely

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163 Anti Selart, “Friedrich von Haseldorf, Bischof von Karelien," in Raudkivi and Seppel, Sõnassee püüttud minevik, pp. 79–91. See also Colker, “America,” p. 725, para. 25: a description of eastern Europe written c. 1255–60, which might originate from the circle of Albert Suerbeer, mentions the priest Vaislanus who preached in Alba Ruscia (northern Rus?) and encouraged a merchant to begin the mission to Karelia. Should the identification of Alba Ruscia be correct, this represents evidence of Rigan missionary activity in Votia in the 1250s.
feasible. Novgorod’s power in the Koporye region did indeed continually strengthen in the second half of the 13th century, but there was also a real possibility that the relationship of dependency or the alliance of the Votians and Karelians with Novgorod would not continue.\footnote{Nazorova, “Crusades,” p. 189} This attack did therefore affect Novgorod’s commercial interests and impinged on its political power and that of its prince, but it still cannot be interpreted as an attempt to promulgate Catholicism in Christian Rus’. The withdrawal of the Swedes is explained in the Novgorod Chronicle by the news that Novgorod had summoned Grand Prince Aleksandr and itself began to gather an army. The general view in the historiography is that the castle was abandoned after the army had been formed in Novgorod.\footnote{Cf. Arnold Süvalep, Taani-aegne Narva. Нарва датского времени (Narva, 1995), pp. 18–19.}

Scholars have usually dated the journey of Prince Aleksandr’s envoys from Novgorod to Trondheim to 1251–52. The talks dealt with the division of the levies collected from the Finmark and the Russian request that Christina, the daughter of the King Haakon Haakonsson of Norway, be given in marriage to Aleksandr’s son. Norway’s return embassy subsequently crossed the Baltic Sea to Novgorod, but the planned marriage did not take place. According to the saga, this was because of the Mongol campaigns against Novgorod.\footnote{Icelandic sagas, pp. 266–267, para. 271.} Aleksandr’s embassy has recently been dated to 1257, when Novgorod was in fact affected by the military campaign of the Mongol tax collectors. Scholars have related Aleksandr’s diplomatic plans with his attempt to strengthen his position in the war against Sweden.\footnote{Glazyrina, Dzhakson and Melnikova, “Скандинавские источники,” pp. 531–34; Tatiana N. Dzhakson and Vladimir A. Kuchkin, “Год 1251, 1252 или 1257? (К датировке русско-норвежских переговоров),” in Восточная Европа в древности и средневековье. X Чтения к 80-летию Владимир Т. Пашуто (Moscow, 1998), pp. 24–28. This notion is opposed by John Lind, “Russian Echoes,” p. 234; cf. Dzhon Kh. Lind, “Разграничительная грамота и Новгородско-норвежские договоры 1251 и 1326 гг.,” in NIS 6 (16) (1997), pp. 135–43.}

The Votian campaign of Dietrich von Kivel and the Swedish crusaders indicates that the attempt to continue the crusading mission eastward from Estonia was still alive. However, this was not in line with the main political goals of either the Teutonic Order or the king of Denmark. Kivel and his allies were in fact trying to gain the upper hand before a possible Danish crusade in Ingria. Although this venture provoked the conflict with Novgorod and its prince, it was never conceived as anti-Russian or anti-Orthodox.
Livonia and Rus', 1260–1330

6.1 Prince Dovmont’s Seizure of Power in Pskov

Lithuanian rulers came to play an increasingly important role in the affairs of Livonia and the Russian territories in the last third of the 13th century. The area controlled by Lithuania began to expand rapidly towards the east and the south, where the small Russian principalities were forced one after the other to recognize their dependency on the emerging new power. The Lithuanian ruler Mindaugas renounced his cooperation with the Teutonic Order c. 1262. Shortly afterwards his wife Martha died. The Hypatian Chronicle says the king then wished to marry Martha’s sister, who was the wife of Duke Dovmont of Nalsen. When Dovmont learned of this, he decided to join Duke Treniota’s plot to assassinate the king. When Mindaugas sent his army with Dovmont against Prince Roman of Briansk in 1263, Dovmont unexpectedly turned back and killed Mindaugas and his two sons on 5 August 1263. Dovmont was one of the leading dukes in Nalsen, the region located in the north-east of Lithuania on the border with Polotsk. Treniota’s nephew Tautvila, who was also prince of Polotsk, was also involved in this conspiracy. It appears that Dovmont withdrew from the ensuing succession struggle after having taken his revenge, for it was Treniota and Tautvila who came into conflict over Mindaugas’ inheritance. Treniota killed Tautvila in the winter of 1263–64. Rule in Polotsk was secured by Dovmont’s rival Duke Gerdenis of Nalsen, who had also taken over in Nalsen, or one of the dukes dependent on him. Mindaugas’ retinue itself then killed Treniota, and in 1264 Mindaugas’ Orthodox son Vaišelga, who was

dependent on the princes of Volhynia, came to power in Lithuania. In the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle Vaišelga is described as a friend of the Teutonic Order and as a virtuous helper of Christians; after returning home from Rus' after the death of his father he asked the master of the Livonian Order for help against his father's murderers and urged them to remember "that he too is a Christian".5

With the backing of troops from Galicia-Volhynia, Vaišelga advanced to Nalsen, so that Dovmont and his retinue were forced to flee to Pskov. Around 1267 Vaišelga handed over power to the Christian Shvarn, the son of Daniil Romanovich who was married to a daughter of Mindaugas. Vaišelga then retired to a monastery, where he was murdered shortly afterwards by Daniil's second son Lev. It is not known to what extent Shvarn was actually able to secure his power in Lithuania; he died c. 1268–69. The pagan Traidenis (d. 1281/82) from the rival dynasty was able to impose himself as grand duke of Lithuania.6

In November 1263 Grand Prince Aleksandr Iaroslavich died in Gorodets on the river Volga while on his way back from his fourth journey to the Horde. The following year his son Prince Iurii was driven from Novgorod "because he was still young" and replaced by Prince Iaroslav Iaroslavich of Tver. There was perhaps concern among the people of Novgorod that the internal conflict in Lithuania would spill over into the north-west of Rus', which was why they would prefer an experienced warrior as their ruler.7 Iaroslav (d. 1271/72) thereafter secured the position of grand prince of Vladimir.

Pskov was at this time also allied to Grand Prince Iaroslav, whose son Sviatoslav represented him there. When Dovmont together with his retinue and their families arrived in Pskov in 1265, they were received by Sviatoslav and baptized.8 Only due to the grand prince's intervention was it possible to prevent an expedition planned in Novgorod to slay the Lithuanians in Pskov. The fact that Sviatoslav recognized the Lithuanians as auxiliary troops strengthened the position of Iaroslav Iaroslavich, whose role as all-powerful prince

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7 NL1, pp. 84, 313; Klug, "Fürstentum Tver," p. 49.

8 The name taken by Dovmont (modern Lithuanian Daumantas) at baptism was Timofei.
could have been jeopardized in the future by Novgorod independence. It is likely that the costs for Pskov and Novgorod of accommodating the ‘unemployed’ duke and his retinue fell to the local commoners of those towns.

The following year, however, Dovmont became prince of Pskov. In the summer of 1266 he embarked on a campaign with the Pskovians to Nalsen, where he took Gerdenis’ wife and two sons prisoner. Gerdenis was defeated in the ensuing battle on the river Daugava. That winter Dovmont repeated the campaign. Meanwhile Iaroslav had been planning to overthrow Dovmont with his troops from north-eastern Rus’, but this attack never took place because of the revolt in Novgorod. The overthrow of Sviatoslav in Pskov—which had originally provoked the grand prince’s intention to launch a revenge attack—changed the balance of power in the region: this time the power of a non-Russian prince in Pskov provided the Novgorod burghers with the opportunity they needed to prevail against their own prince, Iaroslav Iaroslavich. Dovmont in fact launched his third campaign together with the Novgorodians, who were not led by Iaroslav but by the boyar Elevferii Sbyslavich. These campaigns were aimed against Gerdenis, who had consolidated his position in Nalsen and Polotsk and was, moreover, regarded as Dovmont’s rival. In the long run for Pskov the rule of Dovmont signified stronger connections with Lithuania.

6.2 Livonia, Lithuania, and Polotsk

The struggle to achieve supremacy in south-eastern Lettgallia continued in the last quarter of the 13th century. Polotsk and Lithuania, which essentially

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10 See also Khoroshkevich, “Из истории,” p. 223.
11 NLI, pp. 85, 315; PL 2, pp. 16–17, 83–84. A late and unreliable tradition identifies the wife of Gerdenis with the aunt of Dovmont or considers Gerdenis an uncle of Dovmont: Okhotnikova, Повесть, pp. 40–42. See also Klug, “Fürstentum Tver,” pp. 113–114.
12 NLI, pp. 85, 315; cf. p. 612.
14 Auns, Социально-экономическая и политическая структура, p. 22.
controlled the former, confronted the Teutonic Order and the archbishopric of Riga, themselves rivals. Unfortunately there are many gaps in the sources for this conflict. The main source is provided by the interrogation record, only part of which has survived, compiled several decades later under the supervision of Francis of Moliano (d. 1325; bishop of Fermo, 1318–25). The record contains only the very brief answers by the witnesses to the inquisitor’s questions, leaving the questions themselves to be guessed at (see p. 286).15

Duke Gerdenis of Nalsen controlled Polotsk until his death in the campaign against him led by Dovmont alongside Pskov and Novgorod in 1267,16 but it is not known who represented him on the ground. Polotsk and Vitebsk were apparently ruled around the same time by princes both called Iziaslav, from the local princely dynasty (see p. 209). It was common during the rapid territorial expansion of the grand duchy for the local dynasty to continue in power even after Lithuania’s conquest of a particular region. Even the fragmentary accounts of rule in Polotsk and the neighbouring town of Vitebsk at the turn of the 13th and 14th centuries point towards the presence of long-standing local princely houses, although this does not of course mean that the Lithuanian grand dukes had no influence there. The events can only be dated extremely vaguely, which is why it is so difficult to discuss the links between this region and the Livonian states.

During the period of rule of Grand Duke Vaišelga (c. 1263/64–67) both Polotsk and Vitebsk were ruled by princes from a local line of descent.17 Since Vaišelga was on friendly terms with the Teutonic Order in Livonia, it is reasonable to assume that relations between Polotsk and the Order were also more or less friendly. In the last decades of the 13th century the Rigan town council in its letter complained to Prince Mikhail of Vitebsk of injustices suffered by Rigan merchants there. In the letter concerned it is pointed out that there had been no misunderstandings in matters of trade under Konstantin, Mikhail’s father.18 It may be the case that this Konstantin, the father of Mikhail of Vitebsk, was the same Prince Konstantin of Polotsk who had previously assigned lands to the Teutonic Order (see p. 206). At the end of the 1280s it seems that Vitebsk submitted to the authority of Smolensk, and the former

15 Zeugenverhör, pp. XVI–XXII.
16 NL4, p. 236; cf. SL1, p. 343; NL1, pp. 85, 315. Cf. Fennell, Crisis, p. 158.
17 PG 1, no. 2; LUB 6, no. 3037. See Klug, “Fürstentum Tver,” pp. 113–14; cf. Gorskii, Русские земли, p. 53.
18 RLU, no. 49; LUB 6, no. 3059. On the date of the letter, see Goetz, Deutsch-Russische Handelserträge, pp. 332–34; Goetz, Deutsch-Russische Handelsgeschichte, p. 459; Hellmann, Lettenland, p. 205; Rowell, Lithuania, p. 21.
was ruled by a prince from the house of Briansk as governor for Prince Fedor Rostislavich of Smolensk.19

Sometime around 1274–76 the pagan grand duke of Lithuania, Traidenis, agreed a peace treaty with the Teutonic Order, the archbishop and the city of Riga, and the entire “Christian people”. It is apparent from later complaints, however, that the Lithuanians violated the treaty.20 These complaints themselves reveal that trade on the Daugava was vibrant, a fact also testified to by the trade treaties confirmed by the princes of Smolensk. One such confirmation was issued by Prince Fedor Rostislavich of Smolensk in 1284, certifying the peaceful trade between Smolensk, the archbishop, the master of the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order, the city of Riga, and the German merchants.21

Internal tensions continued to intensify within Livonia. The events of the 1260s and 1270s anticipated the internal conflict that would break out at the end of the century. After the Battle of Durben in 1260 the Teutonic Order in Livonia was mainly occupied with the reconquest of Curonia, which it was able to complete in 1267. Resistance came from Semgallia with support from Samogitia, so that Semgallia’s capitulation in 1272 was only temporary. It was only as a result of the warfare during 1279–90 that the Semgallians were finally defeated. It is likely that this fighting took up so much of the Order’s resources that Archbishop Albert Suerbeer was able to strengthen his position while making sure he had the foreign support he would need. In 1267 Count Gunzelin III of Schwerin (1228–74) and Duke Henry of Mecklenburg (d. 1302) arrived in Livonia as crusaders of the archbishop. In contrast to the attempts by the Order to conquer Curonia and Semgallia, the archbishop focused his claims on Nalsen. The legal precedent on which this was based was the treaty agreed with the nobleman Suxe or Nicholas of Nalsen (d. 1273) in 1268, who had assigned his possessions to the archbishop after his baptism, receiving them back as fiefs.22 Suxe can be regarded as an opponent of Gerdenis and his

19 LUB 6, no. 3051. See also Rowell, Lithuania, pp. 84–85.
20 HUB 1, no. 1015; LUB 1, nos. 452, 507; LUR, nos. 1213–14, 1221a. See also Goetz, Deutsch-Russische Handelsgeschichte, pp. 457–58.
22 Perlbach, “Urkunden,” pp. 17–18: “Suxe siue Nicholaus nobilis de Lettowia de prouincia Nalsen gratia sibi inspirante diuina gentilitatis errore relictio . . . ommem hereditatem suam in terris, memoribus et in aquis, cultis et incultis, quam in prouincia Nalsen a progenitoribus suis noscitur possedisse, ad manus nostros . . . libere resignauit et postmodum tam pro se, quam pro fratre suo absente recepit a nobis in feudum.” The virtuousness and
heirs. Possession of Nalsen would have enabled the archbishop to control the Daugava trade route. Count Gunzelin was bound to the archbishopric by being made its bailiff and protector against “barbarians and all other intruders.” Such intruders might have also been meant to include the Teutonic Order among others. When the count left Livonia in 1268, the Order detained the archbishop, imprisoning both him and the cathedral provost of Riga for an extended period. The archbishop was forced to make a number of concessions under this pressure and to renounce his plans to seek help from a foreign ruler or petition the curia for proceedings to be commenced against the Order.

The chronicle of Hermann von Wartberge says of Ernst von Ratzeburg, who had become provincial master of the Livonian Order in 1274 (until 1279), that he built the castle at Dünaburg and immediately afterwards, that he reached an agreement with a certain Rudolf von Ungern. The chronicle also relates that the Order’s provincial master, Gerhard von Jork, rebuilt Dünaburg in 1313, “which had previously been destroyed by brothers of the Order to save the knight Johann von Üxküll from the pagans, since he had been captured by the Lithuanians in Gerzike.” The Order had already had a castle in eastern Lettgallia prior to this: the commander of the Wolkenburg is mentioned in 1263 and 1271. This castle located in eastern Lettgallia is not mentioned thereafter among the Order’s castles.

In the documents from the 14th century the Teutonic Order is accused of surrendering two castles to the pagans, which may relate to the above account. It has been concluded on this basis that these castles were the Dünaburg and Wolkenburg. However, it is more plausible that the strongholds supposedly surrendered by the Order were the Dünaburg and Polotsk because there are reports that there had once been a Catholic church in Polotsk (see p. 204).

The account in the Rhymed Chronicle of the construction of the Dünaburg does not create the impression that this was built in a land under the firm control of the Order. The Order’s troops gathered in Riga and took many provisions...
and arms with them. Once the castle had been quickly built, Master Ernst returned to Riga.\textsuperscript{29} The newly built castle was then unsuccessfully besieged by Traidenis, the grand duke of Lithuania.\textsuperscript{30} The Dünaburg was probably built to replace the former hill fort \textit{burchwalle Nowenene}.\textsuperscript{31} It was here that the major transport route from north to south crossed the river Daugava.

Michael von Taube saw a connection between the construction of the Dünaburg and the treaty with Rudolf von Ungern. He argued that the Dünaburg had been built on the site to which Rudolf von Ungern was meant to be entitled.\textsuperscript{32} There are in fact no grounds for such conjectures since we do not know what the \textit{compositio} mentioned in the chronicle of Hermann von Wartberge dealt with in the first place.\textsuperscript{33} Both Rudolf von Ungern (mentioned in the sources 1277–1325) and Johann von Üxküll (mentioned in the sources 1288–1325) are undoubtedly notable figures in the history of Livonia during this period. Both were vassals of the archbishop who proceeded to act in the Order’s interests, or at least in harmony with them, against their actual lord.\textsuperscript{34}

In the later legal proceedings the Order was accused of taking the Dünaburg away from the archbishop and selling it for three hundred marks to the Lithuanians.\textsuperscript{35} The Order was also said to have sold the castle of Polotsk, which was in the archbishop’s possession, located on the frontier with the pagans.

\textsuperscript{29} L.R, lines 8169–8207. The ‘Ronneburg Necrology’ recorded in the translation by Maciej Stryjkowski mentions a fallen Livonian (?) brother of the Order: \textit{Henricus Sazendob, comendator Nieschowski, ze dwunaścią braciej} (Stryjkowski, \textit{Kronika}, vol. 1, p. 284). There is no reason to identify this person as a commandor of Dünaburg during the 1240s. Cf. Benninghoven, \textit{Orden}, p. 460; Fenske and Militzer, \textit{Ritterbrüder}, p. 560, no. 753; Arbusow, “Die im Deutschen Orden in Livland vertretenen Geschlechter,” p. 88, no. 392. It is more likely in this instance that Wenden (Polish: Kieś) in Livonia or Nessau (Polish: Nieszawa) in Prussia is being referred to. The view is therefore unfounded that the Order’s castle at Dünaburg already existed in the 1240s (for example, as maintained by Militzer, \textit{Von Akkon zur Marienburg}, p. 377).

\textsuperscript{30} L.R, lines 8208–94.


\textsuperscript{34} See LUB 1, no. 524; 2, nos. 606, 621, 661; 70; 3, no. 481a; LGU, nos. 37, 41, 47–48.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Hermannii Chronicon}, p. 152, para. 7; \textit{Zeugenverhör}, p. 7 witness VI, para. 13; p. 27 witness VII, para. 13; p. 40 witness VII, para. 182; p. 126 witness XXII, para. 182; p. 164 supplement IV, para. 13; LUB 2, no. 968.
This enabled the pagans to drive away the Christians *a tota frontaria* and turn the region into a desert.\(^36\) According to another version, the brothers of the Order had oppressed (*oppresserunt*) the people of Polotsk to such an extent that its inhabitants asked the pagans to help them, who then came and drove the Christians from Polotsk.\(^37\) The verb *oppresserunt* in this context undoubtedly means pressure from outside. In defending its actions, the Order claimed that the Dünaburg had always belonged to it. The Lithuainians had previously destroyed the castle and then the Order had rebuilt it at the request of the bishop of Dorpat, the archbishop, and the capital of Riga, as well as all Livonian prelates. The bishop of Dorpat himself had supported the building by providing four hundred men and one hundred silver marks. His precondition had been that in return the Order was to support him if the bishop should in future decide to build another castle for the protection of Christians on the borders with Lithuania.\(^38\) Bishop Theodorik Vyshusen of Dorpat did indeed have political ties with the Teutonic Order, but it is also true that the bishopric of Dorpat, as we know, had shown an interest in the Daugava region as far back as 1248 (see p. 200). The Order further declared that it had received the castle of Gerzike from the vassal Johann von Üxküll as a security, paying three hundred marks for it, since the knight Johann von Öskull had wished neither to bear the costs for the defence of the castle himself nor hand it over to the pagans.\(^39\)

The three hundred marks received for the Dünaburg and the three hundred paid to the knight Johann are most probably connected. Francis of Moliano recorded the statement that the Teutonic Order itself had destroyed the Dünaburg. It was in return for this that the Order received the sum in question

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\(^{36}\) *Zeugenverhör*, p. 164 supplement IV, para. 13; p. 169 supplement V, para. 13; p. 57 witness VIII, para. 182.


\(^{38}\) *Hermanni Chronicon*, p. 152, para. 7; *LUB* 2, no. 1036, para. 7; *Zeugenverhör*, p. 201 supplement IX, paras. 236–39. The castle of Neuhausen was founded with the Order’s help in the bishopric of Dorpat on the border with Pskov in 1342. See Bartholomäus Hoeneke, *Liivimaa noorem riimkroonika (1315–1348)* [ed. Sulev Vahtre] (Tallinn, 1960), pp. 70–72; *Hermanni Chronicon*, p. 70.

and was also why the knight held prisoner by the Lithuanians—Johann von Üxküll—was released.\textsuperscript{40} Since the knight had been taken prisoner in Gerzike, both incidents are linked to extensive military campaigns in south-eastern Lettgallia. However, it is difficult to date these events. They could go back to the campaign of Traidenis (d. 1281/82), in which case they would have occurred c. 1280.\textsuperscript{41} At this time there were also restrictions to trade on the Daugava.\textsuperscript{42} According to a report by the Order from 1366, whose author has been identified as Hermann von Wartberge, the Dünaburg was said to have since lain empty for over thirty years.\textsuperscript{43}

The revelation that Polotsk had been lost for the Latin church apparently refers to the period in which Tautvila renounced the previous alliance and went to war against Livonia. The claim that the Order had sold Polotsk may be related to the ‘Constantinian Donation’, which was what prompted the Order to promise to waive its claim to Polotsk. From the perspective of this study, the complex history of the conquest of eastern Lettgallia shows us that, according to the sources, fighting with the pagans was already taking place at the time. Only the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle mentions the Russian archers in Traidenis’ army,\textsuperscript{44} who probably came from the Russian areas subject to the grand prince. Polotsk was consequently so tightly linked to Lithuania that it could be subsumed under the general political description ‘pagans’.

### 6.3 The Battle of Wesenberg in 1268

Under the year 1267 the Novgorod Chronicle says:

> The men of Novgorod consulted with their Prince Iurii, they wished to go against the Lithuanians, while others \[wished to go\] against Polotsk and others beyond the Narva River. And when they reached the village of Dubrovna there was a quarrel; and they went back and went beyond the Narva River to Wesenberg and made great havoc in their land, but did not take the castle.

\textsuperscript{40} Zeugenverhör, p. 27 witness VII, para. 13; p. 111 witness XX, para. 13.
\textsuperscript{41} Hellmann, Lettenland, p. 204; cf. Taube, “Russische und litauische Fürsten,” pp. 413–14.
\textsuperscript{42} Goetz, Deutsch-Russische Handelsgeschichte, p. 457.
\textsuperscript{43} Hermanni Chronicon, p. 152, para. 7; LUB 2, no. 1036, para. 7.
\textsuperscript{44} LR, lines 8217–19.
The army returned to Novgorod after suffering some losses.\(^45\) It was led by Iurii Andreevich of Suzdal.\(^46\) The Novgorodians were unable to agree about the target of the attack: the three potential opponents—Lithuania, Polotsk, and northern Estonia—were seen as interchangeable. Polotsk and Lithuania had thus joined the side of Novgorod’s enemies after the death of Tautvila.

After the aborted campaign, the Novgorodians began to plan a new and more wide-ranging offensive. At the initiative of the posadnik Mikhail, a number of other rulers were enlisted: Dmitrii Aleksandrovich of Pereiaslav, Iaroslav Iaroslavich’s sons Sviatoslav and the infant Mikhail as the grand prince’s representatives, Iurii Andreevich of Suzdal, Konstantin Rostislavich of Smolensk, a certain Iaropolk, Dovmont of Pskov, “and some other Princes”. This was a large and extremely representative army. Siege engines were built in preparation, and envoys from the Teutonic Order and the bishop of Dorpat gave assurances that they would not interfere in Novgorod’s advance against Danish possessions in northern Estonia. On 23 January 1268 a joint Russian army left for Wesenberg, in Vironia, but there they encountered “on the river Kegola” (на реке Кеголе) a large enemy force that had been gathered from the whole of Livonia. And “there was a terrible battle such as neither fathers nor grandfathers had seen”. The Russian army was defeated, “and Prince Iurii turned shoulder, or there was treachery in him, God knows”. The chronicle goes on to say that God nevertheless showed mercy and on 18 February Prince Dmitrii and the Novgorodians vanquished their opponents, who stumbled over the dead bodies as they fled to the castle of Wesenberg. When they reemerged, the troops stood opposite one another in the night until “they [the Livonians], accursed transgressors of the Cross, fled, not waiting for the light.”\(^47\) The description of the battle in the Novgorod Chronicle is extremely vivid and full of emotion.\(^48\)

The outcome of the confrontation is far from clear. One Russian historiographical tradition sees the Russian army as the undisputed victor. Yet the Battle of Wesenberg has been regarded as of secondary importance compared to the Battle of the Ice of 1242, despite involving a greater number of troops. The Novgorod Chronicle describes both the Novgorod defeat and the victory of the acknowledged leader of the attack, Dmitrii Aleksandrovich.\(^49\) According

\(^45\) NL1, pp. 85, 315. Cf. NL4, pp. 236–38; SL1, pp. 343–47.

\(^46\) See also Khoroshkevich, “Из истории,” p. 224; cf. Ianin, Новгородские посадники, p. 219; NA, p. 150; Matuzova and Nazarova, Крестоносцы, pp. 343–44.

\(^47\) NL1, pp. 85–87, 315–18.

\(^48\) See also Gippius, “К характеристике,” pp. 348–50.

\(^49\) Лаврентьевская летопись, p. 525; Симеоновская летопись, p. 73; cf. PL 1, pp. 3, 13; PL 2, pp. 17, 22, 84. On the identity of this prince (LR , lines 7637–44, p. 175; cf. pp. 319–20:
to the account found in the Livonian sources, the great Russian army was met by 34 Teutonic Knights from Estonian territory (Fellin, Leal, and Weißenstein), Bishop Alexander of Dorpat, and the vassals of the Danish king. Otto, the provincial master of the Order, was at that moment elsewhere fighting the Lithuanians. In the first battle at the church of Maholm the bishop of Dorpat and two knights were killed, but in the second battle **üb eine böse bach** victory was gained over the Russians.50 Stephen Rowell argues that the apparent inconsistency in the sources can be overcome if they are taken to describe different stages in the fighting.51 The losses on both sides were high overall, but the Russians probably came off worse.52

The Vironia campaign, in which so many princes took part, was in fact a continuation of the first aborted campaign whose participants had been unable to reach an agreement in Dubrovna over the target of the offensive. Dubrovna lay on the route from Novgorod to Pskov, on the Udokha River, a tributary of the Shelon. Consequently, the army was already moving in the direction of Pskov, that is, was moving more towards Polotsk and Lithuania than “beyond the Narva River”.53 The quarrel was serious enough to cause the army to turn back shortly afterwards. The attack on northern Estonia can therefore be explained by the fact that the advance was already underway and, since the initial target proved to be unreachable, the weakest neighbouring region was chosen in the interest of obtaining the expected booty. It is likely that the Russians had already tried to besiege Wesenberg during the first campaign, which also indicates far-reaching objectives. The Novgorod factions may have

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53 Another place called Dubrovna was located on the river Kunya not far from Toropets, i.e. also on the route from Novgorod to Lithuania or Polotsk.
had diverging foreign political interests. Estonia's northern coast was strategically important in terms of trade for the land route between Novgorod and Reval. Wesenberg's controlling function over this route is evident. Moreover, Novgorod's interests were opposed to those of Denmark's rulers and vassals in Votia. The 1256 campaign by the Swedish and northern Estonian vassals had been a failure, but their claims to control of Votia did not disappear (see p. 230). The advance towards Pskov would have signified continued involvement in Dovmont's struggle with Lithuania, but the Novgorodians no longer agreed to this. Dovmont's participation in the impending campaign to Estonia was in turn a form of repayment for the help provided by Novgorod in his offensive against Nansen.54

The Novgorod Chronicle says that the Order and the bishop of Dorpat promised not to take part in the campaigns but subsequently failed to keep this promise. This explains why the chronicler is particularly disparaging towards them. The Order's master did not himself take part in the battle. It is also likely that neither Count Gunzelin of Schwerin nor Duke Henry of Mecklenburg, who were in Livonia at the time, took part: both had ties to the archbishopric of Riga, but it kept a distance from these campaigns.55 The tensions between the Teutonic Order and Denmark had become acute by that time. Under the Treaty of Stensby the Order was not allowed to build any castles in Jerwia without the permission of the Danish king. Despite this, in 1265 the Order built the castle of Weißenstein “before” Jerwia. The author of the Rhymed Chronicle also uses this particular expression to designate a stronghold built for the conquest of a region.56

The Order unexpectedly changed its decision when the assembled Russian army proved to be capable of victory and a potential threat to its position in Livonia.57 The subsequent military confrontation shows that the participation of Dovmont of Pskov could have been the decisive factor: Dovmont had become the main military opponent both for the Order and Dorpat. Moreover,

57 Thus, for example, Khoroshkevich, “Из истории,” pp. 227–28.
the Danish vassals—who were not always on good terms with their king—were the Order’s constant allies.

The counteroffensive led by the Order after the Battle of Wesenberg was aimed not at Novgorod, but Pskov. The castle of Izborsk was burnt down and Pskov besieged, but when the Novgorod troops led by Prince Iurii of Suzdal arrived to help, the siege was ended and peace concluded. This peace was regarded as favourable by both the Novgorod sources and those of the Teutonic Order. The Livonian participants in the siege were the provincial master of the Order and its knights and the Danish vassals.\(^{58}\) Since they had travelled to Pskov by ship, it is also likely that the bishopric of Dorpat took part. The bishop’s death at Wesenberg was a good motive for the revenge.\(^{59}\) The Rhymed Chronicle says, perhaps alluding to the capture of Pskov in 1240, that Pskov was a very good castle, which would be invincible if the Russians there were not divided.\(^{60}\) As evidence of Dorpat’s continuing participation in the military campaigns, the Pskovian chronicles contain an account of a battle “on the river Mirovovna” (на реке на Мироповне): “Latins” plundered a number of Pskovian villages in the frontier region; Dovmont together with some Pskovians pursued them by ship, defeating them on 23 April. In the description of this confrontation mention is made of islands and the burning of one of them (perhaps referring to the grass or the reed). The vita of Dovmont says that this episode took place between the Battle of Wesenberg (“after a few days”) and the siege of Pskov.\(^{61}\) The Second Chronicle of Pskov dates this clash to the same year in which the Battle of Wesenberg took place (1268),\(^{62}\) but the Third Chronicle dates it to 1271.\(^{63}\)

It is necessary to examine the relationship between the chronicles of Pskov and the vita of Dovmont before these events can be dated. The vita is integrated into the chronicles, with the result that some details appear twice. It is not absolutely clear which text came first, the composition of the early chronicle in Pskov or the hagiographical text.\(^{64}\) As regards the chronicle account as such, it would appear relatively clear that the date given in the Third Chronicle of Pskov is attributable to later editors, who assigned years to some sections of

\(^{58}\) NL1, pp. 87, 318; LR, lines 7677–7768; PL 1, pp. 3–4; PL 2, pp. 17–18, 22, 85–86.

\(^{59}\) The former bishop of Karelia, Frederick, was elected the new bishop of Dorpat. See LUB 6, no. 3042.

\(^{60}\) LR, lines 7725–28.

\(^{61}\) PL 1, p. 3; PL 2, p. 17.

\(^{62}\) PL 2, p. 22.

\(^{63}\) PL 2, p. 85.

the *vita*. The confrontation on the river Miropovna thus took place in 1268, after Wesenberg and before the siege of Pskov. The river “Miropovna”, which it was possible to reach from Pskov by boat and where there are some islands, may be identical with the bay of Meerapalu, which must have been significantly narrower in the 13th century than today. It would follow from this that the Russian villages on Lake Lämmijärvi or Lake Pskov were attacked by ship from Dorpat.65 The dating in the later Novgorod chronicles of the Miropovna battle to 1271 and the ensuing siege of Pskov to 1272 is an instance of an inaccurate chronological link between the *vita* of Dovmont and the text of the chronicle, which is why the campaigns of Pskov are described twice in some later Russian chronicles, under 1269 and then 1273.66

The date given for the siege of Pskov is also inconsistent: this took place in May or June but was the year 1268 or 1269? The date and weekday for the Battle of Wesenberg, which are given together in the chronicle, allow it to be dated with certainty to 1268.67 In the First Novgorod Chronicle the Battle of Wesenberg is recorded under the year 6776 (1268), and the siege of Pskov under 6777 (1269). If the start of the year in the chronicles is dated to 1 March, the siege would revert to 1268 in today’s system of dating.68 The following year has been claimed as more likely on the basis that the Livonian army was not in a position, following the defeat at Wesenberg, to embark on a new campaign just a few months later.69 It would appear that this claim is based on an overestimation of the size of troop contingents at the time. Moreover, the Livonian master of the Order himself took part in the siege of Pskov, but the bulk of his troops remained absent from the campaigns in northern Estonia that took place in February.

The year 1268 was also when the trade embargo with Novgorod was imposed by the Livonian territorial lords and merchants. On 30 May 1268 the former Livonian master Konrad von Mandern issued a charter in Lübeck confirming that the Teutonic Order had reached an agreement with the burghers of Lübeck and the entire merchant community stating that in that year they were not allowed to do business with “opponents of the faith, that is, with Russians from Novgorod”. This agreement had been negotiated by the envoys of the king of Denmark and of the bishop of Karelia, Frederick, simultaneously *postulatus*

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of Dorpat, and endorsed by all Livonian lords. Konrad von Mandern promised in return that if peace were to be agreed with Novgorod, all the burghers and merchants of Lübeck would be included and receive permission to travel freely to and from Rus'. If one of the territorial lords wished to go to war against Rus' on his own, he should not obstruct the exchange of goods, but “if all Christians were to go to war against the Russians on account of their arrogance, God forbid”, the merchants would have to be willing to enforce the trade embargo once again, “for the Catholic faith, which has been implanted with the blood of many honourable men, shall not be extirpated in Livonia for the sake of trade”.70 Konrad von Mandern had been provincial master in Livonia during the years 1263–66, when he abdicated and moved to Germany. In 1268 he was once again occupied with Livonian affairs, this time in Lübeck, most likely at the behest of the new provincial master, Otto von Lauterberg.71 The enforcement of a trade embargo, which was a common leverage used in trade relations, to serve the interests of the political conflict between Livonia and Rus' may indicate that trade issues lay behind the Novgorod military campaign. On the other hand, the merchants still had to be forced to introduce the trade embargo, which is also suggested by the pressure from the Danish side. Moreover, the dapi-fer (seneschal) Mads Gøye (d. 1270 in battle with the Lithuanians) was sent from Denmark to Estonia, indicating help from the motherland.72 Since the Pskovian campaign was actually under way at the end of May, the trade blockade signals that either an enduring war was expected or it was being used as a means of applying pressure during the hoped-for negotiations with Novgorod. What is certain is that the actions of the dignitaries in Livonia and Lübeck were not exactly well coordinated to say the least.

After the Pskov campaign, that is, about June 1268, Otto, the provincial master of the Order, and the city of Riga proclaimed in identical letters that the Teutonic Order, for the honour of God and glory of Christendom, had, with divine forethought, completely ransacked the city of Pskov, “which was a place of refuge for the traitors of Christian law”. A peace similar to that in the treaty of 1224 from the time of Master Volkwin and Bishop Albert was agreed with the Novgorod army. The merchants were called upon not to resume the exchange of goods until the conclusion of the peace, and to this end the Lübeck envoys

70 LUB 1, no. 408; HUB 1, no. 655.
were summoned to Livonia. It was therefore intended that the merchants too be involved in the final peace. The reference to Bishop Albert’s time, just as the expression in the Russian chronicles of “absolutely according to Novgorod’s will”, refers to the ‘good old’ peace agreements. Pskov’s role as traitor of Christianity mentioned in the letters may be linked on the one hand to Russian Orthodoxy and on the other to the conferment of the rank of prince on Dovmont, who just until recently had been pagan: Pskov was notably described as the helper of the traitors of the faith (Lithuanians?) and as their place of refuge. Although a scornful view of Novgorod and Pskov is expressed in the letters, their authors aim at concluding a secure peace acceptable to both sides. The use of such language is thus determined by the political situation and does not derive from any dispute about religious confession.

In 1268 Grand Prince Iaroslav Iaroslavich arrived in Novgorod and began to level certain accusations: “My men and my brothers, and yours also, are killed, and you have engaged in war with the Germans”. The grand prince attempted to reestablish his authority, repressing his opponents by force. Perhaps they had been the very ones to initiate the war with Livonia. The city wished to regain the prince’s goodwill, which it needed because no true reconciliation with the “Germans” had been achieved and the conflict was dragging on. In the winter of 1268–69 Prince Sviatoslav Iaroslavich gathered a large army from the north-east of Rus in which many princes, as well as the grand baskak (Mongol province administrator) of Vladimir, Amragan, took part. This army intended to attack Reval. Faced with this imminent danger, the “Germans” quickly dispatched emissaries to Novgorod: “We bow to all your terms, we withdraw from the whole of the Narva River (Норовы всюи отступаемся), but do not you shed any blood”.

Peace was subsequently agreed on the terms dictated by Novgorod; and because the offensive had not taken place in the end, Prince Sviatoslav planned a new attack on Karelia, but the city opposed this, and thus the army disbanded. Jaroslav Jaroslavich’s annoyance had evidently been provoked by the conflicts with the Teutonic Order in Livonia rather than by the war in northern Estonia. Hence, Novgorod itself might have been to blame when the Order broke its promise not to take part in the war on Danish territory. The agreement relating to the Narva River region was concluded with the Danish and northern Estonian rulers, not with the Order. Consequently, this agreement cannot be linked to the treaty agreed at Pskov. Although the agreement was later confirmed in Novgorod, it was based on the status quo. One might

73 LUB 1, nos. 410–11; HUB 1, nos. 656–57.
74 NL1, pp. 87–88, 319; cf. Симеоновская летопись, p. 73.
weigh up the possibility that the confirmation occurred simultaneously, with the Order representing all of Livonia, allowing it to secure its leading position.

The expression “withdraw from the whole of the Narva River” is hard to interpret. The logical way of understanding it would be to mean that the Estonians and Livonians renounced their claims to the territory beyond the Narva River in Votia, where Novgorod’s rule was increasingly asserting itself, but where the Danish vassals in Estonia claimed possessions at least until the end of the 13th century. It is not clear whether the castle built in 1256 during the Votia campaign of Dietrich von Kivel was still there. Perhaps the castle, which was located at a strategically important site, was the reason for Novgorod’s dissatisfaction. The possessions of Kivel c. 1240 were indeed close to Wesenberg and Tolsburg, the targets of the Russian campaign of 1268. Certainly by 1294 the castle had been destroyed and so perhaps lay abandoned during the 1268 campaign.

It would appear that the German merchants presented their proposal for peaceful trade with Novgorod in the autumn of 1268. This plan was not accepted, however, since the treaty concluded prior to April 1269 differs in some trade issues from these proposals. Since the Teutonic Order and Lübeck acted in concert, it is entirely feasible that the confirmation of the peace treaty with the Order and the conclusion of the trade treaty occurred simultaneously. The trade embargo against Novgorod had probably already ended by 1269. At the end of April 1270, just after Master Otto had been killed in February in fighting with the Lithuanians on the sea ice off the coast of Wiek, the vice-master Andreas and the city of Riga thanked Lübeck for its support in a joint letter. The letter otherwise noted that the burghers of Lübeck were themselves to blame for the confiscation of their goods, since they had ignored Master Otto’s warnings. At the recommendations of the territorial lords, the trade route had been closed along the entire course of the Daugava, but the

75 Johansen, Estlandliste, p. 136.
77 HUB 1, no. 663; LUB 1, no. 413; ST, no. 118.
78 HUB 1, no. 665; LUB 1, no. 414; ST, no. 118; GVNP, no. 31. See also LUB 1, no. 546; HUB 1, no. 1093 (1271).
79 LUB 1, no. 415; HUB 1, no. 667. Some scholars have described these negotiations as a failure: Khoroshkevich, “О происхождении,” pp. 130–31; Rennkamp, Studien, pp. 69–82. This is not the impression created by the document itself.
80 LUB 1, no. 417.
regions of Novgorod and Rus' were open for trade.81 The confiscation of goods referred to apparently took place on the Daugava and had nothing to do with relations with Novgorod. There is no clear answer about when the difficulties in the exchange of goods with Novgorod were resolved and whether the extant text of the 1268/69 treaty is the final version or only a draft.82 By the beginning of 1270 at the latest trade with Novgorod was again functioning normally via Riga.

The political situation in Novgorod was becoming more and more turbulent. At the beginning of 1269 there was a revolt against Iaroslav Iaroslavich. It was caused by the prince's wilfulness and failure to respect the city's traditional rights. The revolt developed into a full-scale military confrontation between Iaroslav and Novgorod. Iaroslav requested help from the Mongols, but Novgorod succeeded in blocking the arrival of the auxiliary troops. Novgorod itself was able to call on troops from Pskov, Ladoga, Karelia, Ingria, and Votia for support. Through the mediation of the metropolitan of Kiev, however, an agreement was reached in which both sides were forced to make concessions: Novgorod would have to continue to recognize Iaroslav as its prince in future too.83 It can be gleaned from the 16th-century Nikon Chronicle that Novgorod also called upon the “Germans” for help during this revolt.84 Anna Khoroshkevich believes this information to be reliable on the assumption that the German merchant community supported Novgorod in its conflict with the prince. She also presumes on the basis of Iaroslav's letter to Riga, mentioning the prince's authority, that he had discretion to deal with enemies, but that the merchants were promised “free travel” throughout the prince's possessions.85

After the 1268 war the border between Danish Estonia and Novgorod Votia became fixed for the following centuries. The Livonian attempts to continue the crusading effort to Ingria and Karelia virtually came to an end at this

81 LUB 1, no. 418; HUB 1, no. 678.
83 GVNP, no. 3; NA, no. 70; NL1, pp. 88–89, 319–21.
84 Летописный сборник, pp. 148–49. См. Лаврентьевская летопись, p. 525; Симеоновская летопись, p. 73.
point. Nonetheless, these regions remained a target for Swedish crusading and conquest.

6.4 Livonia, Novgorod, and Pskov, 1270–80

After Iaroslav Iaroslavich had reached the agreement with Novgorod at the beginning of 1270, before leaving the city he appointed one of his retinue, the Novgorod boyar Andrei Vorotislavich, as governor, “but he gave Prince Aigust to the Pskovians.” Prince Aigust, who is only mentioned once in the chronicles, is sometimes identified as Dovmont’s opponent and thus his appointment as prince of Pskov would have been a hostile move against Dovmont. There is also the opposite view, that Aigust could have been Dovmont’s right-hand man and governor in Pskov and was simply endorsed by Iaroslav Iaroslavich in his capacity as grand prince. Stephen Rowell contends that the reference is not to the appointment of Aigust as prince at all, but concerns his being handed over to Pskov and/or Dovmont.

The winter of 1270–71 was spent by Dovmont in Novgorod, or rather just outside the city, at the prince’s residence at Gorodishche. A meeting took place in Novgorod between the representatives of the Baltic trading towns to discuss the losses incurred during the disputes of 1269. Four princes, quatuor ex principibus regis, represented Grand Prince Iaroslav in these negotiations, namely Dovmundus, Surele, Wezcele, and Constantin. These were most likely Dovmont of Pskov, the grand prince’s brother Vasilii Iaroslavich (d. 1276), Konstantin Rostislavich from the Smolensk dynasty, and finally a certain Prince Kirill.

Grand Prince Iaroslav Iaroslavich died in that same winter of 1271–72. His brother, the new grand prince Vasilii Iaroslavich, and Dmitrii, the son of Aleksandr Iaroslavich, competed for the throne in Novgorod. Novgorod chose Dmitrii. This signalled the outbreak of hostilities between Tver and Novgorod, given Vasilii’s connections with Tver. Vasilii had gained the advantage by 1273, with the result that Novgorod was forced to pay homage to him as prince. Vasilii

86 NL1, pp. 89, 321.
89 Rowell, “Between Lithuania and Ruś,” pp. 15–16. According to Rowell, Lithuania, p. 21, Aigust could have been the aforementioned son of Tautvila who had flown to Novgorod.
90 HUB 1, no. 1093; LUB 1, no. 546. On the date (1271) and the individuals, see Rowell, “Between Lithuania and Ruś,” pp. 13–16. See also NA, p. 150.
died in the winter of 1276–77, upon which Dmitrii Aleksandrovich became both grand prince of Vladimir and prince of Novgorod. However, Dmitrii’s position was not secure either in Novgorod as grand prince, which his brother Andrei himself decided to fight for. Dmitrii built a wooden castle at Koporye in 1273, which by the following year had already been upgraded to a stone structure with the help of the Novgorod burghers and community. In 1281 Dmitrii and Novgorod were at war with one another, as were Andrei and Dmitrii, both of whom exploited disagreements within the Horde to call on help from Mongol forces: Andrei enlisted the troops of the khan Töde Möngke (d. 1287) and Dmitrii those of Emir Noghai (d. 1300).91 The Novgorodians supported Andrei in this conflict, taking Dmitrii’s wife and children hostage and demanding the castle of Koporye in return for their release. In the fighting over Koporye Prince Dovmont of Pskov also fought for Dmitrii against Novgorod and Andrei. Although the latter was able to gain the position of grand prince during 1281–83, it finally went to Dmitrii in 1283. In 1284 the joined forces of Dmitrii, Andrei, and the Mongols forced Novgorod to accept Dmitrii Aleksandrovich as prince.

The collaboration between Dovmont and Dmitrii Aleksandrovich was further reinforced by the marriage between Dmitrii’s daughter Maria and Dovmont sometime around 1281.92 This marriage alliance with the Riuriksids served to legitimize Dovmont’s power in Pskov. When a group of princes from north-eastern Rus’ and Mongol troops led by Andrei launched the next campaign against Dmitrii in 1293, it was to Pskov that he fled. Andrei finally secured his position as grand prince and Novgorod was obliged to recognize his rule. However, the conflict continued in the 1290s, as hostile coalitions of princes were formed. The princes of Rostov and Yaroslavl supported Grand Prince Andrei, while the opposing side could count on the princes of Pereiaslav, Tver, and Moscow. During the famine of 1296 Andrei’s representatives were driven from Novgorod and replaced by representatives of Prince Daniil Aleksandrovich of Moscow (d. 1303), Aleksandr Iaroslavich’s youngest son, although in 1298 Andrei was again able to reestablish his authority.93

These power struggles in Rus’ are not directly reflected in its relations with Livonia. For example, they did not affect Pskov’s right to tribute in the north-east of Latvia, which remained in place right into the last quarter of the
13th century. The chronicles of Pskov reveal that “in January 1285 the Germans killed the tribute collectors from Pskov, 40 men, in Adsel”. An inventory of losses suffered by German merchants in Rus’ compiled a few decades later may throw some light on what happened. The Pskovians are said to have confiscated assets from the merchants worth 40 or 60 marks in 1288 out of revenge for the death of Pskovians in Adsel at the hands of the Teutonic Knight Otto Paschedach with “men from Rositten” (perhaps meaning with the bailiff of Rositten and his men). Although the years stated in the accounts do not quite coincide—either could be wrong—we are clearly dealing here with one and the same incident. The aim of the reprisals against the merchants was to influence the negotiations that followed the killing of the tribute collectors. Adsel had been within the Order’s territory even under Bishop Albert, and the castle at Rositten had also already been built by the 1280s, but the question is why the “men from Rositten” were in Adsel? Rositten lies some 100 km south of Adsel Land and the areas were separated by the archbishop’s territory. We also do not know whether Pskov’s representatives had the right to collect the tribute themselves or whether the Order dealt with this and was then to hand it over. The killing of the tribute collectors would make sense if the latter were the case. This act of violence in 1285 on no account meant the end of the duty to pay tribute. We do not know when this occurred.

In 1277 the Russians had arrested German merchants, killed them on the Daugava River, and seized their assets. This constituted a violation “of kissings of the cross and confirmations of peace”. In their letter to the merchants of the Baltic cities, all the territorial lords of Livonia and the Danish captain presiding in Reval proclaimed that responsibility for what had occurred must be borne not by the Russians, but the Lithuanians. The attack had taken place under their rule and they had divided up the booty, which they could use to wage war on Livonia. In the same letter the territorial lords expressed their regret over injustices meted out to the merchants in Novgorod. They were of the opinion that the marketplace (forum mercandi) should be moved to a suitable place, either in Livonia or Estonia, and for this they needed the consent of

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94 PL 1, pp. 13–14; PL 2, pp. 22, 88. The (stone) castle of Marienburg had not been built at that point. See Bartholomäus Hoeneke, Liivimaa noorem riikkroonika p. 72. On the date, see Bonnell, Russisch-liwiländische Chronographie, commentary p. 124.
95 HUB 3, p. 424 no. 187; LUB 6, no. 2770.
96 See Keussler, Ausgang, p. 77. The castle of Ludsen is mentioned for the first time in the documents in 1433. See LUB 8, no. 746. Nazarova, “Псков и Ливония,” pp. 604–05, asks whether the tribute collectors had not arrived late or for the second time in Adsel.
the merchants.\textsuperscript{97} The events on the Daugava can be linked to the war between the Teutonic Order and Traidenis at the end of the 1270s; on that occasion Rus’ acted partly as the ally and subject of the Lithuanians.\textsuperscript{98} This incident and vaguely described difficulties in Novgorod (which might have occurred earlier) enabled the territorial lords to demand that the towns move their business to Livonia, in other words under their control and supervision. The merchant towns agreed to the trade embargo, wishing to use the opportunity to settle a dispute in Novgorod and show their willingness to cooperate with the Livonian powers. But the trade embargo was aimed against Novgorod, and the trade along the Daugava is no longer mentioned in this document.\textsuperscript{99} At the beginning of 1278 Archbishop Johannes of Riga, Ernst von Ratzeburg, master of the Livonian Order, and the Danish captain in charge in Reval sent a letter drafted in Riga, also in the name of Bishop Frederick of Dorpat and Bishop Hermann of Ösel, to Lübeck and all the Baltic towns thanking them for their decision to enforce the blockade against Rus’ and reiterating their intention to prohibit the merchants from trading in Rus’ as from Easter. Trade in Livonia would be conducted as before.\textsuperscript{100} This embargo was instigated by the Livonian territorial lords and for that reason did not exactly correspond to the interests of the merchants. Relocating trade to Livonia meant that the territorial lords would be able to control it better and more effectively. Although the merchants had to show themselves satisfied with the trade embargo, it is not known what influence this might have had on relations between Livonia and Rus’.\textsuperscript{101} In 1282 the cities of Riga and Lübeck and the German merchant community in Visby entered into a treaty with a term of eight years whose aim was the protection of merchants travelling from Lübeck and the straits of Denmark to Novgorod.\textsuperscript{102} This treaty may have been aimed against the territorial lords.

The archbishop of Riga, Johannes von Vechten, wrote to Lübeck in 1287 explaining that the Rigans, whom Lübeck blamed for the loss of goods, were not at fault. This referred to a peace that had been entered into by Archbishop Johannes (1273/74–84), Ernst (d. 1279), the Order’s provincial master, the city of Riga, and Grand Duke Traidenis of Lithuania and his subjects. The grand duke had not abided by this treaty, having attacked Livonia. The goods of a merchant from Münster, who had set off up the Daugava at his own risk, had

\textsuperscript{97} LUB 1, no. 452. Cf. LUB 1, no. 453; HUB 1, no. 786.
\textsuperscript{98} Rowell, “Between Lithuania and Ruś,” p. 13; LR, lines 8208–94.
\textsuperscript{99} LUB 6, no. 2766.
\textsuperscript{100} LUB 1, nos. 457–58; LUR, nos. 1213–14; cf. no. 1221a.
\textsuperscript{101} See Goetz, Deutsch-Russische Handelsgeschichte, pp. 52–54, 457–58.
\textsuperscript{102} DD 2/3, no. 47; LUB 1, no. 481.
been lost as a result of this attack. Perhaps the merchants of Vitebsk had also complained about the Rigans in relation to the same incident at least around the same time. In 1288 and 1292 German merchants suffered losses while travelling between Novgorod and Pskov. As we have already mentioned, the culprits in 1288 were the Pskovians, who had taken revenge for the killing of Pskovians in Adsel by launching these raids. These incidents may to some extent be coincidence but the size of the losses and the stress on the element of vengeance suggest that they may indeed have been planned acts of violence.

The conflicts in Karelia and probably also in Votia at the end of the 13th century are linked to trade issues. According to the Novgorod Chronicle, Titmanovich (see p. 230) built his “father’s castle” on the eastern bank of the Narva River in 1294. In response, the Novgorodians burned down the castle during their campaign and occupied his “large village” (село его великое), which may have been the centre of Kivel’s possessions, burning it to the ground too. The Vironian vassal then attempted to rebuild the castle first erected in 1256 and later abandoned or destroyed. At this time Novgorod had strengthened its presence in Votia even further. The Novgorodian princes and the city fortified Koporye in 1279, 1280, and 1297. Thereafter Koporye was Novgorod’s permanent stronghold on the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland. The Novgorod Chronicle sees the building of the castle by Titmanovich as a private undertaking by a vassal. However, it is apparent from the letter of February 1296 from the Estonian vassals to the Danish king that some vassals had robbed the merchants beyond the Narva River, in iurisdiccione Rutenica. It was said that the danger of assault lay from Russians.

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103 LUB 1, no. 507; HUB 1, no. 1015; LUB 6, no. 3051. Cf. LUB 6, no. 3052; HUB 1, no. 1028.
107 DD 2/4, no. 199; LUB 3, no. 562a.
At the same time there was fighting between the Swedish and Novgorod rulers in Karelia and in the river Neva region. Western sources in general still regarded the Karelians as pagans. In 1275 Pope Gregory X wrote a letter at the request of the king of Sweden to the archbishop of Uppsala and his suffragans urging them to fight “against the pagans of Karelia, Ingria, Lapland, and Votia”\(^\text{108}\). The pope also forbade at the king’s request supplying these pagans with “weapons, iron, wood, and other things that could inflict harm on Christians”\(^\text{109}\), threatening with excommunication anyone who disobeyed. The ban on the import of wood naturally originated from the Mediterranean region with its scarcity of forests. Similar prohibitions on selling arms to the pagans had earlier been issued by Innocent IV\(^\text{110}\) and Urban IV\(^\text{111}\) for the Baltic. As with this ban, they were aimed against the pagans, not Rus’. The Swedish measure was tied to the ongoing or planned conflicts in Karelia.

Prince Dmitrii Aleksandrovich and the Novgorodians attacked Karelia in 1278. During the next few years the Swedes conducted campaigns to Lake Ladoga and Karelia, while the Novgorodians were back in Tavastia in 1292. The next year Swedish troops built the castle of Viborg during the so-called Third Crusade, which the Novgorodians were unable to capture, although Sweden’s plan to build a castle at Kexholm in 1295 failed. Fifteen years later the Novgorodians built their own castle of Korela on the same site. The Swedes were also unsuccessful in trying to build a fort on the river Neva. The castle of Landskrona built there by the Swedes in 1300 had already been occupied a year later by the troops of Grand Prince Andrei Aleksandrovich and Novgorod\(^\text{112}\).

There is no evidence that the Roman curia approved these military offensives\(^\text{113}\). The possible venture of Titmanovich, the son of Dietrich von Kivel, in Votia fits in well with contemporary Swedish operations in Karelia. John Lind has

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\(^{108}\) FMU 8, no. 6568; ST 1, no. 78.

\(^{109}\) FMU 1, no. 151; ST 1, no. 79.

\(^{110}\) LUB 1, nos. 201, 257; PUB 1/1, no. 275.

\(^{111}\) LUB 1, no. 371. In 1285 King Magnus of Sweden issued a similar provision regarding the Karelians. See ST 1, no. 141.

\(^{112}\) NL1, pp. 91, 330: “The same year (1300/6808) the Swedes came from beyond sea in great strength into the Neva; they brought masters from their own land, and they brought a special master from great Rome from the Pope, and they established a town at the mouth of the river Okhta on the Neva”. Cf. Shaskolskii, Борьба Руси за сохранение выхода, р. 30; Anna L. Khoroshkevich, “Католики в представлениях русских летописцев XV—XX вв.,” in Katolicyzm w Rosji i Prawosławie w Polsce (XI—XX w), ed. Juliusz Bardach et al. (Warsaw, 1997), p. 37; Lindkvist, “Crusades,” pp. 124–25.

\(^{113}\) See Lind, “Consequences,” pp. 143–44.
put forward the hypothesis that Kivel and Sweden worked together to gain control of the two trade routes in the Gulf of Finland leading to Novgorod. But the brief account in the chronicles does not allow general conclusions to be drawn. Nonetheless, it can be established that Kivel, a leading north Estonian vassal, was well versed in the political situation.

As part of the rivalry between Sweden and Denmark, King Erik Menved of Denmark (1286–1319) granted trade freedoms to the merchants of Lübeck, Gotland, and all Baltic towns in 1294. Crucial was the right to use the land route in Estonia via Vironia and crossing the Narva River towards Novgorod. This was in fact a reaction to the reinforcement of Swedish control and the insecure conditions along the river Neva. The counter-privilege granted by King Birger of Sweden (d. 1321) to Lübeck and the Baltic towns the following year was not as extensive. The king announced that he had converted the pagan Karelians to the Catholic faith and had built the castle of Viborg in their land for the glory of God and the Virgin, the protection of the kingdom, and to guarantee seafaring and peace. The Karelians were said to have received support in their unbelief from the Russians, who were only interested in their worldly goods and had no fear of God. The Russians were thus regarded as unbelievers in this text. The king confirmed that Viborg was not permitted to harm the merchants and promised them that next spring before Midsummer’s Day and for another year afterwards they would be able to travel freely to Novgorod, on condition, however, that they neither supplied the Russians with weapons, iron, steel, or similar goods nor gave them any counsel that could inflict harm on the king. The king did not promise Russian ships an escort in the event of war; normally this would have been up to three men per barge. The interests of the trading towns and Sweden were therefore at odds in this struggle, whereas those of Denmark and Novgorod tended to be compatible. The latter found expression in the treaty concluded in 1302 between Denmark and Novgorod (see p. 269). The increasing significance of the land route through Vironia and Votia gave greater importance to these regions.

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115 DD 2/4, no. 143; LUB 1, no. 555. See also Kivimiae, “Была ли Нарва,” p. 117.
116 HUB 1, no. 1174; LUB 1, no. 559.
The Internal Conflict in Livonia

The conflict between the Teutonic Order in Livonia and the Samogitians, Lithuanians, and Semgallians continued in the 1280s. Following campaigns with heavy losses on both sides, the Order was finally able to conquer Semgallia by c. 1290. This marked virtually the final extent of Old Livonia, although its borders to the south and south-west would always be somewhat disputed. These conflicts forced the Livonian territorial lords to cooperate with one another to a certain extent. There were nevertheless ongoing tensions between the archbishop of Riga and the Livonian Order, although they did not always come to the fore. One of the key areas of friction between the archbishop and the Order was control of the city of Riga. The city, which had been founded by Bishop Albert before the Order of the Sword Brothers, had become prosperous in a short space of time. In 1274 the Teutonic Order received a charter from Rudolf I, the king of Germany, which contained a fictitious account transferring rule of Riga to it. Hence the Order claimed lordship over the town. The conflicts between the city and the Order had intensified by the end of the 13th century. About 1282 the attempt by the archbishop to persuade the Lithuanian prince Dovmont (d. 1285) to convert to Christianity failed. This could have strengthened the archbishop’s position vis-à-vis the Order had he succeeded. The archbishop and the Order promised in 1292 to recognize the other’s rights and support one another, but the Order clearly had the dominant role in agreeing the treaty.

The tensions that had been building up over the years in Livonia came to a head in Riga in early 1297. The war to come was sparked by a relatively trivial incident. The city of Riga had begun to shore up the river banks to protect itself against the flooding of the Daugava that occurred early in the year. A bridge was built across the Riga River to make construction work easier. However, this had the effect of blocking the free access of shipping to the Order’s castle, then

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118 LUB 1, no. 445.
120 Zeugenverhör, p. 29 witness VII, para. 34; cf. p. 210; Michał Giedroyć, “The Arrival of Christianity in Lithuania: Between Rome and Byzantium (1281–1341),” OSP, New Series 20 (1987), 1–3. The possibility that relations between the Teutonic Order and the king of Denmark were strained is further suggested by the transumpt issued in 1282 by the archbishop of Riga, the abbot of Dünamünde, and the mendicant orders of Riga of the confirmation of the Treaty of Stensby by Innocent IV. See DD 2/3, no. 22; LUR, nos. 1259–60.
121 LUB 1, nos. 544–45.
located in the eastern part of the city. When members of the order unilaterally opened a passageway in the bridge, in response to which the city council made enquiries with the Order’s castle commander, Bruno (d. 1298), the provincial master of the Order, ordered the destruction of the bridge and revoked all existing privileges from the Order enjoyed by the city residents. Both parties initially resolved to postpone the resolution of the dispute until the return of Archbishop Johannes, who was abroad at the time, but war with the Order had broken out by the summer. An agreement regarding a truce had been reached in November as a result of the mediation of the Livonian bishops and the north German towns, but by the end of the year the Order was no longer prepared to extend the agreement. Its representatives justified this on the grounds that the archbishop of Riga, the bishops of Dorpat and Ösel, and the city of Riga had joined in an alliance against the Order. The Order announced the end of the truce to the bishops and seized the castle of Leal, which it administered together with the bishop of Ösel. After the archbishop too had suffered a defeat, the bishop of Dorpat left the coalition set up against the Order as a consequence. Archbishop Johannes was imprisoned for some time and his castles of Treyden and Kokenhusen occupied by the Order. It was in these circumstances that the city and cathedral chapter of Riga was forced to ask pagan Lithuania for help.

In 1298 Lithuanians, in part together with the city of Riga, launched a number of attacks on the Order’s territory, but met defeat at the hands of a contingent that had arrived from Prussia. At the beginning of 1299 a new truce was agreed in Lübeck thanks to the mediation of the Hanseatic towns. When in 1305 the monastery of Dünamünde was sold by the Cistercian Order to the Teutonic Order on the pretext that the Cistercians were not capable of defending their possessions from the Lithuanians, the city of Riga called the Lithuanians into the country to act against the Order, but the latter defeated them near Riga in 1307. Despite these setbacks the alliance against the Order held together over the new few years. In 1309 a mediation attempt by the bishops of Reval and Dorpat failed: the city of Riga insisted on the alliance with the Lithuanians as long as the monastery of Dünamünde continued in the Order’s possession. Not until June 1313 was peace reached between the Order and the city of Riga.

Relations between Lithuania and Livonia themselves played an increasingly important role from the beginning of the 14th century in the relationship between Livonia and Rus’, a development also reflected in the language used in the sources to describe them.

The Order was itself involved in trade, including Lithuanian trade. The competition in trade was one of the causes of the conflict between the city and the Order. In the 13th and 14th centuries Riga was the centre of trade for the whole
of Lithuania; both the city and the Order conducted trade with the Lithuanians and came into close contact with them as a result.\textsuperscript{122} The city’s regular residents included not only Russians, but also Lithuanians. The Lithuanians were paradoxically lucrative trading partners for the Teutonic Order, given that it was actually a crusading institution set up against them and in the name of the crusade, whereby its position vis-à-vis its commercial rivals was guaranteed by privileges granted by the pope.\textsuperscript{123}

Although the Livonian ‘civil’ war had been triggered by the clash between the city of Riga and the Teutonic Order, in reality it was a conflict between territorial lords, above all between the Teutonic Order and archbishop of Riga. Both sides claimed supremacy in Livonia, with the Order undoubtedly the militarily stronger of the two. Apart from the fact that there was no absolute agreement among the Order’s rivals, even together they would not have been in a position to defeat the Order as a military organization; thus the archbishop and the city had no choice but to seek outside help. The only possible sources of military aid were the Lithuanian and Russian princes.

On the eve of the internal Livonian conflict relations between the Order and the bishop of Ösel deteriorated over various territorial claims. The Order proceeded to occupy the bishopric, forcing the bishop to renounce the support of the city of Riga and its archbishop.\textsuperscript{124} Theodoric Vyshusen, who supported the Order, became bishop of Dorpat in 1302.\textsuperscript{125} Archbishop Frederick Pernstein later considered his appointment illegal.\textsuperscript{126} Another potential, Catholic source of help for the Rigan camp was Denmark. At the turn of the 13th and 14th centuries King Erik Menved of Denmark was able to strengthen his position on the southern Baltic coast, and the internal conflict in Livonia enabled him to reinforce his position there as well. The cathedral chapter and city of Riga entered into an alliance with the king in 1298 according to which the king

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{123} Mažeika, “Of cabbages and knights,” pp. 72–76.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Busch, \textit{Nachgelassene Schriften}, pp. 46–69.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Schonebohm, “Besetzung,” p. 340. This would also explain why the bishop of Dorpat in particular funded the reconstruction of the Dünaburg.
\item \textsuperscript{126} \textit{Zeugenverhör}, p. xii.
\end{itemize}
would receive the territories of Semgallia, Gerzike, and Nalsen in return for his help in the conflict with the Order. These were areas that belonged to vassals allied with the Order at the time (Semgallia, Gerzike), or that could not be won from Lithuania (Nalsen). The king of Denmark thus clearly wished to control not only the northern trade route with Rus’, but also the Daugava route.\footnote{See Lind, “Den dansk-russiske traktat,” pp. 16–19, 30–31; Johansen, “Riga-Wisby-Urkunde,” pp. 106–08; DD 2/4, nos. 320–21; LUB 1, nos. 572–73.}

Despite the great tension within Livonia, the Livonian army embarked on a campaign against Rus’: The Order forced the bishopric of Dorpat to leave the coalition against it, and they were already advancing together against Pskov in 1299. On 8 February that year the bishop of Dorpat issued a transumpt of the charter relating to Iaroslav Vladimirovich’s inheritance (see p. 166) and confirmed to the Order its claim to possession of half of Pskov’s territory. This action was justified on the grounds that “we are unjustly forced to bear without reason the pressure and attacks of wild tyranny from the Russians, who have devastated with burning and plunder the majority of our dioceses”.\footnote{LUB 3, no. 580a; Schirren, \textit{Verzeichniss}, p. 2; p. 4, no. 38.}

It would appear from this that the Russians (Pskovians?) had invaded the bishopric of Dorpat. The question is when this occurred, whether there was in fact a Russian attack on Dorpat in the 1290s, or whether unstable relations and minor border skirmishes are reflected in this account.\footnote{See Stern, “Dorpat-Pleskauer Kämpfe,” pp. 100–02.}

There is, however, indeed a reference to a confrontation that took place shortly before. In 1298 German merchants on the way to Novgorod were robbed \textit{in Poloco}, that is, perhaps on the river Polonka near Porkhov. Representatives of the bishop of Dorpat and the Teutonic Order (\textit{fratres}) then met with those from Novgorod and Pskov. The Novgorodians and the Pskovians promised, by kissing the cross, to repair the damage. Part of the booty had been distributed to the “Lithuanians”, who it follows must have taken part in the ambush. But the merchants were robbed once again after this agreement, nor were the envoys’ costs of delegation reimbursed as was customary.\footnote{HUB 3, 424, no. 187; LUB 6, no. 2770. See Osten-Sacken, “Hansehandel,” p. 66.}

The participation by the Order and the bishop in the discussion of the robbery of German merchants as well as the attack by Lithuania on two occasions suggest that the incident must have been of political significance. One other source points towards a complex trade conflict around this time: about fifteen years later the Order attempted to defend itself from certain accusations, whose details are not known, with the story that the Lithuanians had once robbed merchants from Riga and other towns on the way to Novgorod, but that the city residents
of Riga had claimed that the culprits were Russians. The trading towns had then imposed a trade embargo on Novgorod, but this was not complied with and so was then revoked.\textsuperscript{131} It appears that Riga had good reason to blame the Order which probably exploited a smaller, ‘routine’ trading conflict for its own political ends, thus creating complications for the towns.

At the beginning of 1299 the Livonian master of the Order was petitioning for support from Lübeck on the basis of the trade privilege granted to this city. He was concerned that the Order in Livonia faced the risk of hostility from Russians and pagans, or their allies. These allies should be understood to refer to the city of Riga and its archbishop.\textsuperscript{132} The \textit{vita} of Prince Dovmont does indeed contain an account of the attack by Pskov on Estonian territory prior to the Livonian counteroffensive of 1299. The attack is justified as retaliation for a previous attack by the “Latins” meaning Livonians.\textsuperscript{133}

In March 1299 the “Germans” burned the outskirts of Pskov and plundered the monastery outside the city. Those defending the castle launched a counter-attack led by Dovmont and won the ensuing battle. The men of the Teutonic Order (\textit{вельневици}, literally ‘the men of Fellin’) taken prisoner were handed over by Dovmont to Grand Prince Andrei Aleksandrovich, who was also prince of Novgorod.\textsuperscript{134} There is no mention of this attack in the Livonian sources. The Order’s participation is mentioned in the \textit{vita} of Dovmont and the sources derived from it; the transumpt of 8 February mentioned above confirmed the collaboration between the Order and bishopric of Dorpat. Later on Pskov always took part in the internal Livonian conflict on Riga’s side. Since the offensive against Pskov of March 1299 took place at the same time as the fighting in Livonia, this attack should be seen in the same context. A possible cause of the dispute between the Order and Pskov may have been Adsel, while the fishing rights to Lake Lämmijärv were disputed between Dorpat and Pskov. Moreover, yet another ambush of merchants took place, which could

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Zeugenverhör}, pp. 205–06 supplement IX, paras. 289–98.
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{PL} 1, p. 4; \textit{PL} 2, pp. 18, 86. \textit{Rusen} took part in 1298 as allies of the city of Riga in the war against the Teutonic Order. See \textit{Aufzeichnungen Albrechts}, pp. 314–15. It is not known whether they came from Pskov or the territory under Lithuanian control. Cf. Nazarova, “Псков и Ливония,” p. 604.
\textsuperscript{134} \textit{PL} 1, pp. 4, 14; \textit{PL} 2, pp. 18, 22, 86–87; \textit{NL1}, p. 329; cf. \textit{SL1}, p. 365.
equally have provoked this offensive. What is unclear is when the second assault on the merchants, mentioned above, took place, i.e. before or after the siege of Pskov. The participation of the representatives of the bishop of Dorpat and the Order in the trade negotiations leads us to think that the losses incurred by the merchants in 1298 had already been discussed during later talks when the territorial lords were attempting to resolve their disputes with Pskov (although the sources do not contain any confirmation of peace after the 1299 campaign). The political ties between Novgorod and Pskov, which come to light in the description of the events of 1299, can only confirm this theory.

In the same year Pskov was struck by an epidemic. Its victims included Prince Dovmont, who the Novgorod chronicles say “had suffered for St Sophia and the Holy Trinity”, i.e. he defended the interests of both Novgorod and Pskov. After Dovmont’s death, Pskov remained tied to Grand Prince Andrei Aleksandrovich. Between 1299 and 1304 one of Andrei’s followers, Fedor Mikhailovich of Beloozero, became prince of Pskov, who, “after the enemy troops had arrived, went away, leaving the city and paying no heed to the petitions of Novgorod and Pskov”. Andrei was apparently attempting to prevent the accession of a new Lithuanian prince to the throne of Pskov, but it emerged that Novgorod was not satisfied with Fedor’s activity. It is hard to determine what military campaign is being referred to here. There is no mention of a military confrontation between Livonia and Pskov at this time. Fedor may have taken part in the fighting between Novgorod and Sweden. Also conceivable would be the use of force by a Lithuanian duke to enforce his entitlement to Dovmont’s inheritance.

Grand Prince Andrei died in 1304. Mikhail Iaroslavich of Tver and Iurii Danilovich of Moscow fought to succeed him as grand prince. Mikhail was able to prevail in the eyes of the Horde. In 1307 he also attempted to enforce his claims in Novgorod. In 1312, when Tver and Novgorod were at war, Mikhail forced Novgorod to cede and pay a large sum in compensation for blocking the transport routes east of the city. At this time Pskov continued to be ruled by the grand prince of Vladimir, this now being Mikhail of Tver, and in 1309 or 1310
by his representative Ivan Fedorovich, whose provenance is unknown. In 1313 a certain Prince Boris was in Pskov, whose origins are unknown, but who may have been connected to Mikhail Iaroslavich of Tver. In the same year Uzbek (d. 1342) acceded to the position of khan in the Horde. Mikhail Iaroslavich remained at the Horde until 1315, while the war between Novgorod and Sweden carried on. In Mikhail’s absence his rival, the ruler of Moscow, Iurii Danilovich, and the latter’s ally Fedor of Rzhev offered Novgorod their military support against Tver. The military clashes between Tver and Novgorod came to an end during the famine of 1314–16. Mikhail, who had returned from the Horde, defeated the Novgorodian army at Torzhok in 1316, but immediately afterwards there was a revolt against Mikhail’s rule in Novgorod. The Novgorod troops who were meant to muster against Mikhail Iaroslavich included the contingent from Pskov. The struggle for rule in Novgorod was necessary for the princes on financial grounds too, since it guaranteed the fiscal revenues that enabled them to ascend to the throne of grand prince and defend it. There was indeed an economic crisis precisely in the second decade of 14th century both in Rus’ and Livonia, which might at least partly explain the political tumult on both sides of Lake Peipus. There were huge price increases in Novgorod and Pskov during 1303–04. Rus’ was stricken by hunger in the years 1309–10, as a result of which it was not possible to pay the tribute to the Horde. There were revolts in Novgorod. A few years later in 1314 a period of famine began in Rus’, Livonia, and the whole of northern Europe, lasting until 1317. The internal war worsened Livonia’s economic situation, above all for Riga, since the Daugava region was particularly badly affected by the warfare. Trade along the Daugava continued to function despite this. This is evidenced by the trade treaties that were entered into and confirmed. The validity of the treaty concluded in 1229 with Smolensk was confirmed by the princes of Smolensk, Aleksandr Glebovich (1297–1313) and Ivan Aleksandrovich (1313–58). Aleksandr seized power in Smolensk, having...
fought against his own uncle Fedor Rostislavich (d. 1299). His confirmation of the treaty was probably related to this usurpation of power.\textsuperscript{144}

Some historical studies have argued that Polotsk did not become definitively subject to Lithuania until the beginning of the 14th century, after the conflict between the Teutonic Order and Grand Duke Vytenis (c. 1295–1315). This assertion, which is particularly firmly rooted in Russian historiography thanks to Nikolai Karamzin, has no foundation and is based on Maciej Stryjkowski’s account of the conquest of Polotsk by the Lithuanians in 1307. This event was conflated by historians with accounts of the relations between Polotsk and Livonia belonging to an earlier period, as well as of the Order's influence on Polotsk (see p. 206).\textsuperscript{145} The rapid expansion of the area under Lithuanian control at the beginning of the 14th century was achieved mainly through dynastic coalitions and political collaboration, not by means of military conquest.\textsuperscript{146} There were thus different possible grades of dependency of the Russian centres of power on the Lithuanian grand dukes. Polotsk had been extremely closely allied with Lithuania since the time of Tautvila and Gerdenis, even though members of the local dynasty would rule on the ground from time to time. Around the turn of the century Iakov, the bishop of Polotsk, was the ruler there. In a letter to the provost and city council of Riga he assured them that he backed the peace agreed between Riga and its “son”, Grand Duke Vytenis.\textsuperscript{147} The treaty referred to was apparently that agreed between the city of Riga, the archbishopric, and Grand Duke Vytenis. In an attempt to justify this treaty with the pagan ruler against the Christian Order, the council of Riga, its cathedral chapter, the abbot of Dünamünde, the Rigan mendicant friars, the captain of the crusaders in Riga, and representatives of some other cities publicly announced in March 1298 that the Lithuanian envoys had promised, despite the Order's counter-actions, to convert to Christianity, just as

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\textsuperscript{146} Rowell, \textit{Lithuania}, pp. 82–111.
\end{flushright}
Mindaugas had once done.\textsuperscript{148} Although we do not know whether Vytenis truly gave expression to this desire to accept Christianity,\textsuperscript{149} this political collaboration is indeed described using ecclesiastical terms. This was either for the good or the bad of all Christians, regardless of how one looked at it.

Although the open hostilities and military campaigns ongoing since 1299 subsided for some time, there were still opposing factions in Livonia for whom it was of the utmost importance to obtain support from outside. The joint rebellion against King Erik Menved, who wished to restore Denmark's leading position in the Baltic, had the effect of bringing the Teutonic Order and the Danish king's vassals in Estonia closer. In 1303 King Erik gave Estonia to his brother Christopher as a fief for six years, triggering outright opposition among his Estonian vassals.\textsuperscript{150} In February 1304, in either Dorpat or Weißenstein, a treaty of alliance was concluded between the Teutonic Order in Livonia, the king of Denmark's vassals in Estonia, and the bishoprics of Dorpat and Ösel. The extant text shows that this alliance reflected above all the interests of the Order and the vassals and was aimed against the city of Riga, the archbishop, his allies, and the Danish king. One of the arguments used in the text by the parties to justify their collaboration was Livonia's location—“surrounded by evil peoples, namely unbelieving Russians and pagan Lithuanians and other enemies of Christianity”—which could be pernicious for the \textit{novella plantacio} of the faith. This was why the parties had agreed to fight together against all attempts to change the position of the Danish king's vassals in Estonia, as well as against the archbishop and city of Riga and its internal and external allies, hence also against “Lithuanian pagans or Russians". By means of this treaty the Teutonic Order forced its allies to support it, while also forbidding them from helping their opponents in the event that any future court of arbitration between Riga and the Order would find in favour of the former. This was a reference to the eventuality that if the Order, the bishops of Ösel and Dorpat or the Danish vassals were, jointly or individually, to come into conflict with the Russians "over borders or on other grounds", a court of arbitration composed of representatives from all the Livonian powers would be appointed to investigate the case. If this court were to decide that Livonia was in the right, all the allies would have to go to war against the Russians; but if the Russians were ruled to be right, the others were not to interfere in the conflict. Anyone who

\textsuperscript{148} LUB 1, no. 570. Cf. the Order's perspective in \textit{Hermanni Chronicon}, pp. 54–56.


provoked an unjust (inüste) war with the Russians would not receive support from the other parties.\textsuperscript{151}

The main purpose of this treaty was to undermine and isolate the archbishop of Riga and his allies and to offer the northern Estonian vassals something in return for their support.\textsuperscript{152} The Teutonic Order retained its freedom of action, but its partners were bound by their obligations under the treaty. Rus’ and the Lithuanians appeared as potential allies of Riga. It can indeed be assumed that Pskov’s troops also took part in the campaigns in 1298–99 in support of Riga (see p. 263). Potential border disputes with Rus’ were to be anticipated, as were various just and unjust wars against the Russian territories. The allusion to border disputes concerned especially the situation of the bishop of Dorpat.\textsuperscript{153} Such a possibility also suggests the intention on the part of the Danish vassals and the bishop of Ösel of conquering the areas east of the Narva River. It must of course be added that when the treaty was agreed neither the bishop of Ösel nor the bishop of Dorpat were able to act independently of the Order. The danger that issued from the pagans and threatened Danish possessions in Estonia is also mentioned in a letter from Boniface VIII dated March 1299, thus signifying that the plans to conquer Votia were still alive among the Estonian vassals.\textsuperscript{154} In 1304 the bishops of Ösel and Dorpat issued a transumpt of the Treaty of Stensby,\textsuperscript{155} which was intended to protect the Order from Erik Menved’s ambitions. In 1301 Pope Boniface VIII released the bishopric of Reval from the excommunication that had been imposed on the Danish state. In the supplication in question the northern Estonian clergy and Bishop Henry of Reval argued that the recently baptized people could apostatize, particularly because they were surrounded by “Russians, Karelians, Ingrians, Votians, and Lithuanians” and constantly incited to renounce their faith by them.\textsuperscript{156} They thus justified their case with reference to all the peoples of a different faith living nearby.

The Danish king in his rivalry with Sweden and the Order competed for Novgorod’s support. It appears most likely that the treaty of alliance of 1304

\textsuperscript{151} DD 2/5, no. 298; cf. no. 299; AR 1, no. 1; LUB 2, no. 608.
\textsuperscript{153} Gernet, Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 107.
\textsuperscript{154} DD 2/5, no. 24; LUB 1, no. 581. The letter’s petitioners were evidently the king of Denmark’s vassals in Estonia.
\textsuperscript{155} Schirren, Verzeichniss, p. 2; p. 4, no. 41; AR 1, no. 2.
also contained the option of fighting against Novgorod. At Denmark’s initiative a treaty was concluded with Novgorod and Grand Prince Andrei Aleksandrovich. A Russian embassy went to Reval or Denmark to confirm it in 1302. The Russian embassy was represented by Andrei’s son (Boris?) and “your relative Vladimir,” as he is described by Grand Prince Andrei in his letter of accreditation addressed to the Danish king’s subjects in Reval. Since the Novgorod chronicles relate this journey of the envoys “beyond the sea” to Denmark, the treaty was not agreed with the Estonian vassals and it was probably also contrary to their aim of expanding their control east of the Narva River. The interests of the Order and the northern Estonian vassals tended to coincide on this point and this agreement motivated anti-Russian declarations in the treaty of alliance of 1304.

Novgorod’s relations with the Hanseatic towns were turbulent in around 1300. A key issue for both was the Swedish king’s control of the river Neva. An embassy from Lübeck was in Novgorod in 1300–01 to seek confirmation of the peace. They discussed the difficulties in trading caused by the construction of the fortress of Landskrona, on which point the positions of Novgorod and the Hanseatic towns became closer. In the autumn and winter of 1301 German merchants were again robbed between Novgorod and Pskov. This time the Novgorodians must have been responsible, since envoys were sent in the winter from Lübeck, Riga, and Gotland precisely to Novgorod. The negotiations proved successful and Grand Prince Andrei together with Novgorod assured the envoys that the German merchants had three land routes and one waterway at their disposal. However, if the waterway were not to prove safe enough, the grand prince was prepared to give the merchants an escort. Perhaps there is a connection between the robbery and the escort offered. This robbery was certainly not endorsed by the rulers. Once the envoys had returned, however, German merchants fell victim to a robbery en route from Narva to Novgorod. Perhaps Novgorodian merchants in Riga were also robbed out of revenge in the early 14th century, for in a letter

157 NL1, pp. 91, 331; GVNP, no. 35; LUB 6, no. 3062; NA, no. 10. See Lind, “Den dansk-russiske traktat,” pp. 4, 17–19, 29, 31. According to Lind, Vladimir was the baptismal name of Boris and reference was made to the kinship between the ruling houses. In the 13th and 14th centuries both Vladimir and Boris were accepted as Christian names; despite this the name at baptism and the dynastic name could be different.

158 GVNP, no. 33; HUB 1, no. 1345; LUB 6, no. 3060; NA, no. 8.

159 HUB 3, p. 425, no. 187; LUB 6, no. 2770.

160 GVNP, no. 34; LUB 6, no. 3061; NA, no. 9.

161 HUB 3, p. 425, no. 187; LUB 6, no. 2770.
Archbishop Feoktist of Novgorod (1299–1307) demanded compensation and punishment of the culprits in line with the treaties in force.162

Lübeck held talks over the free exchange of goods on the Neva with King Birger of Sweden as well. In November 1303 the king allowed trade to be conducted with Rus’. This was on condition that the merchants be allowed to take with them weapons, iron and steel, and such like only for private use, aside from which trade was allowed only temporarily, that is, from Pentecost to the next feast day.163 Erik Menved, his Danish rival who supported the transit route through Estonia, granted the trading cities privileges that enabled them to travel freely to Novgorod without such restrictions.164

The relations between Livonia and Rus’ were increasingly determined by Lithuania by the end of the 13th century. The internal conflict in Livonia forced all sides to search for allies, who were effectively to be founded primarily in pagan Lithuania and Orthodox Rus’. This state of affairs created a remarkable ambivalence between practical politics on the one hand and the rhetorical patterns employed, which often resorted to the trope of dangerous and inhuman Russian schismatics.

6.6 Livonia and Rus’ in the 1320s

In the years 1322–23 the Lithuanian Grand Duke Gediminas (1315/16–1341/42) sent several letters to the Teutonic Order and the cities of Livonia.165 He sent envoys to the king of Denmark, and Pope John XXII also received a letter. In these letters the grand duke expressed his desire to reach a peace with all Christians and receive papal recognition of his country’s borders, and indicated his willingness to tolerate Christianity in his land. Had these wishes been satisfied, they could have significantly strengthened Lithuania’s influence in foreign affairs, thus ensuring its position among the major Christian powers of Europe. From Livonia’s perspective, Gediminas’ letters signified that Lithuania’s allies, i.e. the archbishopric and city of Riga, had been able to strengthen their position relative to the Teutonic Order. Gediminas’ letter to the pope was also aimed very explicitly against the Order insofar as it enumerated the Order’s

162 GVNP, no. 36; LUB 6, no. 3058. For the date, see NA, no. 7; cf. Lind, “Den dansk-russiske traktat,” pp. 26–29.
163 ST 1, no. 155; LUB 3, no. 607a. See also ST 1, no. 180 (1313); LUB 3, no. 645c.
164 DD 2/5, nos. 365–66; 2/6, no. 85; LUB 2, no. 613; 3, no. 626a.
165 On the chronology and significance of the letters, see Rowell, Lithuania, pp. 195–228. Cf. also PUB 2, nos. 461–72; Vetera monumenta Poloniae, nos. 290–300.
crimes against the Christians and the city of Riga. The fact that the complaints of the city of Riga and archbishop against the Order coincided with those of Gediminas has led some scholars to propose that these letters were not from the grand duke at all, but were fabricated by the city of Riga, which was also, incidentally, the view of the Teutonic Order. Although the letters are in fact genuine, it is clear that Gediminas was on the side of the coalition opposed to the Livonian Order. A peace concluded with Lithuania under the supervision of the archbishop would amount to a defeat for the Order not only in its conflict with Lithuania, but also in terms of the internal Livonian conflict. More to the point, it would no longer be possible to justify the existence and actions of the Order with reference to the proximity of the pagans and the supposed threat they posed. In the first half of 1323 Gediminas sent additional letters to the trading towns, the mendicant friars, and especially to the Saxon provinces of the mendicants. In them he proclaimed a policy of religious tolerance and urged merchants, artisans, farmers, and knights to come to his land. About the same time Gediminas sent another letter to the pope in which he promised to believe in the triune God and recognize papal authority.

In August 1323 a meeting took place in Ermes between representatives of the Rigan cathedral chapter and council, the mendicant orders, the Teutonic Order, and Danish-controlled northern Estonia. It was jointly agreed to send ambassadors to Wilno, where they met with the grand duke at the beginning of September. On 2 October 1323 a peace treaty between Lithuania and Livonia was signed for four years. Its parties were the representatives of the archbishop and cathedral chapter of Riga, the bishops of Dorpat and Ösel, the Danish authorities in northern Estonia, the Dominicans of Reval, and the Teutonic Order. Since the Order had been manoeuvred into participating in the treaty because of the diplomatic intrigues of its adversaries, it immediately began to conduct a propaganda campaign against it. Moreover, the treaty had been agreed by only the Livonian branch of the Order; the main powers in Prussia were not party to it. The very same month as it was agreed the Prussian clergy sent letters describing the Lithuanians’ crimes and endorsing the Order’s refusal to observe the peace. The rulers in Livonia were also urged to oppose the peace. The Order introduced reprisals against Gediminas’ ambassadors...

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167 Maschke, Der deutsche Orden, p. 64; Rowell, Lithuania, p. 230.
and overt confrontations had already begun by 1324 on the Order’s frontier with Lithuania. In August 1324, however, the pope confirmed the Wilno peace treaty on the condition that the grand duke was baptized straightaway. The papal legates who were on their way to Gediminas arrived in Riga in October. Their representatives arrived in Wilno at the beginning of November, only to be told that Gediminas did not wish to be baptized; he declared that his earlier letters should not be interpreted in this way. The legates remained in Livonia until early the following year. They accompanied the archbishop of Riga, Frederick Pernstein, on the journey to Avignon after he had excommunicated the Teutonic Order.

The story of Gediminas’ baptism is closely connected to the relations between the Livonian and Russian territories as well as the relations between Catholicism and Orthodoxy in this period.\(^\text{168}\) In their report the legates’ representatives mention that, in addition to the pagan opposition to Catholicization, there was also another possible reason why Gediminas had renounced baptism, this being none other than the opposition of the Russians in Lithuania.\(^\text{169}\) This may very well be the case given the large proportion of Orthodox faithful among the population living in the Lithuanian grand duchy. The fact that Gediminas called himself *Letwinorum et multorum Ruthenorum rex*\(^\text{170}\) may have meant that he was regarded in the curia, if only for a time, as a schismatic rather than a pagan. Certainly the rhetoric used by the pope in his letter to Gediminas dated 1 June 1324\(^\text{171}\) is targeted against schismatics, not pagans. The section on St Peter as the church’s sole authority and Gediminas’ wish “to renounce fully the errors of the schismatics” is drawn from earlier letters to the south-west Russian princes and Georgian king advocating the union of the churches.\(^\text{172}\) This is a good example of the way documents were drafted in

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170 LUB 2, no. 687.

171 LUB 2, no. 703.

172 See DPR, no. 36; Mažeika and Rowell, “Zelatores,” pp. 43–44.
practice: accurate information was not used in drawing up these texts at the curia even when it was available, in this case from Archbishop Frederick. There was apparently no need for such information, with preference being given to the preexisting formulas.\textsuperscript{173} The action had originated in Lithuania; the papal curia reacted to it without any independent initiative.\textsuperscript{174}

In the second decade of the 14th century Pskov appears constantly in the Novgorod chronicles as Novgorod's ally. In 1316 troops from Pskov were part of the Novgorod force that mustered against Grand Prince Mikhail Iaroslavich of Tver. The subsequent peace treaty mentions Mikhail's opponents as both Novgorod and Pskov.\textsuperscript{175} In the autumn of 1317 Mikhail's rival Iurii Danilovich of Moscow returned to Rus'. Some years previously he had been summoned by the khan and was the first Moscow prince to receive the right from the Horde to hold the position of grand prince of Vladimir. Iurii had, moreover, married the sister of Uzbek Khan. In the battle between the two, however, Iurii was defeated in 1318 and forced to flee to Novgorod. Peace was agreed soon after, brought about partly by Archbishop Davyd of Novgorod and imposed through pressure exerted by the troops of Pskov and Novgorod. Mikhail and Iurii both travelled to the Horde, where Mikhail was killed. Grand Prince Iurii sent his brother Afanasii to Novgorod to represent him there.\textsuperscript{176} The war between Tver and Moscow continued, this time Iurii Danilovich's opponent was Mikhail's son Dmitrii.

In 1322 Iurii Danilovich was in Novgorod, from where he embarked on an unsuccessful campaign to Viborg. At the same time Dmitrii Mikhailovich obtained the title of grand prince from the Horde. Iurii was defeated at the Battle of Urdoma and obliged to flee to Pskov, “but the Lithuanian duke Davyd was in Pskov [then]”.\textsuperscript{177} Thus during the years 1319–22 Pskov, as a result of the influence of the Russian grand prince, itself fell under Lithuanian influence, and Duke Davyd of Grodno became its ruler. Davyd was one of the closest companions of Grand Duke Gediminas and Grodno, as a frontier castle, played a key role for Lithuania in its relations with Poland and the Teutonic Order.\textsuperscript{178}


\textsuperscript{174} Zanke, \textit{Johannes XXII.}, pp. 113–14.

\textsuperscript{175} GVNP, no. 11; NA, pp. 155–61, nos. 79–80.

\textsuperscript{176} NL1, pp. 94–96, 337–38.

\textsuperscript{177} NL1, pp. 96–97, 339. See also Borisov, \textit{Политика}, pp. 174–76.

\textsuperscript{178} Rowell, “Between Lithuania and Ruś,” p. 21; Rowell, \textit{Lithuania}, pp. 82–83, 179.
In 1320 a daughter of Grand Duke Gediminas had married Prince Dmitrii Mikhailovich of Tver, making Lithuania more allied with Iurii’s opponents. The enemy coalitions facing one another on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea in the 1320s were the Teutonic Order and Novgorod on the one side, and Lithuania, Pskov, and their allies in Livonia on the other. It is for this reason that Iurii’s flight to Pskov is somewhat unexpected because it ostensibly supported his enemies. But he probably fled there after his defeat, since this frontier town did not belong to the area under Mongol control. He soon returned to Novgorod, where he led hostile operations against the Swedes. That same year, 1323, the Lithuanian army plundered the river Lovat region in the Novgorod Land.

According to the Novgorod Chronicle, Davyd was prince of Pskov when Iurii Danilovich arrived, whereas in the Pskovian chronicles Davyd was first appointed prince of Pskov during Iurii’s stay, after the “Germans” had attacked the territories on the eastern shore of Lake Peipus and on the Narva River. The chronicles further relate that Davyd was not called from Lithuania to be prince, but had already been recognized as such earlier. It would appear that the later chronicle tradition of Pskov aimed to defend the calling of a prince from Lithuania rather than Moscow, given that in the 15th century the princes of Pskov generally came from Moscow.

Nor was the Livonian attack on the region of Gdov or the raids on the Narva fishermen and the merchants on Lake Peipus by any means unexpected during the period in which the peace treaty was in force, as the Russian chronicles claim. The Lithuanians had already attacked the bishopric of Dorpat, near Kirrumpäh, in March 1322. Pskov also probably took part in this campaign. It is true that Pskov was an ‘independent’ territory, but it was still dependent on developments in Lithuania. While the Pskovian chronicles may be strictly right in blaming Livonia for violating the peace, Pskov had in fact as a Lithuanian dependency itself already attacked earlier. This attack may have been led by Davyd of Grodno, who was again called to Pskov in 1322–23 following the

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179 Nikolai Borisov’s attempted explanation (Borisov, Политика, pp. 174–178) is based on a source that is unreliable in this context (Ekaterina, Сочинения на основании подлинных рукописей, ed. Aleksandr N. Pypin, vol. 11 (St Petersburg, 1906), pp. 83–86) and can be discarded. Cf. NL1, pp. 96–97, 338–39; PL 1, pp. 15–16; PL 2, pp. 22–23, 89–90.

180 NL1, pp. 97, 339.

181 PL 1, p. 15; PL 2, pp. 22, 89.

counter-attack, arriving with his army at the beginning of February 1323. Together with the troops of Pskov they plundered Danish northern Estonia. The Prussian chronicler of the Teutonic Order Peter of Dusburg uses the grim language typical in such a context to describe this pagan offensive: Davyd and the Lithuanians are supposed to have captured and killed over five thousand Christians, slaughtered clerics, and desecrated churches and altars. Meanwhile Gediminas was fighting against the Teutonic Order in Prussia and planned to force it to sign a peace. The attack on the fishermen on the Narva River and on the territory of Gdov was apparently in response to the campaign by Lithuania and Pskov in the bishopric of Dorpat. It may be the case that soldiers from northern Estonia had also been involved, which was why the Russians planned their retaliation in Danish territory. It is possible that Gediminas secretly wished to use force to compel all Livonian states to agree peace with him. During 1314–18 the Order and King Erik Menved of Denmark had also reached an agreement; Danish vassals had long traditionally supported the Order.

In May 1323 Konrad Kesselhut, the vice-master of the Livonian Order, launched a major attack on Pskov. Since his forces reached the city by ship too, it is probable that the bishopric of Dorpat also took part. The city was besieged for eighteen days. Novgorod and Iurii Danilovich refused Pskov’s request for support. Prince Evstafii of Izborsk attacked the besiegers first until finally Davyd arrived from Lithuania with his army, putting an end to the siege: “afterwards authorized representatives were sent from the whole of Livonia to Pskov, and a peace was agreed entirely in accordance with Pskov’s wishes”.

The war conducted by the Order, the bishopric of Dorpat, and northern Estonia against Pskov can only be understood in the context of relations between Lithuania and Livonia. Iurii Danilovich had lost control of Pskov and he had to do his utmost to retrieve it. Novgorod had to come to terms with the fact that Pskov had joined an alliance with Lithuania, its constant and dangerous opponent. Pskov and Lithuania worked closely with the city and

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185 Schirren, *Verzeichniss*, p. 2; p. 134, no. 201; *DD* 2/7, nos. 161–62; 2/8, nos. 72–73.
archbishopric of Riga; the Order with northern Estonia and Novgorod. There are several indications that such coalitions did indeed exist at the time.

For example, there is an extant letter from the council of Riga to Gediminas from November 1322. The grand duke is requested not to agree a peace treaty with the Teutonic Order on his own, but—as was the custom—to act so that the cathedral chapter and the city of Riga would also be parties. The council asks the Lithuanians to protect the city against the Order in the war should the need arise. At the end of the letter the council reveals that the city was aware of Davyd’s accession to power in Pskov. Since the council knew that Davyd and Gediminas were intimate associates, it asks Gediminas to intercede with Davyd on behalf of the residents of Riga, who often travelled through Pskov territory.188

The peace between Pskov and Livonia formed only part of the peace treaty concluded between Gediminas and Livonia on 2 October 1323. Gediminas also acted here “in the name of Pskov and all our Russian subjects”.189 The Order’s opposition to peace with Gediminas accordingly extended to peace with Pskov as well. This opposition found expression in a treaty of alliance agreed shortly after the peace of Wilno between the Order, the vassals of northern Estonia, and Novgorod, sealed on 23 December 1323.190 Livonia was represented by some commanders from the Order and Danish vassals, Novgorod by Archbishop Davyd, the posadnik and the tysiatiskii. The parties to the treaty promised to help one another against the Lithuanians and “all their friends and helpers”. Relations between Novgorod and Prince Iurii Danilovich must have been strained because in the treaty the cooperation was also provided for in the event that the Novgarden koningh should act with the Lithuanian duke against Novgorod.191 The parties promised to fight together against the

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190 LUB 2, no. 644; GVNP, no. 37: “des lesten vridaghes vor des heylighen kerstes daghe”; On the date, see AR 1, no. 20; NA, no. 11; cf. Rowell, Lithuania, p. 215.

191 This is taken as an error in the publication of the Novgorod documents (GVNP, no. 66); the commentator believes it ought to say “the prince of Pskov”. However, bearing in mind the often strained relations between Novgorod and its princes, “the prince of Novgorod” is
Lithuanians, not to agree a peace separately with Lithuania, and to resolve disputes peacefully.\footnote{Cf. DD 2/5, no. 298; AR 1, no. 1; LUB 2, no. 608.}

But if it is the case that the Pskovians do not wish to break away from Lithuania, then we [the Teutonic Order and Livonia] must help the Novgorodians, fighting with them against the Pskovians, and they with us, until they become the subordinates of the Novgorodians.

Thanks to this treaty the Order also had the opportunity of acting against the city and archbishop of Riga, who undoubtedly belong to the “friends and helpers” of the Lithuanians. In 1324 the council of Riga defended its relations with Lithuania before the council of Lübeck. One of the charges levelled by the Rigans against the Teutonic Order was the following: in the winter the Order concluded the peace with the Novgorod Russians on condition that all citizens of Riga in Novgorod would lose their property and their lives; this condition was not implemented despite pressure from the Order due to the intervention of the Hanseatic merchants.\footnote{LUB 6, no. 3072; RLU, no. 62, Hildebrand, “Verbesserungen,” pp. 262–63, no. 62.}

The treaty agreed in 1323 between the Order and Novgorod was a continuation of the previous political rapprochement between them. In his reply to the accusations levelled against the Teutonic Order, its procurator expressed the view in 1312 that “the prince of Novgorod and his subjects sunt amici christianorum.”\footnote{Zeugenverhör, p. 206 supplement IX, para. 296.} In September 1323 the Danish captain in Reval, Jens Kande (d. 1326), and the local vassals granted a privilege to the merchants who visited Novgorod intended to ensure them the escort over land and water “as long as the people of Novgorod will favour the Christian folk.”\footnote{DD 2/9, no. 65; LUB 2, no. 692: “quamdiu ipsi ciues Nogardienses amici christianitatis fuerint et fautores”. See also DD 2/9, no. 94; LUB 1, no. 594.}

Novgorod and Lithuania were constantly at war from 1323 to 1326. During this period Grand Prince Dmitrii Mikhailovich killed his rival Iurii Danilovich while they were at the Horde and was in turn killed for this crime. Just as provided for in the 1323 treaty agreed with the Order, apart from the Lithuanian representatives,\footnote{The brother of Gediminas, Prince Voin of Polotsk; Prince Vasili of Minsk; Prince Fedor Sviatoslavich.} the “Germans”, most likely representatives of the Teutonic
Order from Livonia, were also present when peace was concluded between Novgorod and Lithuania. This treaty represented a significant success for Lithuania in its border disputes with Novgorod.\textsuperscript{197} This phase of the conflict between the city of Riga and the Teutonic Order under discussion here did not come to an end until the third decade of the 14th century. In the summer of 1328 the citizens of Riga attacked Dünamünde and burned down the fenced wooden settlement (\textit{Hakelwerk}) in front of the castle. After the city had renewed its alliance with Grand Duke Gediminas, the Order seized some castles in the territory of the archbishopric of Riga. The Lithuanian army laid waste to the Order’s territory at Karkus, Helmet, Tarwast, and near Paistel. In March 1330 the city of Riga was finally forced to surrender to the Order after a siege lasting half a year and recognize its authority.\textsuperscript{198}

The grand dukes of Lithuania were dominant not only in Polotsk but now also in Pskov, which led to an alliance between the Teutonic Order and Novgorod. The alliances and political interest groups clearly did not form based on religious criteria. The eastern shores of the Baltic Sea formed a united political arena in which crusade was one element among many and was as such mainly targeted against Lithuania. Wars against Rus’ became just a derivative of the Teutonic-Lithuanian wars.

\textsuperscript{197} NL\textsuperscript{1}, pp. 98, 341; Klug, “Fürstentum Tver,” pp. 103, 117; Rowell, \textit{Lithuania}, p. 239; Ianin, \textit{Новгород и Литва}, pp. 55–58.

CHAPTER 7

Russian Principalities in the Eastern European Sources, 1250–1350

7.1 The Papacy, the Mongols, and Rus’

From the mid-13th century onwards a large part of Rus’ was under Mongol control. This brought an added dimension to relations between Rus’ and its western neighbours, which needs to be explored in greater depth. The campaigns for plunder in Rus’, and from there on to Poland and Hungary, led by Batu Khan in 1240–41 are mentioned in many contemporary Western European sources. Princes Daniil of Volhynia and Mikhail of Chernigov fled to Hungary in the face of the Mongol advance. Only the fact that Batu’s army unexpectedly turned back at the beginning of 1242¹ saved even larger areas from being devastated. Western sources often mention that Russian territories were among those that lay within the Mongol path of destruction.² Although the events mainly affected the southern regions, the impact on Rus’ was certainly known in Livonia, becoming another factor to be taken into account. As far as the territories of Pskov, Novgorod, Polotsk, and Smolensk are concerned, however, the incursions had no more than indirect consequences. Novgorod and Smolensk were later encumbered with the duty to pay the Mongol tribute—as a result of the policy of the Russian princes—while neither Pskov nor Polotsk were directly affected by the tax collection.

The danger from the Mongols was also felt in the Catholic world, primarily in Poland and Hungary.³ In the second half of the 13th century a significant aspect of papal policy was the crusade against the Mongols, but the popes’ repeated calls to crusade ultimately found little support. There is no evidence that there was even an awareness of these calls in Livonia and Prussia in any case. During the vacancy at the Holy See that lasted from the death of Pope Gregory IX in 1241 until 1243, the preaching of the crusade against the ‘Tatars’ lost its intensity. This was followed by the dispute over supremacy between the pope and

¹ See Kosztolnyik, Hungary, pp. 133–83.
² For example, the north German Annales Stadenses auctore Alberto, ed Johannes M. Lappenberg, in MGH SS, vol. 16 (Hanover, 1859), p. 367.
Emperor Frederick II, which overshadowed everything else. Meanwhile the Mongol raids continued in Catholic Europe. The Mongol governor Quremsa took retaliation on Galicia and Volhynia during 1254–55; the emirs Burundai and Noghai laid waste to Poland in either 1258–59 or 1259–60. The Mongol military campaigns also extended as far as Lithuania. Against the background of these attacks the papacy ordered the preaching of the crusade against the Mongols on repeated occasions throughout the period from 1250 to 1280. The Teutonic Order in Prussia, which was to take part in the planned crusades, also played a key role in these endeavours.

Since during this period the Mongol invasions also included the participation of their Russian subordinates, among whom were the rulers of Galicia and Volhynia, it became possible from the second half of the 13th century to regard Rus’, like the Mongols, as an enemy of Latin Christendom. The crusades themselves were proclaimed not only against the ‘Tatars’ but also the Russians. The most urgent of these calls occurred around 1260, when one of the strategies adopted by King Ottokar II of Bohemia (d. 1278) to enhance his power and prestige was to assume leadership of the crusade. He had already gone on crusade to Prussia in the winter of 1254–55. Ottokar’s enmity with the king of Hungary, who was allied with Galicia, intensified the language he used against Rus’ and the schismatics. In 1260 when Ottokar fought against Hungary he went to war, in his own words, against the Hungarian kings Béla and Stephan (d. 1272), the Russian king Daniil and his sons, “and the other Russians and Tatars who did come to the aid of him”, as well as against princes Bolesław the Chaste of Krakow (d. 1279), Leszek the Black of Łęczyca (d. 1288), “and against a countless crowd of inhuman people, against the Cumans, Hungarians, and all kinds of Slavs, Szeklers, as well as the Vlachs, Muslims, Ismaelites, and the schismatics, namely the Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, and the heretical Bosnians”. For the Teutonic Order, King Ottokar was thus simultaneously a source of aid in the war against the pagans and a rival in the conquest of lands and the recruitment of crusaders. Hence, the Order secured privileges from the curia

7 HRM 2, p. 348, no. 5.
guaranteeing that the competing campaigns of the crusading preachers would not harm its interests.\(^8\) In 1260 the Teutonic Order obtained a confirmation from Pope Alexander IV that all estates in Rus’ either donated to the Order or captured from the ‘Tatars’ would remain in its possession. The pope added:

We nevertheless wish that any prelates or clergy of the dioceses and the other churches of the aforementioned Rus’ who shamefully do not fear to follow the schismatic Greeks and to serve their rite, shall retain their spiritual power in full should they precisely return to the unity of the faith and under the obedience of the Holy Roman Church.\(^9\)

The crusade against the Mongols and their Russian helpers was constantly in the air at the end of the 1250s and beginning of the 1260s,\(^10\) but never actually materialized. The Franciscan William of Rubruck, who had visited the court of the Great Khan in 1254, nonetheless believed that as soon as the pope proclaimed a crusade against the Mongols, they would flee back to their deserts full of fear.\(^11\)

The Polish princes were also involved in the struggle to subjugate Lithuania and Sudovia. This was linked to the desire of the bishop of Lebus to obtain confirmation of his jurisdiction over all Latins in Rus’, despite the fact that he could not visit this part of his diocese “because the land was far away and its ruler disloyal”.\(^12\) The attitude to Rus’ and its schismatic confession depended to a large extent on whether the ruler in question adopted a hostile approach to Russian rulers or had alliances with them. A further aspect related to the rapid expansion of the area under Lithuanian control, as a result of which some Russians became subjects of the pagan Lithuanian dukes and participants in their military campaigns. The Polish, Bohemian, and Hungarian rulers increasingly began to appeal to foreign institutions in their conflicts with one another by drawing attention to their role as defenders of Christendom against the pagan Mongols and Lithuanians. In the second half of the 13th century Rus’

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8 LUB 1, nos. 310, 328; PUB 1/2, nos. 61, 98–99. See also Rhode, Ostgrenze, pp. 151–53; Patze, “Frieden,” pp. 87–88; Maier, Preaching, pp. 87–93; Selart, “Die Bettelmönche,” pp. 492–94.
9 PUB 1/2, no. 89; cf. nos. 88, 98–99, 110–13; LUB 1, no. 345; cf. nos. 346, 355–57; LUR, nos. 930–33, 944–47.
10 PUB 1/2, nos. 7, 21, 23, 38, 59, 61, 82, 109, 115, 131, 134; LUB 1, nos. 311, 359–60; LUR, nos. 841, 879, 954; ST, no. 112. Cf. Bullarium Poloniae, nos. 640, 657, 666, 757, 992, 1070. See also BGP, pp. 181–82, no. 20.
11 Itinerarium Willelmi XIII.2, p. 195: “Si enim Tartari audirent quod magnus sacerdos, hoc est Papa, faceret cucesignari contra eos, omnes fugerent ad solitudines suas.”
12 DPR, no. 33; Vetera monumenta Poloniae, no. 144.
too became an established element in this enemy topos. The theme was partic-
ally elaborated upon by the circle of King Ottokar II, although this did not
prevent that king from forming political alliances with the Russians when it
sued him. The theme was par-
ticularly elaborated upon by the circle of King Ottokar II, although this did not
prevent that king from forming political alliances with the Russians when it
sued him.13 Rus’ was transformed through its relationship with the Mongols
from a Christian people and fellow sufferers into a dangerous enemy.14 The
schismatics were identified by contemporaries and successive generations
mainly with the pagans,15 an association that could be cited as a valid argu-
ment in the pursuit of various claims.16 In 1253 Béla IV defended before the
pope his daughter’s marriage to Lev Danilovich and to Rostislav Mikhailovich,
the ban of Mačva from the Chernigov dynasty, on the grounds that he received
news of the Mongols from them and his other friends in the east. The same
letter also deals with the danger posed to Christians by the Mongols and
the tax collectors dependent on them and justifies the collaboration with the
schismatics and the pagans in terms of their defence.17 The idea thus began to
take root that Poland, because of the continual threat from the Mongols, was
located on the edge of the Christian world—as guardian of Christendom—
an idea also reflected in the Polish self-perception. Mongol supremacy over
Rus’ meant that the latter became increasingly associated with this image of
the enemy.18 Polish petitioners in particular frequently made recourse to their
endangered position in their supplications to the papacy.19 In 1264 Urban IV
wrote to King Ottokar:

13 Floria, У истоков, pp. 189–94.
14 Schirren, Verzeichniss, p. 131, no. 117; PUB 1/2, nos. 5, 38; Annales capituli Posnaniensis, ed.
Max Perlbach, in MGH SS, vol. 29 (Hanover, 1892), p. 460: “pro peccatis christianorum
intraverunt Tartari cum Pruthenis, Ruthenis, Comanis et aliis gentibus”. Since the Mongol
invasion, Rus’ was mentioned in Western European sources almost exclusively in that
context.
15 For example, in the 15th century. See Ioannis Długossi annales, vol. 4, pp. 124–26 (1259),
monumenta Poloniae, no. 112.
17 Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia, no. 440; cf. no. 485. See
Nora Berend, “Hungary, ‘the Gate of Christendom’,” in Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and
18 For example, 1252: Kodeks dyplomatyczny katedry Krakowskiej Ś. Wacława, vol. 1, ed.
Franciszek Piekośiński (Krakow, 1874) (Monumenta mediæ ævi historica res gestas
Poloniae illustrantia 1; Wydawnictwa komisyi historycznej akademii umiejętności w
Krakowie 4), no. 33.
19 Rhode, Ostgrenze, pp. 133–34, 149–54; Grabski, Polska, pp. 274–78; Bârlea, Konzile, p. 66.
We have learned that the schismatic Russians and Lithuanians and other inhabitants of these lands who do not worship God, but rather blaspheme His name, together with their allies, the Tatars, to whom they are bound in a criminal alliance, often attack Poland without meeting any resistance.

At the same time the pope confirmed to the king the right to keep possession of the occupied lands in Rus’ and Lithuania and those converted to the true faith, provided that they were not already in the possession of the Teutonic Order or other Catholics. At the beginning of the 1270s, before the Second Council of Lyon, Bruno of Schauenburg (d. 1281), the bishop of Olomouc, wrote to Pope Gregory X about eastern Europe and his concerns, explaining the unworthiness of the neighbours of King Ottokar II: the king of Hungary was allied with the pagan Cumans, even the queen herself was of Cuman descent, and he had promised his two daughters to the schismatic Russians: “the Russians are schismatics and extremely subservient slaves of the Tatars”. In 1267 Ottokar had intended to establish in Olomouc the see of an archbishopric for Lithuania and the adjoining Russian territory, and during 1267–68 he went on crusade to Prussia. The pope confirmed in 1286 the powers of the cardinal-legate John Boccamazza (d. 1309) “in Germany, Bohemia, the kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden, as well as in Moravia, Brandenburg, Poland, Pomerania, Prussia, Kashubia and Livonia, and in the Russian principality”. This area coincides with that covered by Albert Suerbeer’s legation, but there are no reports to indicate that Cardinal John had any connection with Rus’.

Catholic Europe’s visions were not just limited to crusades against the Mongols. Ideas abounded about the Mongols’ Christianity or the possibility of sending missions to them. This would have given Christendom a mighty ally in the fight against the Muslims. From the 12th century onwards the legend circulated of a powerful Christian ruler located deep in Asia, called Prester John or King David. When reports of the creation of the Mongol empire reached

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20 PUB 1/2, no. 222; HRM 2, pp. 350–51, no. 6; Vetera monumenta Poloniae, no. 149. See also PUB 1/2, no. 944.


23 For example, DD 2/3, no. 235.
the West, they were immediately merged with these legends. Although Batu’s offensive undoubtedly created a negative idea of the Mongols, the dreams of missionizing and of political alliances against the Muslims were not relinquished. The Mongols, moreover, did go to war against the Arabs, while the Nestorians and other Christians in their territory exercised considerable influence. There appeared to be great prospects for the missionary activity of the Dominicans and Franciscans in Asia. It is only with the benefit of hindsight, knowing that such endeavours failed, that they can be regarded as fantastical. The hope resurfaced in the 1250s, when people in Europe became convinced that Sartaq (1256–57), the son of Batu who governed on the Volga, had allegedly converted to Christianity. When Sartaq died, however, he was succeeded by the Muslim Berke.

Motivated by these missionary hopes and to establish diplomatic relations, as well as to find out their intentions, Innocent IV sent various embassies to the Mongols. Four embassies were sent to Asia in 1245. One of these, that of the Franciscan John of Plano Carpini, returned in 1247 with the news that the Mongols were planning a major new invasion. Mongol envoys returned the visit to Europe in 1248. The next year King Louis IX of France, who was then in Cyprus on crusade, sent an embassy to the great khan. But hopes of a joint venture against the Caliphate of Baghdad ended in disappointment. The Franciscan William of Rubruck, the author of another travel account, embarked on his journey slightly later. He left Palestine in 1253, precisely with


25 Both in Rus’ and Latin Europe the Mongols were viewed within an apocalyptic framework. On the possible interplay between the two, see Jackson, “Medieval Christendom’s Encounter with the Alien,” pp. 357–68.

26 According to John of Plano Carpini, Russians and Hungarians lived among the Mongols, including cleric ruteni, who were extremely helpful with linguistic and other knowledge. See Pian di Carpine, Storia dei mongoli IX.39, p. 324.


the intention of doing missionary work, only to return disappointed in 1255, having discovered that Sartaq was not Christian after all, that the Christianity of the Nestorians did not meet his standards, and that the prospects for any missionizing whatsoever were extremely limited.\textsuperscript{29}

This apparent duplicity on the part of the papacy—the calls to crusade on the one hand and the sending of mendicant embassies to the Mongol rulers on the other—has led to accusations of hypocrisy, above all in Russian historiography. It is claimed that the papacy’s objective had been to exploit the situation created by the Mongols to seize power in eastern Europe, namely in Rus'. The hidden aim of the delegations had been neither the Christian missions nor joining forces with the Mongols against the Muslims in the Near East, but the conquest and conversion to Catholicism of Rus’ working in liaison with the Mongols.\textsuperscript{30} Only John of Plano Carpini’s negotiations in Volhynia could possibly be cited as evidence in support of this view, even though their real subject was the shared interest in mounting a defence against any raids. For example, William of Rubruck wrote that north of Rus’ was Prussia, which had just been conquered by the brothers of the Teutonic Order, who would in turn easily be able to subjugate Rus’ too if they decided to.\textsuperscript{31} However, it would seem that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} *Itinerarium Wilhelmi* xiii.1.2, p. 195: “Ultra Rusciam ad aquilonem est Pruscia, quam nuper subiugaverunt totam fratres Teutonic, et certe de facili aquirent Rusciam si appon-\end{itemize}
what was meant by this was the possible expulsion of the Mongols from Rus', not the conquest of Rus' with the help of the Mongols.

Around the middle of the 13th century the submission of the church of Rus' to the obedience of the church of Rome appeared to be becoming a reality. But relations with Rus' on the ground, including how they are reflected in the papal letters, were in fact determined in the frontier lands, not in Lyon or Rome. The contradiction between the calls to crusade and the Mongol embassies is therefore only a superficial one: the missions, the dreams of conversion to Christianity, and of the submission of the Eastern Christians to the Catholic church, not to mention any joint undertakings in the Near East, all served the same aim of self-defence, which in the language of the 13th century also signified the recognition of the supremacy of the church of Rome. To interpret events as though they were aimed against Rus' would be to place far too much weight on this aspect of European affairs of state. Much more pressing affairs took precedence, namely concerns about defence of the Holy Land, the conflict with Frederick II and, after his death, between the pretenders to the German crown, not to mention the problems of rule in Italy and relations with the Greek schismatics.

7.2 The Role of Rus’ in the Disputes between the Teutonic Order, the Archbishop of Riga, and the City of Riga

The conflict between the city of Riga and the Teutonic Order was in truth a struggle over the Order’s supremacy in Livonia, with the archbishop of Riga as the principal opponent of the knightly corporation. The Order’s opponents had brought a formal accusation against it before the pope by 1298 at the latest, the first in a succession of legal actions which lasted several decades and leading to various outcomes. Following a vacancy of some length, the Franciscan Frederick Pernstein was appointed archbishop of Riga in 1304. Frederick arrived in Livonia in 1305, but was unable to gain control of Riga and left the country again in 1307 for Avignon, where he continued his campaign against the Teutonic Order. In 1310 the pope ordered the canon of Ravenna, Albertus de Mediolano, and the archbishop of Bremen, Jens Grand, to investigate the accusations against the Order. The investigation was carried out by the papal chaplain Francis of Moliano (see p. 237), who, along with Archbishop Frederick,

was actually in Livonia during 1311–12. Under his supervision a succession of Livonian clergy were questioned about the accusations against the Teutonic Order. At least twenty-four witnesses were interviewed. The transcripts of these interviews as well as other written complaints, responses, and prosecution records are bound to be polemical by their very nature. Their purpose was to justify one side and accuse the other. Both parties used arguments aimed at harming their opponents and having the strongest possible impact on the curia and ‘public opinion’ throughout Europe.

In 1313 the Order was able to impose a peace treaty on its opponents; in 1316 it formed an alliance against the archbishop with some of his vassals and some of the cathedral canons. This resulted in the archbishop being driven from his possessions, which the Order proceeded to occupy, allowing it to seize overall control throughout Livonia. Pope John XXII declared this ‘conspiracy of Segewold’, so called because it was agreed at the Order’s castle there, invalid in 1317, and summoned the parties to appear before him the following year to hold them to account. However, the Order was able to turn the course of events in its favour due to the fact that its grand master, Karl von Trier, was staying in Avignon at the time.34

It is crucial to examine closely the arguments used by the parties if we are to understand the issues that lay at the heart of the conflict. This was in fact a difficult and precarious period for the Order. The last towns held by the Latins in the Holy Land had recently been lost, which had provoked criticism of the military orders in general at the beginning of the 14th century.35 They themselves were accused of causing the defeat: the Holy Land had fallen not because of the superior force of the Muslims, but the weakness of the faith and the sins of the Christians. The same explanatory formula was transposed to the borders of Livonia whenever it was necessary to explain the success of the pagans. The king of France, Philip IV the Fair (1285–1314), took reprisals against the Knights Templar in 1307, some of its members were killed, and the Order was finally dissolved at the ecumenical Council of Vienne in 1312. The accusations against the Templars were manifold, covering heresy, profanity, and idolatry. The inquisition conducted by Francis of Moliano could have entailed


similarly severe consequences for the Teutonic Order; the precedent had been set and the conditions were ripe.\textsuperscript{36} The charge of profanity was also levelled against the Order in Livonia.\textsuperscript{37} The allegation that the Order had prevented the building of churches and chapels for neophytes was one of the questions included in the interrogation protocol drawn up by Moliano,\textsuperscript{38} which means that the archbishop had already brought the charge against the Order. Thus the Order’s crimes, the fate of Livonia, and the omens supplied by the fall of Acre and Tripoli were merged into a single context by Archbishop Frederick.\textsuperscript{39} The Livonian Teutonic Order or its knights were excommunicated on repeated occasions (1312, 1317, 1325). They also faced the case brought by Władysław the Elbow-High (king of Poland, 1320–33) relating to the Order’s capture of Pomerelia in 1308/09. A judgement in Poland’s favour was issued in 1320–21, but the Order failed to implement it and the trial lingered on.\textsuperscript{40}

In this juridical and propaganda battle the other side’s links to the heretical Russians could always be cited as a valid argument. According to the accusations levelled against the Teutonic Order, it had called the pagans into the country against the Christians.\textsuperscript{41} It was the Order’s fault that King Mindaugas had apostatized from Christianity.\textsuperscript{42} The Order made no effort to spread the Christian faith throughout its territory.\textsuperscript{43} This very same charge had actually been levelled by Henry of Livonia against Rus’ about a century before. The Order was to blame for the fact that the Semgallians, who had already been baptized on one occasion, apostatized yet again and could no longer return to


\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Zeugenverhör}, p. xx.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Zeugenverhör}, p. 166 supplement IV, para. 26; \textit{LUB} 2, no. 616.


\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Zeugenverhör}, p. 147 supplement I, para. 3; \textit{LUB} 1, no. 584 (1300).

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Zeugenverhör}, p. 147 supplement I, para. 6; \textit{LUB} 1, no. 584 (1300); \textit{Zeugenverhör}, p. 169 supplement V, para. 16; \textit{LUB} 2, no. 630 (1310).

the faith out of fear of the Order’s violent reaction. The Order had acted more cruelly than the pagans in its wars against the Christians, and had ceded the Christian castles of Polotsk and Dünaburg to the pagans. The Teutonic Order rejected these charges and used the same arguments in its counter-attack: in truth it had been the city of Riga that had reached an agreement with the infidel Lithuanians to the detriment of all Christians, just as Bishop Conrad of Ösel and his cathedral chapter had joined in an alliance with the Rigans and the pagans against the Teutonic Order.

Each side also accused the other of trading with the pagans. The city of Riga alleged that the Order had agreed peace and truces with the pagans in the interest of trade, designating specific locations for the exchange of goods to which Rigan merchants were not admitted. The archbishop accused the Order, *quod dolor est dicere pariter et audire*, of having sold arms, iron, and other items to the pagans, and agreeing treaties with them in violation of papal decrees and council decisions. The Order countered that on the contrary it had impeded the citizens of Riga from selling the forbidden military goods to the pagans and that it had, moreover, been granted trade privileges. In reality both parties probably conducted trade with Lithuania, and these accusations simply reflect their commercial rivalry.

Usually coming after the threat from dangerous pagan neighbours, the numerous accusations also referred to the dangerous schismatic neighbours. The necessity of the ‘conspiracy of Segewold’ (1316) is justified in the treaty

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44 *Zeugenverhör*, p. 148 supplement I, para. 7, 12; *LUB* 1, no. 584 (1300); *Zeugenverhör*, p. 169 supplement V, para. 17; *LUB* 2, no. 630 (1310).
45 *Zeugenverhör*, pp. 163–64 supplement IV, para. 9; *LUB* 2, no. 616 (1305).
46 *Zeugenverhör*, p. 164 supplement IV, para. 13; *LUB* 2, no. 616 (1305); *Zeugenverhör*, p. 169 supplement V, para. 14; *LUB* 2, no. 630 (1310).
47 See *Zeugenverhör*, pp. 179–207 supplement IX.
49 *Zeugenverhör*, p. 193, supplement IX, para. 128.
50 *Zeugenverhör*, p. 157 supplement II, para. 46; *LUB* 1, no. 585 (1300); *LUB* 2, no. 3072. Cf. *L.R.*, lines 4586–4623.
51 *Zeugenverhör*, p. 164 supplement IV, para. 14; *LUB* 2, no. 616 (1305). See also *Zeugenverhör*, pp. 168–69 supplement V, para. 11; *LUB* 2, no. 630 (1310); cf. *Zeugenverhör* pp. 175–78 supplement VII–VIII.
text in language similar to that used in the treaty of Weißenstein or Dorpat of 1304, in other words Livonia’s endangered situation “surrounded by evil peoples, namely by infidel Lithuanians and schismatic Russians”.⁵⁴ Indeed one of the arguments used to show Livonia’s difficult situation—as justification for one deed or another—was its location in extremis finibus christianitatis or its role as ultimum antemurale christianitatis, formulas which begin to circulate by the end of the 13th century at the latest.⁵⁵ The northern Estonian “Feudal Law of Valdemar-Erik” (set down in 1315) says that if, following the death of the previous king, vassals have to travel to Denmark for the new investiture, the king shall make a concession, allowing the vassals to appear before him in three groups during the course of three years, “because the lands are dangerously situated near the heathens, Lithuanians, Russians, and Karelians, and are internally unsecure due to the natives”.⁵⁶

This image of the dangerous and evil schismatic Russians is repeated uniformly throughout the Livonian sources. But as well as unconditional condemnation at one extreme, there are a wide range of shades through to recognition of the Russians as fellow Christians. The judgement depends on the values of the author(s) of the texts and on the political context. Thus the Teutonic Knight who wrote the older Livonian Rhymed Chronicle in the 1290s placed great weight on military ability, even praising this virtue when exhibited by pagans.⁵⁷ Although the Russians appear in the text in a sequence with the pagans, they are not portrayed in the same terms.⁵⁸ They are valsche Christians who can even oppose the Christian people and who, inflamed with evil, do not contribute to the success of Christendom.⁵⁹ However, they can still be on the same side as the Christians, meaning here the Order.⁶⁰ In the virtually contemporary Prussian chronicle of the Teutonic Order written by Peter of Dusburg,
for example, the possibility that a Russian could lead a pagan Lithuanian to God was allowed for.\textsuperscript{61} During trade negotiations between Novgorod and the Hanseatic towns at the end of the 13th century or beginning of the 14th century the procurator of the Teutonic Order stated openly that \textit{dictus rex} (the prince of Novgorod) \textit{et omnes Rutheni subditi regis sunt amici christianorum}.\textsuperscript{62} The Novgorodians are thus not seen as Christians in their own right, but they are at least as friends of the Christian people. The same did not apparently hold for Pskov. From the Livonian perspective, the periods of warfare between Livonia and Pskov, which were connected with Prince Davyd of Grodno, had the effect of binding Pskov even more firmly to Lithuania than before. The Order thus began to regard the schismatic Russians of Pskov as enemies just as much as the Lithuanian pagans. Gediminas' policy towards Livonia and Rus' was well coordinated.\textsuperscript{63} For Livonia the wars with Rus' became practically by-products of the conflicts of the Order and its allies with Lithuania.\textsuperscript{64} The fighting in the territory of Polotsk in the 14th century, in which the Russians are occasionally mentioned as a group, was already equivalent to a Lithuanian–Livonian war and that is exactly how it is reflected in the sources. One of Gediminas' constant claims was to Dünaburg.\textsuperscript{65} When Archbishop Frederick excommunicated the Livonian Teutonic Order in 1325, he blamed it for the fact that the bailiff of Rositten had captured Christians recently baptized by the archbishop and sold them as slaves to “the infidels and schismatics”.\textsuperscript{66} But simultaneously in the accounts in the Livonian (and Prussian) sources Rus' appears as an ally and helper to the helpers of the pagans.\textsuperscript{67} We must therefore bear in mind that the term “Christianity”—as it is used in these generally highly polemical sources—does not stand for either religious conviction or adherence to a particular confession, but indicates a favourable or unfavourable political relationship.\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{61} Peter, \textit{Chronicon} III.294 (287), p. 173.
\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Zeugenverhör}, p. 206, supplement IX, para. 296. In 1311 some German merchants travelling between Pskov and Novgorod were injured. See \textsc{hub} 2, no. 187; \textsc{lub} 6, no. 2770.
\textsuperscript{65} \textsc{rlu}, nos. 69, 71; Hildebrand, “Verbesserungen,” p. 264, nos. 69, 71; \textsc{lub} 6, nos. 3074–75.
\textsuperscript{66} \textsc{lub} 2, no. 710.
\textsuperscript{67} See also \textsc{lub} 6, no. 3081; \textit{Der Litauer von Schondoch}, ed. Erich Maschke, in \textsc{srp} vol. 6, pp. 54, 56.
7.3 Rus’ and its Western Neighbours in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century

The presence of pagan or schismatic neighbours was also used as an argument both in and outside Livonia in other contexts aside from the internal political conflict. In the sources relating to Polish territory, which had a greater influence on the image of Rus’ in central and western Europe as whole than the Livonian sources, the treatment of the Russians as hostile schismatics and dangerous helpers of the Mongols became even more strongly entrenched in the first half of the 14th century. The Russians are grouped together with the pagans and the unbelievers and are called, like the Mongols and Lithuanians, “disloyal schismatics” or accomplices of the “Tatars”.69 These sources were intended to justify the hostile actions of their protagonists.70 This was the period when it was hoped, as political relations improved, that the princes of western Rus’ could be brought under the obedience of Rome. The Russian princes were, moreover, related by blood to the Polish rulers and in some cases dependent on them.71 This dependency and kinship resulted in the allies of Rus’ being regarded as though they were willing to join the union of the churches.72 The bishops of Lebus continued to claim Latin jurisdiction in Rus’.73 The Teutonic Order in Prussia and the princes of Galicia and Volhyna concluded treaties against the “Tatars”, but also against their Polish neighbours.74 These agreements aimed against the “Tatars” in fact first had to justify to the Christian ‘public’ the collaboration against Poland, which was indeed the very same purpose served by claiming that the Russian princes had expressed the wish to recognize the

70 See Acta camerae apostolicae, vol. 1, ed. Jan Ptaśnik (Krakow, 1913) (Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana 1; Editionum Collegii historici Academiae litterarum Cracoviensis 71), no. 83 (1323), no. 214 (1343); AV, no. 121 (under 1306–08); no. 186 (1325); no. 282 (1331); LUB 2, no. 793 (1340); vetera monumenta Poloniae, no. 316 (1325). See also Rhode, Ostgrenze, pp. 153–154; Brincken, Nationes, p. 63; Bárlea, Konzile, pp. 66–67; Rowell, Lithuania, pp. 4–5; Nora Berend, “Défense de la Chrétienté et naissance d’une identité Hongrie, Pologne et péninsule Ibérique au Moyen Âge,” in Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 58 no. 5 (2003), 1009–27.
71 DD 2/7, no. 286.
72 AV, nos. 138–39; DPR, nos. 36, 40–41.
74 PUB 2, no. 157 (1316); no. 537 (1325); no. 582 (1327); no. 826 (1334). Cf. PUB 2, no. 485.
supreme authority of the pope.\textsuperscript{75} This still did not prevent the grand master from accusing King Władysław I of Poland of having waged war with the Hungarians, Lithuanians, Russians, and Cumans against the Order.\textsuperscript{76} This type of argument was not used just in Poland. In 1259 King Christopher of Denmark and King Valdemar of Sweden obtained permission from Pope Alexander IV for the Swedish king’s marriage to the Danish princess Sophia, despite the close degree of kinship between them, and justified the treaty between them on the basis that the pagans in their proximity were attacking their kingdoms and churches.\textsuperscript{77} About 1290 Bishop Bernard of Dorpat and his cathedral chapter of Lübeck claimed the estate of the previous bishop, using the argument that the church of Dorpat was suffering from the raids of the pagans and the Russians.\textsuperscript{78}

Novgorod’s relations with Livonia’s rulers were generally peaceful at the beginning of the 14th century. On the other hand, Novgorod was embroiled in a permanent conflict with Sweden over Karelia and the Neva estuary region. In 1310 it launched a military campaign in Karelia, where it built the castle of Korela (Kexholm). Four years later the Karelians revolted against Novgorod supremacy and submitted to Swedish rule, although this uprising was suppressed. Russian and Hanseatic merchants were repeatedly attacked by the Swedes on the river Neva and Lake Ladoga. The Novgorodians went on extended campaigns in Finnish territory in 1311 and 1318, besieging Viborg without success in 1322, while that same year Swedish troops tried to take Korela.\textsuperscript{79} The attempts by the Swedish kings to consolidate their position in this region involved Sweden in a century-long conflict with Rus’ which has left its mark on Novgorod’s entire medieval literature. The origin of the animosity with the “Germans” (немцы) testified to in the Novgorod sources actually relates to these wars with Sweden rather than Novgorod’s relations with Livonia or the Hanseatic towns in the Baltic. Novgorod and the Hanseatic towns tended to share the same interests, for if the Neva trade route had been under Swedish control, this would have entailed control over the Hanseatic merchants—undoubtedly one of the aims of Swedish policy. The fact that the same word немцы was used to designate both the Swedish and the Livonian ruling class laid the foundation later on for the transfer of hostility from one group to another. In the Swedish sources from the beginning of the 14th century the main enemy of the Swedish people, kingdom, and church is likewise

\textsuperscript{75} Forstreuter, \textit{Preußen}, pp. 32–33.
\textsuperscript{76} PUB 2, no. 747.
\textsuperscript{77} SD 1, no. 463.
\textsuperscript{78} LUB 1, no. 503.
\textsuperscript{79} For a history of the events, see Shaskolskii, \textit{Борба Руси за сохранение выхода}, pp. 64–141.
no longer the pagans, but the Russians. The Swedish *Erikskrönikan* (c. 1325) still sees the pagans as the main enemy when Viborg was erected in 1293, but in the succeeding episodes the Russians living nearby come increasingly to the fore: when narrating the history of Kexholm under the year 1295 the chronicler is certain that the Russians will definitely go to hell because of the suffering they have inflicted on the Christians there. While the pagans are still the main opponents of the Christians in the description of the Swedish campaign of 1300, the main section of the account is actually dedicated to the fighting with the Russians, in which Russians and pagans are effectively acting together against the Christians.  

It was the “schismatic Russians and pagans” who had attacked the people of the kingdom of Sweden.  

In August 1323 the envoys of Sweden and Novgorod signed a peace in Nöteborg, but this did not put an end to the anti-Rus’ rhetoric nor the hostilities. The tensions remained, and the portrayal of the opposing side as not just a political enemy but also a religious one became more deeply engrained. In contemporary sources relating to King Magnus’ crusade to Ingria and Votia during 1347–51 the Russians were already clearly seen as the enemies of the Catholic faith, forcing the newly baptized pagans to renounce their faith. Since the wars with Novgorod took place in approximately the same area as the wars with the pagans a hundred years before, the same language and ideological arguments were also applied to them because they actually derived from disputes caused by the same political ambitions.

The Treaty of Nöteborg also contains the following clause: should Novgorod fall into dispute with “those beyond the Narva River” (*далееки́е от Нарвы*; *illī de Nārffua*), the Swedes were not allowed to send them any aid. On the other hand, there was no actual political conflict between Novgorod and Danish northern Estonia around 1323. The claim that Novgorod diplomacy made it impossible to create a common front against Rus’ by means of this clause cannot be taken

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81 ST 3, no. 2322; REA, nos. 68, 80. Cf. ST 1, no. 523.


seriously. A war against Novgorod was undoubtedly also at odds with the intentions of the Teutonic Order, which were focussed on Lithuania and its allies. It can be conjectured that the ongoing claims of some northern Estonian vassals in Votia, who had traditionally received support from Sweden, were taken into account in this point. This provision of the peace treaty was thus really aimed at limiting Sweden’s activities, whereas the connection with Estonian affairs was merely indirect. The treaty, to which merchant representatives were also party, enabled the reopening of the Neva trade route to Novgorod, use of which had been impeded during the warfare.

However, these conflicts should not be overestimated. Despite their disagreements, the relations between the different sides continued to bring benefits. For example, the population that originated in the lands of Rus’ played a small role in the emergence of the towns in Livonia. Given that these towns developed along the transit routes connecting Novgorod, Pskov and the towns on the upper Daugava and Dniepr with the Baltic lands, as well as at their intersection points, it was also inevitable that inhabitants from both ends of route, i.e. from northern Germany and Rus’, settled in these new centres, which grew rapidly during the 13th century. The Rigan Schuldbuch, a ledger of lending transactions from the period 1286–1352, contains 1397 personal names. About one hundred of them are Russians whose places of origin were the points of intersection along the trade route between Pskov and the Daugava: Riga, Kokenhusen, Üxküll, Treyden, Wenden, Rositten, Dorpat, Polotsk, and Pskov.

84 For example, Jaakkola, *Kuningas Maunu*, pp. 138–39; Jaakkola, *Suomen varhaiskeskiaika*, p. 495; Shaskolskii, *Борба Руси за сохранение выхода*, p. 120.


86 LUB 3, no. 707a.


are mentioned repeatedly during the course of the 14th century, two of their traditional areas of employment being furriers and trade. If an indication of origin can be assumed from a name with Russian influence, then there was a small settlement of Russian origin in a few Livonian towns throughout the Middle Ages. Russian Orthodox churches may have already been founded in Riga, Dorpat and Reval as early as the 13th century, although these were more along the lines of trading enclaves whose primary purpose was to serve the needs of foreign merchants from Rus'. The Orthodox Church of St Nicholas in Riga served the merchants of Polotsk and the bishop of Polotsk also supplied its priest. The churches of St Nicholas and St George in Dorpat belonged to Pskov and Novgorod respectively, while in Reval the Orthodox Church of St Nicholas was also a Novgorod foundation. Nor can the possibility be ruled out that similar 'merchant churches' were founded by Russian merchants in Wenden and Kokenhusen during the Middle Ages.

It is notable in the cases of Dorpat and Fellin that the first settlers of these towns included potters who had emigrated from the Pskov Land. In the part of Dorpat where the place called 'the Russian Quarter' was located in the late Middle Ages archaeological excavations have revealed a level dating to around the middle of the 13th century rich in finds with Russian influence.

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93 Anti Selart, "Orthodox Churches in Medieval Livonia," in Murray, Clash of Cultures, pp. 273–90; The theory of Ants Hein that there was also a Russian 'merchant church' in northern Estonia, in Maholm, in the 13th century probably goes too far and is not based on any written source: Ants Hein, "Viru-Nigula Maarja kabelist nii- ja naapidi," Kunstiteaduslikke Uurimusi 22 (2013), no. 1/2, 123–54.
95 An irregular clay fragment of approximately 5x6 cm was found precisely at this location (Tartu City Museum, no. 2032/A824) with the markings of the Cyrillic letters A (or P) Б В Г pressed into it. The form of the letters resembles that of contemporary birch-bark documents unveiled in Novgorod and other Russian towns. The clay fragment was apparently hardened by accidental fire and may originate from the inner clay cast of a wooden
the cheaper pottery used in the eastern part of Livonia throughout the Middle Ages originated from north-western Rus', as did its sellers. The archaeological material in Latvian territory indicates the ongoing use of external symbols of the Orthodox religion during the 14th and 15th centuries. The degree to which confessional adherence can be determined on the basis of objects is still doubtful. Nonetheless, we at least know that part of the populace in Latvian territory had been baptized according to the Orthodox rite at the beginning of the 13th century. It can be presumed that over time most Livonian Russians or Orthodox believers integrated with the German or non-German population, depending on their social status. Such integration could only have occurred if not too much importance was placed on confessional difference.

Different estimations have been made of the economic and demographic consequences of the wars between Livonia and Rus' in the middle and second half of the 13th century. The sources do provide details that indicate the number and location of these campaigns, but as to how destructive they were and what indirect economic or social consequences they had can only be guessed at. A majority of the campaigns affected only the immediate border region; incursions further afield (almost in the immediate vicinity of Novgorod; in Livonia as far as Wesenberg, Fellin, and Wenden) were less frequent than in the first decades of the 13th century. The Dorpat-Izborsk-Pskov area probably suffered the most from the direct intervention of enemy forces. Archaeologists have estimated that the number of inhabitants in Votia declined at the beginning of the 13th century, possibly caused by an economic crisis resulting from failed harvests, which forced emigration to the west and south. A drastic fall in population in this region precisely from the 1230s to the 1260s has also

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been explained by these military conflicts.\footnote{Lesman, “Динамика,” pp. 55–57.} However, there are also other explanations.

There are only a few indicators that allow us to estimate the indirect impact of warfare on people’s prosperity and the region’s economic stability during the 13th century. Formulas for the economic performance of Rus’ have been developed based on the assumption that economic growth can be measured in line with building activity.\footnote{David B. Miller, “Monumental Building as an Indicator of Economic Trends in Northern Rus’ in the Late Kievan and Mongol Periods, 1138–1462,” *The American Historical Review* 94 (1989), column 360–90; cf. Ilia V. Антипов, *Древнерусская архитектура второй половины XIII– первой трети XIV в. Каталог памятников* (St Petersburg, 2000).} These reveal that the whole of Rus’ was in the midst of an economic depression around the middle of the 13th century. Historians have explained this situation in the overall Russian context with reference to the Mongol conquest, but as regards Novgorod and Pskov specifically the cause has been identified in the military activity on their western borders, i.e. ‘the German aggression’.\footnote{See for example Inga K. Labutina, “Псков в XIII веке,” in *Великий Новгород в истории средневековой Европы. К 70-летию Валентина Л. Янина*, ed. Aleksei A. Gippius et al. (Moscow, 1999), pp. 260–63; Inga K. Labutina and Marina I. Kulakova, “Псков в XIII веке (археологические наблюдения по динамике расселения и сооружения),” in *Русь в XIII веке. Древности тёплого времени*, ed. Nikolai A. Makarov and Aleksei V. Chernetsov (Moscow, 2003), pp. 66–82.} Both factors were undoubtedly important. Nor should we forget the regional differences between the various parts of Russian territory, not to mention the high number of wars among the Russian princes themselves. Warfare will hardly have been the only factor to influence growth. For example, the high level of expenditure that Novgorod had to spend on the princes and Mongol tax collectors in the 1250s and 1260s must be taken into account. Moreover, the 13th century as a whole in Rus’ has been seen as a period of economic transformation in terms of the ‘agrarization’ of society and cultural change. These manifestations of crisis were not caused by the Mongol invasion, but had already begun to appear somewhat earlier.\footnote{Nikolai A. Makarov, “Русь в XIII веке: характер культурных изменений,” in Makarov and Chernetsov, *Русь в XIII веке*, pp. 5–11.} Thus Novgorod had already begun to decline economically by around 1200, even before the beginning of outright warfare in the Baltic.\footnote{Jos Schaeken, “The Birchbark Documents in Time and Space—Revisited,” in *Epigraphic Literacy and Christian Identity. Modes of Written Discourse in the Newly Christian Europe*, ed. Kristel Zilmer and Judith Jesch (Turnhout, 2012) (Utrecht Studies in Medieval Literacy 4), pp. 222–23.}
Similarly, a strict dividing line cannot be drawn between Rus’ and the adjoining regions. Livonian trade was closely bound up with north-western and western Rus’ to the extent that the data on economic growth worked out by scholars for Pskov and Novgorod may also essentially be extrapolated for the Baltic’s entire eastern zone. There is no evidence of building activity for Novgorod for the 1250s. A series of renovations was carried in the subsequent decades, which in the case of the St Sophia Cathedral, for example, may have been quite extensive. The construction of new buildings did not begin until the 1280s and by the final years of the century Novgorod was enjoying a comparatively buoyant period of building activity. In Pskov building activity reached a low point in the 1230s, to become vibrant again by the end of the 1250s after which it experienced a certain decline before recovering particularly by the last decade of the 13th century. The final years of the century were a period of economic upturn throughout the whole of Rus’, a trend which continued at the beginning of the 14th century. The castle of Koporye was built in the Novgorod Land in 1279–80 and 1297, and a stone fortress in Novgorod itself in 1302. In Pskov extensive building work took place in the Kremlin during the time of Dovmont, with the construction of a number of churches and monasteries. Pskov was fortified in 1309 and Izborsk in 1303. All the evidence suggests that economic growth in Livonia and in north-western Rus’ accelerated at the end of the 13th century. This may indicate that the structural changes in the organization of trade, which accompanied the foundation and rise of the Livonian towns and the consolidation of the different areas of power, had reached their conclusion. The basis for stable growth was in place. This is surely also demonstrated indirectly by the treaties between Novgorod and the German merchants, as well as by Sweden’s steadily increasing interest in the Neva estuary region. It is evident that not all castles in Rus’ were built for defence against Livonian armies and not all castles in Livonia for defence against Rus’. Pskov was fortified just at the time when there was tension between it and more powerful Novgorod. Relations among the Livonian

104 Vladimir V. Sedov, “Церковь Николы на Липне и Новгородская архитектура XIII в. во взаимосвязи с романо-готической традицией,” in Древнерусское искусство. Русь. Византия. Балканы. XIII век, ed. Olga E. Etingof et al. (St Petersburg, 1997), p. 398. It is not beyond the realms of possibility that new building techniques were adopted from the Baltic countries. See Sedov, “Церковь,” pp. 404–08.

105 Labutina, “Псков,” p. 260. Whereas the study of Novgorod is based on written sources and deals mostly with building in stone, research on Pskov looks at dendrochronological data and mainly the cheaper wooden buildings.

rulers were sufficiently strained to need castles for defence against rivals and the subjugated population, while raids by the Lithuanians extended into both Livonia and Rus’.

As far as ecclesiastical relations are concerned, there is no evidence that Livonia played a role after the 1240s and 1250s in papal attempts to achieve the union of churches. The Latin Empire fell in 1261, leaving Constantinople once again the centre of the Orthodox Byzantine Empire. Byzantium’s main opponent in the 1260s and 1270s was King Charles I of Sicily of the Anjou dynasty (d. 1285). One of the main focuses of his political activity was his attempts to conquer the Balkans. To strengthen his position against Charles the Byzantine emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos began talks with the Roman curia about ecclesiastical union, which was achieved in Lyon in 1274. This signalled an ecclesiastical victory for the pope and a political victory for the Byzantine emperor, but the union was not supported by the Byzantine clergy, since it would require at least formal recognition of the primacy of the church of Rome, the use of unleavened bread, and acceptance of the doctrine of the *filioque*. Pope Gregory X died in 1276; succeeding popes took a more cautious approach to the issue of union, until Pope Martin IV proved entirely to be the puppet of Charles I. On the pretext that the Greeks should also be required actually to comply with the union, the pope excommunicated Emperor Michael in 1281–82, bringing an end to the interlude of church union.107 People in the 13th century treated the schism as though it had just recently occurred. For example, Matthew Paris, a staunch critic of the curia, claimed in his *Chronica Maiora* that the division of the churches had emerged recently and not without the popes being to blame.108

These developments were not reflected in the church’s relationship with Rus’. It has been argued that the greater dissemination of works against Latin culture in Rus’ from the 13th century onwards coincided with the union attempts with Byzantine, but this was also determined by the fact that the Serb *kormchaia* (*кормчая*, a collection of canon law), which contained writings in Slavonic attacking Latin culture (Byzantine works from the 11th century), reached Rus’ precisely in 1262 and made only now the traditional Byzantine anti-Latin polemics familiar here. The original Russian anti-Latin works were mainly compiled in the south-west of Rus’, where the real rivalry between the

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different confessions typical of a border zone threw into sharp relief the question of the right faith. On the other hand, the accusations of the errors of the Latins could also be exploited in the polemics against the princes of southwestern Rus’ in Vladimir, where the metropolitan of Kiev, Kirill, was based for extended periods.\textsuperscript{109} It was under Kirill’s supervision or due to his influence that the original version of the \textit{vita} of Aleksandr Iaroslavich was compiled, possibly as early as the 1260s, which records the episode in which the prince refused to receive the papal envoys.\textsuperscript{110} However, the recent attempt by Igor Danilevskii to justify the alleged hostility towards Catholicism in the \textit{vita} of Aleksandr Iaroslavich with reference to the policy of religious tolerance practiced by the Mongols, as opposed to “the Order” as the embodiment of a new European and religiously intolerant form of living,\textsuperscript{111} certainly exaggerates the importance of Livonia and Prussia for north-eastern Rus’.\textsuperscript{112} These kinds of traditional motives sometimes take on a momentum of their own.

Pskov pursued both its anti-Novgorod stance in the 14th century and its ties to Lithuania.\textsuperscript{113} The continuing tradition of Lithuanian princes in Pskov laid the groundwork for the veneration of Dovmont as a saint from the first half of 14th century.\textsuperscript{114} It was not difficult to transform the veneration as a military hero of a figure who had repeatedly defeated Livonia into the religious vilification of Livonia as an enemy power.\textsuperscript{115} The ongoing tradition of Pskov chronicle writing, dating to the beginning of the 14th century, was also aimed at justifying Pskov’s position vis-à-vis Novgorod and Livonia.\textsuperscript{116} Thus the beginnings of a hostile attitude towards Livonia, and hence an anti-‘German’ tone in Old Russian literature, are largely associated with Pskov. We know that Pskov

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{110}] For an interesting but highly implausible hypothesis on the literary influence of the \textit{vita} of Aleksandr Nevskii on that of Saint Louis IX written by William of Chartres (d. before 1282), see Dzhordzhetta Revelli, “Образ „христианского государя“ в житии Александра Невского и в латинской средневековой литературе,” in \textit{Contributi Italiani al xi\textsuperscript{1} congresso internazionale degli Slavisti} (Cracovia 26 Agosto—3 Settembre 1998), ed. François Esvan (Naples, 1998), pp. 188–218.
\item[\textsuperscript{111}] Danilevskii, \textit{Русские земли}, pp. 218–28.
\item[\textsuperscript{112}] Khoroshkevich, “Католики,” pp. 36–37.
\item[\textsuperscript{114}] Rowell, “Between Lithuania and Rus’,” pp. 17–20.
\item[\textsuperscript{115}] Rowell, “Between Lithuania and Rus’,” pp. 18–31; Rowell, \textit{Lithuania}, pp. 177–79; Prinz-aus der Wiesche, \textit{Die Russisch-Orthodoxe Kirche}, pp. 66–75.
\item[\textsuperscript{116}] Grabmüller, \textit{Pskover Chroniken}, pp. 148, 166.
\end{itemize}
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was one of the places where Aleksandr Iaroslavich’s *vita* was redacted, a text traditionally regarded as one of the first documents of Old Russian literature to express antagonism towards Catholic Europe. It may have been precisely here in Pskov, in addition to the western Russian territories, that the perception of a Russian identity contrasted with that of the ‘Tatars’ and Lithuanians, predominant in the 13th and first half of the 14th century,\(^{117}\) began to change with Pskov now allied with none other than Lithuania. This would seem inconsistent, however, with the work’s known initial origins in north-eastern Rus’. Despite various attempts at reconstruction, we do not know the text’s original form. It is possible that Metropolitan Kirill, who was familiar with the attempts at Catholicization in south-western Rus’, could have highlighted Aleksandr’s dismissal of the papal envoys. An evaluation of the rest of the work, i.e. principally the description of the Battle of the Neva and the Battle of the Ice, as either hostile or neutral towards Catholicism also depends on each scholar’s particular preconception.\(^{118}\) For example, on the basis of a study of the biblical passages cited in the *vita* Igor Danilevskii has placed the work not so much in the context of anti-Western writings as of general eschatological expectations.\(^{119}\)

A disparaging attitude towards Catholicism certainly cannot be discerned in the section of the Hypatian Chronicle relating to the 13th century, the so-called Galician-Volhynian Chronicle covering the period from c. 1205 to c. 1290, which narrates the deeds of Daniil Romanovich and his direct successors. Their close relations with the Polish princes tied Daniil and his brother Vasilko to events in Poland, Bohemia, Hungary and Germany. Orthodox and Catholic rulers are also judged in the chronicle on the basis of their relationships with the Romanovich house, not their confessional adherence. The pagans are regarded as enemies without qualification. This ‘attitude of compromise’ towards the West was not, however, either a feature setting apart the princes of Galicia or an expression of their secret sympathies, but was determined by the very dynastic ties and geographical proximity absent in north-eastern Rus’. It is entirely exaggerated to conclude that the cult of Aleksandr Iaroslavich was a reaction by Vladimir to the ties between the rival princely house of Galicia and Western Europe.\(^{120}\)

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\(^{119}\) Danilevskii, *Русские земли*, pp. 181–82.

The representation of princely heroes in both the chronicles and the *vitae* is not based on real individuals but an idealized type: the prince is a priori a manly, handsome, and brave man who defends his principality fighting at the head of his army. His enemies, whether Orthodox, Catholic or pagan, deserved their condemnation. It is not actually the prince as an individual but his position, or more precisely the institution, that is idealized.\textsuperscript{121} Aleksandr Iaroslavich was the prince of Novgorod and Pskov, the grand prince of Kiev and Vladimir, and the progenitor of the Moscow princes who would assume a leading position in Rus’ during the 14th century. Even during his lifetime he was one of the most distinguished among Russian rulers, an achievement that was acknowledged in various local literary traditions. In the *vita* and the Novgorod Chronicle the prince defends his power and his principality by doing his duty. The treatment of his enemies from the perspective of Novgorod, Rus’ or Orthodoxy depends inherently on the position of each scholar, not on the medieval sources. For example, the literary historian Anatolii Demin has characterized the attitude of the Novgorod chronicles towards the ‘Germans’ as spiteful against a tenacious and irksome but not particularly dangerous assailant.\textsuperscript{122}

It would make more sense, however, to examine the sections common to the Russian and Livonian sources, instead of making rather arbitrary judgements about the emotional tone of texts with an extremely complex literary history. Such is the reference to the Sword Brothers and the Teutonic Knights common to the Livonian and the Russian texts: in the older Rhymed Chronicle those called *gotes rittere*\textsuperscript{123} are “knights of God” (боржий дворяне)\textsuperscript{124} in the 1229 treaty between Smolensk and the German merchants and the Hypatian Chronicle, and “servants of God” (слуги божия)\textsuperscript{125} in the *vita* of Aleksandr Iaroslavich. What is at issue is the translation: “knights of God” is transformed into “servants of God” in the Russian texts, a term with the same inherent value and positive tone. The first clear sign in the First Novgorod Chronicle of religious rejection does not appear until 1349, when King Casimir the Great of Poland

\textsuperscript{121} Likhachev, Человек, pp. 34–53.
\textsuperscript{122} Anatolii S. Demin, О художественности древнерусской литературы (Moscow, 1998) (Язык. Семиотика. Культура), pp. 635–54. See also Anna L. Khoroshkevich, “Смирение и высокоумие (у истоков русского национального характера),” in Россия в IX–XX веках. Проблемы истории, историографии и источниковедения, ed. Iurii N. Afanasev et al. (Moscow, 1999), pp. 490–92.
\textsuperscript{123} For example, I.R., lines 599, 2010, 4732, 6481, 11436.
\textsuperscript{124} Ivanovs and Kuzņecovs, Smoļenskas-Rīgas aktis, p. 550 cf. 718; Ипатьевская летопись, pp. 816–17.
\textsuperscript{125} Begunov, Памятник, p. 161.
(1333–70) occupied Volhynia and “did much injury to the Christians, and he converted the sacred churches to the Latin service hated of God.”

Just as after 1204 Orthodoxy in the Mediterranean region became increasingly identified with the political entity of Byzantium, the church acquired greater influence than ever before in the areas that remained Greek, a similar process can be observed in the area in which Livonia and Rus’ came into contact when the political opposition began to be more clearly expressed in religious terms with reference to Pskov. There is no doubt that, in Livonia, Lithuania and its pagan population were still regarded as the worst of the enemies. Rus’, which was dependent on the Lithuanians in some respects, was among the list of enemies generally only in the sense of their accomplices. In daily political life, just as for trade, Rus’ and Lithuania were accepted as partners and allies. Erich Maschke (1900–82) has described this situation as follows: “the idea of mission lived on only in the mutual recriminations”.

In the polemical sources each side emphasizes the other’s alliance with the pagans and, in some cases, with the schismatics as well, while seeking to refute similar accusations made against it. Any deeds that did not comply with prevalent moral and legal rules could be justified on the basis of Livonia’s location on the frontaria with the pagans.

The schismatics were occasionally ascribed a more autonomous significance as Livonia’s enemies due to the military disputes with Pskov in the 1340s. The same connection was made in the sources in Prussia: the Ruthenia of the Prussian chronicles was politically a part of Lithuania in which the conflicts with the Lithuanians took place. It must be remembered that each region identified a different enemy ‘Rus’—Prussia had the Black Rus’ (region of upper reaches of the Neman River), Poland the west Russian territories,

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126 NL1, p. 361.
127 Maschke, Der deutsche Orden, p. 63.
129 Hermanni Chronicon, pp. 68–70; Bartholomäus Hoenke, Liiivimaa noorem riümkroonika, pp. 66–76, 86–88; LUB 2, nos. 809, 829; DD 3/1, no. 329; 3/2, no. 171.
Sweden had Novgorod and Livonia had principally Pskov and Polotsk. The Moscow Germanist Catherine Squires has distinguished between the language used by the Teutonic Order and the Hanseatic towns in polemical texts: while the former represent the Russians as schismatic enemies, the latter do not give expression to any hostile attitude towards the populations of Novgorod, Pskov, and other Russian towns.\(^{131}\) The absence of confessional antagonism in the urban milieu and in trade has been repeatedly pointed out.\(^{132}\) Nevertheless, we would still have to ask how the sources for major events which originated in the interest of the Order, the Swedish kings or the archbishops of Riga reflect actual relations. As repeatedly stressed in this work, these sources are polemical materials in which the neighbouring community with a different faith functions as an argument. Relations between the Hanseatic towns and their Russian counterparts were also often tense. These tensions—in general they took the form of unusual incidents whose very exceptionality gave rise to a large amount of source material, which has in turn become part of the history of trade—did not need to be exploited against anyone or for anyone's protection. It was in the interest of both sides to resolve any difficulties linked to trade; the possibility and necessity of trade was conceded by all concerned. We cannot distinguish between territorial lords hostile to Rus' and towns well-disposed towards it, but only between an ‘neutral’ and a polemical group of sources. This does not mean that the burghers did not express their rejection of the Russians’ schismatic faith or that the territorial lords or prelates were not willing to engage in the peaceful exchange of goods or enter into political alliances with the Russians—as the latter point has been convincingly demonstrated through a historical analysis of their political relations. For example, Norbert Angermann has made the following observation about a slightly later period: “In connection with the conflicts there are suddenly increased references in Hanseatic correspondence to ungeloven (unbelievers) or affgesnedenen (schismatic) Russians, which are terms otherwise used only rarely when applied to trading partners”.\(^{133}\)


\(^{133}\) Angermann and Endell, “Partnerschaft,” p. 100; See also Khoroshkevich, “Католики,” p. 48; On the pragmatism of the confessional frontier, see Charles J. Halperin, “The Ideology of
The history of their political relations also explains why the Russians were considered second-class enemies overall from the Livonian perspective compared to the Lithuanians. Only gradually did this order begin to change depending on the specific circumstances. The conception of the Russians as schismatics rather than fellow Christians started to become more firmly rooted in the literature from the mid-14th century onwards. For example, Hermann von Wartberge when compiling his chronicle (1370s) translated the *Rûzen* used in the Rhymed Chronicle (occupants of Gerzike) with the word *scismatici* in the context of events at the beginning of the 13th century and placed the capture of Pskov c. 1240 in the context of the promulgation of the faith.

In Livonia the awareness of its position at the extreme margin of Christendom is directed most markedly against the schismatic Russians in the self-perception or self-presentation of the bishopric of Dorpat during the 14th century. The sources for this mainly relate to the state of war in the 1340s and the castle of Neuhausen built directly on the border in 1342. The bishopric of Dorpat was located *in ultramarinis partibus*, “where Christianity ends, in the vicinity and near heretical peoples, namely the schismatic Russians and the infidel Lithuanians”. The bishopric was located more than sixty days’ journey from the papal curia, in the frontier zone of the infidels. The bishop of

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134 For example, LUB 2, no. 822 (1344); Hermanni Chronicon, p. 150, para. 9; pp. 154–55 (1366); Die Recesse und andere Akten der Hansetage von 1256–1430, vol. 1, ed. Karl Koppmann (Leipzig, 1870), no. 398 (1368); LUB 6, no. 2892.


Dorpat had his castle at Neuhausen built “in the most remote corner of his diocese, on the frontier with the enemies of the right faith, the Russians”\(^\text{139}\). As might be expected, this material comes mainly from the Avignon register of supplications or responses to them: this argument dealt with the bishopric’s special location, which could be cited when asserting its claims, but was at the same time the formula that had emerged to express the situation at the time. For when necessary it could also be affirmed of the bishop of Ösel, whose diocese bordered neither directly on Lithuania nor Rus’, but who also found himself in the midst of newly baptized peoples and schismatics.\(^\text{140}\) At the end of the 14th century the Teutonic Order accused the bishop of Dorpat, Dietrich Damerow, of having fought the Order with help from the Russians.\(^\text{141}\)

Lithuania and Rus’ as dangerous enemies were contrasted in this rhetoric with *tota Christianitas* as a metaphor for Livonia. This referred to the Livonian territorial lords and estates (including those from northern Estonia). This entity was not of course neutral either, but could be invoked as a political argument: “the whole of Christianity” had been heralded in the alliances led by the Order (1304, 1316) against the city and archbishop of Riga.\(^\text{142}\) This contrast was emphasized even further by naming the pagans and schismatics among Riga’s allies. The idea of a schismatic enemy was probably even more strongly engrained in Sweden, where the Russians had become the opponents earlier during the crusade, than in Livonia. In the *Erikskrönikan* the Christians are contrasted with the Russians and the pagans or Ingrians and Karelians in a much more direct form than in the older Livonian Rhymed Chronicle.\(^\text{143}\)

It has been argued that the archbishop of Riga, Frederick Pernstein, also had plans to bring about the submission of the church of Rus’. This idea derives partly from a historiographical tradition in which all the major figures from early Livonian history are said to have dreamed of bringing the Russians under the obedience of the church of Rome. This is also attributed to the 14th century, when Rome persevered in its attempts to unify the churches. The wish of the ruler of many Russians, Grand Duke Gediminas, to be baptized, which he


\(^{141}\) LUB 4, no. 1404; cf. nos. 1383, 1399, 1400, 1412, 1421, 1425. For a later example, see LUB 8, no. 883 (1434).


\(^{143}\) *Erikskrönikan*, lines 485–87, 494–95.
gave expression to during Pernstein’s episcopate, does indeed provide a certain foundation for this belief. Rasa Mažeika and Stephen Rowell have found support for their argument in a work from Frederick Pernstein’s extensive and remarkable library. This concerns the *Passagium novum*,\(^\text{144}\) which can be identified with a work with the title *Directorium ad faciendum passagium transmarinum* presented as a gift to King Philip VI of France (1328–50) in 1330. This sets out a plan for a crusade to the Holy Land whose precondition and preliminary stage is the subjugation of the schismatics—the Greeks and the Christians in the Balkans—to the church of Rome. According to Mažeika and Rowell, Archbishop Frederick gave the author of the manuscript information about the Russians, while the submission of Rus’ is in any case said to have played an important role in the work.\(^\text{145}\) The text is indeed extremely hostile towards the schismatics, although here *Rassia* does not mean Rus’, but Serbian territory.\(^\text{146}\) In the introductory part there is, however, a section that says the following: in Europe there are different peoples, among whom are the Christians who “are not unified with us in the same faith and doctrine”. These were *Raceni* (or *Rutheni*), who lived next to Bohemia and Poland\(^\text{147}\) and adhered to the errors of the Greeks.\(^\text{148}\) Unlike most crusading propaganda, it is true that this particular account does not originate from the Mediterranean region, but there is no evidence that it arose under the influence of Frederick Pernstein or reflects his views. There were numerous clergy in Avignon from the whole of Europe, including from Prussia or Poland, all of whom would have been able to provide information about eastern European geography.


\(^{147}\) *Directorium ad faciendum passagium*, p. 820; cf. p. 823.

\(^{148}\) *Directorium ad faciendum passagium*, p. 89.
Conclusion

The major transformation that took place in the eastern Baltic in the 13th century, when the pagan lands, or rather those regarded as such by their conquerors, were captured from Finland in the north to Prussia in the south and converted to Catholicism, was far from an isolated phenomenon. It is not always possible to distinguish clearly from the modern perspective what factors among the ideological, social, and economic developments can be regarded as intrinsic to Livonia and what elements were due to outside influences. The sources are often brief and not always clear. Moreover, when interpreting them the reason and purpose behind their composition must never be forgotten. Irrespective of whether they were written in Livonia or in the chanceries of western Europe on the basis of information supplied by the parties to a particular conflict, they were mostly polemical in nature. They also belong to an established tradition in Latin literary culture of how to depict the enemy—Saracens, pagans, and schismatics. The realities of a ‘new’ geographical space connected to Latin Europe were adapted to preconceived language and explanatory models.

This is the background to the politically motivated ideas of Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and paganism in the contemporary sources. It was possible to describe contemporary political rivalries with reference to a threat—real or imagined—from pagans or schismatics. In the language used by the contemporary Livonian sources it is virtually impossible to separate political and religious categories. Rus' and its inhabitants are repeatedly described as schismatic in the 13th century. Although this placed them outside Latin Christianity, it still did not put them on a par with the pagans. Whereas under Bishop Meinhard the Livonian church represented a small community of missionaries, merchants, and a few baptized Livs in a land on the lower Daugava River owing tribute to the prince of Polotsk, by the 14th century the Orthodox Russian, and Catholic Livonian territories were equal powers. These might not only wage war against one another but could also act as allies.

During the course of the 13th century no crusade was planned in Livonia directly against Rus'. The crusades and missionary wars and conquests in what was then the predominantly pagan territory of Votia did inevitably lead to clashes with Novgorod, but they were always justified in the Livonian sources with reference to the pagan, not schismatic neighbours. Territories were also captured in the Daugava region and Lettgallia, parts of which at least had formerly been controlled by Polotsk or Pskov, but here too the terminology used in the sources always refers to pagan wars.
When the Russian principalities were occupied by the Mongols in the 1240s and 1250s, the Russians began to be represented as the subjects of the Mongols, especially in Poland and Hungary. The crusades preached against the Mongols in the third quarter of the 13th century were never carried out, but their propagation was nevertheless a crucial step in the creation of the idea of the ‘schismatic Russians’ as the enemy. This coexisted with another idea, that of Russian princes willing to recognize the authority of Rome. The political situation was decisive here too: the depiction of a territory in Rus’ as schismatic or willing to join the union of the churches depended less on the views of the Russians and their rulers and instead reflected more the position of the Latin powers whose interests the chroniclers and chancery clerks defended and which were manifested in the petitions sent to the papal curia to obtain privileges and confirmations. The means available to the papacy of gathering information about eastern Europe and of influencing events at the periphery were extremely limited. Only very seldom can it truly be demonstrated that the popes even held such a wish. The decisive role was played, without exception, by local rulers. In the event that they did try to gain papal support, it was usually because they were embroiled in a power struggle with one of their co-religionists, such that any argument referring to their schismatic neighbours was merely a rhetorical commonplace. The anti-schismatic religious contrasts were still not capable of causing conflicts in north-eastern Europe in the 13th century. Just as south-western Rus’, Poland, and Hungary, so too Livonia, Novgorod and Pskov formed a common political space at the time. Within that space no great importance was placed on distinguishing between Roman and Greek Christianity.

The economic and social context of this phenomenon was provided by the early Hanseatic trade in the eastern Baltic region and the emergence of towns in Livonia that profited from trade with Russia and where—at least in the cases of Riga, Dorpat, Fellin, and Kokenhusen—as well as the local population and that of German origin, traders and craftsmen came from Rus’ to settle, enjoying rights of citizenship to some extent. The territorial lords also profited from trade, which in turn depended on political stability.

There is therefore no evidence for the 13th and beginning of the 14th century that a crusade against Rus’ was planned or implemented in Livonia. It is true that Swedish expansion in Karelia can be interpreted as a series of crusades against territories controlled by Rus’, yet here too it was the pagans, not the schismatics, who were depicted as the opponents in the sources, at least until the turn of the century—the Russians, who also claimed control of the strategically important river Neva region, were merely seen as helpers and supporters of the pagans. The argument that Livonia was endangered by the pagan and schismatic neighbours became an established theme in the con-
fllicts between Livonian rulers, since in this way each could justify its selection of allies and condemn than of the other side. Livonia was increasingly conceived as a region at the outermost reaches of Christendom. Thus the fact that the schismatic beliefs of Rus' in the sources relating to Livonia begin to be mentioned more frequently from the early 14th century than before is not so much an indication of greater tension between Livonia and Rus', but rather of the increasingly strained situation within Livonia since the last quarter of the 13th century. These tensions led the different factions in Livonia to use the most compromising arguments at their disposal against their opponents. The 14th century also saw improved communication between Latin Europe's north-eastern periphery and its core areas, while the quantity and range of documents increased. This is turn reinforced the idea of schismatic Rus'.

It is clear, therefore, that very little can be explained by the concept of the 'Russian threat' in the 13th and 14th centuries in Livonian history and that the sense of fear of such a 'Russian threat' need not be dismissed but nor should it be overestimated. It should be remembered that between 1270 and 1350 there was no military conflict on Livonia's eastern frontier that was not simultaneously a conflict against pagan Lithuania. Consequently, the commonplace of the dangerous schisms in Rus' during this period is, in a sense, a by-product of the fighting against Lithuania on Livonia's southern border as well as of the struggle for hegemony within Livonia itself. Christianity's external enemies served to justify the efforts to achieve internal unity among (Latin) Christians. The Livonian warring parties, however, understood this not in the sense of a compromise solution or harmony, but in terms of their own supremacy.
Appendix

Secular and Ecclesiastical Rulers

**Bishops of Üxküll and Riga**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Bishop</th>
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<th>Bishop</th>
<th>Reign</th>
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<tr>
<td>Meinhard</td>
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<td>Berthold</td>
<td>1196–1198</td>
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**Archbishops of Riga**

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**Bishops of Leal/Dorpat**

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<td>Bernard</td>
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<td>Hermann</td>
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<td>Theodoric Vyhusen</td>
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<td>1263–1268</td>
<td>Engelbert von Dolen</td>
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<td>Frederick of Haseldorp</td>
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**Bishops of Ösel (Ösel-Wiek)**

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<td>Conrad</td>
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**Appendix**

### Bishops of Reval

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<td>Heinrich</td>
<td>1298–nach 1318</td>
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<td>Throgot</td>
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<td>Otto</td>
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<tr>
<td>Johannes</td>
<td>1280–1293/94</td>
<td>Olav</td>
<td>1323–1351</td>
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<tr>
<td>Johannes Tristevere</td>
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### Masters of the Order of the Sword Brothers

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<td>Volkwin</td>
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### Provincial Masters of the Teutonic Order in Livonia

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<td>1290–1293</td>
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### Grand Princes of Vladimir

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<td>1155–1175</td>
<td>Iaroslav Iaroslavich</td>
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<td>1175–1177</td>
<td>Vasilii Iaroslavich</td>
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<td>Vsevolod 'Bolshoe Gnezdo'</td>
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<td>Dmitrii Aleksandrovich</td>
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<td>Andrei Aleksandrovich</td>
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### Genealogical Tables

#### Chernigov

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#### Smolensk

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MAP  Livonia and its Neighbours in the Thirteenth Century
MAP  North-Eastern Europe in the Thirteenth Century
## Multilingual Place-Name Concordance

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